Hermes.
HERMES

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BY

JAMES HARRIS ESQ.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

LONDON:

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M.DCCC.VI.
To the Right Honourable

PHILIP Lord HARDWICKE,
Lord High Chancellor of Great-Britain.*

My Lord,

As no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes of Business, you have

*The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as a real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.
have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient humble Servant,

Close of Salisbury,
Oct. 1, 1751.

James Harris.
THE chief End proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree cooperate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue
PREFACE

tue of the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.—

For
For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty "fruits of a few idle hours; written "merely for private amusement; never "revised; published against consent, at "the importunity of friends, copies "(God knows how) having by stealth "gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask such Prefacers, If what they allege be true, what has the A 4 world
world to do with them and their cru-
dities.

As to the book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of ancient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence.
The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Noemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that nobody knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—
He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of antient sentiments, as the view of antient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same Reason has at all times prevailed; how there is one Truth, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind
PREFACE.

Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

It is perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we Britons by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search farther.
The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow: a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.
There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than Mathematics. It is hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of Logic, or universal Reasoning. It is thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the Mind, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since Mind, like other Powers, can be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser
a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its
its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confessed already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whether
PREFACE

The productions of modern Wit are every day passing,
in vicum vendentem thus et odores.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published first in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1744.
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A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

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BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

If Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since Speech then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties, (a) (that is to say, of our Reason

(a) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume.
son and our social Affection) being with-
al our peculiar Ornament and Distinc-
tion, as Men; those Inquiries may surely
be deemed interesting as well as liberal,
which either search how Speech may
be naturally resolved; or how, when re-
olved, it may be again combined.

Here a large field for speculating
opens before us. We may either behold
Speech, as divided into its constituent
Parts, as a Statue may be divided into
its several Limbs; or else, as resolved
into its Matter and Form, as the same
Statue may be resolved into its Marble
and Figure.

These different Analysings or Resolu-
tions constitute what we call\(^{(b)}\) Philoso-
phical, or Universal Grammar.

\(^{(b)}\) Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit
literaria, alia philosophica, &c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient.
VI. 1. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen hác ipsā
re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quan-
dam, quæ non analogium verborum ad invicem, sed analo-
giam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat.
Book the First.

When we have viewed Speech thus analysed, we may then consider it, as compounded. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (c) Synthesis, which by combining simple Terms produces a Truth; then by combining two Truths produces a third; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of Science.

Now this is that superior and most excellent Synthesis, which alone applies itself to our Intellect or Reason, and

(c) Aristotle says—τὰν δὲ καὶ λαμβανεῖν συμπλεκτην λεγο-
μένων καθιστά ἄληθες ὑπερ Σωθῆς ἵνα ὅπως ἄνθρωπος, λέος, τρί-
χη, ῥακ—Of those words which are spoken without connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise De Interpretatione, πρὸ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διάισεως ἵνα τὸ Σωθῆς τε καὶ τὸ ἄληθες.

True and False are seen in Composition and Division. Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical.
which to conduct according to Rule, constitutes the Art of Logic.

After this we may turn to those (d) inferior Compositions, which are productive of the Pathetic, and the Pleasant

(d) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise Περὶ Ερμινίας, p. 53, gives the following Extract from Theophrastus, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διτθος γὰρ ἔστι τὸ λόγῳ σχέσεως, (καθ' αὐτής διάφοραν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὁ Θεόφρας) τὸς τὸν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τοῖς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ύπερ δὲν ὁ λόγον σχίζει συρτίθηται τὸς ἀκρομένης, περὶ μὲν ἐν τῷ σχέσιν ἀυτῷ τῶν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καλαγίνοιας σωφρικὴ καὶ ἐνθωμική, διότι ἑγὼν αὐτὰς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμιτερα τῶν ὑφομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδομενένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἑκακομίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὅτε διὰ τῶν τοῦτος ἐπομένων, οἷον σαφεῖς, γιλκύττη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδέων, ἐτί τε μακρολογίας, καὶ ἑκακολογίας, καθ' χαίρον πώλητος σαφελαμμένων, οἰσαί τε τὸν ἀκροατὸν, καὶ ἐκπλήκει, καὶ πρὸς τὸν σείθων χειρωθεῖν ἕχειν τῶν δὲ γε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τὸ λόγῳ σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος οἰσιμελήσει, τό, το Ψευδό διελέγων, καὶ τὸ ἄλοθρος ἀποδεικνύω. The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the Hearers, to whom it explains
Pleasant in all their kinds. These latter Compositions aspire not to the Intellect, but being addressed to the Imagination, the Affections, and the Sense, become plains something, and one to the Things, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the Hearers, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to Things, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem.—Sermonis autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quae ab oratione solacismos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quae in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quae ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit. M in. l. 1. c. 2.
become from their different heightnings either Rhetoric or Poetry.

Nor need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. Grammar is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though Logic may indeed subsist without Rhetoric or Poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct Logic, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deemed Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

At present we shall postpone the whole synthetical Part, (that is to say, Logic
BOOK THE FIRST.

Logic and Rhetoric) and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say, Universal Grammar. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing Speech, as a Whole, into its constituent Parts; then resolving it, as a Composite, into its Matter and Form; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

Should any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things, which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

The following Story may not improperly be here inserted. "When the "Fame of Heraclitus was celebrated "throughout Greece, there were cer-
tain Persons, that had a curiosity to see so great a Man. They came, and, as it happened, found him warming himself in a Kitchen. The meanness of the place occasioned them to stop; upon which the Philosopher thus ac-costed them—Enter,(says he) boldly, for here too there are Gods.

We shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(c) See Aristot. de Part. Animal. l. 1. c. 5.
Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its smallest Parts.

Those things which are first to Nature, are not first to Man. Nature begins from Causes, and thence descends to Effects. Human Perceptions first open upon Effects, and thence by slow degrees ascend to Causes. Often had Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition; much oftener had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion. Even in

(a) This Distinction of first to Man, and first to Nature, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy.—See Arist. Phys. Auscult. 1, 1. c. 1. Themistius's Comment on the same, Poster. Analyt. 1, 1. c. 2. De Anima, 1, 2. c. 2.
1. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between Intelligence Divine and Intelligence Human. God may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views Effects through Causes in their natural Order. Man views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views Causes through Effects, in an inverse Order, and hence the Meaning of that Passage in Aristotle: ἐστὶν γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὑμᾶλα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μὲν ἡμέραν, ἕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμερής ὕψιν, ὃς πρὸς τὰ τῆ φωτείνα φανερώταλα ἠμαλ. As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all things. Metaph. 1. 2. c. 1. See also 1. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. 1. 1. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—Ἀγαπητὸς τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φώσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀπελέξεων καὶ συνεθῶν ἐτὶ τὰ ἀπελέξεις καὶ τελεστέρα προέχειν: τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνέθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμωτέρα: "Ὅτι τίνι καὶ τὸ παῖς εἶρα μὲν λόγον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ, ἢν δὲν ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὅνομα καὶ ἔρμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβᾶς, κάκεινα εἰς σοιχεῖα, ἐκτὸς: Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and
tical Observers, the rest look no higher than to the Practice and mere Work, knowing nothing of those Principles, on which the whole depends.

Thus in Speech for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own language? How few then must be those, who know Grammar universal; that Grammar, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?

'Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall

and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.
shall follow the Order consonant to human Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

We shall begin therefore first from a Period or Sentence, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all; and thence pass, if possible, to those its primary Parts; which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

With respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we assert, and when we question; when 'tis we command, and when we pray or wish?

For example, when we read in Shakespeare*,

* The Man that hath no music in himself,
And is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for Treasons—

Or

* Merchant of Venice.
BOOK THE FIRST.

Or in Milton*,

O'Friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet,

Hasting this way—

'tis obvious that these are assertive Sentences, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

When the Witch in Macbeth says to her Companions,

When shall we three meet again

In thunder, lightning, and in rain?

this 'tis evident is an interrogative Sentence.

When Macbeth says to the Ghost of Banquo,

— Hence, horrible Shadow,

Unreal Mock'ry, hence!—

he speaks an imperative Sentence, founded upon the passion of hatred.

* P. L. IV. 866.
When Milton says in the character of his Allegro,

Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee Jest and youthful Jollity,

he too speaks an imperative Sentence, though founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

When in the beginning of the Paradise Lost we read the following address,

And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples th' upright heart, and pure,

Instruct me, for thou know'st—

this is not to be called an imperative Sentence, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence precative or optative.

What then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in their stamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite Classes?
Classes? If not, they can be no objects of rational comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that he speaks his mind; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the Powers of the Soul (over and above the mere nutritive) may be included all of them in those of Perception and those of Volition. By the Powers of Perception, I mean the Senses and the Intellect; by the Powers of Volition, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the Will, but the several Passions and Appetites; in short, all that moves

+ Vid. Aristot, de An. II. 4.
Ch. II. moves to Action, whether rational or irrational.

If then the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

If we assert, then is it a Sentence which respects the Powers of Perception. For what indeed is to assert, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to publish some Perception either of the Senses or the Intellect?

Again, if we interrogate, if we command, if we pray, or if we wish, (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative) what do we but publish so many different Volitions?—For who is it that questions? He that has a Desire to be informed.—Who is it that commands? He that has a Will, which he would have obeyed,
obeyed.—What are those Beings, who either wish or pray? Those, who feel certain wants either for themselves, or others.

If then the Soul's leading Powers be the two above mentioned, and it be true that all Speech is a publication of these Powers, it will follow that every Sentence will be either a Sentence of Assertion, or a Sentence of Volition. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude.

THE
The Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare

...
pare the Æneid to an Epigram of Martial. But the longest Extension, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here considered, that is to say, a Sentence. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

Now a Sentence (c) may be sketched in the following description—a compound

logitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem atque in hac, vel ut a-prestantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi faculitate proficisit tur: haque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quae in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hae sola verum falsumque capi: praterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(c) Αὐτῷ δὲ φωνὴ συνθητὴ σημαντική, ὦς εἰναὶ μέγη καθ' ἄυτα σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.
pound Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.

Thus when I say [the Sun shineth] not only the whole quantity of sound has a meaning, but certain parts also, such as [Sun] and [shineth.]

But what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) Word.

For

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντικὴ,—ίς μετὰ ἐνί γιὰ καὶ αὐτὸ σημαντικὸν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows—Diecit est pars
For thus, though the Words [Sun] and [shineth] have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other.

If therefore all Speech, whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain Meaning, divisible into other Meanings, but Words imply a Meaning, which is not so divisible: it follows that Words will be the smallest parts of Speech, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

To

To know therefore the species of Words, must needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minutest Parts.

This therefore must become our next Inquiry.
Concerning the species of Words, the smallest Parts of Speech.

Let us first search for the Species of Words among those Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For Example, in one of the passages above cited.—

The Man that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons—

Here the Word [The] is an Article; — [Man] [No] [Music] [Concord] [Sweet] [Sounds] [Fit] [Treasons] are all Nouns, some Substantive, and some Adjective— [That] and [Himself] are Pronouns— [Hath] and [is] are Verbs— [mov'd] a Participle — [Not] an Adverb — [And] a Conjunction — [In] [With]
and [For] are Prepositions. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the Greek Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The Latins only differ in having no Article, and in separating the Interjection, as a Part of itself, which the Greeks include among the Species of Adverbs.

What then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover it its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

*The Man that hath no Music, &c.*

One Difference soon occurs, that some Words are variable, and others invariable. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have,*
Have, Hast, Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweetest; Fit into Fitter and Fittest. On the contrary, the Words The, In, And, and some others, remain as they are, and cannot be altered.

And yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the Greeks have the dual Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns, and to the ancient Latins. Thus the Greeks and Latins vary their Adjectives by the triple Variation of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the English never vary them in any of those ways, but through all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by Auxiliars, as when for Bruti or Bruto,
we say, of Brutus, to Brutus; some by meer Position, as when for Brutum amavit Cassius, we say, Cassius lov'd Brutus. For here the Accusative, which in Latin is known any where from its Variation, is in English only known from its Position or place.

If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

Suppose then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several Parts as they stand separate and detached. Some ’tis plain still preserve a Meaning (such as Man, Music, Sweet, &c.) others on the contrary immediately lose it (such as, And, The, With, &c.) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when in company, or associated.

Now
Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For all Words are significant, or else they would not be Words; and if every thing not absolute, is of course relative, then will all Words be significant either absolutely or relatively.

With respect therefore to this Distinction, the first sort of Words may be call’d significant by themselves; the latter may be call’d significant by relation; or if we like it better, the first sort may be call’d Principals, the latter Accessories. The first are like those stones in the basis of an Arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole subsists.

§ This

(c) Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest Authors that ever wrote on the Subject of Grammar) illustrates the different power of Words, by the different power
power of Letters. "Et e, ov tropon tov soikeion tā mev ēs
phonēnta, ò χαθ' ēautā phainōn ēpotelei tā dé sūmfwna, ἀπο
āne tōn phonēntōn ém ēxe érpet tōn ikrōphnhs. tōn autōn trōpon
ēsin ēpinośtai kāπi tōn lēxewn. ēi mev gās ēilhān, tētron tīnē
tōn phonēntōn ēntai ēis: kathāpes ēpi tōn ρημάτων, ϋνομάτων,
āntωνμάων, ἐπιφημάτων—āi dē, ὃπερι σύμφωνα, ἀναιμηνο
tā phonēnta, ε δυνάμενα κατ' ἰδιαν ὑπάται πίνα—καθάπες ēpi tōn
αποδέσων, tōn ἀρθρων, tōn συνδέσμων tā γαρ τιμῶτα ēi tōn
μοριών συσσημαίνω.
In the same manner, as of the Ele-
ments or Letters, some are Vowels, which of themselves
complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without
the help of Vowels have no express Vocality; so likewise
may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them,
like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of
Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Con-
sonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become ex-
pressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of
Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for these parts
of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only sig-
nificant, when associated to something else. Apollon. de
Syntaxi. L. 1. c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis pla-
cuit nomen & verbum Solas esse partes Orationis;
cætera vero, Adminicula vel Juncturas carum : quomo-
do navium partes sunt tabulae & trabes, cætera autem (id
est, cera, stuppa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutina-
tiones
things whatever either exist as the Energies, or Affections, of some other thing, or without being the Energies or Affections of some other thing. If they exist as the Energies or Affections of something else, then are they called Attributes.—Thus to think is the attribute of a Man; to be white, of a Swan; to fly, of an Eagle; to be four-footed, of a Horse.—If they exist not after this manner, then are they call'd Substances*. Thus Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as Energies or Affections.

And

And thus all things whatsoever, being either (f) Substances or Attributes, it follows, of course that all Words, which are significant as Principals, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are significant of Substances, they are call'd Substantives; if of Attributes, they are call'd Attributives. So that all Words whatever, significant as Principals, are either Substantives or Attributives.

Again, as to Words, which are only significant as Accessories, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner define or determine, they may justly for that reason

(f) This division of things into Substance and Attribute seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and ages. See Catagor. c. 2; Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. De Cælo, L. III. c. 1.
son be called Definitives. If to many Words at once, then as they serve to no other purpose than to connect, they are called for that reason by the name of Connectives.

And thus it is that all Words whatever are either Principals or Accessories; or under other Names, either significant from themselves, or significant by relation.—If significant from themselves, they are either Substantives or Attributives; if significant by relation, they are either Definitives or Connectives. So that under one of these four Species, Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives, are all Words, however different, in a manner included.

If any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the Substantives, Nouns; the Attributives, Verbs; the Definitives,
Shou'd it be ask'd, what then becomes of Pronouns, Adverbs, Prepositions, and Interjections; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ There were various opinions in ancient Days, as to the number of these Parts or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his *Sophist mentions only two, the Noun and the Verb. Aristotle mentions no more, where he treats of +Prepositions. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to Logic

+ Dé Interpr. c. 2 & 3.
Logic or Dialectic, considering the Essence of Speech as contained in these two, because these alone combined make a perfect assertive Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore Aristotle in his *treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements of a more variegated

gated speech) adds the Article and Conjunction to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To Aristotle's authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder Stoics

The latter Stoics instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the Appellative and Proper. Others increased the number, by detaching the Pronoun from the Noun; the Particle and Adverb from the Verb; and the Preposition from the Conjunction. The Latin Grammarians went farther, and detached the Interjection from the Adverb, within which by the Greeks it was always included, as a Species.

For this we have the authority of Dionysius, of Halicarnassus, De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2, whom Quintilian follows, Inst. 1. 1. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Priscian make them always to have admitted five Parts. See Priscian, as before, and Laertius, Lib. VII. Segm. 57.
We are told indeed by (i) Dionysius
of Halicarnassus and Quintilian, that
Aristotle, with Theodectes, and the more
early writers, held but three Parts of
speech, the Noun, the Verb, and the
Conjunction. This, it must be owned,
accords with the oriental Tongues,
whose Grammars (we are (k) told) admit
no other. But as to Aristotle, we have
his own authority to assert the contrary,
who not only enumerates the four
Species which we have adopted, but
ascertains them each by a proper De-
finition.*

D 2 To

(i) See the places quoted in the note immediately pre-
ceeding.

(k) Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faci-
unt. Estque haec Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quo-
que (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinerent,
artem eamdem scribere cæperunt, quod ante annos cõnti-
tigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re se-
cuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium clas-
sium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis lingue retinent.—
Dubium, utrum ea in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos
Græcorum, an hi potius seculi sunt Orientalium exemplum.
Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agno-
visse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Ana-
log. l. 1. c. 1. See also Sanctii Minerv. l. 1. c. 2.

* Sup. p. 34.
To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the Noun, the Verb, the Article, and the Conjunction; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives.
Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

Substantives are all those principal Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.

The first sort of Substances are the natural, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

There are other Substances of our own making. Thus by giving a Figure not natural to natural Materials, we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

Again, by a more refined operation of our Mind alone, we abstract any Attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence.
For example, from Body we abstract to Fly; from Surface, the being White; from Soul, the being Temperate.

And thus it is we convert even Attributes into Substances, denoting them on this occasion by proper Substantives, such as Flight, Whiteness, Temperance; or else by others more general, such as Motion, Colour, Virtue. These we call abstract Substances; the second sort we call artificial.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in natural Substances, Animal is a Genus; Man, a Species, Alexander, an Individual. In artificial Substances, Edifice is a Genus; Palace, a Species; the Vatican, an Individual. In abstract Substances, Motion is a Genus; Flight, a Species; this Flight or that Flight are Individuals.
As therefore every (a) Genus may be found whole and intire in each one of its Species; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every Species may be found whole and intire in each one of its Individuals; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly a Man) hence, it is, that every Genus, though One, is multiplied into Many; and every Species, though One, is also multiplied into Many, by reference to those beings which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as Many, and so is truly an Individual as well in Nature as in Name.

D 4 From

(a) This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of μίαν ὑπαρκτικὴν τοιαύτην κείμενας, τὸν δὲ διαστάσεως ὄμορφον—ὑπὸ τὸν Ἒρατος, ἐπὶ τῷ ἀλλῶν, ὑπὸ μίαν ἐξωθεὶν περιεχόμεναν.—Sophist. p. 253. Edit. Serrani. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the Isagoge or Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle's Logic.
From these Principles it is, that Words following the nature and genius of Things, such Substantives admit of Number as denote Genera or Species, while those, which denote (b) Individuals, in strictness admit it not.

Besides

(b) Yet sometimes Individuals have plurality or Number, from the causes following. In the first place the Individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new Name for every new-born Individual. Hence then instead of one only being call'd Marcus, and one only Antonius, it happens that many are called Marcus and many called Antonius; and thus 'tis the Romans had their Plurals, Marci and Antonii, as we in later days have our Marks and our Anthonies. Now the Plurals of this sort may be well called accidental, because it is merely by chance that the Names coincide.

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the Ptollemies, Scipios, Catos, or (to instance in modern names) the Howards, Pelhams, and Montagues; because a Race or Family is like a smaller sort of Species; so that the family Name extends to the Kindred, as the specific Name extends to the Individuals.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the high Character or Eminence of some one Individual, whose Name became afterwards a kind of common Appellative, to denote all those, who
Book the First.

Besides Number, another characteristic, visible in Substances, is that of Sex. Every Substance is either Male or Female; or both Male and Female; or neither one nor the other. So that with respect to Sexes and their Negation, all Substances conceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration.

Now the existence of Hermaphrodites being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language,

who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus every great Critic was call'd an Aristarchus; every great Warrior, an Alexander; every great Beauty, a Helen, &c.

A Daniel come to judgment! yea a Daniel,
cries Shylock in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So Martial in that well known verse,

Sint Mæcenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.

So Lucilius,

ΑΠΙΑΙΠΟΙ montes, ΑΕΤΝ.Ε. omnes, asperi Athonès.

κωςοι ΦΑΣΟΝΤΕΣ, 7 ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΩΝΕΣ. Lucian in Timon.

T. I. p. 108.
guage, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious, considers *Words denoting Substances* to be either *Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter*. 

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, which have reference to common Life, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are eminently distinguished, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female.—But as to those animal Species, which either less frequently occur, or of which one Sex is less apparently distinguished from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both sexes.

* After this manner they are distinguished by Aristotle. Τὸν ὄνομάτων τὰ μὲν ᾄφινα, τὰ δὲ Ἑλέα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ. Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ᾄφινα, Ἑλέα, καὶ σκίν.——Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called ἔστερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μεταξὺ καὶ σκίν.
In the English Tongue it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance *has no Sex*, the Substantive is always *Neuter*.

*But tis* not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern* Tongues. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. *Mind* is surely neither male, nor female; yet is *Νοῦς*, in *Greek*, masculine, and *Mens*, in *Latin*, feminine.

+ Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haber i oportet, sed id Ars, &c. Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum*, *qua naturalia sunt*, &c. is worth perusing.
In some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the mere casual structure of the Word itself: It is of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, even in things without Sex, a distant analogy to that great natural distinction, which (according to Milton) animates the World.

In this view we may conceive such substantives to have been considered as masculine, which were "conspicuous for the Attributes of imparting" or communicating; or which were by "nature active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately whether to "good or to ill; or which had claim to Eminence,

† Mr. Linnaeus, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the distinction of sexes throughout the whole vegetable world, and made it the basis of his botanic method.
Book the First.

"Eminence, either laudable or other-
"wise."

The Feminine on the contrary were
"such, as were conspicuous for the At-
tributes either of receiving, of con-
taining, or of producing and bringing
forth; or which had more of the pas-
sive in their nature, than of the ac-
tive; or which were peculiarly beau-
tiful and amiable; or which had re-
spect to such excesses, as were rather
"Feminine, than Masculine."

Upon these Principles the two greater Luminaries were considered, one as Masculine, the other as Feminine; the Sun ("Hλ, Sol) as Masculine, from communicating Light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his Rays; the Moon (Σελήν, Luna) as Feminine, from being the Receptacle only of another's Light, and from shining with rays more delicate and soft.

Thus
Thus Milton,
First in his East the glorious Lamp was seen,
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude thro' Heav'n's high road:
the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before him danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the Moon
But opposite, in levell'd West was set,
His mirror, with full face borrowing her Light
From him; for other light she needed none.

P. L. VII. 370.

By Virgil they were considered as Brother and Sister, which still preserves the same distinction.

Nec Fratris radius obnoxia surgere Luna.

G. I. 396.

The Sky or Ether is in Greek and Latin Masculine, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.
Earth. *The Earth on the contrary is universally Feminine, from being the grand Receiver, the grand Container; but above all from being the Mother (either mediatly or immediately) of every sublunary Substance, whether animal or vegetable.

Thus Virgil,

_Tum Pater omnipotens fœcundis im-bribus Æther
Conjugis in gremium lētē descendit,
& omnes
Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus._

G. II. 325.

Thus Shakespear,

__ † Common Mother, Thou
Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite breast
Teems and feeds all—Tim. of Athens._

So Milton,

_Whatever Earth, all-bearing Mo-
ther, yields,_

P. L. V.

So

* Senecæ Nat. _Quæst._ III. 14.
† _Παμμίτορ γῇ χαιε—_Græc. Anth. p. 281.
So Virgil,

Non jam mater alit Tellus, viresque
ministrat.

Æn. XI. 71.

Among artificial Substances the Ship
(Ναῦς, Navis) is feminine, as being so emi-
nently a Receiver and Container of va-
rious things, of Men, Arms, Provisions,
Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of
their Vessel, say always, "she rides at
"anchor," "she is under sail."

A City (Πόλις, Civitas) and a Coun-
try, (Πατρίς, Patria) are feminine also,
by being (like the Ship) Containers and
Receivers, and farther by being as it
were the Mothers and Nurses of their
respective Inhabitants.

Thus

(c)—διὸ κ dés τὸῦ ὅλου τῆς Γῆς φώσιν, ὡς ὁ Θάτο κ υ ῬΕΤΕΡΑ
νομίζειν οὐτ’ ὅταν αἱ Ἁίοιν, ὥς ἐν τῶ ἄλλων τῶν
τοιῶν, ὡς γενόντας κ υ πατερᾶς περισσαγορεύσει. Arist.  
de Gener. Anim. 1. c. 2.
Thus Virgil,

Salve, magna parens frugum, Saturnia Tellus,
Magna virum— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those brave Greeks, who fell at Chaeronea,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλείστα πα-μόντων
Σώματα—

Their parent Country in her bosom holds
Their wearied bodies.—*

So Milton,
The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, Queen of the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the Ocean, tho' from its being the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the Container and Productress of so many Vegetables

* Demost. in Orat. de Coronā.

E
Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) Feminine; yet its deep Voice and boisterous Nature have, in spight of these reasons, prevailed to make it Male. Indeed the very sound of Homer's

—μέγα θέν Ὀμεανοῦ,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with female delicacy and softness.

TIME (χρόνος) from his mighty Efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as Masculine. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

*Ο γὰρ χρόνος μ' ἐκαμψε, τέντων ἐ σοφὸς,

"Απαντα δ' ἐγγαζόμενο τ' ἄθενέζεφα.†

Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, he That surely makes, whate'er he handles, worse.

So

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.
So too Shakespear, speaking likewise of Time,

Ori. Whom doth he gallop withal?
Ros. With a thief to the gallows.—
As you like it.

The Greek Θάνατος or Αἵμων, and the English Death, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as Masculine. Even the vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a Female Death they would treat as ridiculous\(^{(d)}\).

Take a few examples of the masculine Death.

\(^{(d)}\) Well therefore did Milton in his Paradise Lost not only adopt Death as a Person, but consider him as Masculine: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not supported by Custom, that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of national Opinion for his Masculine Death, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.
Callimachus upon the Elegies of his Friend Heraclitus—

\[ \text{Αἱ δὲ τειλ ὀθεσιν ἀφόνες, ἥτιν ὃ πάντων Ἀρπάκτης Ἀίδης ἐν ἕπι χεῖρα βαλεῖ.} \]

—yet thy sweet warbling strains
Still live immortal, nor on them shall Death.
His hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all.

In the Alcestis of Euripides, Θείνως or Death is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between Him and Apollo; and towards its end, there is a fight between Him and Hercules, in which Hercules is conqueror, and rescues Alcestis from his hands.

It is well known too, that Sleep and Death are made Brothers by Homer. It was to this old Gorgias elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, "How he did?"—Sleep.
"Sleep (replied the old Man) is just upon delivering me over to the care of his Brother."
The supreme Being (God, θεός, Deus, Dieu, &c.) is in all languages Masculine, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ θεῖον, Numen, Deity (which last we English join to a neuter, saying Deity itself) sometimes I say we meet with these Neuters. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expressed by a Negation, than by any of those Distinctions which are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as Male.

And over them triumphant Death her dart Shook, &c.

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength of the whole sentiment weakened!
Male for example is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Left, &c. &c. (e).

**Virtue** (*Ἀετὴ, Virtus*) as well as most of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

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(e) Thus Ammonius, speaking on the same Subject—

—abash'd the Devil stood,
And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw
Virtue in her shape how lovely; saw,
and pin'd
His loss——

P. L. IV. 846.

This being allowed, Vice (κακία) becomes Feminine of course, as being, in the σοφία, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite(h).

The Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of Fortune would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make a very

(h) They are both represented as Females by Xenophon, in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. See Memorab. L. II. c. 1. As to the σοφία here mentioned, thus Varro—Pythagoras Sanius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem. De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also Arist. Metaph. L. I. c. 5. and Ecclesiasticus, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.
very natural *Female*, which has no small resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,*

*Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

**Why the Furies were made Female,** is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

*Talibus Alecto dictis exarsit in iras.*

*At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus:*  
*Diriguere oculi: tot Erinnys sibilat Hydris,*  
*Tantaque se facies aperit: tum flammea torquens*  

*Lumina*
HE

(i) The Words above mentioned Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c. in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquir'd, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say ἡ ἀρετή or ὧ ἀρετή, hæc Virtus or hic Virtus, la Virtu or le Virtu, and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in English. We in our own language say, Virtue is its own reward, or Virtue is her own reward; Time maintains its wonted Pace, or Time maintains his wonted Pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or Logical Style, and the ornamental or Rhetorical. For thus when we speak of the above Words,
He, that would see more on this Subject, may consult *Ammonius* the Peripatetic, Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as Neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes a logical Inquiry. When we give them Sex, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth personified; are a kind of intelligent Beings, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of Rhetoric or of Poetry.

Thus Milton,

---The Thunder,

Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,

Perhaps hath spent his shafts— P. Lost. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's Ministers of Vengeance, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

*Should intermitted Vengeance arm again*

*His red right hand*— P. L. II. 174.

In this Place *His* Hand is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *It's*, by immediately referring us to *God himself*, the Avenger.

I shall
tetic, in his Commentary on the Treatise de Interpretatione, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd
Each to his place: they heard his voice and went
Obsequious: Heav'n his wonted face renew'd,
And with fresh flourrets Hill and Valley smil'd.

P. L. VI.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills hear, the Valleys smile, and the Face of Heaven is renewed.—Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—Each Hill retir'd to its Place—Heaven renew'd its wonted face—how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the Prosopopeia, which he was aiming to establish! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be wished, his correctors had been as wise on their parts.
be received with candour, rather than scrutinized with rigour. Varro's words on a Subject near akin, are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. Non mediocres enim tenebrae in silvâ, ubi hæc captanda; neque ed, quo pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt.*

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both Number and Gender appertain to Words, because in the first place they appertain to Things; that is to say, because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter. There is however this difference between the two Attributes: Number in strictness descends no lower, than to the last Rank of

* De Ling. Lat. I. IV.
of Species\(^{(k)}\): Gender on the contrary stops not here, but descends to every Individual, however diversified. And so much for Substantives, properly so called.

\(^{(k)}\) The reason why Number goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to Individuals: the cause of which see before, p. 39.
Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

We are now to proceed to a Secondary Race of Substantives, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

Every Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before. In the former case it is called an Object τὸς πρῶτος γνώσεως, of the first knowledge or acquaintance(a); in the latter

(a) See Apoll. de Syntaxi, 1. 1. c. 16. p. 49. 1. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus Priscian—Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit; Quis fecit?
latter it is called an Object \( \tau\iota\gamma\nu\omega\tau\varepsilon\omega\varsigma \) of the second knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between Particulars or Individuals, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects \( \tau\iota\gamma\pi\rho\omega\tau\varepsilon\omega\varsigma \), that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been \( \Delta\epsilon\iota\xi\varsigma \), that is, Pointing, or Indication by the Finger or Hand, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking.

But

But the Authors of Language were not content with this. They invented a race of **Words to supply this Pointing**; which Words, as they always stood for **Substantives or Nouns**, were characterized by the Name of 'Αυτονομιαί, or **Pronouns**. These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them **Pronouns of the First**, the **Second**, and the **Third Person**, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

**Suppose** the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the

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(6) Ἐπειδὴ ἦν 'Αυτονομία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΝ ἢ ἀναφεγᾶς 'ΑΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of **Individuals**, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. **Pronomen est pars orationis, quae pro nomine proprio unusquisque accipitur.** Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.
the Subject of the Conversation to be the Speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, they furnished the Speaker with the Pronoun, I. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason the Pronoun of the First Person.

Again, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be the Party addrest. Here for similar reasons they invented the Pronoun, Thou. *Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c.* and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun of the Second Person.

Lastly, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but some Third Object, different from both. Here they provided another Pronoun. He, She, or It, which
which in distinction to the two former was called the Pronoun of the Third Person.

And thus it was that Pronouns came to be distinguished by their respective Persons.

The description of the different Persons here given is taken from Priscian, who took it from Apollonius. Personae Pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quae loquitur; de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de ea pronunciatur, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de ea, quae nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same Distinctions. Пώτον (ποθαυστον sc.) ἂν μεν τῇ ἑαυτῇ φημί τῇ λόγῳ διηλεύει, ἂν δὲ τῇ, ἂν δὲ δὲ λόγῳ τείτον, ἂν δὲ τῇ ἀντίτιμο. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.

This account of Persons is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the Speaker; the Second, the Party addrest; and the Third, the Subject. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the Speaker, the other the Party addrest; yet till they become subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the subject, this is a character, which it shares in common with both
As to Number, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (we), because there may be many Speakers at once

both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When Eneas begins the narrative of his adventures, the second Person immediately appears, because he makes Dido, whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party addrest) we hear nothing farther of this Second Person, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the First Person may be seen everywhere, because the Speaker every where is himself the Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—quaque ipse miserrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui—

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second Persons
once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (Thou) has the plural (you), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (He) has the plural (they), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

But tho' all these Pronouns have Number, it does not appear either in Greek, or Latin, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of Sex. The reason seems to be, that the Speaker

Persons by being introduced as present. The real Second Person (Dido) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Euclid, we find neither First Person, nor Second, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party addrest, (in which light we may always view the Writer and his reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.
Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (a) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages the third Person has its Genders, and that even English (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (c) distinction of He, She, and It.

Hence


(c) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—He caused him to destroy him—
Hence too we see the reason why a single Pronoun (f) to each Person, an I to the First, and a Thou to the Second, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes.

him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were Alexander, Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous sentence, He caused him to destroy him, we are told with the proper distinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

7 Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diverse indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper presentes inter se sunt, & demonstrative; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Iste; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.
poses of Speech. But it is not so with respect to the Third Person. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many Pronouns, such as He, This, That, Other, Any, Some, &c.

It must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as Pronouns. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, This is Virtue, or δεικτικῶς, Give me That) then are they Pronouns. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, This Habit is Virtue; or δεικτικῶς, That Man defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of Definitives or Articles. That there is indeed a near relation between Pronouns...
Pronouns and Articles, the old Gramarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine Pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the Power of a Noun, and supplying its place—The genuine Article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as Attributives or (s) Adjectives.

As

(s) To "��όθον μηλα ὃνόματι", ἐν 'Ἀνωμορία αὐτ ὅνόματι. The Article stands with a Noun; but the Pronoun stands for a Noun. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. 'Ἄθα ἐν τὰ ἄθεσι, τὸς ποὺ τὰ ὄνομα ἑαυτόν ἐποιήσει, εἰς τὸν οὐκ ὀνομαστὴν ἀντωνομίαν μεταπίθει. Now Articles themselves, when they quit their Connexion with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Again—"Ὅταν τὸ "Ἄθεσι μη μετ ὅνοματε σαφαλαμζάνται, οὐκόπαι δὲ συντάξαν ὅνοματι ὃν σαφαλαμζάμεθα, ἐν τὰς ἀνάγκας εἰς ἀνωμορίαν μεταλοφθάσται, εἰς ἐκ ἑνισθάνυν μετ ὅνοματε δυνάμει ἅντι ὅνοματε σαφαλάθθην. When the Article
As to the Coalescence of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second will, either of them, by themselves is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in Power assumed for one. Eus. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96.—


Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: Articulis autem Pronomina connumerantes, finitos ea Articulós appellabant; ípsos autem Articulós, quibus vos carcemus, infinitos Articulós dicebant. Vél, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronomibus, & Articularia eos Pronomina vocabant, &c. Pris. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hic, calls them both Articles, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. L. VII. See also L. IX. p. 132. Vossius indeed in his Analogia (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because Hic has not the same power with the Greek Article. But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers.
selves coalesce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—I am He—Thou art He—but we cannot say—I am Thou—not Thou art I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the Speaker to be the Subject also of the Discourse, as when we say, I am He; or for the Person addrest; as when we say, Thou art He. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the Speaker, and the Party addrest, this is impossible; and so therefore is the Coalescence of the First and Second Person.

And now perhaps we have seen enough of Pronouns, to perceive how they

Writers on this Subject, wh. considered all Words, as Articles, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their signification.
they differ from other Substantives. The others are *Primary*, these are their *Substitutes*; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already *(h)* mentioned the others could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of *Articles*, which are

(h) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no "Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. "It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pro-"nou is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes equi-"valent to Διγίς, that is, to *Pointing or Indication by "the Finger."* It is worth remarking in that Verse of *Persius*,

*Sed pulchrum est digito monstrari, & dicier, Hic est.*

how the Διγίς and the *Pronoun* are introduced toge-"ther, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of Διγίς the Pronoun of the *third* Person stands for the *first.*

*Quod si militibus parces, & hic quoque Miles.*

That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See Vulpius.
are nearly allied to them, that "LAN-
"GUAGE, tho' in itself only significant
"of general Ideas, is brought down to
"denote that infinitude of Particulars,
"which are for ever arising, and ceas-
"ing to be." But more of this here-
after in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns
already mentioned, they may be called
Prepositive, as may indeed all Substan-
tives, because they are capable of in-
troducing or leading a Sentence, with-
out having reference to any thing pre-
vious. But besides those there is ANO-
THER

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Cor-
respondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where
the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there
is a sort of implied Presence, which they are supposed
to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so
great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction
in Apollonius, τὰς μὲν τῶν ὅσεον εἰναι διεῖς; τὰς δὲ τὰ νῦ,
that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental.
De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.
78

HERMES.

Ch. V. THE PRONOUN (in Greek ὦς, ὢςς (i); in Latin, Qui; in English, Who, Which, That) a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

Suppose I was to say—Light is a Body, Light moves with great celerity. These would apparently be two distinct Sentences.

(i) The Greeks, it must be confess, call this Pronoun ἰτοταχικὸν ἄθγον, the subjunctive Article. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. Apol- lonius, when he compares it to the ἰτοταχικὸν or true prepositive Article, not only confesses it to differ, as being express by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὁτῳ ὦ ὄ το κυίως ἐν ἰταγον ταλι— for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article. And just before he says, κυίως το μον ἄθγον το τοταχικὸν—however properly speaking it is the Prepositive is the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.
Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, Light, I were to place the pre-positive Pronoun, it, and say—Light is a Body; it moves with great celerity—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a Connective (as for Example an and) saying—Light is a Body, and it moves with great celerity—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now it is in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of and it, we substitute that, or which, saying Light is a Body, which moves with great celerity—the Sentence still retains its Unity and Perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the Subjunctive, be-
cause it cannot (like the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous. (k)

(k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, which Sentence contains, either express or understood, two Verbs, and two Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of Horace,

Quiet in tenuen vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; qui metuens vivit—is another. Ille and Qui are the two Nominatives; Erit and Vivit, the two Verbs; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from Apollonius (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above speculations are taken. 

(k) 

The text is not fully translatable due to the presence of Greek and Latin words. The primary focus is on the English translation of the Greek text, which deals with the structure of sentences and the role of pronouns in complex sentences.
The Application of this **Subjunctive**, like the other Pronouns, is universal. It may be the Substitute of all kinds

The subjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, AND: This Copulative assumes the antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it is that the Words—the Grammarian came, who discoursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came, AND discoursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their qui and quis from que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to
kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the Animal, Which, &c. the Man, Whom, &c. the Ship, Which, &c. Alexander, Who, &c. Bucephalus, That, &c. Virtue, Which, &c. &c.

Nay, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, I, who now read, have near finished this Chapter; Thou, who now readest; He, who now readeth, &c. &c.

And thus is this Subjunctive truly a Pronoun from its Substitution, there

the Greek) from KAI and 'OΣ and KAI and 'O. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

Homer also expresses the Force of this Subjunctive, Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepositive and a Connective, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See Iliad, Ά. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.
there being no Substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is essentially distinguished from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only a Substitute, but withal a Connective.

Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the Ego and the Tu, are implied in the very Form of the Verb itself (γεάφω, γεάφις, scribo, scribis) and are for that reason never express, unless it be to mark a Contradistinction; such as in Virgil,

Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentes in umbrá
Formosam resonare doces, &c.

This however is true with respect only to the Casus rectus, or Nominative of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their oblique Cases, which must always be added, because tho' we see the Ego in Amo, and the Tu in Amas; we see not the Te or Me in Amat, or Amant.

Yet even these oblique Cases appear in a different manner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. If they contradictistinguish, then are they commonly placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.
And now to conclude what we have said concerning Substantives. All Substantives

Thus Virgil,

—Quid Thesea, magnum
Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab Jove summo.

Thus Homer,

ΤΩΝ Με Σεοί δύνεν—
Παιδα δη ΜΟΙ λόσατι φίλν—

Il. A.

where the ΤΩΝ and the ΜΟΙ stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the ΤΩΝ even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὅρθονεμικίαν, or Pronouns uprightly accented. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of Εὐκλητικία, that is, Leaning or Inclining Pronouns. The Greeks too had in the first person Ἐμι, Ἐμοί, Ἐμι for Contradistinctives, and Με, Μοί, Μι for Enclitics. And hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read

Παιδα
stantives are either Primary, or Secondary, that is to say, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either Nouns or Pronouns. The Nouns denote Substances, and those either Natural, Artificial, or Abstract*. They moreover denote Things either General, or Special, or Particular. The Pronouns, their Substitutes, are either Prepositive, or Subjunctive. The Prepositive is distinguished into three Orders, called the First, the Second, and the

*See before, p. 37, 38.
the Third Person. The Subjunctive includes the powers of all those three, having superadded, as of its own, the peculiar force of a Connective.

HAVING done with Substantives, we now proceed to AttrIBUTIVES.
Concerning Attributives.

Attributives are all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes. Such for example are the Words, Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c.\(^{(a)}\).

\(^{(a)}\) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles, in as much as all of them equally denote the Attributes of Substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance. Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or Verb is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λόγος a Verb, tells us τάσσει φωνή, κατηγορέμενον ὅρον ἐν ὑστεραί προίσα τό, 'PHMA καλεῖσθαι, that every Sound articulate,
However, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be any thing else. For existence may be considered as an universal Genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either express, or by implication; express, as when we say, The Sun is bright; by implication, as when we say, The

ticulate, that forms the Predicate in a Proposition, is called a Verb, p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. Non Declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis. L. II. p. 576. And in another place, he says—non similitudo, declinationis omnimodo conjunct vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. L. XIII. p. 970.
The Sun rises, which means, when resolved, The Sun is rising.

The Verbs, Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est, Fit, ἐγέρσει ἐστὶν, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this general Genus. The Latins have called them Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive, but the Greeks ἔγερεν τὸ πάροικόν Verbs of Existence, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well Attribute, as Substance. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the Verb, ἐστὶ, Est, Is.

Now all Existence is either absolute or qualified—absolute, as when we say, B is; qualified, as when we say, B is an Animal; B is black, is round, &c.
With respect to this difference, the Verb (is) can by itself express absolute Existence, but never the qualified, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not expressd, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (is) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of a mere Assertion. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, Riseth means, is rising; Writeth, is writing.

Again—As to Existence in general it is either mutable, or immutable; mutable, as in the Objects of Sensation; immutable, as in the Objects of Intellection and Science. Now mutable Objects exist all in Time, and admit the several Distinctions of present, past, and future.
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But immutable Objects know no such distinctions, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

And hence two different Significations of the substantive Verb (is) according as it denotes mutable, or immutable Being.

For example, if we say, This Orange is ripe, (is) meaneth, that it existeth so now at this present, in opposition to past time, when it was green, and to future time, when it will be rotten.

But if we say, The Diameter of the Square is incommensurable with its side, we do not intend by (is) that it is incommensurable now, having been formerly commensurable, or being to become so hereafter; on the contrary we intend that Perfection of Existence, to which Time and its Distinctions are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this Verb, when we
we say, Truth is, or, God is. The opposition is not of Time present to other Times, but of necessary Existence to all temporary Existence whatever. And so much for Verbs of Existence, commonly called Verbs Substantive.

We are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as black and white, to write, to speak, to walk, &c. among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive make without

(c) Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunec esse, sed tantum in Substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantia, quam ab tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, dies est, ad nunc dici substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicianus, nunc est. Quare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter est addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.
out farther help a perfect assertive Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise,* these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an *Assertion,* to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an *Assertion* elsewhere, an *(is)* or a *(was)* to complete the Sentence, saying *Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent.* On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh,* in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the words *(writeth)* and *(walketh)* imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an *Assertion* likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing,* the other into *Is* and *Walking.*

Now
Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call Verbs. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take the Attribute alone, without the Assertion, then have we Participles. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of Adjectives.

And thus it is, that all Attributives are either Verbs, Participles, or Adjectives.

Besides the Distinctions abovemen¬tioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in Motion; such are to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of Motion; such are to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And lastly, others have it in subjects, which have nothing
nothing to do with either Motion or its Privation; such are the Attributes of, Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish, and in a word the several Quantities and Qualities of all Things. Now these last are Adjectives; those which denote Motions, or their Privation, are either Verbs or Participles.

And this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all Motion is in Time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies Time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But besides this, all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one Place for one instant only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. + To stop therefore or rest,

+ Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning Motion.
rest, is to be in one Place for more than one Instant, that is to say, during an Extension between two Instants, and this of course gives us the idea of Time. As therefore Motions and their Privation imply Time as their concomitant, so Verbs, which denote them, come to denote Time also\(^{(d)}\). And hence the origin and use of Tenses, “which are so many different forms, assigned to each Verb, “to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various Times in “which such meaning may exist.”

Thus Scribit, Scripsit, Scripserat, and Scribet, denote all equally the Attribute, To Write, while the difference between them, is, that they denote Writing in different Times.

\(^{(d)}\) The ancient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—\(\eta\mu\alpha\ η\ το\ ει\ \tau\ \pi\rho\os\eta\mu\a\i\om\i\nu\ ν\chi\v\om\ \nu\). a Verb is something, which signifies Time over and above (for such is the force of the Preposition \(\pi\os\)). If it should be asked, over and above what? It may be answered, over and above its principal Signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. See Arist. de Interpret. c. 3, together with his Commentators Ammonius and Boethius.
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Should it be asked, whether Time itself may not become upon occasion the Verb's principal Signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same Time may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words, writeth and speaketh) and different Times by the same Verb (as in the words, writeth and wrote) neither of which could happen, were Time any thing more, than a mere Concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or substantives. Of the adjective kind are Timely, Yearly, Dayly, Hourly, &c. of the substantive kind are Time, Year, Day, Hour, &c.

The most obvious division of Time is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any language complete, whose Verbs have not Tenses, to mark these distinctions. But we may go still further. Time past and future are both infinitely extended.
extended. Hence it is that in universal Time past we may assume many particular Times past, and in universal Time future, many particular Times future, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present Time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of Extension, as does every given line, however minute.

Here then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote indefinitely (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, what kind of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.
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However as the knowledge of Tenses depends on the Theory of Time, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.
Concerning Time, and Tenses.

T**ime** and Space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply Extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the Extension of Space, and between Yesterday and To-morrow, the Extension of Time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of Space exist at once and together, while those of Time only exist in Transition or Succession\(^{(a)}\). Hence then we may gain some Idea of **Time**, by considering it under

\(^{(a)}\) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—\(\text{οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Χρῆς ἑλξώμενός ἡμᾶς ὑφίσταται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μόνον τὸ Νῦν ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνομεν \& φθινόμενον τὸ ἐνα ἐκεῖ. \textbf{Time doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single Now or Instant; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be.}
\text{Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.}
under the notion of a transient Continuity. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of Transition go, Time is different from Space; but as to those of Extension and Continuity, they perfectly coincide.

Let us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given Line we may assume any where a Point, and therefore in every given Line there may be assumed infinite Points. So in every given Time we may assume any where a Now or Instant, and therefore in every given Time there may be assumed infinite Nows or Instants.

Farther still—A Point is the Bound of every infinite Line; and a Now or Instant, of every finite Time. But altho' they are Bounds, they are neither of them Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor the Now or Instant of any Time. If this appear strange, we may
may remember, that the parts of any thing extended are necessarily extended also, it being essential to their character, that they should measure their Whole. But if a Point or Now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other Points, and infinite other Nows (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

These assertions therefore being admitted, and both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, but not as Parts, it will

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(1) —φανεῖν ὅτι ἐδί μόνοι τὸ Ἕν ὑπὸν, ἦσσει ἐδί αἱ γυμνὶ τῆς γημμὴς αἱ δὲ γημμαὶ δῶ τῆς μιᾶς μόχα. It is evident that a Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, than Points are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur. Ausc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ Ἕν ἡ μέγα ματέσθαι τῆ γηματο το μέγα, καὶ συγκειοθαί δὴ τὸ ἐδοὺ ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ὅ δὲ Ἕπος ἐκ αὐθεὶ συγκειοθαί ἐκ τῶν Ἕν. A Now is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but Time doth not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.
will follow, that in the same manner as the same Point may be the End of one Line, and the Beginning of another, so the same Now or Instant may be the End of one Time, and the Beginning of another. Let us suppose for example, the Lines, $A\, B\, B\, C$.

I say that the Point $B$ is the End of the Line $A\, B$, and the Beginning of the Line, $B\, C$. In the same manner let us suppose $A\, B, B\, C$ to represent certain Times, and let $B$ be a Now or Instant. In such case I say that the Instant $B$ is the End of the Time $A\, B$, and the Beginning of the Time $B\, C$. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the Now or Instant, which they include, the first of them is necessarily Past Time, as being previous to it.
C. VII. the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. As therefore every Now or Instant always exists in Time, and without being Time, is Time's Bound; the Bound of Completion to the Past, and the Bound of Commencement to the Future: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole(c).

From the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been

(c) Τὸ δὲ Νῦν ἵνα συνῆκαι χρόνος, ὅπως ἐλέχθη, συνῆκα γάρ τοῦ χρόνου, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἰσόμενον, καὶ ἄλως πέτασως χρόνου ἵν' ἵσε γάρ τε μιαν ἀέρι, τὸ δὲ τελευτά. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνῆκαι in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.
been attentively considered. In the first place there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such Thing as Time present. For if all Time be transient as well as continuous, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such Continuity is essential.

Farther than this—If there be no such thing as Time Present, there can be no Sensation of Time, by any one of the senses. For all Sensation is of the *Present only, the Past being preserved not by Sense but by Memory, and the Future being anticipated by Prudence only and wise Foresight.
But if no Portion of Time be the object of any Sensation; farther, if the Present never exist; if the Past be no more; if the Future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts, out of which Time is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity? Let us try however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

The World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble

(2) "Oti μὲν ὄλως ἐκ ἑσιν, ἢ μόνις ἢ ἀμύβλητος, ἢ τὸν ἔτι τις ἂν ὑποτεινεῖς: τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ γέγονεν, ἢ ἐκ ἑσιν ἢ ἔτι τῶν ἢ ἢ ἀπειδής ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ λειμαχώμενος. Χρόνος δὲ ὑπεντείνων: ἀδύνατον δὲ ὠν ὁδηγεῖν κατὰ κατὰ τοι τῆς ὀσίας. That therefore Time exists not at all, or at least his but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity. Natural. Ause. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.
ble no one more, than some moving spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the Soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to the Imagination, and above all to the Intellect, the several Nows or Instants are not lost, as to the Senses, but are preserved and made objects of steady comprehension, however in their own nature they may be transitory and passing. "Now it is from contemplating two or more of these Instants under one view, together with that Interval of Continuity, which subsists between them, that we acquire in- sensibly
"sensibly the Idea of Time." For example: The Sun rises; this I remember; it rises again; this too I remember. These Events are not together; there is an interval between them. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is Time, and this it is we call Time. Natural. Auscult. L. IV. c.

16. Themistius's Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. "Όταν γὰς ὁ νῦς ἀναμνησθεὶς τὸ Νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ τιμήσα, τότε ἔχον ἐνυῖν ἑννόησαν, ὡς τῶν δύο Νῦν ἐπεζήσαν, διὸν ὑπὸ σπέρματον ήμὼν. ἐπεὶ μὲν λέγειν, ὅτι ἔνοι ἐπὶ πεντακάδεκα θέσιν, ἔκκαθήσασα, διὸν εἰς ᾠδεῖς γεγεγομένης συχναῖαν δύο σημεῖαν ἀποτείμας. For when the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of Time, terminated by these two Nows, as by two Boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points. Themist. Op. edit. Aldi. p. 45. b.
an Extension between them—not however of Space, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize some Extention between them. Now what is this Extention, but a natural Day? And what is that, but pure Time? It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extention between these: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extention between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as Months and Years, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together.

And thus it is the Mind acquires the Idea of Time. But this Time it must be remembered is Past Time only, which is always the first Species, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of Time Future? The answer is, we acquire it by Anticipation. Should it be
C. VII. be demanded still farther, *And what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights in futurity. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future.*

We go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural Periods*
riods, but even in matters of human and civil concern. For example: Having observed in many past instances how health had succeeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate future health to those, who, being now sickly, use exercise; and future sickness to those, who, being now healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of practical Wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them the barren prospect of futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men) but shews withal those events, which are
are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those, who have had diviner assistances) we may justly say, as was said of old,

*He's the best Prophet, who conjectures well.*

From

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\(\text{\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{Mánti} \text{ς ο} \text{δι} \text{ίωσι, ο} \text{τίσ έινάξει καλός.}\)}\)

So Milton,

*Till old Experience do attain\nTo something like Prophetic Strain:*

*Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodammodo Divinationem.*


There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the Mind or Intellect only, as the Future does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past. For though it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) *it actually was*, yet was it then something *Present*, and not something *Past*. *As Past,* it has no existence but in the Mind or Memory, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called Past. It was this intimate connection between Time, and the Soul, that made some Philosophers doubt whether *if there was no Soul, there could be any Time,* since Time appears to have its being in no other region.

\(\text{πότερον δ} \text{ μή έστες ψυχ} \text{ς ειν αν} \text{ ο} \text{ χρόνος, άποροις αν τις, τ. λ.}\)
From what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of the Future comes from knowledge of the Past; as does knowledge of the Past from knowledge of the Present, so that their Order to us is that of Present, Past, and Future.

Of these Species of knowledge, that of the Present is the lowest, not only as first in perception, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all animal Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess Sensation. Knowledge of the Past comes next, which is superior to the former, as being confined to those animals, that have Memory as well as Senses. Knowledge of

of the Future comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason the most excellent as well as the most rare, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse*

AND now having seen, how we acquire the knowledge of Time past, and Time future; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the present Now or Instant, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

In the first place there may be Times both past and future, in which the present Now has no existence, as for example in Yesterday, and To-morrow.

Again, the present Now may so far belong to Time of either sort, as to be the

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.
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the End of the past, and the Beginning of the future; but it cannot be included within the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the present Now included

\[ A \quad B \quad C \quad D \quad E \]

within the limits of the past Time AD. In such case CD, part of the past Time AD, will be subsequent to C the present Now, and so of course be future. But by the Hypothesis it is past, and so will be both Past and Future at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a future Time, such as BE.

What then shall we say of such Times, as this Day, this Month, this Year, this Century, all which include within them the present Now? They cannot
cannot be past Times or future, from what has been proved; and present Time has no existence, as has been proved likewise*. Or shall we allow them to be present, from the present Now, which exists within them; so that from the presence of that we call these also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such Times present, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be a compound of the Past and the Future, divided from each other by some present Now or Instant, and jointly called Present, while that Now remains within them. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

\[ f\ldots X A B C D E Y \ldots g \]

let

* Sup. p. 104,
let us call a Day, or a Century; and let C. VII. the present Now or Instant exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, Time Present. The same holds, if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY Time past, and still more so, when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at f, then was the whole XY Time future; it was the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became Time present. And thus it is that Time is Present, while passing, in its present Now or Instant. It is the same indeed here, as it is in Space. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane in a single Point at once,
once, while during the whole progress- 

sion its parts absent are infinite.

From what has been said, we may perceive that **all** Time, of every denomination

*(a) Place*, according to the antients, was either medi-
ate or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe, be-
cause I am in England; in England, because in Wilt-
shire; in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury; in Salisbury, 
because in my own house; in my own house, because in 
my study. Thus far **mediate** Place. And what is 
**my immediate** Place? It is the internal Bound of that 
containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with 
the external Bound of my own Body. Ἄνωσυνος 
πέρα, καθ'o περιχεί το περιχώμαν. Now as this imme-
diate Place is included within the limits of all the former 
Places, it is from this relation that those **mediate** Places 
also are called each of them **my Place**, tho' the least 
among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply 
this to **Time**. The **Present Century** is present in the 
**present Year**; that, in the **present Month**; that, in the 
**present Day**; that, in the **present Hour**; that, in the 
**present Minute**. It is thus by circumscription within 
circumscription that we arrive at **that real and indi-
visible Instant**, which by being itself the **very Essence** 
of the Present, diffuses **Presence** throughout all even the 
largest
mination, is divisible and extended. But if so, then whenever we suppose a definite Time, even though it be a Time present, it must needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. And so much for Time.

Now from the above doctrine of Time, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theorie of Tenses.

The Tenses are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either indefinitely without reference to any 
Beginning,
Beginning, Middle, or End; or else definitively, in reference to such distinctions.

If indefinitely, then have we three Tenses, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If definitely, then have we three Tenses to mark the Beginnings of these three Times; three, to denote their Middles; and three to denote their Ends; in all Nine.

The three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future: The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Comple- tive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future.

And thus it is, that the Tenses in their natural number appear to be twelve;
BOOK THE FIRST.

TWELVE; three to denote Time absolute, and nine to denote it under its respective distinctions.

Aorist of the Present.

\[ \Gamma\alpha\Phi\omega. \] Scribo. I write.

Aorist of the Past.

\[ \varepsilon\gamma\alpha\psi\alpha. \] Scripsi. I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

\[ \Gamma\alpha\Psi\omega. \] Scribam. I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

\[ \text{Μέλλω γράφων. Scripturus sum.} \] I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

\[ \text{Τυγχάνω γράφων. Scribo or Scribens sum.} \] I am writing.

Completive Present.

\[ \text{Γέγραφα. Scripsi. I have written.} \]

Inceptive Past.

\[ \text{Εμελλων γράφειν. Scripturas eram.} \] I was beginning to write.

Middle
Middle or extended Past.

*Εγράφον or ἐτύγχανον γράφων. *Scriberam. I was writing.

Completive Past.

Ἔγεγράφειν. *Scripsera. I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. Scripture *Scriberus ero. I shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

Ἑσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero. I shall be writing.

Completive Future.

Ἑσομαι γεγράφας. *Scripsero. I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with
with Tenses, as with other affections of speech; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

In the first place, as to Aorists. Aorists are usually by Grammarians referred to the Past: such are ἦλθον, I went; ἐπεσον, I fell; &c. We seldom hear of them in the Future, and more rarely still in the Present. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscriptio, than that of Simple present, past, or future, the Tense is an Aorist.

Thus
Thus Milton,

Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth
Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep. P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (walk) means not that they were walking at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls Hypocrisy,

—the only Evil, that walks Invisible, except to God alone,

the Verb (walks) hath the like aoristical or indefinite application. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the Gnomologic kind, such as

Ad paenitendum properat, cito qui judicat.

Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte facit, &c.
All these Tenses are so many AORISTS OF THE PRESENT.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

*Tu nihil admittes in te, formidine pæne.*

Hor.

So too Legislative Sentences, *Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal,* &c. for this means no one particular future Time, but is a prohibition extended indefinitely to every part of Time future

*W.B.*

(h) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of Aorists. It has no peculiar form even for an Aorist of the Past, and therefore (as Priscian tells us) the Praeteritum is forced to do the double duty both of that Aorist, and of the perfect Present, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that *feci* means (as the same author informs us) both *τετεινκα* and *τετεινα*, *I have done it,* and *I did it; vidi* both.
We pass from Aorists, to the Inceptive Tenses.

These may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar. *ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν*. *Scripturus sum*. *I am going to write*. But the Latins go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called Inchoatives or Inceptives. Thus from *Ca-leo*, *I am warm*, comes *Calesco*, *I begin to grow warm*; from *Tumeo*, *I swell*, comes *Tumesco*, *I begin to swell*. These Inchoative Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the Beginnings of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its Completion, and therefore have neither *Perfectum*, *Plus quam-perfectum*, or *Perfect Future.*

There

There is likewise a species of Verbs called in Greek Ἐφετινά, in Latin Desiderativa, the Desideratives or Meditative, which if they are not strictly Inceptive, yet both in Greek and Latin have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμοσεῖο, Bellaturio, I have a desire to make war; βρωσεῖο, Esurio, I long to eat. And so much for the Inceptive Tenses.

The two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called the Middle Tenses (which express Time as extended and passing) and the Perfect or

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(i) As all Beginnings have reference to what is future, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρῶσω come πολεμοσείο and βρωσείο; from Bellaturus and Esurus come Bellaturio and Esurio. See Macrobius, p. 691. Ed. Var. ἔπαιν γι με τιν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ εποίησας γελάσατε. Plato in Phaedone.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these middle Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.
or Completive, which express its Completion or End.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. Hoadly, and explained and confirmed by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his rational edition of Homer's Iliad. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in Scaliger, and by him (1) ascribed to †Grocinus, as its author. The learned Gaza


† His name was William Grocin, an Englishman, contemporary with Erasmus, and celebrated for his learning. He went to Florence to study under Landin, and was Professor at Oxford. Spec. Lit. Flor. p. 205.
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(who was himself a Greek, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner. What Apollonius hints, is exactly consonant. Priscian too advances the same

(m) The Present Tense (as this author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεπάμενον, ἂν ἂπει, that which is now Instant and incomplete; the Perfectum, τὸ παρειπαλθῆς ἄτη, ἂν ἂπει τὸ ἐνεπάμενον, that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present; the Imperfectum, τὸ παρειπαμένον ἂν ἂπει τὸ παρέμενεν, the extended and incomplete part of the Past; and the Plusquam-perfectum, τὸ παρειπαλθῆς πάλαι, ἂν ἂπει τὸ παρεκαιμένον, that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum. Gram. L. IV.

(n) Ἐντύθει δὲ τῷ ἀνεπάμενῃ ὅτι ἂν ἂπαξεκαίμενον συντελεῖσθαι συ- μάνης ἂν ἂπαξαίμενος, τὴν γέ μὴ ενεπάμενον—Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but present Completion. Apollon. L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle ἂν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted Potentia or Contingence, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this Perfectum, because this implied such a complete and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a Contingent.

K
same doctrine from the Stoics, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to Dialectic, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these Grammatical Speculations(0).

Before

(0) By these Philosophers the vulgar present Tense was called the Imperfect Present, and the vulgar Præteritum, the Perfect Present, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear Priscian, from whom we learn these facts.—

Præsens tempus proprie dicitur; cujus pars jam præterit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsentii, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præterit vel futura est. Unde Stoici jure hoc tempus præsens etiam Imperfectum vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præterit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versus dicam scribo versum, priore ejus parte scriptum; cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsentii utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed Imperfectum est, quod deest adhuc versus, quod scribatur—Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nescitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur Præterito Perfecto; continuo enim, scriptum ad
Before we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

And first, the Latins used their Præteritum Perfectum in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, Vixit, signified, is dead; Fuit, signified, now is not, is no more. It was in this sense that Cicero addressed the people of Rome, when he had put to death the leaders in the Catalinarian Conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum, and cried out

ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum.—And soon after speaking of the Latin Perfectum, he says—scendum tamen, quod Romani Præterito Perfecto non solum in re modo completa utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Graecos παταξιμῶς vocatur, quem Stoici teleion ἐνεστῶτα nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀοῖσυ accipitur, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.
out with a loud voice, *Vixerunt.—
So Virgil,

||Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium &
ingens
Gloria Dardanidum——Æn. II.
And

* So among the Romans, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim Dixerunt, i.e. they have done speaking. Ascon. Ped. in Verr. II.

|| So Tibullus speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hac fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,
Prodigia indomitis merge sub æquoribus.
Eleg. II. 5, ver. 19.

Let these Events have been in days of old;—by Implication therefore—but henceforth let them be no more.
So Eneas in Virgil prays to Phæbus,

Hac Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna secula.

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy, and its inhabitants,;) have so far followed us. By Implication therefore, but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic sit Finis, as Servius well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the Tense, but of the Mood, the Precative or Imperative, not in the Future but in the Past. See p. 154, 155, 156.
And again,

—Locus Ardea quondam

Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet

Ardea nomen,

*Sed fortuna fuit—Æn. VII.

The reason of these significations is derived from the Compleitive Power of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of Contraries. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, OF HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, OR, IS NO MORE.

K 3

*Certus in hospitibus nón est ámor; errat, ut ipsi:
Cumque nihil speres firmius esse, fuit.

Sive erimus, seu nos Fata fuisse volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32
It is remarkable in *Virgil, that he frequently joins in the same sentence this complete and perfect Present with the extended and passing Present; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of Time, and therefore naturally formed to coincide, with each other.

—**Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens Scorpius, & caeli justa plus parte reliquit.**

*G. I.*

**Terra tremit; fugere ferae—**

*G. I.*

**Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis Incubuit, glomeratque fercns incendia ventus.**

*G. II.*

—**illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ, Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.**

*AEn. V.*

*In*

*See also* Spenser's *Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19.


*He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his sword he draws.*
In the same manner he joins the same two modifications of *Time in the Past*, that is to say, the complete and perfect Past with the extended and passing.

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Inruerant Danai, & tectum omne tenebant.  
Æn. II.

*Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosæ,  
Addiderant rutili tres ignis, & alitis austri.*

Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque metumque  
Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus iras (p).  
Æn. VIII.

K 4  
As

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(p) The intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into *English*.

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*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens  
Scorpius et caeli justa plus parte reliquit.*

*For thee the scorpion is now contracting his claws, and hath already left thee more than a just portion of Heaven.*  
The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting *Augustus* among the heavenly signs, that though he has already made him more than room enough, yet he still continues to
C. VII. As to the Imperfectum, it is sometimes employed to denote what is usual and customary. Thus surgebat and scriebat signify not only, he was rising, he was writing, but upon occasion they signify, he used to rise, he used to write. The reason of this is, that whatever is customary, must be something which has been frequently repeated. But what has been frequently repeated, must needs require an Extension of Time past, and thus we fall insensibly into the Tense here mentioned.

Again,

to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one perfect, the other pending, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read relinquuit; but relinquit has the authority of the celebrated Medicean manuscript.

—Ilia noto citius, volucrique sagittā, Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit allo.

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, continues flying to land, and is hid within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid from those spectators who had gone out to see the Ship-
Again, we are told by *Pliny* (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti title*, *in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. It was \( \text{Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίεε, Ἀπελλῆς faciebat, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίεε, Πολύκλειτος faciebat, and never ἐποίησε or fecit.} \) By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that *it was once indeed in hand, but no pretension that it was ever finished*\(^{(q)}\).

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race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore within.

---Inruerant * Данai*, & tectum omne tenebant.

The *Greeks had entered and were then possessing the whole house; as much as to say, they had entered, and that was over, but their Possession continued still.*

\(^{(q)}\) *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the antient
It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the Latins derive these Tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From the passing Present come the passing Past, and Future. Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam. From the perfect Present come the perfect Past, and Future.—Scripsi, Scripsiram, Scripsero. And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from Fero come Ferebam and Feram; from Tuli come Tuleram and Tulero.

We shall conclude by observing, that the Order of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained

antient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes.*
plained already<sup>(r)</sup>. Hence it is, that
the *Present Tense* stands first; then the
*Past Tenses*; and lastly the *Future*.

And now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it definitely, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Completive) we here finish the subject of *Time* and *Tenses*, and proceed to consider the *Verb in other Attributes*, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

CHAP.

<sup>(r)</sup> See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum.* "Quod enim prateritiit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore affertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem *Presens Tempus* primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. *Præteritum autem iis tantum, quae memoria prædita sunt.* *Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiae officium.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also *Senecæ Epist. 124.* *Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsencia; præteritorum, &c.*
Concerning Modes.

We have observed already (a) that the Soul's leading powers are those of Perception and those of Volition, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all Speech or Discourse is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain Perception, or a certain Volition. Hence, then, according as we exhibit it either in a different part, or after a different manner, hence I say the variety of Modes or Moods(b).

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(a) See Chap. II.

(b) Gaza defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is—βάλημα, ἐὰν ἐν ψυχῇ, διὰ φωνῆς σημαίνομεν—a Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through, some Voice or Sound articulate. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is Apollonius observes—
If we simply declare, or indicate something to be, or not to be, (whether a Perception or Volition it is equally the same) this constitutes that Mode called the Declarative or Indicative.

A Perception.

—Nosco crines, incanaque menta
Regis Romani——- Virg. Æn. VI.

A Volition.

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
Corpora——- Ovid. Metam. I.

If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something possible only, and in the number of Contingents, this makes that Mode, which Grammarians call the Poten-
C. VIII. Potential; and which becomes on such occasions the leading Mode of the sentence.

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, Haberet
Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

Yet sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only subjoined to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the End, or final Cause; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore exprest most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

Ut Jugulent homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. Hor.
Thieves rise by night, that they may cut mens throats.

Here that they rise, is positively asserted in the Declarative or Indicative Mode;
Book the First.

Mode; but as to their cutting mens throats, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly soever it may be the End of their rising, it is still but a Contingent, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but the Subjunctive.

But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some Perception informed, or some Volition gratified. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we interrogate, it is the Interrogative Mode; if we require, it is the Requisitive. Even the Requisitive itself hath its subordinate Species: With respect to inferiors, it is an Imperative Mode; with respect to
And thus have we established a variety of Modes; the Indicative or Declarative, to assert what we think certain; the Potential, for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent; the Interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us Information; and the Requisitive, to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions. The Requisitive too appears under two distinct species, either as it is Imperative to inferiors, or Precautive to superiors

As

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with—Sing, Muse, the Wrath,—When he thinks to pray, in reality commands. ἔκλεξθεις, οἴομενος, ἐπ' ἄτατεῖ. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical form being in both cases the same.

(c) The Species of Modes in great measure depend on the Species of Sentences. The Stoics increased the number of Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had many.
As therefore all these several Modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain

many more, as may be seen in *Animonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius,* L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive.—There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive or Indicative. The Vocative, (which the Peripatetics called the ἱδίως κλατικὸν, but the Stoics more properly ἀγοραίοις ὑποτικὸν) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Boethius,* the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latin, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil,* after the following manner.

'Αλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ πάντα ἱδίως, τῷ τε κλατικῷ, ὡς
tò, ὅ μάκαιρ Ἀτείδης—
χῦ τῷ προαστικῷ, ὡς τῷ,
Βάσκε θῇ, ἵ οι ταχεῖα—

L
certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be

Boethius’s Account is as follows. Perfectarum vero
Orationum partes quinque sunt : DEPRECATIVA, ut,

Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ulla,
Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hac omina firma.

IMPERATIVA, ut,

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

Die mihi, Damatia, cuium pecus?

VOCATIVA, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque aeterna potestas.

ENUNCIATIVA, in qua Veritas vel Falsitas inventur, ut,

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.
be enabled by our discourse to signify them, one to another. And hence those various Modes or Moods, of which we find in common Grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than "so many literal Forms, intended to "express these natural Distinctions.(d)."

In Milton the same sentences may be found, as follows.

The Prepositive,

—Universal Lord! be bounteous still
To give us only Good——

The Imperative,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

The Interrogative,

Whence and what art thou, execrable Shape?

The Vocative,

—Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,
Of God inspir'd——

The Assertive or Enunciative,

The conquer'd also and enslaved by war
Shall, with their Freedom lost, all virtue lose.

(d) The Greek Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes, and all
All these Modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of Syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the Syllabic and the Temporal. The Latin, which is but a species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives, it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the Auxiliar, sum. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the English Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from Write cometh Wrote; from Give, Gave; from Speak, Spake, &c.—Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. Do, Am, Have, Shall, Will, May, and Can; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I am writing, I have written;
the Soul and its Affections. Their Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part, as follows.

The Requisitive and Interrogative Modes are distinguished from the Indicative and Potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a Return, to the two former it is always necessary.

If we compare the Requisitive Mode with the Interrogative, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the Return, but in other Peculiarities.
The Return to the Requisitive is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds. To the request of Dido to Eneas—

—*a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis Insidias Dandum*—

the *proper* Return was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief—*date obolum Belisario*—the *proper* Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to the Interrogative, the Return is necessarily made in *Words alone*, in *Words*, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. Whose Verses are these?—the Return is a Sentence—*These are Verses of Homer*. Was Brutus a worthy Man?—the Return is a Sentence—*Brutus was a worthy Man*.

And hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity
affinity of this *Interrogative Mode* with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (e), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (f).

L 4

But

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(c) "Ἡς ἐν πρὸς ἐν ὑπερβολὴ ἑγγίζεις, τὴν ἔνοχον κατά-
φασιν ἀποβάλλετα, μεθίσατε τῷ καλεῖσθαι ὑπερβολὴ—ἀναπληρω-
θείσα δὲ τὴς κατάφασις, ὑποθέτεις τῷ εἶναι ὑπερβολή. The
Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that
Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name
of Indicative—when it reassumes the Assertion, it returns
again to its proper Character. Apoll. de Synt. L. III.
L. IV.

(f) It may be observed of the *Interrogative*, that as
often as the *Interrogation* is *simple* and *definite*, the Re-
sponse may be made in almost the same *Words*, by con-
verting
But to return to our comparison between the Interrogative Mode and the Requisitive.

But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we say—Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?—much more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general—Whose are these Verses?—We cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not, perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot subsist of less than two simple ones; each of which may
THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language of Grammarians) has all Persons of both Numbers. The Requissitive may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance—Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's? (1.) They are Homer's—(2.) They are not Homer's—(3.) They are Virgil's—(4.) They are not Virgil's—we may add, (5.) They are of neither. The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance—Whose are these Verses? We may answer affirmatively—They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.—or negatively—They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single Yes, or a single No, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a Sentence. Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the single essential characteristic Word, and retranching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?—we answer in the short monosyllable, Two; whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.
or **Imperative** has no *first Person* of the singular, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in *Modes* for a person to *request or give commands to himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become *the subject of his own address*.

**Again,** we may interrogate as to all *Times*, both Present, Past, and Future. *Who was Founder of Rome? Who is King of China? Who will discover the Longitude?*—But *Intreating and Commanding* (which are the *Essence of the*)

The Ancients distinguished these two *Species of Interrogation* by different names. The simple they called "Eρωτημα, Interrogatio;" the complex, Πόρωμα, Percontatio. Ammonius calls the first of these "Eρωτημα διαλεκτική;" the other, "Eρωτημα πυρματική." See *Am. in Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert. VII.* 66. *Quintil. Inst.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.
the Requisitive Mode) have a necessary respect to the *Future* only. For indeed what have they to do with the present

(8) Apollonius's Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. "Επί γὰρ μὴ γινομένους ἡ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἡ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ: τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἡ μὴ γε-
gοντα, ἐπιτυδείότετα δὲ ἕχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἰςι. A Command has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to the Future. De Syn-
taxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—"Ἀπαντᾷ τὰ σφραγικα ἰδειμένων ἐξε τῶν τὰ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—καὶ δόν γὰρ ἐν ὑπ. ίσοι τό, ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΆΣΟΝ, τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΕΣΤΑΙ, κατὰ τῶν χρόων ἐνομα τῇ ἐκκλίεσι διήλα-
χως, καθ’ τὸ μὲν σφραγικῶν, τὸ δὲ ὁδικῶν. All Impera-
tives have a disposition within them, which respects the Future—with regard therefore to Time, it is the same thing to say, Let him, that kills a Tyrant, be honoured, or, he, that kills one, shall be honoured; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is Imperative, the other Indicative or Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. 1. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Pres-
sent
present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

sent to be nothing else than an immediate Future, as opposed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videetur posse accipere. Eae etsi imperamus, quae vel in præsenti statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatatione, vel in futuro. Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the Perfectum, and of the two Aorists. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are used to insinuate such a Speed of execution, that the deed should be (as it were) done in the very instant when commanded. The same difference seems to subsist between our English Imperative, Be gone, and those others of, Go, or Be going. The first (if we please) may be stiled the Imperative of the Perfectum, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands: the others may be stiled Imperatives of the Future, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterwards.

It is thus Apollonius, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between σκαφίτω τὰς ἄμπιλας, Go to digging the Vines, and σκαφάτω τὰς ἄμπιλας, Get the Vines dug. The
Book the First.

It is from this connection of *Futurity* with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, **YOU SHALL DO THIS**, has often the same force with the *Imperative*, **DO THIS**. So in the Decalogue—**THOU SHALT NOT KILL**—**THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS**

The first is spoken (as he calls it) *εἰς παράτασιν*, by way of *Extension*, or *allowance of Time for the work*; the second, *εἰς συνταξίαν*, with a view to *immediate Completion*. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same *Tenses*, *Συνταξία* and *Συντάξιον*, he says of the last, *ε ὑπὸν ὁ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον παρατάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει*, that it not only commands something which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an *Extension*, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in *Greek*, *ΓΡΑΦΕ, WRITE* (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but *ΓΡΑΦΩΝ, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS*. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 24*. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Grec. & Lat. p. 680*. *Edit. Varior. Latini non estimaverunt*, &c.
C. VIII. WITNESS—which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the Potential Mode, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its subordinate or subjunctive Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the Requisitive and Interrogative, by implying a kind of feeble and weak Assertion, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, This may be, or, This might have been, we may remark without absurdity, It is true, or It is false. But if it be said, Do this, meaning, Fly to Heaven, or, Can this be done? meaning, to square the Circle, we cannot say in either case, it is true or it is false, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the Potential does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a dubious and conjectural Assertion, whereas that of
of the Indicative is absolute, and without reserve.

This therefore (the Indicative I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfections of desires and wants; which includes the whole of Time, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various Past Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the remembrance of former Events; in its Futures is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its Present Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish necessary Truth; that Truth, which from its nature only exists in the Present; which knows
knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where, and always invariably one(\textsuperscript{h}).

(\textsuperscript{h}) See the quotation, Note (c) Chapter the Sixth, Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a Roman of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as Themistius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Ammonius, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing in Time and not in Time, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

"The things, that exist in Time, are those whose Existence Time can measure. But if their Existence may be measured by Time, then there may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence of any one of them, as there may be assumed a number greater than the greatest multitude, that is capable
Through all the above Modes, with their respective Tenses, the Verb being capable of being numbered. And hence it is that things temporary have their Existence, as it were limited by Time; that they are confined within it, as within some bound; and that in some degree or other they all submit to its power, according to those common Phrases, that Time is a destroyer; that things decay through Time; that men forget in Time, and lose their abilities, and seldom that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, Time always attends Motion. Now the natural effect of Motion is to put something, which now is, out of that state, in which it now is, and so far therefore to destroy that state.

The reverse of all this holds with things that exist eternally. These exist not in Time, because Time is so far from being able to measure their Existence, that no Time can be assumed, which their existence doth not surpass. To which we may add, that they feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to damage or dissolution.

To instance in examples of either kind of Being.—There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge and the Pyramids. It is likewise true at this instant, that the Diameter of the square is commensurable with its side. What then shall we say? Was there ever a
considered as denoting an Attribute, has always reference to some Person, or Substance. Thus if we say, Went, or, Go, or Whither goeth, or, Might have gone, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero went; Caesar might have gone; whither goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor! But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—To eat is pleasant;

"Time, when it was not incommensurable, as it is certain there was a Time, when there was no Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it daily growing less incommensurable, as we are assured of Decays in both those massy Structures?" From these unchangeable Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the unceasing Intelllection of the universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See Nat. Ausc. L. IV. c. 19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII. The following Passage may deserve Attention.
pleasant; but to fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs To eat, and, To fast, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the Latin and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, **Infinitives.** Sanctius has given them the name of **Impersonals;** and the Greeks that of 'Απαθέματα, from the same reason of their not discovering either Person or Number.

**These Infinitives go farther.**—They not only lay aside the character of **Attributives,** but they also assume that of **Substantives,** and as such themselves become distinguished with their several Attributes. Thus in the instance above, **Pleasant** is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, **To Eat; Wholesome** the attribute attending the Infinitive, **To Fast.** Examples in Greek and Latin of like kind are innumerable.
THE Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that

(6) It is from the Infinitive thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, 'that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes "Ονομα βηματιχων, a verbal Noun; Sometimes "Ονομα βηματος, the Verb's Noun.—The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; το γεάφειν, το γεάφειν, το γεάφειν. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus Spenser,

*For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the son of Thetis from to die—*
that they held this alone to be the genuine PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the Infinitive only. Thus the Infinitives Περιπτησεῖν, Ambilarē, To walk, mean simply that energy, and nothing more. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, superadd certain Affections, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus Ambulo and Ambula mean not simply To walk, but mean, I walk, and, Walk Thou. And hence

than Riches, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἥπες τὸν χλητον. Thus too Priscian, speaking of Infinitives—Currere enim est Cursus; & Scribere, Scriptura; & Legere, Lectio. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut Persius,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dieier, hic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, Bonum est legere, nihil aliud signisco, nisi, Bona est lectio. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also Apoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza Gram. L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἄπαθεματον, ὄνομα ἐστὶ βήματον κ. τ. λ.
hence they are all of them resolvable into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper Character. *Ambulo,* I walk; this is, *Indico me ambulare,* I declare myself to walk. *Ambula,* Walk Thou; that is, *Impero te ambulare,* I command thee to walk; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the Assertion, the Command, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than the mere *Infinitive,* which (as Priscian says) *significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum*(k).

(k) See Apollon. L. III. 13. Καθίλη ταύτα παρηγμένον ἀπὸ τινος κ. τ. λ. See also Gaza, in the note before. Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere *Infinitivum* possimus dignoscere; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.—Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131. From these Principles Apollonius calls the Infinitive *PyObject γενικωτάτος,* and Priscian, *Verbum generale.*
The application of this infinitive is somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those Verbs that denote any Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say ἐθλομαί ζ̄ν, Cupio vivere, I desire to live; but not to say Ἐδο vivere, or even in English, I eat to live, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of I eat for to live; as we say ἐνεκα τῷ ζ̄ν, or pour vivre. The reason is, that though different Actions may unite in the same Subject, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, He walked and discoursed) yet the Actions notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to Volitions, and Actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the Volition is unintelligible, till the Action be exprest. Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by Infinitives, which express
the proper actions to which they tend. Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see. Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment as in syntax(

AND so much for Modes, and their several Species. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters; it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be exprest under positive assertions, and as positive assertions only belong to

(1) Priscian calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, Verba Voluntativa; they are called in Greek Προαιρετικά. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see Apollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat. p. 685. Ed. Var.

—Nec omne aπαθιματωσ cuicunque Verbo, &c.
to the Indicative, we may denominate it for that reason the Mode of Science\(^{(m)}\). Again, as the Potential is only conversant about Contingents, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode the Mode of Conjecture.—Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming Proficients; hence we may call the Interrogative, the Mode of Proficiency.

*Inter cuncta leges, & percontabere doctos,*

*Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum, Quid purè tranquillet,* &c. Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most excellent use of the Requisitive Mode is legis-

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\(^{(m)}\) *Ob nobilitatem praevit Indicativus, solus Modus aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis.* Scal. de Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.
legislative command, we may stile it for this reason the Mode of Legislature. *Ad Divos adeunto caste*, says Cicero in the character of a Roman lawgiver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the laws of England; and in the same Mode speak the laws of every other nation. It is also in this Mode that the geometricalian, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science, which he is about to establish.

There are other supposed affections of Verbs, such as Number and Person. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the Number and Person of every Substantive, that
that we may know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal Attributes. The same may be said of Sex, with respect to Adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect Beings male or female, tho’ Substances past dispute are alone susceptible of sex\(^{(n)}\). We therefore pass over these matters,

\(^{(n)}\) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammarian as Sanctius, should justly deny Genders, or the distinction of Sex to Adjectives, and yet make Persons appertain, not to Substantives, but to Verbs. His commentator Perizonius is much more consistent, who says—\textit{At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus \& Pronominibus vel maximè, imò unicum inest ipsa Persona; \& Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Génerum ad Substantiva, quibus solis auctor (Sanctius scil. L. I. c. 7.) \& rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis. Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12.} There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of Sex and Person. There are but two Sexes, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two Persons (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addressed.—The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.
matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is the Difference of Verbs, as to their several Species, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

(0) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note (h) of this chapter, may consult Letters concerning Mind, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. John Petvin, Vicar of Ilsington in Devon, a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.
Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their other remaining Properties.

All Verbs, that are strictly so called denote (a) Energies. Now as all Energies are Attributes, they have reference of course to certain energizing Substances. Thus it is impossible there should be such Energies, as To love, to fly, to wound, &c. if there were not such beings as Men, Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some Subject. For example, if we say, Brutus loves—we must needs supply—loves

(a) We use this word Energy, rather than Motion, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both Motion and its Privation. See before, p. 94, 95.
loves Cato, Cassius, Portia, or some one.
The Sword wounds—i. e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is active, and a Subject which is passive. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call a Verb active.—Thus we say Brutus amat, Brutus loves. On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call a Verb passive. Thus we say, Portia amatur, Portia is loved. It is in like manner that the same Road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is Ascent, with respect to the foot is Descent.—Since then every Energy respects an Energizer, or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in language a ne-
cessary reference to some *Noun* for its *Nominative Case*.

But to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus loved Portia.*—Here *Brutus* is the *Energizer*; *loved*, the *Energy*; and *Portia*, the *Subject*. But it might have been, *Brutus loved Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the *Energy* is referable to *Subjects* infinite. Now among these infinite *Subjects*, when that happens to occur, which is the *Energizer* also, as when we say *Brutus loved himself*, slew himself, &c. in such Case the *Energy* hath to the same being *a double Relation*, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among the *Greeks*

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(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper *Nominative* supplied to all *Verbs* of this supposed character.
Greeks to that species of Verbs, called **Verbs middle**\(^{(c)}\), and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is expressed like other accusatives.

**Again**, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth*, it is impossible *the Energy should pass out*

\(^{(c)}\) Τὰ γὰς καλόμενα μεσότητος χρήματα συνέπλοιν ἀνεδίζατο ἐνεργεικῶς καὶ παθητικῶς διαθέσεως. *The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character.* Apollon. Ἐ. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of the middle verb explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic Kuster, entitled, *De Vero Usu Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.
(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily express by the Terms, ἀυτοποιήσις and ἑαυτοποιήσις, which Priscian renders quae ex se in seipsa fit intrinsecus Passio. L. VIII. 790. Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2051.

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Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects being infinite; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars that Verbs Active require

It may be here observed, that even these Verbs, called Actives, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and assume the Form of Neuters, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere Energy or Affection only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, ἐκ οἴδειν ἄναγγισθαι τοῖς; This Man knows not how to read, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them, ἐκ οἴδειν ἄναγγισθαι τὰ Ὀμήρου, He knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or Cicero, &c.

Thus Horace,

Qui cupit aut metuit, juvat illum sic domus aut res,
Ut lippum pictae tabula—

He that desires or fears (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast these affections'
require an Accusative, while Neuters require none.

Of the above species of Verbs, the Middle cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. The Species of Verbs therefore remaining are the Active, the Passive and the Neuter, and those seem essential to all languages whatever(d).

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affections prevail) has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures. So Cæsar in his celebrated Laconic Epistle of, VENI, VIDI, VICI, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in the rapid Sequel of the Events. Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. Whom he saw, and whom he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See Apoll. L. III. c. 31. p. 279.

(d) The Stoics, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.
There remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of Energy and Motion. But there are some which appear to denote nothing more,

When a Verb, co-inciding with the Nominative of some Noun, made without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence, as ἵππος ἱππεύειν, Socrates walketh; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason ἑπίσκεψις, a Predicable, or else, from its readiness συνεχέω, to co-incide with its Noun in completing the Sentence, they called it Συνεχάμα, a Co-incider.

When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such Noun, but under some oblique Case, as ἵππος ἱππεύειν, Socratem pietātē: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Παρακάτησις or Παρακάτησις.

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun in its Nominative, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other Noun under an oblique Case, as πλάτων φίλι Diōn, Plato loveth Dio (where without Dio or some other, the Verb loveth would rest indefinite:) Such Verb,
more, than a mere simple Adjective, joined to an Assertion. Thus ἰσὰζει in Greek, and Equalleth in English, mean nothing more than ἰσὸς ἐς, is equal. So Albo in Latin is no more than albus sum.

from this Defect, they called τὸν ἄνωμα, or ἰσακώμα, something less than a Co-incider, or less than a Predicable.

Lastly, when a Verb required two Nouns in oblique Cases, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we say Ἐνεργάτερ᾽ Ἀκολούθεις μίλει, Ἡδον Με Βίλα, or the like: Such Verb they called τὸν, or ἱλατίτω ἡ παρακαταστάμα, or ἡ συνανακτάμα, something less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable.

These were the Appellations which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns, to the forming of Propositions. As to the Name of ΠΗΜΑ, or Verb, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the Infinitive, as we have shewn already. See page 164. See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 37. Apollon. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Theod. Gaz. Gram. L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs Neuter are Ἐνωμαλα; Verbs Active, Ἡλον ἄνωμα.
The same may be said of Tumeo.—Mons tumet, i.e. tumidus est, is tumid.
To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

_Fluctus uti primo cæpit cum ALBESCERE Vento._

_Freta ponti_ Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE. _Virg._

There are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that in Abstract Nouns (such as Whiteness from White, Goodness from Good) as also in the Infinitive Modes of Verbs, the Attributive is converted into a Substantive; here the Substantive on the contrary is converted into an Attributive.—Such are κυνίζειν from κύων, to act the part of a Dog, or be a Cynic; Φιλιτπίζειν from Φιλίτπα, to Philippize, or favour Philip; Syllaturire from Sylla, to mediate.
tate acting the same part as Sylla did.—
Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperor, by way of counsel to himself—\( \delta \gamma \alpha \mu \lambda \upsilon \alpha \pi \omicron \alpha \iota \sigma \rho \omega \theta \varsigma \), beware thou bee'st not be-C\( \varsigma \)\( \alpha \)R'd; as though he said, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle into a mere C\( \varsigma \)\( \alpha \)R(e). In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

Sternhold himself he Out-Stern-holded.

And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary Bishop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says of him, that he out-bonner'd even Bonner himself.*

And so much for that Species of Attributes, called Verbs in the strictest Sense.

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* Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.
Concerning those other Attributes, Participles and Adjectives.

The nature of Verbs being understood, that of Participles is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an Attribute; of Time; and of an Assertion. Now if we take away the Assertion, and thus destroy the Verb, there will remain the Attribute and the Time, which make the essence of a Participle. Thus take away the Assertion from the Verb, \( \Gamma \alpha \Phi \epsilon \), Witteth, and there remains the Participle, \( \Gamma \alpha \Phi \omega \nu \), Writing, which (without the Assertion) denotes the same Attribute, and the same Time. After the same manner, by withdrawing the Assertion, we discover \( \Gamma \alpha \phi \alpha \varsigma \) in \( \varepsilon \gamma \phi \alpha \varsigma \), \( \Gamma \alpha \phi \omega \nu \) in \( \Gamma \alpha \phi \epsilon \), for we chuse to refer to the Greek, as being of
of all languages the most complete, as well in this respect, as in others.

And so much for Participles(a).

(a) The Latins are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in or (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as Loquens, Locutus, Locuturus) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in O, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as Scribens, and Scripturus) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as Scriptus) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as Scribendus and Docendus for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for γεσὰγας they say cum scripsisset—for γεςαμισας dum scribitur, &c. In English we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The English Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Language, it seems
The nature of Verbs and Participles being understood, that of Adjectives becomes easy. A Verb implies (as we have said) both an Attribute, and Time, and an Assertion; a Participle only implies an Attribute, and Time, and an Adjective only implies an Attribute; that is to say, in other Words, an Adjective has no Assertion, and only denotes such an Attribute, as has not its essence either in Motion or its Privation.—Thus in general the Attributes of quantity, quality, and relation (such as many and few, great and little, black and white, good and bad, double, treble, quadruple, seems wrong to annihilate the few Traces, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, it was wrote, for, it was written; he was drove, for, he was driven; I have went, for, I have gone, &c. in all which instances a Verb is absurdly used to supply the proper Participle, without any necessity from the want of such Word.
It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of Motion, assume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in albeo, tumeo, \( \sigma \xi \omega \), and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, Verbal Adjectives. It is in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus doctus, in Latin, and learned in English, lose their power, as Participles, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus Vir eloquens means not a man now speaking, but a man who possesses the habit of speaking, whether he speak or no. So when we say in English, he is a thinking Man, an understanding Man, we mean not a person, whose mind is in actual
actual Energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. It is indeed no wonder, as all Attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in natural species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

We have shewn already (b) in the Instances of Φιλιστιζειν, Syllaturire, Ἀποκαισαρωθώναι, and others, how Substantives may be transformed into Verbal Attributives. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into Adjectives. When we say the party of Pompey, the stile of Cicero, the philosophy of Socrates,
ocrates, in these cases the party, the stile, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons, whom they respect. Those persons therefore perform the part of Attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then they actually pass into Attributes, and assume, as such, the form of Adjectives. And thus it is we say, the Pompeian party, the Ciceronian stile, and the Socratic philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet of Brass, we say, a braven Trumpet; for a Crown of Gold, a golden Crown, &c. Even Pronominal Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus, instead of saying, the Book of Me, of Thee, and of Him, we say, My Book, Thy Book, and His Book; instead of saying the Country of Us, of You, and of Them, we say Our Country, Your Country, and Their Country, which Words may be called so many Pronominal Adjectives.
It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no sex\(^{(c)}\). And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their Substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote Attributes; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as never properly denoting Substances.—But of this we have spoken before\(^{(d)}\).

The Attributives hitherto treated, that is to say, Verbs, Participles, and

\(^{(c)}\) Sup. p. 171.

\(^{(d)}\) Sup. C. VI. Note \((a)\). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.
and Adjectives, may be called Attributes of the First Order. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed Attributes of the Second Order, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.
Concerning Attributives of the second Order.

As the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote the Attributes of Substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the Attributes only of Attributes.

To explain by examples in either kind—when we say, Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote; in these instances the Attributives eloquent, and wrote, are immediately referable to the substantives, Cicero, Virgil, &c. As therefore denoting the Attributes of Substances, we call them Attributives of the first Order. But when we say Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote
wrote admirably; in these instances, the
Attributives, Moderately, Exceedingly,
Indifferently, Admirably, are not refer-
able to Substantives, but to other Attribu-
tives, that is, to the words, Eloquent and
Wrote. As therefore denoting Attributes of Attributes, we call them ATTRIBU-
TIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER.

Grammarians have given them the Name of 'Επιφηματα, Adverbia, Ad-
verbs. And indeed if we take the word 'Ρημα, or Verb, in its most compre-
hensive Signification, as including not only Verbs properly so called, but also Particiles and Adjectives [an usage, which may be justified by the best autho-
rities(a)] we shall find the name, Επιφη-

(a) Thus Aristotle in his Treatise de Interpretatione, instances "Ανθρωπος as a Noun, and Ανδρας as a Verb. So Ammonius —κατα τυ το σημαίνειν, το μιν ΚΑΛΟΣ κ' 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ κ' οσα τοιαύτα—'ΡΗΜΑΤΑ λίγοθα ι' εκ ΟΝΟ-
ΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signification (that is of de-
noting the Attributes of Substance and the Predicate 

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μα, or Adverb, to be a very just appellation, as denoting a Part of Speech, the natural Appendage of Verbs. So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an Adverb can no more subsist without its Verb, than a Verb can subsist without its Substantive. It is the same here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its existence requires a solid Body(b).

Among

in Propositions) the words, Fair, Just, and the like, are called Verbs, and not Nouns. Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arist de Interp. L. I. c. 1. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note (a) p. 87.

In the same manner the Stoics talked of the Participle. Nam Participium connumerantes Verbis, Participiale Verbum vocabant vel Casuale. Priscian, L. I. p. 574.

(b) This notion of ranging the Adverb under the same Genus with the Verb (by calling them both Attributives) and of explaining it to be the Verb's Epithet or Adjective (by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conformable
Among the Attributes of Substance are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we say, a white Garment, a high Mountain. Now some of these Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intension, and Remission. Thus we say, a Garment exceedingly white; a Mountain tolerably high, or moderately high. It is plain therefore that

conformable to the best authorities. Theodore Gaza defines an Adverb, as follows—μέγος λόγων κατὰ ἰδιότητος λέγομεν, ἐπὶ ἰδιότητος ἰδιότης. A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb’s Adjective. L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an Aptote, since its principal sometimes has cases, as in Valde Sapiens; sometimes has none, as in Valde amat.) Priscian’s definition of an Adverb is as follows—Adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio Verbis adjectur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomin. apppellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vivit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says—Etiam Adverbia Nominibus vel Verbis connumerabant, & quasi adjectiva Verborum nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 3. sub fin.
that Intention and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. — Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, Intension and Remission. The Greeks have their ἐνδαλίζα, πάνυ, εἴνιξα; the Latins their valdè, vehementer, maxime, satis, mediocriter; the English their greatly, vastly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indifferently, &c.

Further than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be compared together. Thus if the Garment A be exceedingly White, and the Garment B be moderately White, we may say, the Garment A is more white than the Garment B.

In these Instances the Adverb More not only denotes Intension, but relative Intension. Nay we stop not here. We not only denote Intension merely relative
tive but relative Intension, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say the Mountain $A$ is more high than the Mountain $B$, but that it is the most high of all Mountains. Even Verbs, properly so called, as they admit simple Intensions, so they admit also these comparative ones. Thus in the following Example — *Fame he loveth more than Riches, but Virtue of all things he loveth most* —the Words more and most denote the different comparative Intensions of the Verbal Attributive, Loveth.

And hence the rise of Comparison, and of its different Degrees; which cannot well be more, than the two Species above mentioned, one to denote Simple Excess, and one to denote Superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited Number, when in all subjects, susceptible of Intension, the intermediate Excesses are in a manner
iner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of more White, between the first Simple White, and the Superlative, Whitest; the same may be said of more Great, more Strong, more Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about three such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is no Comparison at all, and because their Superlative is a Comparative, as much as their Comparative itself. Examples to evince this may be found everywhere.

Socrates was the most wise of all the Athenians—Homer was the most sublime of all Poets.—

—Cadit et Ripheus Justissimus unus
Qui fuit in Teucris—

Virg.

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BOOK THE FIRST.

It must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, seem sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the *Degree*, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, *et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes.*

Rusticior *paulo est*—

*In the Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave man,—*that is to say, not the *bravest* and *most learned* Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities *in an eminent Degree*.

*The Authors of Language* have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say *FAIER*; instead of *Most fair*, *FAIREST*, and the same holds true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. 

""
Latin. This Practice however has reached no farther than to Adjectives, or at least to Participles, sharing the nature of Adjectives. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some Attributives, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure; as when we say, a Circular Table, a Quadrangular Court, a Conical Piece of Metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it equally, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all Attributives, denoting definite Quantities, whether continuous or discrete, whether absolute or relative.—

Thus
Thus the *two-foot* Rule A cannot be *more* a *two-foot* Rule, than any other of the same length. *Twenty* Lions cannot be *more twenty* than *twenty* Flies. If A and B be both *triple* or *quadruple* to C, they cannot be *more triple*, or *more quadruple*, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be *no Comparison* without Intension and Remission; there can be *no* Intension and Remission in things *always definite*; and such are the Attributives, which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why *no Substantive is susceptible of these Comparative Degrees*. *A Mountain* cannot be said *more to be*, or *to exist*, than a *Mole-hill*, but the *More* and *Less* must be sought for in their Quantities. In like manner when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called *more a Lion*, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is *more fierce, more speedy*, or exceeding
ing in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are more bulky, more strong, &c. the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes.—So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite—that Substance is not susceptible of more and less(c). But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of Adverbs.

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attributes already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of Quantity continuous; Once, Twice, Thrice, are Adverbs of Quantity discrete; More and Most, Less and

(c) εν ἀντιδικοῖτα ἢ ἐσια τὸ μάλλον ἀν τόντιον, Categor. c. 5. See also Sanctius, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also Priscian, p. 598. Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Nomminibus Adjectivis, &c.
and Least, to which may be added Equally, Proportionally, &c. are Adverbs of Relation. There are others of Quality, as when we say, Honestly industrious, Prudently brave, they fought bravely, he painted finely, a Portico formed Circularly, a Plain cut Triangul arly, &c.

And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same Essence, assumes different grammatical forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ Honest, Honestly, and Honesty. The Answer is, they are in Essence the same, but they differ, in as much as Honest is the Attributive of a Substantive; Honestly, of a Verb; and Honesty, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the Power of a Substantive, so as to stand by itself.

The Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to Verbs of every Species; but
but there are some which are peculiar to *Verbs properly so called*, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All *Motion* and *Rest* imply *Time* and *Place*, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper *Adverbs*; *of Place*, as when we say, *he stood there*; *he went hence*; *he travelled far*, &c.: *of Time*, as when we say, *he stood then*; *he went afterward*; *he travelled formerly*, &c. Should it be asked—why *Adverbs of Time*, when *Verbs* have *Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' *Tenses* may be sufficient to denote the greater distinctions of *Time*, yet to denote them all by *Tenses* would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of *Forms*, to denote *Yesterday*, *To-day*, *To-morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Just now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Presently*, *Soon*, *Hereafter*, &c.? It was this then that made the
Temporal Adverbs necessary, over and above the Tenses.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the Intensions and Remissions peculiar to Motion, such as speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c. as also Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions, such as ἀνω and υπάρ, from ἀνά and υπάρ, in English upward and downward, from up and down. In some instances the Preposition suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, circa equitat, he rides about; prope cecidit, he was near falling; Verum ne post conferás culpam in me, But do not after lay the blame on me(d).

There

There are likewise Adverbs of Interrogation, such as Where, Whence, Whither, How; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their Interrogative power, they assume that of a Relative, so as even to represent the Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun. Thus Ovid,

Et Seges est, ubi Troja fuit—
translated in our old English Ballad,

And Corn doth grow where Troy town stood.

That is to say, Seges est in eo loco, in quo, &c. Corn groweth in that place, in which, &c. the power of the Relative, being implied in the Adverb. Thus Terence,

Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,
Ubi me excarnufices— Heaut. IV. 6.

where ubi relates to res, and stands for quibus rebus.
BOOK THE FIRST.

It is in like manner that the Relative Pronoun upon occasion becomes an Interrogative, at least in Latin and English. Thus Horace,

*Quem* Virum aut Heroa tyrâ, vel acri Tibiad sumes celebrare, Clio?

So Milton,

Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?

The reason of all this is as follows. The Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, Relatives. Even when they become Interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject, which is antecedent, definite, and known; with an Interrogation, to a Subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown, and which
which it is expected that the Answer should express and ascertain.

Who first seduc'd them?

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, though unknown, the Pronoun, Who, has a reference.

Th' infernal Serpent

Here in the Answer we have the Subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the Who in the Interrogation is (we see) as much a Relative, as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all, It was the infernal Serpent, who first seduced them.

And thus is it that Interrogatives and Relatives mutually pass into each other.

And so much for Adverbs, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all Attributives. We have likewise
wise attempted to explain their general nature, which we have found to consist in being the Attributes of Attributes. There remains only to add, that adverbs may be derived from almost every part of speech: from prepositions, as when from after we derive afterwards—from participles, and through these from verbs, as when from know we derive knowing, and thence knowingly; from scio, sciens, and thence scienter—from adjectives, as when from virtuous and vicious, we derive virtuously and viciously—from substantives, as when from piθυνειν, an ape, we derive πιθυνειν βλέπειν, to look apishly; from δεων, a lion, δεοντωδως, Leoninely—nay even from proper names, as when from socrates and demosthenes, we derive socratically and demosthenically.—It was socratically reasoned, we say; it was demosthenically spoken.* Of the same

same sort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such as Catiliniter from Catilina, Sisenniter from Sisenna, Tullianè from Tullius, &c.(e)

Nor are they thus extensive only in Derivation, but in Signification also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us,(f) that Adverbs may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal Genera. The Stoics too called the Adverb by the name of πανδεκτικος; and that from a view to the same multiform Nature. Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessa sibi rerum variâ potestate. It is thus that Sosipater explains the Word,(s) from whose

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(f) —Μιν δη τοι οὖν ἃμενον ἵσα αἰῶς τὰ ἐπιφθηνόν φιλοθέοι εἰκών τοίς ἀδελφοῖς ὑδροῦς, ἱσιαος, φοίνικας, χρώμας ξύλου, κ. τ. λ. Gram. Introd. L. II.
Book the First.

whose authority we know it to be Stoical. But of this enough.

And now having finished these principal parts of Speech, the substantive and the attributive, which are significant when alone, we proceed to those auxiliary parts, which are only significant, when associated. But as these make the subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.
HERMES

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Definitives.

What remains of our Work, is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once-formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.
DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, Articles, Articuli, Ἀρτικλιν. They are of two kinds, either those properly and strictly so called, or else the Pronominal Articles, such as This, That, Any, &c.

We shall first treat of those Articles more strictly so denominated, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

The visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least to some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head
head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it Dog, or Horse, or Lion, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, Animal.

But this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? Known, or unknown? Seen now for the first time, or seen before, and now remembered? It is here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (The). (A) respects our primary Perception, and denotes Individuals as unknown; (The) respects our secondary Perception, and denotes Individuals as known. To explain by an example—I see an object pass by, which I never saw till now. What do I say?—There...
goes a Beggar with a long Beard. The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I say then?—There goes the Beggar with the long Beard. The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

Yet mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, once vague, is now recognized as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past. (a)

The Truth is, the Articles (A) and (The) are both of them definitives, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most

(a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64.
most part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself unascertained, whereas the Article (The) ascertains the Individual also, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the Greeks have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'O. 'O ἄνθρωπος ἦ στεν, The man fell— ἄνθρωπος ἦ στεν, A Man fell without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn. (b) Even in English, where the Article

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(b) Τὰ γὰρ ἄριστωφότα πῶτε νομίζει, ἡ τῷ ἄγθρον παράθεσιν ὑπὸ οἰκίσμον τῇ περιστάτῳ ἔγει. Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person. Apoll. L. IV. c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ποιητὶ (τὸ Ἀρείου σε.) δὲ ἀναπόλησεν φρονηματικῶς τῷ ἐν τῇ συντάξει οἷον εἰ.
Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is expressed by the same Negation. Those are the Men, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. Those are Men, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many vague and uncertain Individuals, just as the Phrase, A Man, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

But

μὲν λέγει τις, ἄνθρωπος οἱκε, ἐδηλοῦ τίνα ἄθρωπον λέγει. οἱ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐδηλοῦ, περιγράφησάν τινὰ ἄθρωπον λέγει. Τῶτο δὲ αὐτὸ βάλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τῷ ἄθρωπον σημαντικὸν περὶ νόσον γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before the texture of the Discourse. Thus, if any one says "ἄθρωπος ἡμέρα, MAN CAME (which is the same, as when we say in English a man came) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says ἄθρωπος ἡμέρα, THE MAN CAME, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gazae. L. IV.
But tho' the Greeks have no Article correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their ὅ, to the Article ΤΗ. ὁ βασιλεὺς, ΤΗΣ Κίνγ; ΤΟ δῶρον, ΤΗΣ Γίφτ, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the Greek Article, as they are described by Apollonius, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

Εἰςιν ἦν καθὸ καὶ ἐν ἀλλοις ἀπεφθημέθα, ἵναν ἄρθρων ἢ ἀναφορὰ, ἢ ἐς ἱροκατειλεγ-μένα στρατωτε ψαρακατική.—Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again—Ὄν γὰρ δὴγε τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφοράν παρίσην, εἰ μὴ συμπα-ραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, ἢ ἐξαιρετὸς ἦσιν ἡ ἀναφο-ρὰ. For Nouns of themselves imply not Reference, unless they take to them the Ar-
ticle,
article, whose peculiar Character is Reference. Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προὐφεροκαταν γνώσιν διήλοι—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance: (c) His reasoning upon Proper Names is worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells us) often fall into Homonymie, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to Adjectives or Epithets. For example—there were two Grecian chiefs, who bore the name of Ajax. It was not therefore without reason, that Menestheus uses Epithets, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

(c) Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of Reference is as follows—Ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς περικατειλαγμένη προκόπῳ δευτέρα γνώσις, The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned, L. II. c. 3.
If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, —at least alone
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.

Apollonius proceeds—Even Epithets themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

In order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes an Article before it, that it may indicate a Reference to some single Person only, μοναδική ἄνωφορή, according to the Author's own Phrase: And thus it is we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικός, Trypho the Grammarian; Απολλόδωρος ὁ Κυριακός, Apollodorus the Cyrenean, &c. The Author's
Author's Conclusion of this Section is worth remarking. \( \text{Δεόντως ἄφα μαλ κατὰ τὸ τοιῶτον ἢ πρόσθεσις ἐγὼ τῇ ἄφθε, συνιδαξεῦ-} \) 
\( \text{σια τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ δύναμι—It is with} \) 
\( \text{reason therefore that the Article is here} \) 
\( \text{also added, as it brings the Adjective to} \) 
\( \text{an Individuality, as precise, as the proper} \) 
\( \text{Name.} \)

We may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the Article even common Appellatives, come to have the force of proper Names, and that unassisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the Athenians \( \text{Πλοῖον meant Ship; "Ενδέξα, Eleven; and "Ανθετος, The ship,} \) 
\( \text{meant that particular Ship, which they} \) 
\( \text{sent annually to Delos; 'Ο "Ενδέξα, The} \) 
\( \text{Eleven meant certain Officers of Justice; and 'Ο "Ανθετος, The man, meant} \) 
\( \text{their public Executioner. So in English,} \) 
\( \text{City,} \)

\((d) \text{See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by mistake Menelaus}\)
\( \text{is put for Menestheus.} \)
City, is a Name common to many places; and Speaker, a Name common to many Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, the City means our Metropolis; and the Speaker, a high Officer in the British Parliament.

And thus it is by an easy transition, that the Article, from denoting Reference, comes to denote Eminence also; that is to say, from implying an ordinary pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal Notoriety. Thus among the Greeks "O Ποιητής, the Poet, meant Homer (c); and "O Σταγειρίτης, the Stagirite, meant Aristotle; not that there

(c) There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle twice denotes Euripides by the Phrase ὁ ποιητής, once at the end of the seventh Book of his Nicomachian Ethics, and again in his Physics, L. II. 2. Plato also in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. Edit. Serr.) denotes Ἡσίωδ after the same manner.
there were not many Poets, beside Homer; and many Stagirites, beside Aristotle; but none equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

It is on a like principle that Aristotle tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert—ἐἶναι τὴν ἴδιον ἄγαθον, or, ΤΟ ἄγαθον—that, Pleasure is A Good, or, The Good. The first only makes it a common Object of Desire, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it that supreme and sovereign Good, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours.(f)

But to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as re-

quire defining, for it is by nature a Definitive.—And what Words are these?—Not those which already are as definite, as may be. Nor yet those, which, being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those, which though indefinite, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming definite.

Upon these Principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, O ΕΓΩ, The I, or o στ, The Thou, because nothing can make those Pronouns more definite, than they are. (8) The same may be asserted.

(8) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, to refuse coalescence with the Article. Ἐξείνω ὡς Ἀντωνιμία, τὸ μετὰ δεῖξεως ἢ ἀναφορὰς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ἢ ἐ συνεις τὸ ἀζθευόν. That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with which the Article doth not associate. —L. II. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns—Πάνι δὲ—ἐν ἰπιδέχοντι ἀζθευόν. L. IV. Priscian says the same. Jure igitur apud Græcos prima et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine
serted of Proper Names, and though the Greeks say ὅ ἴωνδατυς, ὃ Ξένθιττο, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in Greek, ΟΙ ἈΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in English, THE BOTH, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous.—Thus, if it be said, I have read both Poets, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δυάς ἐγνωσμένη, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself,(h) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, I have read Two Poets, this may mean any pair out of

sine dubio demonstrativa sunt; articulis adjungi non possunt; nectertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938.
—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. Supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas Pronomen.

(h) Apollon. L. I. c. 16.
of all that ever existed. And hence this Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to assume the Article, whenever it would become *definite.* And thus it is, *The Two* in *English,* and οἱ Δυο in *Greek,* mean nearly the same thing, as *Both* or Ἄμφοτεροι.—Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some *primary* and *indefinite* Perception, while the Article, *The,* has reference to some *secondary* and *definite*; hence I say the Reason, why it is bad *Greek* to say Δυο οἱ Ἄνθρωποι, and bad *English,* to say Two the Men. Such Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incompatibles,* that is *Q 2* to

*This explains Servius on the XIIth Ἀειδ. v. 511, where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amborum. In English or Greek the Article would have done the business, for the Two, or τοῖν δύοιν are equivalent to Both or Ἀμφότεροι, but not so Duorum, because the Latins have no Articles to prefix."

† Sup. p. 215, 216.
to say of a defined Substantive with an undefined Attributive. On the contrary to say in Greek ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in English, BOTH the MEASURE, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, it is correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΤΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEASURE, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, extends its Power as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to define them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, because they are by Nature as definite as may be, so there are others, which admit it not, because they are not to be defined at all. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about Substances, we cannot say ΟΤΙΣ ΟΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΤΟΣ,
BOOK THE SECOND.

ΟΤΤΟΣ, ΤΙΟΙΣ ΤΗΝ; THE SAME as to 'Qualities and both kinds of Quantity. We say without an Article, ΠΟΙΟΣ ΠΟΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in English, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reason is, that the Articles Ο and ΤΗΕ, respect Beings, already known; Interrogatives respect Beings, about which we are ignorant; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

In a word the natural Associates with Articles are all those common Appellatives, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different Article, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge. (k)

Q 3 We

(1) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, τινα διωτατον των αξων, a Part of Speech most contrary, most averse to Articles, L. IV. c. 1.

(k) What is here said respects the two Articles which we
We shall here subjoin a few Instances of the Peculiar Power of Articles.

Every Proposition consists of a Subject, and a Predicate. In English these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing first, the Predicate last. Happiness is Pleasure—Here, Happiness is the Subject; Pleasure, the Predicate. If we change their order, and say, Pleasure is Happiness; then Pleasure becomes the Subject, and Happiness the Predicate. In Greek these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the Article, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. Happiness is Pleasure—ὑδονη ἕνδαιμονια—Pleasure is Happiness—ὑ ὑδονη ἕνδαιμονια—Fine things are difficult—καλετὰ τὰ καλά—Difficult things are fine—τὰ καλετὰ καλὰ.
In Greek it is worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same Article, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ὁ Πτολεμαίος γυμνασιαρχής ἐτιμήθη—Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured. The Participle γυμνασιαρχής has here no other force, than to denote to us the Time, when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the Article, and say, Ὁ γυμνασιαρχής Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured. The Participle in this case, being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour.\(^{(1)}\)

Q 4  In

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\(^{(1)}\) Apollon. L. I. c. 33, 34.
In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the Articles, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the Man.* In that single the, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the Article, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a Man. Might not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position.

Non dices Hodie, quorsum haec tam pudita tendant?

But

* ΣΥ ΕΙ 'O ANHP. Bavih. B'. κφ. 6.
But enough of such Speculations. The only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that "minute Change in Principles leads to mighty Change in Effects; so that well are Principles intitled to our regard, however in appearance they may be trivial and low."

The Articles already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the Pronominal Articles, such as, This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns, (m) where we have shewn, when

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(m) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue—Noster sermo Articulos non desideratur; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. His declaratis, satis constat Graecorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid prescribendum est, quod Graeci per articulum efficiunt (.pag. 6 ül Legislature)
when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. — Thus when we say, this Picture I approve, but that I dislike, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, Some men are virtuous, but All men are mortal, what is the natural Effect of this All and Some, but to define that Universality, and Particularity, which would remain

*δέλατα* expletur a Latinis per *Is aut Ille; Is, aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad prescribendum intellectionem, quae latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Caesar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Caesares. *Sic Graece Καῖσαρ* *& ιωνγάνγας*. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.
remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as—Some substances have sensation; others want it—Chuse any way of acting, and some men will find fault, &c. For here some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different Parts of a given Whole; some, to denote a definite Part; any, to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the remaining Part, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes a large indefinite Portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining Part, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,

Excudent alii spirantia mollius aer;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de mare
more vultus;
Orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera
dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane,
memento, &c.

Æn. VI.

Nothing
HERMES.

Ch. I. Nothing can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; one Act set as equal to many other Acts taken together; and the Roman singly (for it is Tu Romane, not Vos Romani) to all other Men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of Alii to Tu.

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of Connectives.
Concerning Connectives, and first those called Conjunctions.

Connectives are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either Sentences or Words, are called by the different Names of Conjunctions, or Prepositions. Of these Names, that of the Preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the Conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the Conjunction first, because it connects, not Words, but Sentences. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we began this inquiry*, and which led us,

* Sup. p. 11, 12.
us, by parity of reason, to consider Sentences themselves before Words. Now the Definition of a Conjunction is as follows—a Part of Speech, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making two or more significant Sentences to be one significant Sentence.(a)

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather single Parts of Speech, than whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This Sanctius justly explodes.—Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipse enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.—Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18, and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsiderius prodidero; neque enim, quod aient, partes alias conjungit (ipser enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed conjunctio est, qua conjungit Orationes plures. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

This
This therefore being the general Idea of Conjunctions, we deduce their Species in the following manner.

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἀσμὸς, ἐκ ἀκλίνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημασιών δὲ, ὑπὲρ τετρυθία μιᾶν φωνὴν σημασίαν. An articulate sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as one, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men are by nature social, it is their
CONJUNCTIONS, while they connect Sentences, either connect also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these

their Interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences.

(1.) Men are by nature social.  (2.) It is Man's Interest to be just.  (3.) It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just. The first two of these Sentences are made One by the Conjunction, If; these, One with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, Tho'; and the three, thus united, make that φωνὴ μία συμμαθηκὴ, that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. Ὅ γὰς συνετέμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὸ σωλλή: ὃς ἵκτειθή, ἔλλοι ὅτι τεναντοί ἐσαι τὸ ἐν σωλλῆ. The Conjunction makes many, one; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, ἡλθο, ἀπάνθοσα, ἔδομεν, veni, occurri, rogavi, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for ἡλθο, ἀπάνθοσα, and ἔδομεν, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's
these two Sentences—Rome was enslaved—Caesar was ambitious—and connect them together by the Conjunction BECAUSE. Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Caesar was ambitious. Here the Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say,—Manners must be reformed, or Liberty will be lost—Here the Conjunction, or, though it join the Sentences, yet as to their respective Meanings, is a perfect Disjunc—

Ammonius's Account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὰ τῶν λόγων ὃ μὲν ὑπάρχει μίαν σημαίνων, διέκειτο εἰς, ἀνάλογον τὸν μονδέντα τυπικῶν εἴλων, ἐπεὶ διὰ τῶν ἰενομομένων ὃ δὲ σαλίζοντα ὑπάρχεις δηλῶν, ἔνα (lege διὰ) τινά δὲ συνόδουν οἴωνοι πὼς δοξῶν, ἀνάλογοι τῇ τῇ τῇ ἐκ συνόδου γενομένης εἴλων ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένης ἰδίον τῇ ἴδιοι. Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly one, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called on this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made one by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity. *Am. in Lib. de Interpret, p. 54. 6.
Disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions conjoin Sentences, yet with respect to the Sense, some are Conjunctive, and some Disjunctive; and hence it is that we derive their different Species.

The Conjunctions which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings, are either Copulatives, or Continuatives. The principal Copulative in English is, And. The Continuatives are If, Because, Therefore, That, &c. The Difference between these is this—The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects whose natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate Sentences into one continuous

continuous Whole, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an essential Co-incidence.

—To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, Lysippus was a Statuary, and Priscian was a Grammarian—The Sun shineth, and the Sky is clear—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, Lysippus was a Statuary, because Priscian was a Grammarian; tho' not to say, the Sun shineth, because the Sky is clear. The Reason is, with respect to the first, the Co-incidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, it is essential, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between Copulatives and Continuatives(c).

R 2 As

(c) Copulativa est, qua copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more explicit—si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessarió,
As to Continuatives, they are either Suppository, such as, If; or Positive, such as Because, Therefore, As, &c. Take Examples of each—you will live happily, if you live honestly—you live happily, because you live honestly. The Difference between these Continuatives is this—The Suppositives denote Connection, but assert not actual Existence; the Positives imply both the one and the other.

Farther

cessario, aut non necessario, tum sunt Copulative, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of Continuatives is as follows. Continuatives sunt, quae continuationem & consequentiam rerum signifient—ibid. Scaliger's account is—caussam aut præstitununt, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was Συνδέσμος συνεπελεξός; for the Continuative, συναπτικός; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the name Συναπτικοί, and the Latins that of Continuator, to those...
Farther than this, the Positives above mentioned are either causal, such as, because, since, as, &c. or collective, such as, therefore, wherefore, then, &c. The difference between these is this—The causals subjoin causes to effects—The sun is in eclipse, because the moon intervenes.

Conjunctions, which we have called suppositive or conditional, while the positive they called ταχεύονται, or subcontinuative. They agree however in describing their proper characters. The first according to Gaza are, ὅπου ταχεύει μὴ ὅ, ἀκολουθεῖ δι τινα καὶ ταχεύει διαλύεις—L. IV. Priscian says, they signify to us, qualis est ordinatio & nauta rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua essentiae rerum—p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin sine substitentiâ necessariâ; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the positive, or ταχεύονται (to use his own name) Gaza tells us, ὅτι καὶ ταχεύει μετὰ ταχεύαν συμάλλασιν—And Priscian says, causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum—And Scaliger, non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt. Ibid.
venes—The Collectives subjoin Effects to Causes—The Moon intervenes, therefore the Sun is in Eclipse. Now we use Causals in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and Collectives, in Demonstrations, and Science properly so called, where

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the Positive Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the Suppositive, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what actually is; the Suppositive extend to Possibles, nay even as far as to Impossibles? Thus it is false to affirm, As it is Day, it is Light, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, If it be Day, it is Light, because the, If, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—amplitudinem Continuative percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is, (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.
where the Cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences).

All these Continuatives are resolvable into Copulatives. Instead of, Because it is Day, it is light, we may say, It is Day, and it is Light. Instead of, If it be Day, it is Light, we may say, It is at the same time necessary to be Day, and to be Light: and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the Copulative extends to all Connexions, as well to the essential, as to the casual or fortuitous. Hence therefore the Continuative may be resolved into a Copulative and something more, that is to say, into a Copulative implying an essential Co-incidence in the subjects conjoined.

R 4

As

(c) The Latins called the Causals, Causales or Causative; the Collectives, Collective or Illative; The Greeks called the former 'Αιτιολογικός, and the latter Συλλογικός.

(f) Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes ha, prop-tereat quod Causa cum Effectu Suápte naturâ conjuncta est. Scal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.
As to Causal Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, the Material Cause—The Trumpet sounds, because it is made of Metal—the Formal—The Trumpet sounds, because it is long and hollow—The Efficient—The Trumpet sounds, because an Artist blows it—The Final—The Trumpet sounds, that it may raise our courage. Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are expressed by the strong affirmation of the Indicative Mode, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the Contingent or Potential. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be first in Speculation, is always last in Event. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which, like other Contingents, may either
either happen or not\(^{(e)}\). Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as, That, \\(\text{in}\\), Ut, &c.

**The Sum is, that all Conjunctions, which connect both Sentences and their Meanings, are either Copulative, or Continuative;** the Continuatives are either Conditional, or Positive; and the Positives are either Causal or Collective.

**And now we come to the Disjunctive Conjunctions**, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they disjoin the Sense, they conjoin the Sentences\(^{(h)}\).

WITH

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\(^{(e)}\) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 280.

\(^{(h)}\) 'Οι δὲ διατυπωμένως διακαταλήγοντες, ἰδίως ἡ συνενεκτική ἀπὸ τοῦ προσωπικοῦ διακαταλήγοντι, τὴν φάσιν ἑπιστολῆσιν. Guae Gram. L. IV. Disjunctivæ sunt,
With respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of Union diffused throughout all things, by which this Whole is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation; so there is a Principle of Diversity diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order).

Now

sunt, quae, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunction habent. Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intellection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly synthetical, as any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. 1. Note (b) p. 3.

(9) The Diversity, which adorns Nature may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as Individuals, but if we recur to their Species, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are Socrates and Plato. Others differ as to Species, but as to Genus are the same:
Now it is to express in some degree the Modifications of this Diversity, that Disjunctive Conjunctions seem first to have been invented.

Of these Disjunctives, some are Simple, some Adversative—Simple, as when we say, either it is Day, or it is the same; such are Man and Lion. There are others again, which differ as to Genus, and co-incide only in those transcendental Comprehensions of Ens, Being, Existence, and the like: such are Quantities and Qualities, as for example an Ounce, and the Colour, White. Lastly all Being whatever differs, as Being from Non-being.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of Opposition with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is it self, and not any of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not the same. In Relatives, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in these it is more striking, than in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In Contraries, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad,
is Night—Adversative, as when we say, It is not Day, but it is Night. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than merely disjoin; the Adversative disjoin, with an Opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the Adversative are definite; the Simple, indefinite. Thus when we say, The Number of

Bad, Virtuous and Vicious, in these the Opposition goes still farther, because these not only differ, but are even destructive of each other. But the most potent Opposition is that of *Ἀνίφαρις*, or Contradiction, when we oppose Proposition to Proposition, Truth to Falsity, asserting of any Subject, either it is, or it is not. This indeed is an Opposition, which extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its Negative, though multitudes by nature have neither Relatives, nor Contraries.

Besides these Modes of Diversity, there are others that deserve notice: such for instance, as the Diversity between the Name of a thing, and its Definition; between the various Names, which belong to the same thing, and the various things, which are denoted by the same Name; all which Diversities upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of Diversity.
of Three is not an even Number, but an odd, we not only disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, The Number of the Stars is either even or odd, though we assert one Attribute to be, and the other not to be, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for simple Disjunctives\(^{(k)}\).

\(^{(k)}\) The simple Disjunctive \(\&\), or *Vel*, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used definitely, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with \(\& \ \&\), or, *Et non*. It is thus *Gaza* explains that Verse of Homer.

\[\text{Βέλομ' ἔγω λαὸν σοῦ ἐμεναι, ἦ ἀπολέσθαι.}\]

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, and not be destroyed*, the Conjunction \(\&\) being *ἀναγετικός*, or sublative. It must however be confess, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of *μᾶλλον*, or *ἀντίς* concerning which see the Commentators.
As to Adversative Disjunctives, it has been said already that they imply opposition. Now there can be no opposition of the same Attribute, in the same Subject, as when we say, Nireus was beautiful; but the Opposition must be either of the same Attribute in different Subjects, as when we say, Brutus was a Patriot, but Caesar was not—or of different Attributes in the same Subject, as when we say, Gorgias was a Sophist, but not a Philosopher—or of different Attributes in different Subjects, as when we say, Plato was a Philosopher, but Hippias was a Sophist.

The Conjunctions used for all these purposes may be called Absolute Adversatives.

But there are other Adversatives, besides these; as when we say, Nireus was more beautiful, than Achilles—Virgil was as great a Poet, as Cicero was an Orator.
The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only Opposition, but that Equality or Excess, which arises among Subjects from their being compared. And hence it is they may be called Adversatives of Comparison.

Besides the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are unless and altho'. For example—Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, altho' Hector defend it. The nature of these Adversatives may be thus explained. As every Event is naturally allied to its Cause, so by parity of reason it is opposed to its Preventive. And as every Cause is either adequate (1) or in-adequate (in-adequate,

(1) This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.
quate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every Preventive. Now adequate Preventives are exprest by such Adversatives, as unless—Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved; that is, This alone is sufficient to prevent it. The Inadequate are exprest by such Adversatives, as although—Troy will be taken, although Hector defend it; that is, Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual.

The Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures\(^{(m)}\). They may be better perhaps called Adversatives Adequate and Inadequate.

And thus it is that all Disjunctives, that is Conjunctions, which conjoin

\(^{(m)}\) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, Adversativa, or \(\text{'\(\text{\'}\)ant\(\text{\'\}\)at\(\text{\'}\)ixo\(\text{\'}\)e}\).
join Sentences, but not their Meanings, are either SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE, and that all ADVERSATIVES are either Absolute or Comparative; or else Adequate or In-adequate.

We shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

In the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the same Disjunctive appears to have greater or less force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, Every Number is even, or odd—Every Proposition is true, or false—nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the Disjunctive, because no things are in Nature more incompatible than the Subjects. But if we say, That Object is a Triangle, or Figure contained under three right lines—the (or) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than distinctly
tinctly to express the Thing, first by its Name, and then by its Definition. So if we say, That Figure is a Sphere, or a Globe, or a Ball—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the several Names, which belong to the same Thing

Again—the Words, When and Where, and all others of the same nature, such as, Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c. may be properly called Adverbial Conjunctions, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—of Conjunctions, as they conjoin Sentences; of Adverbs, as they denote

(n) The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called Subdisjunctiva, a Subdisjunctive; and that was Sive. Alexander sive Paris; Mars sive Maxors. The Greek ἐνταύτω seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, Scaliger thus speaks—Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivorum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctive. Nam Disjunctive sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctae autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris. De C. L. Lat. c. 170.
denote the Attributes either of Time, or of Place.

Again—these Adverbial Conjunctions, and perhaps most of the Prepositions (contrary to the Character of accessory Words, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of obscure Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like Zoophytes in Nature; a kind of middle Beings, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together.

S 2 And


(p) It is somewhat surprising that the politest and most elegant of the Attic Writers, and Plato above all the
HERMES.

AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS, their Genus, and their Species.

CHAP.

the rest, should have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is Connection in the Meaning, there must be Words had to connect; but that where the Connection is little or none, such connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an elegance, to the Antients unknown?

Venimus ad summam fortunam, &c.
Concerning those Connectives, called Prepositions.

Prepositions by their name express their Place, but not their Character.—Their Definition will distinguish them from the former Connectives. A Preposition is a Part of Speech, devoid itself of Signification, but so formed as to unite two Words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves (a). This connective Power, (which relates

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Πρεσβετικὸς Συνδεσμός, Præpositiva Conjunction, a Prepositive Conjunction. Ὡς μὲν ἐν χ' κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας συνδέσεις οἱ συνδέσεις συνδεσμικὸς συνάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικά, λίπεκλαι ἤμεν ἐν χ' ἀφορμὴ ἐνεργεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Ἐστικοῖς τῇ καλεῖσθαι ἀυτὰς Πρεσβετικὰς Συνδεσμοὺς. Now in what manner even in other applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence
relates to \textit{Words} only, and not \textit{Sentences}) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help, and as it were compulsion.—Thus in Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone coalesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities coalesce immediately with their Substances. Thus it is we say, \textit{a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain}; and from this \textit{Natural Concord of Subject and Accident}, arises the \textit{Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective}.

\begin{quote}
whence too the Stoics took occasion to call them \textit{Prepositive Conjunctions}. \textit{Apollon. L. IV. c. 5, p. 313}.—Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive \textit{Sketch}, than a complete \textit{Definition}, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See \textit{Gaz. L. IV. de Preposit}. \textit{Prisc. L. XIV. p. 983}.
\end{quote}
In like manner Actions coalesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus it is we say, *Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered*. Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, Agent, Energy, and Patient, coalesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius*. And hence, that is from these Modes of natural Coalescence, arises the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb. Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as ran, beautiful, learned, he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c. And hence the Coalescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.

The general Conclusion appears to be this. "**Those Parts of Speech unite of themselves in Gram-**

S 4  "**MAR,**
"Man, whose original Arche-
types unite of themselves in
"Nature." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that the great Objects of Natural Union are Substance and Attribute. Now tho' Substances naturally co-incide with their Attributes, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, one with another. And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that Body is impenetrable; that two Bodies cannot possess the same place; that the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances, &c.

From these principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the Substantive without difficulty co-incides with the Verb, from the natural Co-incidence of Substance and Energy—The Sun warmeth. So likewise the Energy with
with the *Subject, on which it operates*—*Warmeth the Earth*. So likewise both *Substance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*.—*The Splendid Sun,*—*Genially warmeth—the fertile Earth*. But suppose we were desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, *Air,* or *Beams.* How would these co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives,* for both those places are already filled; the Nominative by the Substance, *Sun*; the Accusative by the Substance, *Earth*. Not as Attributes to these last, or to any other thing; for *Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made.* Here then we perceive the Rise and Use of *Prepositions.* By these we connect those Substantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume for instance a pair of these Connectives, *Thro',* and *With,* and mark their Effect upon the Substances here mentioned.
tioned. The splendid Sun with his Beams genially warmeth thro' the Air the fertile Earth. The Sentence, as before, remains entire and one; the Substantives required are both introduced; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the Relations of Place (c). The reason is, this is that grand Relation, which Bodies or natural Substances maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at rest.

It may be said indeed that in the Continuity of Place they form this Universe

(c) Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquá notā, quāto non significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quāe motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Præpositionis essentiam definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.
BOOK THE SECOND.

VERSE OF VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as much ONE by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the contiguous Relation of Body, as when we say, Caius walketh with a Staff; the Statue stood upon a Pedestal; the River ran over a Sand; others for the detached Relation, as when we say, He is going to Italy; the Sun is risen above the Hills; these Figs came from Turkey. So as to Motion and Rest, only with this difference, that here the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, that Lamp hangs from the Ceiling, the Preposition, From, assumes a Character of Quiescence. But if we say, that Lamp is falling from the Ceiling, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of Motion. So in Milton,

—To support uneasie steps
Over the Burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here over denotes Motion.

Again—
—He—with looks of cordial Love
Hung over her enamour’d—Par. L. IV.

Here over denotes Rest.

But though the original use of Prepositions was to denote the Relations of Place, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to denote Relations, as well intellectual as local. Thus, because in Place he, who is above, has commonly the advantage over him, who is below, hence we transfer over and under to Dominion and Obedience; of a King we say, he ruled over his People; of a common Soldier, he served under such a General. So too we say, with Thought; without Attention; thinking over a Subject; under Anxiety; from Fear; out of Love; through Jealousy, &c. All which instances, with many others of like
like kind, shew that the first Words of Men, like their first Ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible Objects, and that in afterdays, when they began to discern with their Intellect, they took those Words, which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual Conceptions. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of Metaphor, or that of Coining new Words, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion (d).

Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to Anaxagoras, ὁμοιομένως; to Plato, Ποιήσας; to Cicero, Qualitas; to Aristotle, Ἕλεξις; to the Stoics, ὄντις, περάτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to special Meanings, to the Platonics we may ascribe ὑδία; to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, ἑαυτοςία, and ἑαυτοςίαν; to the Stoics, ἄναληψις, ὑπόληψις, καθήκον; to the Pyrrhonists, ἐξεσθη, ἐδίχται, ἅπεφθο, &c.
In the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied \( \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \alpha \rho \alpha \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \nu, \) by way of Juxta-position, that is to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, without becoming a Part of it.

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends ancient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps, it is impossible he should attain.
But they may be used also \( \textit{κατὰ σύνθεσιν} \), by \textit{way of Composition}, that is, they may be prefixed to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (e). Thus in \textit{Greek} we have \( \textit{Εξισοδαί} \), in \textit{Latin}, \textit{Intelligere}, in \textit{English}, to \textit{Understand}. So also, to \textit{foretell}, to \textit{overact}, to \textit{undervalue}, to \textit{outgo}, &c. and in \textit{Greek} and \textit{Latin}, other instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of \textit{Place}, (f) as used either in its \textit{proper} or \textit{metaphorical} acceptation.

\textbf{Lastly,}

(e) See \textit{Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Praepositione.}

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space. \( \textit{E} \) and \( \textit{Ex} \) signify \textit{out of that Space}; \( \textit{Per} \), through \textit{it}, from beginning to end; \( \textit{In} \), within \textit{it}; \( \textit{Sub} \), under \textit{it}. Hence then
Lasty, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature,

then E and Per in composition augment: Enormis, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; Dico, to speak; Edico, to speak out; whence Edictum, an Edict, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So Terence,

Dico, Edico vobis—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an "Avzvris. Fari, to speak; Effari, to speak out—hence Effatum, an Axiom, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagnus, Perutilis, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, In and Sub diminish and lessen. Injustus, Iniquus, unjust, inequitable, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; Subniger, blackish; Subrubicundus, reddish; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. Inter, Between, implies Discontinuance,
Nature, being converted into Adverbs, and used in Syntax accordingly. Thus Homer,

—Γελαστε δε πασα σεφι χθον.
—And earth smil'd all around.

I. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter. One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of Cases in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is exprest by two

for in things continuous there can nothing lie between.

From these two comes, Interimo, to kill, that is to say, To take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also, Perimo, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, ἀναγενν, and the English Verb, To take off, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(9) See before, p. 205.
two Methods, either by Situation, or by Prepositions; the Nominative and Accusative Cases by Situation; the rest, by Prepositions. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning Prepositions.
Concerning Cases.

As Cases, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of Nouns, partly of Verbs, and partly of Prepositions; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present.

There are no Cases in the modern Languages, except a few among the primitive Pronouns, such as I and Me; Je, and Moy; and the English Genitive, formed by the addition of s, as when from Lion, we form Lion's; from Ship, Ship's. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances what a Case is, the Periphrasis.
H E R M E S.

Ch. IV. sis, which supplies its place, being the Case (as it were) unfolded. Thus Equi is analized into Du Cheval, Of the Horse, Equo into Au Cheval, To the Horse:—And hence we see that the Genitive and Dative Cases imply the joint Power of a Noun and a Preposition, the Genitive's Preposition being A, De, or Ex, the Dative's Preposition being Ad, or Versus.

We have not this assistance as to the Accusative, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

The Vocative we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the antient being supplied by the Nominative.

The Ablative likewise was used by the Romans only; a Case they seem to
to have adopted to associate with their Prepositions, as they had deprived their Genitive and Dative of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the Greeks do as well without it, and because with the Romans themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

There remains the Nominative; which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The Peripatetics held it to be no Case, and likened the Noun, in this its primary and original Form, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line AB.

The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if AB were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to AC, or AD. Hence then they only called
called these Variations πτωσείς, Cases, or Fallings. The Stoics on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the Nominative a Case also. Words they considered (as it were) to fall from the Mind, or discursive Faculty. Now when a Noun fell thence in its primary Form, they then called it πτωσίς ὀρθή, Cases rectus, an erect, or upright Case of Falling, such as AB, and by this name they distinguished the Nominative.—When it fell from the Mind under any of its variations, as for example in the form of a Genitive, a Dative, or the like, such variations they called πτωσίς πλαγιαῖ, Cases oblique, oblique Cases, or side-long Fallings (such as AC, or AD) in opposition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular. Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, κατάσεις, Declinatio, a Declension, it being

(a) See Ammon. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.
BOOK THE SECOND.

ing a sort of progressive Descent from the Noun's upright Form thro' its various declining Forms, that is, a Descent from AB, to AC, AD, &c.

Of these Cases we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the Nominative, the Accusative, the Genitive, and the Dative.

It has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are Substance and Attribute. Now from this Natural Concord arises the Logical Concord of Subject and Predicate, and the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Attributive. These Concord in Speech produce Propositions and Sentences, as that previous Concord in Nature produces natural Beings. This being admitted,

\(^{(b)}\) See before, p. 264.
mitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, Nature's Substance, the Logician's Subject, and the Grammarian's Substantive are all denoted by that Case, which we call the Nominative. For example, Cæsar pugnat, Æs fìngitur, Domus ædificatur. We may remark too by the way, that the Character of this Nominative may be learnt from its Attributive. The Action implied in pugnat, shews its Nominative Cæsar to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in fìngitur, shews its Nominative Æs to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in ædificatur prove Domus to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a Nominative also. So we find it in such instances as—Cicero est eloquens; Vitiurn est turpe; Homo
Homo est animal, &c. When it has no Cases, (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of Number and Person*; as when we say, Cicero loquitur; nos loquimur; Homines loquentur.

From what has been said, we may make the following observations—that as there can be no Sentence without a Substantive, so that Substantive, if the Sentence be regular, is always denoted by a Nominative—that on this occasion all the Attributives, that have Cases, appear as Nominatives also—that there may be a regular and perfect Sentence without any of the other Cases, but that without one Nominative at least, this is utterly impossible. Hence therefore we form its Character and Description—the Nominative is that Case, without which

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see before, p. 170, 171.
which there can be no regular\(^{(c)}\) and perfect Sentence. We are now to search after another Case.

When the Attributive in any Sentence is some Verb denoting Action, we may be assured the principal Substantive is some active efficient Cause. So we may call Achilles and Lysippus in such Sentences as Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still in suspense, and finds its conception incomplete. Action, it well knows, not only requires some Agent, but it must have a Subject also to work on, and it must produce some Effect. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the Subject or the Effect) that the Authors of

\(^{(c)}\) We have added regular as well as perfect, because there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfect without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics Παρασυμσάματα or Παρακαθηγήματα, such as Σωκράτει μετάμισθε, Socratem pœnitet, &c. See before, p. 180.
of Language have destined the Accusative. *Achilles vulneravit Hectorem*—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lysippus fecit statuas*—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—the *Accusative is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject*. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

It has been said in the preceding Chapter\(^{(a)}\), that when the Places of the *Nomi-\[a. See before, p. 265.\]*
Ch. IV. Nominative and the Accusative are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of Prepositions. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method, yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the Latin or Greek, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

Among the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the Term or Point, which something commences from, and the Term or Point, which something tends to. These Relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar Terminations of their own, which exprest their force, without the help of a Preposition. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive, and Dative,
tive, the Genitive being formed to express all relations commencing from itself; the Dative, all Relations tending to itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already.(a)

It is on these Principles that they say in Greek—Δεομαι ΣΟΥ, διδωμι ΣΟΙ, Of thee I ask, To thee I give. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected from; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes to. So again—(b) Πετοιηται λίθος, it is made of Stone. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the Genitive, as being the Term from, or out of which. Even in Latin, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read—

Implentur

(a) See before, p. 275, 276.
(b) Χρυσῶς χειροτόμων, ἵλιθρος, made of Gold and Ivory. So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, L. V. p. 400. See also Hom. Iliad. Σ. 574.
The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, of or from which they were filled. Upon the same principles, πίνω τῇ ἰδιωτῇ, is a Phrase in Greek; and Je bois de l'eau, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, I take some or a certain part, from or out of a certain whole.

When we meet in Language such Genitives as the Son of a Father; the Father of a Son; the Picture of a Painter; the Painter of a Picture, &c. these are all Relatives, and therefore each of them reciprocally a Term or Point to the other, from or out of which it derives its Essence, or at least its Intellection. (e)

(e) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, Πάντα δὲ τὰ σὺν τι σὺν ἀναγεγραμμένα λίγεσται οἷον ὃ ἐκλεξέσθη.
The Dative, as it implies Tendency to, is employed among its other uses to denote the Final Cause, that being the Cause to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

—Tibi suaveis daemon tellus
Submittit flores— Lucret.

—Tibi brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpius— Virg. G. I.

—Tibi serviat ultima Thule.
Ibid.

And so much for Cases, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,

τὸ δὲ δὲλθε, κἂν δεσπότης δὲλθε δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, κἂν τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσετε διπλάσιον, κἂν τὸ ἡμίσει διπλάσιε ἡμίσει. Omnia vero, quae sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quae reciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium. Categor. C. VII.
tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (h) both in the Greek and Latin Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

CHAP.

(h) Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritibus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similiumuisse; modernas, his ferè destitutas, plurima per prepositiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedire? Sane facile quis coajicit (utcunque nobis ipsi placamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostrisuisse multo acutiora et subtilia. - Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.
Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—Conclusion.

Besides the Parts of Speech before mentioned, there remains the Interjection. Of this Kind among the Greeks are "Ω, Φεϋ, Αλ, &c. among the Latins, Ah! Heu! Hei! &c. among the English, Ah! Alas! Fie! &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their Adverbs; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always coincides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now Interjections co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in† separating them by themselves;

† Vid. Servium in Æneid XII. v. 486.
themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

**Should it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they?** It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain **Voices of Nature**, rather than Voices of **Art**, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events(a).

"**And**

(a) **Interjectiones a Gravis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de tis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspitus aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut que **naturales** sint notae; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significat. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. I. **Interjectio est Vox affectum mentis significans**, ac cita verbi operem sententiam compleans. Ibid. c. 3. **Restat classium extrema, Interjectio. Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis.**"
"And thus we have found that all words are either significant by themselves, or only significant..."
"Pecant, when Associated—that those significant by themselves, denote either Substances or Attributes, and are called for that reason Substantives and Attributiones—that the Substantives are either Nouns or Pronouns—that the Attributiones are either Primary or Secondary—that the Primary Attributiones are either Verbs, Participles, or Adjectives; the Secondary, Adverbs—Again, that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either Definitives or Connectives—that the Definitives are either Articular or Pronominal—and that the Connectives are either Prepositions or Conjunctions."

And thus have we resolved Language, as a Whole into its constituent Parts, which was the first thing
thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry. (b)

But now as we conclude, methinks I hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—"Is there no speaking then without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned, as learned; as well poor Peasants, as profound Philosophers?" We may answer by interrogating on our part—Do not those same poor Peasants use the Lever and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peasants, a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur

(b) See before, p. 7.
occur every day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation—of our very Senses and Intellect, by which we perceive every thing else—That they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied—What they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the World. (c)

But a graver Objector now accosts us. "What (says he) is the Utility? "Whence the Profit, where the Gain?" Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent

(c) 'Αλλ' ἐστι πολλὰ τῶν ὁλίων, ἡ τῶν μὲν ὑπαρξεῖν ἔχει γνωσιμωτάτων, ἄγνωστοτάτων δὲ τῶν ἁσίαν ὑστερή ὕπνα κίννασι, κρὸς τότος, ἐστι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τῶν τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνωσιμὸν κἀναμφιλεκτὸν τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν ἀυτῶν ἡ ἁσία. τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ὁπάθεια. Ἐστι δὲ ὅτι τὸ τῶν τοιάτων κρὸς τὸ μὲν, γὰρ εἶναι τί τῶν ψυχῶν, γνωσιμωτάτων κἀναμφιλεκτον τί δὲ ποτὲ ἐστιν, οὐ μᾶλλον καταμαθεῖν. Ἀλέξανδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β, p. 142.
cellent for the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for the measuring of Estates; Astronomy, for the making of Almanacks; and Grammar perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

Thus much to the *Sordid*—If the *Liberal* ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature’s original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.

Perhaps
Perhaps too there is a Pleasure even in Science itself, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of Body desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen; And have not Health and Strength of Mind their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument? Why should there not be a Good (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere Energy of our Intellect, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, why they pursue such things; but if they answer, they pursue them, because they are Good, it would be folly to ask them farther, why they pursue what is Good. It might well in such case be replied on their
their behalf (how strange soever it may at first appear) that if there was not something Good, which was in no respect useful, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence. For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are Ends, some things are Means, and that if there were no Ends, there could be of course no Means.

It should seem then the Grand Question was, what is Good—that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

In the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country,
Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent, and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as perfect Good, without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called Misers, or Miserable.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the subordinate kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the sublimest of all Objects? Shall the Intellect alone feel no pleasures in its Energy, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were
to be controverted, may not the Intellectual Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of Intellectual Good, that it is "the Good of that Part, which is most excellent within us; that it is a Good accommodated to all Places and Times; which neither depends on the will of others, nor on the influence of external Fortune; that it is a Good, which decays not with decaying Appetites, but often rises in vigour, when those are no more." (d)

There is a Difference, we must own, between this Intellectual Virtue, and Moral Virtue. Moral Virtue, from its Employment, may be called more Human, as it tempers our Appetites

(d) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.
petites to the purposes of human life. But **Intellectual Virtue** may be surely called more **Divine**, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

**Indeed for Moral Virtue**, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vicious, it would be impious to suppose the **Deity** to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet God Is, and Lives. So we are assured from Scripture itself. What then may we suppose the **Divine Life** to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than a **Perpetual Energy of the purest Intellect** about
Book the Second.

ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELLECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF? For in pure Intellection it holds the reverse of all Sensation, that the perceiver and thing perceived are ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME).

It was Speculation of this kind concerning the Divine Nature, which induced

(e) Ἐι ἐν ὑπὸς εἰ ἑξη, ὡς ἡμεῖς ψωτε, ὁ Θεὸς ἀεί, Σαματαῖον ἐι δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐτι Ἐκμασσίωτειν ἑξη δὲ ὁδε, θυ θεο νε ὑπάγης ἐξαίτη τῇ γὰρ Νὐ ἐνεργεῖα, εἰ Ἐκεῖνος ἐστι, ο ἐνεργείας ἐνεργεία δὲ ἡ καθ' ἀυτὴν, ἐκεῖνος ὡς ἁγία ἡ ἁγία ἡ ἁγίας. Φαινεῖ δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἰναι θυ θεον ἁγίον, ἁγίον ὡς τῇ ἁγίοις ὑπάγης τῷ Θεῷ ΤΟΥΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσι λ. ζ. It is remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly characterized as a living God, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.
induced one of the wisest among the Ancients to believe—"That the Man, "who could live in the pure enjoyment of his Mind, and who properly cultivated that divine Principle, was "happiest in himself, and most beloved by "the Gods. For if the Gods had any "regard to what passed among Men "(as it appeared they had) it was pro-
bable they should rejoice in that. "which was most excellent, and by na-
ture the most nearly allied to them-
"selves; and, as this was Mind, that "they should requite the Man, who "most loved and honoured This, both "from his regard to that which was "dear to themselves, and from his act-
ing a Part, which was laudable and "right (f)."

AND

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. "Αυτὸν δὲ νοεὶ ὁ νεός κατὰ μετάληψιν τα νοστῶ νοστὸς γὰρ γίνεται, διγλανών κ'y νοσῆν, ὡσε ΤΑΤΤΟΝ ΝΟΤΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.

(f) ῬΗΙΧ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧ' τ' Κ', κερ. ἵ.
Book the Second.

And thus in all Science there is something valuable for itself, because it contains within it something which is divine.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.
HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
CONCERNING
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts.

SOME things the MIND performs thro' the BODY; as for example the various Works and Energies of Art.—Others it performs without such Medium; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last more
more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is *Mind ultimately the Cause of all*; of every thing at least that is *Fair* and *Good*.

Among those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one.—Corporeal Separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animalcule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (a) the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Concretion*.

(a) *Itaque Natura facienda est prorsus Solutio & Separatio*; *non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem*, tanquam *ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.
creation, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself, convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.

And thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as Wholes, into their more conspicuous Parts, but persisting, till it even separate those Elementary Principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest Part, as much as in the mightiest Whole.\(^{(b)}\)

Now if Matter and Form are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as the principal among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether

\[^{(b)}\text{See below, p. 312.}\]
ther these, or any thing analogous to them, may be found in Speech or Language. (c) This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

(c) See before, p. 2. 7. Matter and Form (in Greek ΥΛΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal or concrete, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Process.

The original meaning of the Word ΥΛΗ, was SYLVA, a Wood. Thus Homer,

—Τξεμε δ' ἕρεα μακέα χ' ὙΛΗ,
Ποσοὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτωις Ποσειδάων ιόντος.

As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.

Hence as Wood was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "ΤΛΗ, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote Matter or Materials in general. In this sense Brass was called the ΤΛΗ or Matter of a Statue; Stone, the
Book the Third.

Every thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution composed into its "γαν or Matter of a Pillar; and so in other instances.—The Platonic Chalcidius, and other Authors of the latter Latinity use Sylva under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of Matter here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, Matter and Body have been taken to denote the same thing; Material to mean Corporeal; Immaterial, Incorporeal, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term Matter was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. By these, every thing was called Υα, or Matter, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called Brass the "γαν of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "γαλοι of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "γαλοι of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "γαλοι of Syllogisms. The Stoics held all things out of our own power (τα ἐν ἑναὶ ἑν) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health and Sickness, Life
Life and Death, to be the \( \tau \lambda \alpha \iota \), or Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these, (Vid. Arr. Epict. L. 1. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the '\( \tau \lambda \iota \nu \delta \) and '\( \Lambda \tau \iota \nu \delta \) are opposed to each other.) The Peripatetics, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be \( \alpha \sigma \varphi \mu \alpha \tau \tau \sigma \), or Incorporeal, yet still talked of a \( \nu \varepsilon \) '\( \tau \lambda \iota \nu \delta \), a material Mind or Intellect.—This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the Words, Natural Capacity, and consider them as only denoting that original and native Power of Intellection, which being previous to all human Knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of \( \tau \alpha \lambda \), or Matter. See Alex. Aphrod. de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. Arist. Metaph. p. 121, 122, 141. Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid. p. 22, 23.

As to \( \varepsilon \iota \delta \omicron \sigma \), its original meaning was that of Form or Figure, considered as denoting visible Symmetry, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from \( \varepsilon \iota \delta \omega \) to see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus Euripides,

\[
\pi \gamma \tau \omicron \nu \mu \dot{\iota} \nu \varepsilon \iota \delta \omicron \varepsilon \xi \iota \nu \tau \gamma \alpha \nu \nu \delta \omicron.
\]

Fair Form to Empire gave the first pretence.
thing Common, and belonging to many other things; and of something Peculiar, by

Now as the Form or Figure of visible Beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its "γενέσεως or Matter, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients Εἴδωσ or Form. Thus not only the Shape given to the Brass was called the Εἴδωσ or Form of the Statue; but the Proportion assigned to the Drugs was the Εἴδωσ or Form of the Medicine; the orderly Motion of the human Body was the Εἴδωσ or Form of the Dance; the just Arrangement of the Propositions, the Εἴδωσ or Form of the Syllogism. In like manner the rational and accurate Conduct of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἴδωσ or Form, described by Cicero to his Son,—

FORMAM quidam ipsis, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientie, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—the supreme Intelligence, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes, this supreme Intelligence has been called Εἴδωσ Εἴδων, the Form of Forms, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being
by which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

Hence

being those essential and distinctive Attributes, which make it to be itself, and not any thing else.

And so much concerning Form, as before concerning Matter. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their separating, to perish, and be at an end—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxta-position, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate coincidence, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both Matter and Form, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the Beings, which they constitute; the Matter being to be found in the world at large; the Form, if artificial, pre-existing within the Artificer, or if natural, within the supreme Cause, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their immediate generating Cause; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.
Hence Language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has in common this, that like them, it is a Sound. But then on the contrary

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

**Matter.**

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine illa specie, atque currentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex quâ omnia expressa atque effecta sint: (quæ tota omnia accepte possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) cœque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c.—Acad. I. 8.

**Form.**

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrior id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complacetimur.—Hæs rerum formas appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravisissimus auctor et magister, Plato: eaeque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis Formam speciænque ridigendum, Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.
contrary it has in peculiar this, that whereas those Sounds have no Meaning or Signification, to Language a MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is essential. — Again, Language, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has in common this, that like them, it has a Meaning. But then it has this in peculiar to distinguish it from them, that whereas the Meaning of those Animal Sounds is derived from Nature, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but from Compact. \(^{(d)}\)

\(^{(d)}\) The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant \(\chi τ\alpha \varsigma \nu ν\), by Compact. See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the Words \(\chi τ\alpha \varsigma \nu ν\), \(a d\) placitum, or secundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment —Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res a natura est, ita quoque a natura veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit.
From hence it becomes evident, that Language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings; and that of these two Principles, the Sound is as the Matter, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the Meaning as that peculiar and characteristic Form, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of Language.

The Matter of Language comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this Matter is Sound, and Sound is that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect. (a)

As

(a) This appears to be Priscian's Meaning when he says of a Voice, what is more properly true of Sound in general, that it is—

\[ \textit{suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.} \]

Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of Sound to an Undulation in the Air propagated circularly, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water,
As the Causes of this Percussion are various, so from hence Sound derives the Variety of its Species.

Further, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand Species of Sounds are likewise Animal or Inanimate.

There is no peculiar Name for Sound Inanimate; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is merely water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any—'Ακουειν θ, τῷ μεταξὶ τοῦ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τῷ ἀκεόντος αἴνος σωληνομένα σφαιροειδῶς, εἰτα κυματομένη, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπιπλοντος, ὡς κυματιστὰ ἤτο ἤτο τῇ διεξαμενῇ ὕδας κατὰ κύκλον ὑπὸ τῷ ἰμεληθέντος ιθε—Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et auditum est, aër verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisterna aqua per orbem injecto agitatūr lapide. Diog. Laert. VII.
merely accidental. But that, which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a Voice.

As Language therefore implies that Sound called Human Voice; we may perceive that to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact to know the Matter or common Subject of Language.

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

What these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philo-
Philosophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now pure and simple Voice, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) transmitted to the Mouth. Here then, by means of certain different Organs, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the Form or Character of Articulation. For Articulation is in fact nothing else, than that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c. The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its primary Qualities)
(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of Speech, but those very different ones likewise of Mastication and Respiration; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in vain.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for Discourse in Man, who is a Discursive Animal, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to themselves.
The simplest of these new Characters are those acquired thro' the mere Openings.

The following account from Ammonius will shew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish Voice from mere Sound; and articulate Voice from simple Voice.

Καὶ ὙΦΟΣ μὲν ἐσι σαληγ γάρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοή: ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ὙΦΟΣ εἶ ἐμφυκε γινόμενος, ὡσα ἔως τῆς συγγένεις τῆς Ὑφακος ἐκβιλεόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀνε προσπινη ἁθέως τῷ καλεμένῃ πτερεύσῃ αετησίᾳ, ὡς τῷ ωπεργῳ, ὦτοι τῷ γαργαρεών, ὡς διὰ τῆς ταληγίδος ἀποτελή τινα ἁκοή αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ τινα ὁμοίως τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευσῶν ἀσφα τοῖς μεσικοῖς καλεμένων ὁφαγάνων συμβαίνει, ὣν αὐλῶν ὡς συγιγ νωρ τῷ γαλάτις, ὡς τῶν ὀδόντων, ὡς χειλέων ςεδὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἁναγκαίων ὄντων, ςεδὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ 'ΑΠΑΙΟΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ὑ κάτως συμβαλλομένων.—Estque Sonus, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elius simul totus in arteriam, quam asper ram vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quia quia infanti, ideo ἐμπνευστά a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fustulis contin. ζιτ, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquem necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino con ferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630.

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of Y the
ings of the Mouth, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several Vowels; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus eminently Vocal,\(^{(c)}\) and easy to be sounded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate Forms, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by different Contacts of its different parts; such for instance, as it makes by the Junction of the two Lips,

the Peripetetics) used the word \(\text{ΦΩΝΗ} \) to denote Sound in general. They defined it therefore to be—\(\text{Τὸ ἄνοιχτον ἀκοὴς} \), which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the Note preceding. Animal Sound they defined to be—\(\text{Ἅρμονία ἀνεμών οἰκονόμης} \), Air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse; and Human or Rational Sound they defined—\(\text{Ἐνεργής ἀπὸ ἀναδυόμενον} \), Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty. Diog. Laert. VII. 55.

\(^{(c)}\) \(\text{ΦΩΝΗΕΝΣΑ} \).
Lips, of the Tongue with the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the Articulations so produced are called Consonant, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel. (d)

There are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all

(d) Συμφωνά.
all denoted by the common Name of 
Element, in as much as every Arti-
culation of every other kind is from 
them derived, and into them resolved. 
Under their smallest Combination they 
produce a Syllable; Syllables properly 
combined produce a Word; Words 
properly combined produce a Sentence; 
and Sentences properly combined pro-
duce an Oration or Discourse.

(And) The Stoic Definition of an Element is as follows—

Εὰν δὲ σαλίσεων, ἐξ οὗ σφόντες γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, ὥς εἰς ὁ ἐσχα-
τον ἀναλύεται. An Element is that, out of which, as their 
first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, 
as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laer.

VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon Elements with 
respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to 

—Φωνής σαλίσεως, ἐξ ὧν συγκεῖται ὁ φωνής, ἥς εἰς ὁ διαίρεται ἐσχατὰ ἐκ

ίμυρα δὲ μηκὸν εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἐτίθησε τῷ ἔπει διότι ἄντων. 
The Elements of articulate Voice are those things, 
out of which the Voice is compounded, and into which, as 
its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves 
being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, dif-
siering in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.
AND thus it is that to Principles apparently so trivial, as about twenty plain elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been

The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they called Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped under the Name of Hermes, and represented commonly by a Head alone without other Limbs, standing upon a quadrilateral Basis. The Head itself was that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a Petasus, or Bonnet, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the Head, because no other was deemed requisite to rational Communication. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as Homer well describes them) ΕΠΙΖ ΕΛΕΓΟΝΤΑ, Winged Words, were represented in their Velocity by the Wings of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the Front of his Basis (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with some old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung across, by which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let a Youth be seen drawing off this Veil; and a Nymph, near the Youth, transcribing what She there discovers.

Suck
been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. The Youth we might imagine to be the Genius of Man (Nature Deus humana, as Horace stiles him;) the Nymph to be Mnemosyne, or Memory; as much as to insinuate that "Man, for the Preservation of his Deeds and Inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to Letters; and that Memory, being conscious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Acquisition."

Mr. Stuart, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the Antiquities of Athens, has adorned this Work with a Frontispieceagreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly Attic and Simple, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.


For the value and importance of Principles, and the difficulty in attaining them, see Aristot. de Sophist. Eleuch. c. 34. The
Book the Third.

It appears from what has been said, that the Matter or common Subject of Language is that Species of Sounds called Voices articulate.

What remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar Form, that is to say, Language considered, not with respect to Sound, but to Meaning.

Y 4 CHAP.

The following Passage, taken from that able Mathematician Tacquet, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said in this chapter concerning Elementary Sounds, p. 324, 325.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.

When to any articulate Voice there accedes by compact a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called a Word; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) under the same Compact, \(^{(a)}\) unite in constituting a particular Language.

\(^{(a)}\) See before Note \(^{(c)}\) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 1. Notes \(^{(a)}\) and \(^{(c)}\).

The following Quotation from Ammonius is remarkable—Καθάπερ ἐν τῷ μίν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φῶςει, τὸ δὲ δεχεῖσθαι, Σίσει: κ' κατὰ συνθῆκην, κ' τὸ μίν ξύλον, φῶςει, ἡ δὲ Σύκα, Σίσει: ἄτω κ' τὸ μίν φωνεῖν, φῶςει, τὸ δὲ δ' ουράμάτων ἡ φημάτων σημαίνειν, Σίσει—κ' ὕψει τὴν μίν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὀργανὸν ἤσαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ὣμιν δυνάμεων γνωσικῶν, ἡ δεξιοτέρα, κατὰ φῶςει ιχθυ.
It appears from hence, that a Word may be defined a Voice articulate, and significant by Compact—and that Language may be defined a System of such Voices, so significant.

It is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be
be tempted to call Language a kind of Picture of the Universe, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars.

And yet it may be doubted, how far this is true. For if Pictures and Images are all of them Imitations, it will playing of Nouns, or Verbs; or Sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shews itself; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de

Interpr. p. 51. a.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, (ἐνεγίνεσται τεχνω) of which Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the Human Soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design; else it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159, &c.
will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the Original, will by help of the same faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its Greek or Latin Name.

The Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from Natural Attributes, and then it is an Imitation; or else from Accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a Symbol. (b)

Now,

(b) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τὸ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν ἀυτὴν τῷ σφάγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνάτον ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βολεῖται, κ缬 ἐκ ἐς, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀυτὸ μεταπλάσσαι τὸ γάς ἐκ τῇ εἰκόνι γεγειμένων τῷ Σωκράτες ὁμοίωμα, ἐμὲ κ缬 τὸ φαλάκρον, κ缬 τὸ σιμάν κ缬 τὸ ἐξωφθαλμὸν ἔχει τό Σωκράτες, οὐκι' ἐν αὐτῷ λέγοντο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δὲ γε σύμβολον, ἢτοι συμβολον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀυτὸ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὄλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ὡς κ缬 ἐκ μόνης ὁφισάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοιας' οὖν, τῷ ποτὲ δὲ ἑτε συμβάλλειν ἀλλῆλοις τὸς συμβαλλεῖσθαι, δύνατον σύμβολον.
Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their natural Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through such Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that Words must of necessity be Symbols, because it appears that they cannot be Imitations.

But here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—"Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have Imitations been neglected, and Symbols..."
Symbols preferred, although Symbols are only known by Habit or Institution, while Imitations are recognized by a kind of natural Intuition?—To this it may be answered, that if the Sentiments of the Mind, like the Features of the Face, were immediately visible to every beholder, the Art of Speech or Discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our Minds lie enveloped and hid, and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our Thoughts,

the flat-nosed, and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a Symbol or Sign (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what Euripides says,

But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign
Of purple light, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.) or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.
Thoughts to convey them to each other through a Medium which is corporeal. (c) And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the Senses. (d) Now the Senses, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by Symbols but by Imitations, as far as things are characterized by Figure...
Figure and Colour, our Imitation would be necessarily thro’ Figure and Colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds; it would for the same reason be thro’ the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how complicated such Imitation would prove.

If we set Language therefore, as a Symbol, in opposition to such Imitation; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a *Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly perceive an

* Επει δηλοϊτα—See before, p. 325.
an Answer to the Question here proposed, "Why, in the common inter-
"course of men with men, Imitations "have been rejected, and Symbols pre-
"ferred."

Hence too we may perceive a Rea-
son, why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to ex-
press the Properties and real Essences of things, as a Mirror exhibits their Fi-
gures and their Colours. For if Lan-
guage of itself imply nothing more, than certain Species of Sounds with certain Mo-
tions concomitant; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be ex-
pressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between the Medium and themselves there is nothing Connatural(e).

(e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.
It is true indeed, when Primitives were once established, it was easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of Derivatives and Compounds. Thus the Sounds, Water, and, Fire, being once annexed to those two Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, Watry, of the last, Fiery, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse.—But why, and from what natural Connections the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the Reason, why all Language is founded in Compact, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols of which Words are a certain Species.

The Question remains if words are Symbols, then Symbols of what?—Z  If
If it be answered, of things, the Question returns, of what Things?—If it be answered, of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a proper Name. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

Again, if all Words are proper Names, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as Individuals are infinite, to make a perfect Language, Words must be infinite also. But if infinite, then incomprehensible, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols,
Symbols, which Missionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the Chinese.

Again, if all Words are proper Names, or (which is the same) the Symbols of Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of Individuals, which it follows.

Again, if all Words are proper Names, the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow that in Language there can be no general Proposition; because upon the Hypothesis all Terms are particular; nor any Affirmative Proposition, because no one Individual in nature is another. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but
but Particular Negatives. But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating General Affirmative Truths—If so, then of communicating Demonstration—If so, then of communicating Sciences, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating Arts which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice.(e) And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

If Words are not the Symbols of external Particulars, it follows of course, they must be the Symbols of our Ideas: For this is evident, if they are not

(e) The whole of Euclid (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon general Terms and general Propositions, most of which are affirmative. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their stile,

Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, utctè concludere stvis.
not Symbols of things without, they can only be Symbols of something within.

Here then the Question recurs, if Symbols of Ideas, then of what Ideas?—Of sensible Ideas.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of external Particulars; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several Ideas, which Particulars imprint, must needs be as infinite and mutable, as they are themselves:

If then Words are neither the Symbols of external Particulars, nor yet of particular Ideas, they can be Symbols of nothing else, except of general Ideas, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by general Ideas?—We mean such as are common to many Individuals; not only to Individuals which

 exists
exist now, but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, Man, Lion, Cedar. — Admit it, and what follows? — It follows, that if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with proper Names.

It follows that one Word may be, not homonymously, but truly and essentially common to many Particulars, past present and future; so that however these Particulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Language notwithstanding may be definite and steady. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the Chinese Absurdity.*

Again, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it

* See p. 338, 339.
it stands for the same general Ideas, may be as intelligible now, as it was then.—
The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of ever new and ever changing Objects.

Again, it follows that Language may be expressive of general Truths; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind.\(^\text{c}^\)

Now if it be true "that none of these things could be asserted of Language, were not Words the Symbols of general Ideas—and it be further true, that these things may be all undeniably asserted of Language"—it will follow (and that necessarily) that Words are the Symbols of general Ideas.

\(^\text{c}\) See before Note \(^\text{c}^\).
AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of general Ideas, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosopher, who reason about general and abstract Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of Particulars, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to no other End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than general Ideas?

To this it may be answered, that Arts surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are general Terms from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be rationally explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through general
general Terms learnt those general Theorems, that respect the doctrine and practice of Mensuration?

But suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—That the Objection was just; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of Language, that it should be expressive of Particulars, as well as of Generals. We must however add, that its general Terms are by far its most excellent and essential Part, since from these it derives "that comprehensive Universality, that just proportion of Precision and Permanence, without which it could not possibly be either "learnt, or understood, or applied "to the purposes of Reasoning and "Science;"
"Science;" — that *particular Terms* have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

One Method of expressing Particulars, is that of *Proper Names*. This is the least artificial, because *proper Names* being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of *Definitives or Articles*, whether we assume the *pronominal*, or those *more strictly* so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite *Art* of Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude*, contrives *how to denote things infinite*; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of *Definitives properly applied to general Terms*,

(1) See before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c.
Terms, knows how to employ these last, tho' in number finite, to the accurate expression of infinite Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be Man. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular as unknown; I say, a Man—known; I say, the Man—indefinite; any Man—definite; a certain Man—present and near; this Man—present and distant; that Man—like to some other; such a Man—an indefinite Multitude; many Men—a definite Multitude; a thousand Men—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout; every Man—the same ones, taken with distinctions; each Man—taken in order; first Man, second Man, &c.—the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively; all Men—the Negation of this Multitude; no Man. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.
The Sum of all is, that Words are the Symbols of Ideas both general and particular; yet of the general, primarily, essentially, and immediately; of the particular, only secondarily, accidentally, and mediateley.

Should it be asked, “why has Language this double Capacity?”—May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourse of our Ideas? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express the whole of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either Intellection without Sensation, or Sensation without Intellection? If not, how should Language explain the whole of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To conclude—As in the preceding Chapter we considered Language with a view
BOOK THE THIRD.

a view to its Matter, so here we have considered it with a view to its Form. Its Matter is recognized, when it is considered as a Voice; its Form, as it is significant of our several Ideas; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A System of articulate Voices, the Symbols of our Ideas, but of those principally, which are general or universal.

CHAP.
CHAP. IV.

Concerning general or universal Ideas.

MUCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about general or universal Ideas, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

The Vulgar merged in Sense from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing
nothing to be real, but what may be tasted, or touched. The Philosopher, as to these matters being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to experimental Amusements, deeming nothing Demonstration, if it be not made ocular. Thus instead of ascending from Sense to Intellect (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midst of Sense, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars.—Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of Science, the Studies of Mind, Intellec- tion, and Intelligent Principles, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by Experiment, is deemed no better than mere Hypothesis.

And yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such Notions, that
that there should still remain two Sciences in fashion, and these having their Certainty of all the least controverted, **which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment.** By these I mean **Arithmetic, and Geometry.**

But to come to our Subject concerning **general Ideas.**

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(a) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two Sciences so eminently abound, arise originally from **Principles, the most obvious imaginable;** Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of Experiment, that they are **self-evident to every one, possessed of common sense.** I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue Experiment; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of Life. Nay, I go farther—I hold all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject to be founded in Experience, which is no more than **the result of many repeated Experiments.** But I must add withal, that the man who acts from Experience alone, tho' he act ever so well, is but an **Empiric or Quack,** and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. It is then only that we recognize Art, and that the Empiric quits this name for the
Man's first Perceptions are those of the Senses, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least indefinite, and more fleeting and transient, than the very Objects, which they exhibit, because they not only

Science, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, what is to be done, but why it is to be done; for Art is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing it Materials, and Science giving them a Form.

In the mean time, while Experiment is thus necessary to all practical Wisdom, with respect to pure and speculative Science, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who ever heard of Logic, or Geometry, or Arithmetic being proved experimentally? It is indeed by the application of these that Experiments are rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.
only depend upon the existence of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their immediate Presence. Hence therefore it is, that there can be no Sensation of either Past or Future, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the Senses, it never could acquire the least Idea of Time.

But happily for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called Imagination or Fancy, which however as to its energies it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in dignity and use. This it is which retains the fleeting Forms of things, when Things themselves are gone, and all Sensation at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may

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(b) See before, p. 105. See also, p. 112. Note (f).
may be seen from hence. We have an *imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we control them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves(c).

\[ \text{As} \]

(c) Besides the distinguishing of *sensation* from *imagination*, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are Mnemosyne, and Anamnesis, Memory, and Recollection.

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is Phantasy or *imagination*.

When we view some such *relict*, and *refer it withal to that sensible Object*, which *in time past was its cause and original*, this is Memory.

Lastly
As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to retain, as well as to receive; the same holds of the Soul, with respect

Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is Recollection. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between Memory and Phantasy be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is the Portrait, such Contemplation is analogous to Phantasy. When we view it with reference to the Original, whom it represents, such Contemplation is analogous to Memory.

We may go farther. Imagination or Phantasy may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. It is here that Hope and Fear paint all their pleasant and all their painful Pictures of Futurity. But Memory is confined in the strictest manner to the past.
pect to Sense and Imagination. Sense is its receptive Power; Imagination, its retentive. Had it Sense without Imagination, it would not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

Thus then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call Sense (if we please) a kind of transient Imagination; and Imagination on the contrary a kind of permanent Sense(d).

A 3

Now

What we have said may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult Aristot. de Animá, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise de Mem. et Reminisc.

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἵνα ἡ φαντασία ὑπολογίσεται; δει νοεῖν εἰ ποιήθη ἡ μνήμη ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσόγειων τῶν περί τὰ ἀψηφητὰ, διὸν τὸ πολὺ (lege τόπον) τινὰ ἕνα ἀνακοινωνήθη ἐν τῷ σαρωτῷ ἀνασηπηθείῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμα τινὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀμφότερος γινομένων κινήσεως, ὁ ἕνα μηκέτι τὸ ἀμφότερον παραφόρος, ὑπομένει τι ὡς σάκτει, ὅταν ὁ ὁστεός ἐκεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἡ ἕνα τῆς μνήμης ἡμῶν σωζόμενον ἄλλων γίνεται, τὸ τοῦτον ἐγκατάλειμμα,
Now as our feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the Soul in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of Reason and Intellect, till Imagination first fix the fluency of Sense, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

AFTER

κ' τὸν τοιότον ὁπλικὸν τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλέσω. Now what Phansy or Imagination is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) Impression they call Phansy or Imagination. Alex. Aphrod. de Animá, p. 135. b. Edit. Add.
After this manner, in the admirable Economy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there no Things external, the Senses could not operate; were there no Sensations, the Imagination could not operate; and were there no Imagination, there could be neither Reasoning nor Intellection, such at least as they are found in Man, where they have their Intensions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere Capacity or Power. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature more divine, to which "Intension and Remission and mere Capacity are unknown." But not to digress.

(c) See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of Man's Existence is not a little different from that of the Deity. The Life of Man has its Essence in Motion.
It is then on these permanent Phantasms that the human Mind first works,

This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that Life, which is peculiar to him as Man. Objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to Practice or Contemplation. But the Life or Existence of God (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason immutable and superior to all Motion.

It is to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he tell us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κίνησις ἐστὶν ἐνέγεναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσια; καὶ ὅλον μᾶλλον ἐν ἑξεμίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκοῦ, κατὰ τὸν σωστὸν, διὰ σωφροσύνην τινα· ὡσīς γὰρ ἀνθρωποῦ τοῦ ἴμμεταβόλος ὁ σωφρός, καὶ ὡς τοῦ διεσώμενος μεταβαλός· ἐ γὰρ ἀπλῦν, οὐδ' ἰπεικῆς. For there is not only an Energy of Motion, but of Immobility; and Pleasure or Felicity exists rather in Rest than in Motion; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same manner
works, and by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it

ner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin.

It is to this unalterable Nature of the Deity that Boethius refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

—— Tempus ab Ævo
Ire jubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.

From this single principle of Immobility, may be derived some of the noblest of the Divine Attributes; such as that of Impassive, Incorruptible, Incorporeal, &c. Vide Aristot. Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that though we are not Gods, yet as rational Beings we have within us something Divine, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, per-
it discerns at once what in many is one; what in things dissimilar and different is similar and the same. By this it comes to behold a kind permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—"ομαίωσι τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δύνατον, the be-
coming like to God, as far as in our power. Τοῖς μὲν γὰς
τοιοῖς σᾶς ὅ βιον μακάζον τοῖς ἄνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσιν ὁμοίωμα
τι τις τοιαύτας ἰσεγίας ὑπάρχει. For to the Gods (as
says another antient) the whole of life is one continued hap-
piness; but to Men, it is so far happy, as it rises to the
resemblance of so divine an Energy. See Plat. in Thea-

(7) This connective Act of the Soul, by which it
views one in many, is perhaps one of the principal
Acts of its most excellent Part. It is this removes that
impenetrable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence
invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even
the sensible World (with the help of all our Sensations)
would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index.
It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone,
nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is
made up of all these, and other attributes united; not
an unknown Constitution of insensible Parts, but a known
Constitution of sensible Parts, unless we chuse to extir-
pate the possibility of natural Knowledge.
What then perceives this Constitution or Union?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. It is the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some higher collective Power, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her subordinate Wholes, much more in that comprehensive Whole, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this collecting, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this unifying Power more conspicuous, than in the subjects of pure Truth. By virtue of this power the Mind views One general Idea, in many Individuals; One Proposition in many general Ideas; One Syllogism in many Propositions; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions of Science.

Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspergunt, &c.

Lucr.

Even
than those of Sense; a Race of Per-
ceptions, each one of which may be found intire

Even negative Truths and negative Conclusions can-
not subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions

together, so necessary is this uniting Power to every
Species of Knowledge. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction be-
tween sensitive Perception, and intellective, may

observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is heard by
our Ears, and understood by our Minds. That these
two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of
such, as hear the sounds, without knowing the language.
But to shew their difference still stronger, let us
suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall
both hear and understand the Truth proposed. Let
the Truth be for example, The Angles of a Triangle
are equal to two right Angles. That this is one Truth,
and not two or many Truths, I believe none will deny.
Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth be-
come perceptible (if at all) to Sensation?—The An-
swer is obvious; it is by successive portions of little
and little at a Time. When the first Word is present,
all the subsequent are absent; when the last Word is
present, all the previous are absent; when any of the
middle Words are present, then are there some absent,
as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at

once
intire and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, without

once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much is not, (to Sensation at least) as tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of Sense, than which we see nothing can be more dissipated, fleeting, and detached.—And is that of the Mind similar?—Admit it, and what follows?—it follows, that one Mind would no more recognize one Truth, by recognizing its Terms successively and apart, than many distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every Truth is one, tho' its Terms are many. It is in no respect true, by parts at a time, but it is true of necessity at once and in an instant.—What Powers therefore recognize this Oneness or Unity?—Where even does it reside, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the Stagirite, τὸ ἐν ὅλος τὸ ὅλον ὅντος ἐναρξον—If this be allowed, it should seem, where Sensation and Intellection appear to concur, that Sensation was of Many, Intellection was of One; that Sensation was temporary, divisible, and successive; Intellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are many; at the Center that they are one. Let us then suppose Sense and Mind to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at
without departing from the unity and permanence of its own nature.

AND

at the Circumference; Mind at the Center; and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is another Act of the Mind, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not one in many, but many in one. This is that mental Separation, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or Analysis which enables us to investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it by itself the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for particular Sciences to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as Optics, were we necessitated to contemplate Colour concreted with Figure, two Attributes which the Eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any coloured Body.

Those
And thus we see the Process by which we arrive at General Ideas; for the Per-

Those two noble Sciences, Arithmetic and Geometry, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this separative Power. They are both conversant about Quantity; Geometry about continuous Quantity, Arithmetic about Discrete. Extension is essential to continuous Quantity, Monads, or Units, to Discrete. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those simple and perfectly similar Units, which being combined make Number, and are the Subject of Arithmetic.—Again, by separating from Body every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be Body no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed Magnitude, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of Geometry.

By the same analytical or separate Power, we investigate Definitions of all kinds, each one of which is a developed Word, as the same Word is an enveloped Definition.

To conclude—In Composition and Division con-
Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these too we perceive the objects of Science and Real Knowledge, which can by no means be, but of that which is general, and definite, and fixed. Here too even Individuals, sist the whole of Science, Composition making Affirmative Truth, and shewing us things under their Similarities and Identities; Division making Negative Truth, and presenting them to us under their Dissimilarities and Diversities.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question. If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science as well to compound as to separate, may we not say that those Philosophers took Half of Wisdom for the Whole, who distinguished it from Wit, as if Wisdom only separated, and Wit only brought together? Yet so held the Philosopher of Malmsbury, and the Author of the Essay on the Human Understanding.

(2) The very Etymologies of the Words ἙΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, Scientia, and Understanding, may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and proper Objects. ἙΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ἰδίας αὕτη, διὸ το ἙΠΙΣ ΣΤΑΞΙΝ ἵκε ὡς τῶν πραγμάτων ἁγίων.
dividuals, however of themselves unknownable, become objects of Knowledge,

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in the following account of it from his Cratylus. In this Dialogue Socrates, having first (according to the Heraclitean Philosophy, which Cratylus favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that Flow and unceasing Mutation, supposed by Heraclitus to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds Ἐκοπώμεν δὴ, ἀκριτῶν ἀναλαξάντως σφάλτων μὲν τέτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ἙΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφίκοτον ἐστι, ἥτις μᾶλλον ἤκοι ἑπαγαίνει τι ὑπὸ ἙΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ ἡμῶν ἙΠΙ τοῖς σφάλμασι τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ ὑπὸ συμπεριφερέται. Let us consider, then (says he) some of the very Words already examined; and in the first place,
ledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may any Particular

the Word Science; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that it Stops the Soul at Things, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing System of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ἔπιστημή from ἑπιστήμην and μένων, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See Plato as before, p. 412.

The English Word, Understanding, means not so properly Knowledge, as that Faculty of the Soul, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm Basis, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to stand under them, as their immoveable Support.

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered Science and Understanding, not as fleeting powers of Perception, like Sense, but rather as steady, permanent, and durable Comprehensions.—But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain steady, permanent, and durable Objects; since if Perception of any kind be different from the thing perceived, (whether, it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) such Perception must of necessity be erroneous and false. The following passage from a Greek Platonic (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—Εἰ ἐστὶ γνώσις ἀνθρώπων τῆς ἀισθήσεως, ἐν ᾧ ἡ γνώσις ἀνθρώπων τῆς ἀισθήσεως. If there be a Knowledge more accurate
Now it is of these comprehensive and permanent Ideas, the genuine Perceptions of pure Mind, that Words of all Languages, however different, are the Symbols. And hence it is, that as the Perceptions include, so do these their Symbols express, accurate than Sensation there must be certain objects of such knowledge more true than objects of Sense.

The following then are Questions worth considering, —What these Objects are? —Where they reside? —And how they are to be discovered? —Not by experimental Philosophy it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of Mathematics; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our own Minds, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not ?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—Nec te quaesiveris extra.

Pers.
press, not this or that set of Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were therefore the Inhabitants of Salisbury to be transferred to York, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the local proper Names; which Names, as we have said already*, are hardly a part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the Language of modern England is able to describe antient

* Sup. p. 345, 346.
antient Rome; and that of antient Rome to describe modern England. But of these matters we have spoken before.

§ 2. And now having viewed the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) whence it is that these Ideas originally come. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, what kind of Beings they are, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

Let

(h) As far as Human Nature, and the primary Genera both of Substance and Accident are the same in all places, and have been so thro' all ages: so far all Languages share one common Identity. As far as peculiar species of Substance occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the positive Institutions of religious and civil Polities are everywhere different; so far each Language has its peculiar Diversity. To the Causes of Diversity here mentioned, may be added the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.
Let us suppose any man to look for the first time upon some Work of Art, as for example upon a Clock; and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea of what he had seen?—And what is it, to retain such Idea?—It is to have a Form internal correspondent to the external; only with this difference, that the Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the External is united with it, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to view many such Machines, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one End, he might be then said to possess a kind of intelligible Form, by which he would not only understand, and know the Clocks, which he had seen already, but every Work also of like Sort, which he might see hereafter.—Should it be asked,
Ch. IV. asked, "which of these Forms is prior, "the External and Sensible, or the In-"ternal and Intelligible?" the Answer is obvious, that the prior is the Sensible.

Thus then we see, there are intelli- gible Forms, which to the Sensible are subsequent.

But farther still—If these Machines be allowed the Work not of Chance, but of an Artist, they must be the Work of one, who knew what he was about. And what is it, to work, and know what one is about?—It is to have an Idea of what one is doing; to possess a Form internal, corresponding to the external, to which external it serves for an Exem- plar or Archetype.

Here then we have an intelligi- ble Form, which is prior to the sensible Form; which, being truly prior as well in dignity as in time, can no more
more become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.

Thus then, with respect to Works of Art, we may perceive, if we attend, a triple Order of Forms; one Order, intelligible and previous to these Works; a second Order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to work; thro' the second, the Works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; the first may be called the Maker's Form; the second, that of the Subject; and the third, that of the Contemplator.

Let us pass from hence to Works of Nature. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect; "a Plain, for example, spacious and fer-
"tile; a river winding thro' it; by the banks of that river, men walking, and cattle grazing; the view terminated with distant hills, some craggy, and some covered with wood." Here it is plain we have plenty of Forms natural. And could any one quit so fair a Sight, and retain no traces of what he had beheld?—And what is it, to retain traces of what one has beheld?—It is to have certain Forms internal correspondent to the external, and resembling them in every thing, except the being merged in Matter. And thus, thro' the same retentive and collective Powers, the Mind becomes fraught with Forms natural, as before with Forms artificial.—Should it be asked, "which of these natural Forms are prior, the External ones viewed by the Senses, or the Internal existing in the Mind?" the Answer is obvious, that the prior are the External.
Thus therefore in Nature, as well as in Art, there are intelligible Forms, which to the sensible are subsequent. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in Intellectu quod non prius fuit in Sensu*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the Ideas of a mere Contemplator.

But to proceed somewhat farther—Are natural Productions made by Chance, or by Design?—Let us admit by Design, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly* more exquisite than any Works of Art, and yet these we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by Chance.—Admit it, and what follows?—We must of necessity admit a Mind also, because Design implies Mind, wherever it is to be found. Allowing therefore this, what do we mean

mean by the Term, Mind?—We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.

That such Exemplars, Patterns, Forms, Ideas, (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be a Mind, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a Mind do we leave without them? Chance surely is as knowing, as Mind without Ideas; or rather Mind without Ideas is no less blind than Chance.

The Nature of these Ideas is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen
seen in natural Substances, which are but their Copies or Pictures. That they are mental is plain, as they are of the Essence of Mind, and consequently no Objects to any of the Senses, nor therefore circumscribed either by Time or Place.

Here then, on this System, we have plenty of Forms intelligible, which are truly previous to all Forms sensible. Here too we see that Nature is not defective in her triple Order, having (like Art) her Forms previous, her Concomitant, and her subsequent.

That

\(\text{(i) Simplicius, in his commentary upon the} \)\n\(\text{Predicaments, calls the first Order of these intelligible} \)\n\(\text{Forms, } \tau \alpha \rho \omega \tau \tau \iota \mu \theta \iota \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \omega \varsigma, \text{ those previous to Participation, and} \)\n\(\text{at other times, } \hat{n} \iota \varepsilon \gamma \gamma e \mu \pi \iota \varepsilon n \chi \omicron \upsilon \alpha \omicron \tau \iota \iota, \text{ the transcendent Universality or Sameness; the second Order he calls } \tau \alpha \iota \mu \theta \iota \varsigma \iota, \text{ those which exist in Participation, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them}\)
THAT the previous may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially

\[\text{κατατάσσεις, the subordinate Universality or Sameness}; \text{lastly, of the third Order he says, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—}\]

\[\text{ἡμῖν ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἰννολαις, καθ' ἰσαυτὰ ὑπενθύμαις, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imagi-

\[\text{nations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves. Simp. in Prædie. p. 17. In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine— Mountains εἰς τεθ-}

\[\text{νων λατινόν τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἑξηγημένον τῶν καθ' ἐκάρω, ἡ ἀυτίον}

\[\text{τῆς ἐν αὐτοὶς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἐκαύτῃ φύσιν, ὡσπερ ἡ}

\[\text{τῆς διαφοράς κοινότητα κατὰ τὴν σολωμοῦ ἡγοληψίαν—Deuteranò de ἵστε}

\[\text{τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινὸ ἀυτίον τῶν διαφοραῖς ἐκεῖνον ἐνδιδομένον, ἡ}

\[\text{ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τεῖτερον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐκ}

\[\text{ἀφηγίσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὡσπερογενέως—Perhaps therefore we must admit a triple Order of what is Universal and the Same; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—}

\[\text{that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Under-

\[\text{standings, being of subsequent origin to the other two. Ibid. p. 21.}
tially prior to all things else. The whole visible world exhibits nothing more

To Simplicius we shall add the two following Quotations from Ammonius and Nicephorus Blemmides, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these authors are not easy to be procured.

τῶν δεικτῶν τοῖνος δακτύλιος τις ἐκλύσωμα ἡχὼν, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχίλλεως, ἡ κηφία χωλακακείμενα: ο δε δακτύλιος σφραγίζεται τὸς κηφίς πάλινς ἤσεον δε τις εἰσελθὼν κυθεσάμουν τὰ κηφία, ἐπιεσάσας ὅτι πάλιν ἢ ἡ ἀνόητος ἐκείνην ἐκτιμάμαι, εἴποτε ἤπιο τὸ εἰκοσμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Αὐτῷ τῷ διάνοιᾳ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἔδωκα η δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηφίοις, ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς: η δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῷ ἀποκαλέμενῳ, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἡ ἄστεγονίς. Τάτο τὸ ἐν ἐνοικίῳ κηφί ἐπὶ τῶν γενών κηφὶ εἰδῶν ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργὸς, τοῖνος σάντα, ἔχει ταχύ ἐκατό τά σάντω χαρακτηρισμάτω· οὖν, τοῖνοι ἀνθρώπων, ἔχει το ἐκδότα ταχύ ἐκατό τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ, ποὺς ὁ ἀφορίζων, σάντας ποιεῖ. Εἰ δὲ τὼς ἐνυμένα λέγων, δέ χα εἷς ἐκατό τῇ Δημιουργῷ τὰ ἐκδοσ ἀκείμενα ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργὸς δημιουργεῖ, ἡ ἐκδόσ τὰ υπ᾽ αὐτό δημιουργεύμενα, ἢ ἢ εἰδῶν. Ἄλλη ᾧ μὲν μὴ εἰδῶς, ἢ κακῶς δημιουργεύσει. Τίς γὰρ, μείλλων τονήσειν τί, αὐγοῖς ὁ μέλλει ποιεῖν; ὃ γὰρ, ἢ κἀκεῖνος.
Ch. IV. more, than so many passing Pictures of these immutable Archetypes. Nay thro' these
these it attains even a Semblance of Immortality,
Immortality, and continues throughout ages

Λέγονται δέ τὰ γένη ὑ' τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς: οὖν ἐννοοῦσθαι τι σφραγισθήσοιν, ἧ̃ον χ' ἐκλύσωμα τὸ τυχὸν, ἦς ἁ κοινὰ πολλά μεταλαέστω τὰ ἐκλύσωματο, καὶ τίς ὄργιν ἄγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ σφραγισθοῦν μὴν ὅλος τὸ σφραγισθήσοιν ἑσπερικὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὅς τὸ ἐκλύσωμα, ἣ ἐπιστάσας ὅτι τάδε τὸ ἀντιμετέχοις ἐκλυσώματο, ἢ τὰ δοκῶντα πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συμφρονίσας εἰς ἐν, ἐχεῖν ὅ τότε κατὰ δίανοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ἐν σφραγισθήσοιν τύπωμα λέγεται πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κείσοις, ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς· τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς καταληφθέν, ἢ κατὰ δίανοιαν ἄκλως ὑποταί, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς. "Οὔτως ἂν ἡ τὰ γένη ὑ' τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν μὲν εἴσιν ἐν τῷ Δημητρίῳ, κατὰ τὸς μοιχικὸς λόγος· ἐν τῷ Θηὺ γὰρ οἱ ἐσισποῖοι λόγοι τῶν οὖν ἐνιαίως φησινεῖκαυν, καθ' ὅ νομος ὁ ὑπερουσίος· τὰ ζῶν μᾶλλον ὑποδείκται τῷ παράλληλῳ· ὑποστήλεια ἡ λέξικαι τὰ γένη ὑ' τὰ εἴδη ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπων· τὸ τὰ ἀνθρώπων εἴδος ἢ, ἡ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἤπειρος· ἐποιεῖται τὸ τὰ ἀνθρώπων εἴδους· ὅπερ ἢ τὸ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἢ τὸς ὁμοίως τῶν τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς καθωλικῶντας· τὸ οἰκοδομεῖ τὸ καθωλικῶτερον· τὸ ἀνθρώπικον, ἐκεῖταίσας· συναχθέντων δὲ τοὺς φυτῶν, ἑσεῖται τὸ ἀριστο-
ages to be specifically one, amid those

...
those infinite particular changes, that befal it every moment\(^{(k)}\).

**MAY**

effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existunt; secun-
dum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicitur Ge-
nera et Species in multis, quioniam in singulis hominibus
hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In ho-
minibus aequae ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus inventur
karum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam
una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempse sensiti-
vum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus ani-
maturum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscruc-
tari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem
entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, appa-
rebít primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem
in multis subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens
vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam hu-
manam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita uni-
versalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et
universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale
sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et
maximè universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in
sūd mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit
\[\varepsilonπί \tauόις \πόλας, \text{ hoc est, post multa, et posterius
\text{Alcin. in Platon. Philosoph. Introduc. C. IX, X.}}\]

\(^{(k)}\) The following elegant lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho’ applied to no higher a subject than
Bees.

*Ergo*
MAY we be allowed then to credit those speculative Men, who tell us, "it is 

Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi
Excipiat; (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET—G. IV.

The same Immortality, that is, the Immortality of the Kind, may be seen in all perishable substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' individuals perish, the several Kinds still remain. And hence, if we take Time, as denoting the system of things temporary, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the Timeus, where the philosopher describe Time to be—μένον ἡ ἄνωθεν ἐν ἵνα κατὰ ἀείτιαν ἱςόταν ἴδὼν ἴκιόνα. Aēternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.

We have subjoined the following extract from Boethius, to serve as a commentary on this description of Time.—Aēternitas igitur est, interminabilis vita tota simul et perfecta possessor. Quod ex collatione temporali clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in tempore, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti: sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hesternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vita non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod
HERMES.

"is in these permanent and comprehen-
sive FORMS that the DEITY views at
"once, without looking abroad, all pos-
sible productions both present, past, and
"future—that this great and stupendous
"View is but a View of himself, where all
"things lie enveloped in their Principles
"and Exemplars, as being essential to the
"fulness

Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec experit unquam esse, nec desinat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, non-
dum tamen tale est, ut aeternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinita licet vita spatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vita plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec prateriti fluxerit, id AETERNUM esse jure perhibe-
tur: idque nsecase est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem. Unde quidam non rectè, qui cum audiant visum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse de-
fectum, hoc modo conditori conditionem mundum fieri co-aeter num putant. Aliud est enim. PER INTERMINABILEM DUCE
VITAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABI-
LIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM,
quod Divinae Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim
fulness of his universal Intellection?

—If so, it will be proper that we invert the Axiom before mentioned. We must now say—Nil est in Sensu, quod non prius fuit in Intellectu. For tho' the contrary may be true with respect to Knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to

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...enim Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim vitæ immobilitis præsentarium statum, infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur; cumque eum effingere, utque æquare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac praeteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitae sua plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso, quod aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, aligans se ad qualemcunque præsentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quoniam manentis illius præsentia quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque contigerit, id præstat, ut esse videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit; coque modo factum est, ut continuaret vitam mundo, cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit permanendo. Itaque, &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.
Knowledge universally, unless we give precedence to atoms and lifeless body, making mind, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky course.

§ 3. It is far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above precedence.

For mark the Order of things, according to their account of them,—First comes that huge body the sensible world. Then this and its attributes beget sensible Ideas. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that mind was coeval with body, yet till body gave it Ideas, and
and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more, than a sort of dead Capacity; for INNATE IDEAS it could not possibly have any.

At another time we hear of Bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very EXILITY makes them susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrunk into Intellect by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as subtle Æther, animal Spirits, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with occult Qualities, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

But the intellectual Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental Cause
Cause. It is here it looks for the origin of intelligible Ideas, even of those, which exist in human Capacities. For tho' sensible Objects may be the destined medium, to awaken the dormant Energies of Man’s Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in Sense, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire(1).

(1) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted before, p. 371.) upon the Phaedo of Plato; which, tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of Platonic Reminiscence, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the Senses assist in the acquisition of Science, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the 2 Principles
Principles or Causes of the more excellent; and though we admit the common interpretations, and allow Sense to be a Principle of Science, we must, however, call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient Cause, but as it rouses our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of Sense to Reminiscence or Recollection.

And in another passage he observes—'Επεὶ δέν γὰς πάντως καταφερεῖν άκαλλάμβανεν ἵνα Ἰχνὶν, εἴτε ὅλων τῶν ὅλων Ἰχνεῖα λόγως, εἰπὼν τὸν τῶν ἁρμονίων ἀναμμηνακίται ὅν ἐνδον Ἰχνία λόγως, τότε τεσσεράκοντα. For in as much as the Soul, by containing the Principles of all beings, is a sort of Omnipresent Representation or Exemplar; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὸν ψυχὴν φαίνει οἷς τὰ ἐνδο τιθίμαιναι ἀναλαμβανόμενα ἐντος ἐπιτηγμένας τῶς ἐν τοῖς ἁρμονίων λόγως, ἀκριβέστερον ἄντες ἐπιτηγμένας ἐπὶ τέλωτερον ἐν καυτῇ Ἰχνίαν, ἐν τοῖς ἁρμονίων Ἰχνεῖα. Τὸ ἐν τέλωτερον τέτορ ἀκριβέστερον ἐκ ἔν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁρμονίων Ἰχνεῖα τῶν ψυχήν, ὥστε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ. Οὔτε γὰρ μὴν ἀλλαδόθη ἐν αὐτῆν ἐκ ἀυτῆς διανοεῖσθαι.
too are their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were it otherwise, there could be no intercourse between Man and Man, or (what

Those who suppose Ideal Forms, say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of Science, those proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior Perfection or Accuracy the soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence anywhere else. For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where, since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them compositions, irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but of various real Beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the Soul from some other Nature, which is by many degrees more excellent and perfect. Pleth. de Aristotel. et Platonic. Philosop. Diff. edit. Paris 1541.

The ὑμάλοι or Proportions, of which Gemistius here
(what is more important) between Man and God.

For here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions of Equality and Inequality, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical Lines, Angles, Figures, &c. of all which Ἀ'β'γ'ρ'α'τ ου Proportions, tho' we possess in the Mind the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible world.

To these two authors we may add Boethius, who, after having enumerated many acts of the Mind or Intellect, wholly distinct from Sensation, and independent of it, at length concludes,

Hacc est efficium magis,
Longè caussa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux œculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepit;
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
Introsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines.

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.
Ch. IV. For what is Conversation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourse of Speaking and Hearing.—To the Speaker, it is to teach; to the Hearer, it is to learn.—To the Speaker, it is to descend from Ideas to Words; to the Hearer, it is to ascend from Words to Ideas.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at no Ideas, then is he said not to understand; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said to misunderstand.—What then is requisite, that he may be said to understand?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up within himself, correspondent and similar to those within the Speaker. The same may be said of a Writer and a Reader; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid wrote in Greece two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvellous, there should be so exact an Identity of our Ideas, if they were only generated from sensible Objects,
Objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in Time, distant in Place, and no one Particular the same with any other?

Again, do we allow it possible for God to signify his will to Men; or for Men to signify their wants to God?—In both these cases there must be an identity of Ideas, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these common identical ideas come?—Those of Men, it seems, come all from Sensation. And whence come God's Ideas?—Not surely from Sensation too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to Body that notable Precedence of being prior to the intellect of even God himself.—Let them then be original; let them be connate, and essential to the divine Mind.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects...
so totally distinct) should so happily coincide in the same wonderful Identity?

HAD we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all Minds have their Ideas derived; or all have them original; or some have them original, and some derived. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, which is itself not Mind, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them original, then are all Minds divine, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must one Mind (at least) have original Ideas, and the rest have them derived. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them?—From Mind, or from Body?—From Mind, a thing homogeneous; or from Body, a thing heterogeneous? From Mind, such as (from the Hypothesis) has original Ideas; or from
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from Body, which we cannot discover to have any Ideas at all? An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean Poet,

\[ \text{Corpora natura animum constare, animamque;} \]

or trust the Mantuan Bard, when he sings in divine numbers,

\[ \text{Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo Seminibus.} \]

\[ \text{BUT} \]

\[ \text{(1) NOYN ἡ ἡμ ᾽ΩΜΑ γενά' ἄνω γάς ἤν τὰ ἀνοίητα NOYN γενήσει; No Body produces Mind: for how should Things devoid of Mind produce Mind? Sallust de Deis et Mundo, c. 8.} \]
But it is now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.
CHAP. V.

Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.

Original Truth (a), having the most intimate connection with the supreme

(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of Being and Knowledge are derived from Body and Sensation, have a short method to explain the Nature of Truth. It is a factitious thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance the last of any, being not only subsequent to sensible Objects, but even to our Sensations of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have not
preme Intelligence, may be said (as it were) to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence.—Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but itself neither admits Diminution, nor Change, because the Darkness respects only

not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent Truth not as the last, but the first of Beings; who call it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method how they perceive Truth, was to pass for an account of Truth itself; as if to describe the road to London, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human
only particular Percipients. Among these therefore we must look for ignorance and error, and for that Subordination of Intelligence, which is their natural consequence.

We have daily experience in the Works of Art, that a partial Knowledge will suffice for Contemplation, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to Nature; and well for mankind.

man Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of natural materials, but are as much creatures of our own, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If Milton by his Urania intended to represent Truth, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

——Heav'ly born!
Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
With thy celestial Song.——

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kind is it found to be true, else never could we attain any natural Knowledge at all. For if the constitutive Proportions of a Clock are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to those seminal Proportions, which make the essence and character of every natural Subject? —Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some too general, some too partial, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are erroneous, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

And thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of Letters, and
and that of Virtue appear to co-incide, it being the business of both to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth (b).

In this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how these peculiar Ideas become the genius of their Language, since the Symbol must of course correspond to its Archetype (c); how the wisest Nations

(b) How useful to Ethic Science, and indeed to Knowledge in general, a Grammatical Disquisition into the Etymology and Meaning of Words was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting Plato in his Cratylus; Xenoph. Mem. IV. 5, 6. Arrian. Epict. I. 17. II. 10. Marc. Anton. III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

tions, having the most and best Ideas, will consequently have the best and most copious Languages; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, discover by Words, to whom they are indebted for Things.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. We Britons in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our multiform Language may sufficiently shew. Our terms in polite Literature prove, that this came from Greece; our Terms in Music and Painting, that these came from Italy; our Phrases in Cookery and War, that we learnt these from the French; and our Phrases in Navigation, that we were taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in Regularity and Analogy. Yet we have this advantage to compensate
sate the defect, that what we want in Elegance, we gain in Copiousness, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own.

Let us pass from ourselves to the Nations of the East. The (d) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about the Form of their Government; for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of, who should be their Master, whether

(d) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ διελικέωτερον εἶναι τὰ ἄνθρωποι μην Βάσιλεῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ πεζί τὴν Ασίαν τῶν πεζί τὴν Εὐρώπην, υπομινέοντες τῶν δισποτικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔδει δυσχεραίνοντες. For the Barbarians by being more slavish in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent. Arist. Polit. III. 4.
whether a Cyrus or an Artaxerxes, a Mahomet or a Mustapha.

Such was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction; for ever in their sight, was that of Tyrant and Slave; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into the Great and Magnificent (e), they as frequently degenerated

(e) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of divine Providence, &c.
nerated into the *Tumid* and *Bombast*. The Greeks too of Asia became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters; and hence that Luxuriance of the *Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the Greeks we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*.

And what sort of People may we pronounce the Romans?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their *Language* became, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms expressive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purposes both of *History* and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was their *Philosophy*?—As a Nation, it was none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language to this 1 Subject;
Subject; a defect, which even Cicero is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent (f). Virgil

See Cic. de Fin. I. C. I, 2, 3. III. C. I, 2, 4. &c. but in particular Tusc. Disp. I. 3. where he says, Philosoplia jacuit usque ad hanc etatem, nec ullam habuit lumen Literarum Latinarum; qua illustranda et excitan-da nobis est; ut si, &c. See also Tusc. Disp. IV. 3. and Acad. I. 2. where it appears, that till Cicero applied himself to the writing of Philosophy, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of Amatusius the Epicurean, and others of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to Cicero for Philosophy, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The Epicurean Poet Lucretius, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have overlooked the Latin writers of his own sect; deriving all his Philosophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian Sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in Philosophy in Latin, both from the Poverty of the Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject. Nec
gil seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

"Tu"

\[
\text{Nec me animi fallit, Graiorum obscura reperta}
\]
\[
\text{Difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse,}
\]
\[
\text{(Multa novis rebus præsertim quom sit agendum.)}
\]
\[
\text{Propter egestatem linguæ et rerum novitatem:}
\]
\[
\text{Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas}
\]
\[
\text{Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem}
\]
\[
\text{Suadet—} \quad \text{Lucr. I. 137.}
\]

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of Philosophy; as did the Patriot Brutus, a Treatise concerning Virtue, much applauded by Cicero; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came Horace, some of whose satires and epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of Latin Philosophy, whether we consider the purity of their Stile, or the great Address with which they treat the Subject.

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the Satirist Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life,
so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single difficult writer among the Latin Classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit to make it worth while to labour through his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also Seneca; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble author of the Characteristics, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the Antonines, lived Aulus Gellius, or (as some call him) Agellius, an entertaining writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a Philosopher, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With Aulus Gellius we range Macrobius, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under Honorius
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From considering the Romans, let us pass to the Greeks. The Grecian Commonwealths, while they maintained

Honoriai and Theodosius) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and ancient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero may be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind.

In the same age with Aulus Gellius, flourished Apuleius of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was Martianus Capella, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a Philologist, than of a Philosopher.

After Capella, we may rank Chalcidius the Platonic, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the Timaeus of Plato.
tained their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed. They

The last Latin Philosopher was Boethius, who was descended from some of the noblest of the Roman Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greatest part in the Logical way. But his Ethic piece, On the Consolation of Philosophy, and which is partly prose and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed Africans already mentioned. By command of Theodoric king of the Goths, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the Latin Tongue, and the last remains of Roman Dignity, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other Romans, who left Philosophical Writings; such as Musonius Rufus, and the two Emperors, Marcus Antoninus and Julian; but as these preferred the use of the Greek Tongue to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of Latin Writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for the Latin Authors of Philosophy; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.
They were the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men. In the short space of little more than a Century, they became such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, that one can hardly help considering that Golden Period, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew to what perfection the Species might ascend (2).

Now

(2) If we except Homer, Hesiod, and the Lyric Poets, we hear of few Grecian Writers before the expedition of Xerxes. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the Persian power was at an end, the Effulgence of Grecian Genius (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of Alexander the Macedonian, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that Golden Period spoken of above. I do not mean that Greece had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the Great, the Striking, the Sublime (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after age.
The same kind of fortune befel the people of Rome. When the Punic wars were ended, and Carthage their dreaded rival was no more, then (as Horace informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets, arose, and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden Period, which lasted to the death of Octavius Caesar.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one the Socratic Period, the other the Ciceronian.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vitious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among the Greeks that fatal Peloponnesian
and universal Genius. Where Matter so abounded, Words followed of course, and

ponnesian War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wasted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the Romans; raised those unhappy contests between the Senate and the Gracchi; between Sylla and Marius; between Pompey and Cæsar; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, and the subsequent defeat of Anthony at Actium, the Romans became subject to the dominion of a Fellow-Citizen.

It must indeed be confessed, that after Alexander and Octavius had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. Aristotle maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with Alexander. In the time of the same Monarch lived Theophrastus, and the Cynic Diogenes. Then also Demosthenes and Æschines spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of Octavius, Virgil wrote his Æneid, and with Horace, Varus,
and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in Greek.

Here were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an Aristophanes; for the native Elegance of a Philemon or Menander; for the amorous Strains of a Mimnermus.

Varius, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remembered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by Alexander and Octavius, soon stopt the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of Longinus—Θείος τε γὰρ ἲκανα τὰ φυσικὰ τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἙΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ, χρεπελπίσας, χρα 
ἀμα διωθήν τὸ σέβεσθαι τὰς πειρὰς ἀλλὰς ἐργεία, ἑτὰ τὰς πειρὰς ἑτὰ σέβεσθαι πτολεμίας. It is Liberty that is formed to nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with another, and the generous emulation of being the first in rank. De Subl. Sect. 44.
Minuermus or Sappho; for the rural lays of a Theocritus or Bion; and for the sublime Conceptions of a Sophocles or Homer. The same in Prose. Here Isocrates was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here Demosthenes found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting their Philosophy, than Xenophon, Plato, and his disciple, Aristotle? Different, I say, in their character of Composition; for as to their Philosophy itself, it was in reality the same. Aristotle, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence
we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed in Greek? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves, either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either Xenophon or Plato, nothing of this method and strict order appears. The Formal and didactic is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

And yet though these differ in this manner from the Stagirite, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—Plato, copious, figurative, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric; enriching his Works
Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity; every where smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic; ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself.

The Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

And thus is the Greek Tongue, from its propriety and universality, made for all that is great, and all that is beautiful.
tiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.

Græsis ingenium, Græsis dedit ore rotundo
Musa loqui.

It were to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of Grecian Literature; that they would not waste those hours which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the French and English Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any rational pleasure
pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid improvement.

To be competently skilled in ancient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that it is Men, and not Books, we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples.
Ch. V. People, whose transcendent abilities, without the common helps, have been sufficient of themselves to great and important Ends. But alas!

Decipit exemplar vitiiis imitabile—

In truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of natural Capacity, and of superinduced Habit. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess the best Capacities, cultivated with the best Habits. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of Culture and good Learning, they are able to render a Man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.

And
Book the Third.

And so much at present as to general Ideas; how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language. So much likewise as to the Subject of this Treatise, Universal Grammar.

End of the Third Book.
THE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:

PAG. 95.—TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from Proclus in the Note may be thus rendered—THAT THING IS AT REST, which FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, both itself and its Parts.

P. 105. In the Note, for γενόμενον read γενόμενον, and render the passage thus—For by this faculty (namely the faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.

P. 106. Note (d).] The passage of Philoponus, here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings corporeal and sensible, which were said to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following.—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἐστι γενόμενοι; Περὶ δὲ μὲν ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ σαρκικὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μέλλων, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡφασμός καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ δὲ ἐπώ ἐστὶ, συμπαράδειπνον δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸς κινήσεως αὐτῶν σαρκικὸν ἑπξανάληθημά εἰς χρόνον. How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entitys? In the first place, because here (where they exist) exists the Past and the Future, and these are Non-Entitys; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with Time, or rather it is upon their Motion that Time is an Attendant.

P. 119.
ADDITIONAL NOTES,

P. 119—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the Real Now, or Instant, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a necessary Connection between Existence and the Present Instant, because no other Point of Time can properly be said to be, but also between Existence and Life, because whatever lives, by the same reason necessarily is. Hence Sophocles, speaking of Time present, elegantly says of it—

—χρόνῳ τῷ ζωῆι, καὶ σαφῶς νῦν
THE LIVING, and now present Time.

Trachin. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in Virgil, of which Servius here speaks, is a description of Turnus's killing two brothers, Amycus and Diores; after which the Poet says of him,

—curru absissa Duorum
Suspendit capita.

This, literally translated, is—he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas the sense requires, of the Two persons, that is to say, of Amycus and Diores. Now this by Amborum would have been exprest properly, as Amborum means The Two; by Duorum is exprest improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note (o) from Themistius may be thus rendered—Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.

P. 294.
P. 294.—Note (c)—There are in the number of things many, which have a most known Existence, but a most unknown Essence; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The Existence of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their Essence is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.


P. 368—in the Note—yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.]

Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his account of Wisdom or Philosophy, and its Attributes, or essential Characters.—"I'dion γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς τολλαῖς ἐχεσθαί διαφοράν δεῖξαι τῶν κρινών, κ' τὸ ἐν τοῖς τολλαῖς ἐχεσθαί κοινών δεῖξαι τὸν διαφερον. ἐν γὰρ δυσχερέσι τὸ δεῖξαι, φάτης (lege φατης) κ' πεισεῖσάς κοινών (παντὶ γὰρ πεισθήν), ἀλλ' ἐν (lege ὑπὸ) τὸ διάφορον τότων ἔπειν ἐδὲ καὶ νός κ' ὑπὸ διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ τι κοινὸν ἐχεσθιν. It is the proper business of Philosophy to shew in many things, which have Difference, what is their Common Character; and in many things, which have a Common Character, thro' what it is they differ. It is indeed no difficult matter.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.

matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove, (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. 'Arithm.

P. 379—they are more exquisite than, &c.] The Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these—μᾶλλον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἡμέρας ὥς τὸ καλόν ἐν τοῖς τῶν φύσεως ἐξαιρετικοῖς, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῶν τεχνῶν. The Principles of Design and Beauty are more in the Works of Nature, than they are in those of Art.

P. 379—we must of necessity admit a Mind, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of Ideas, as held by antient Philosophers.

Ἐὰν δὲ δεῖ συντόμως ἐπειτεῖν τὸν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἱδεῶν υποθέσεως, οὐ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἤρετα, ἀλλὰ ὅτι ταύτα πάντα ὧν δεῖται, ἐράνια ἢ ὑπὸ σελήνης, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυλομάτων ἐξίν, ἢ κατ’ αἰτίαν ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ταυλομάτων ἀδύνατον· ἐξίν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις τὰ κρήτινα, νέα, κτλ. λόγος, κτλ. αἰτία, κτλ. αἰτίας, κτλ. ὡς τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρήτινω τῶν ἁρχῶν, σωφρονὺς τῷ κτλ. φησιν τὸ Ἀρείοτέλης· δεῖ δὲ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίαν εἶναι τὰ καθ’ αὐτά, τῶν γὰρ ἱκανοῖς τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς· ὡς τῷ ἀπὸ ταυλομάτων σωφρονίτερον ἡ ἡ ἐν τὸ κατὰ αἰτίαν, ἢ κτλ. ἀπὸ ταυλομάτων τὰ θεϊότατα ἡ τῶν φανερῶν.
If therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why the Hypothesis of Ideas pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from Chance, or according to a Cause. From Chance is impossible; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the Endings of things will be more excellent than their Beginnings. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that essential Causes ought to be prior to accidental, in as much as every accidental Cause is a Deviation from them; so that whatever is the effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even though we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects [the heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be One. After which he goes on as follows.—

—'Ει μὲν ἐν ἀλογον τὸ το, ἀτοπον ἐτι γὰς τι σάλαν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τέτων αἴτιας κρείττων, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἀγνώσιν ὑποίειν, ἕστω τῷ Παντὸς ὁν, ἔτι τῷ 'Ολη μέγεσ, ὥ ἐστὶν ἀπ' αἴτιας ἀλόγη τειττότου. 'Ει δὲ λόγον ἐχουν, ἔτι ἀντί γινώσκον, οἶδεν έκατον ὅπε ὑπὲ τῶν σάντων αἴτιον ὁν, ἔτι τῷ ἀγωνεῖν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν εὖστε φύσιν. 'Ει δὲ οἴδειν, ὅτι κατ' ἐσίαι ἐστί τῷ παντὸς αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ὑφιστάται εἰ-

—F f 2
If this cause be void of reason, that indeed would be absurd; for then again there would be something among those things, which came last in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. I mean by more excellent, something operating according to reason and knowledge, and yet within that universe, and a part of that whole, which is, what it is, from a cause devoid of reason.

But if, on the contrary, the cause of the universe be a cause, having reason and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the cause of all things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from its very essence it is the cause of the universe, and if that, which knows one part of a relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the cause. It knows therefore the universe, and all things out of which the universe is composed, of all which also it is the cause. But if this be true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by knowing itself, it knows what comes after itself, and is subsequent. It is, therefore, through certain reasons and forms devoid of matter that it knows those
those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—agreeable to which Ideas these Works are fashioned, &c.] It is upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the Supreme Being an Artist—έν τῷ τε τοιχίτην Θεός δίων, in Dei artificis mente. Where Philoponus, in his manuscript Comment, observes as follows—ταξιθν φησι τὸν Θεόν, ὡς πάσιν τὰς πρωτὰς αἰτίας κἂν τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἑχοντα. He calls God an Artist, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—ἔστι γὰρ ἡμών, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέπονες, συνίεις τὸ δε τι, ἐτώ κἂν ἄνθυμψος, σωφρόνες ἐκεῖνα ἀποτελέσµατα, τὰ τούτα σώσκα κεκόσμηκαν ἀλλ’ ἵσιν, ὡς τὰ μὲν τόδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτείλῃ ὑσιν, εἰσὶνοι δὲ δι’ ὑμῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγοι ἀφιχθυτοί κἂν σωματειωτοί ὑσιν. As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those Reasons or Proportions, which exist in God, are Archetypal and all-perfect.

It is according to this Philosophy, that Milton represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating
Proclus proves the Existence of these General Ideas or Universal Forms by the following Arguments—

In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair, Answering his great Idea.—

P. Lost, VII. 556.

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—how it show'd

In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair, Answering his great Idea.—

P. Lost, VII. 556.
reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, that the Cause of the Universe, operating after this manner, is that primarily, which the World is secondarily. If therefore the World be the plenitude of Forms of all Sorts, these Forms must also be primarily in the Cause of the World, for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The Forms therefore, previous to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their active and efficient Causes, are to be found pre-existing in that One and common Cause of all the Universe. Prodi Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this ancient Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Orpheus himself.

If the Phrase, to operate merely by existing, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 162, 359.
That we should not therefore think of a blind unconscious operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy, where he forms the Character of these Divine and Creative Ideas.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—αλλ’ οί θείοιμεν την ιδιότητα άυτών (sc. ιδεών) αφορίζοντες δια των γνωριμιώτερων, άπό μην των φυσικών λόγων λάξωμεν τό άυτό τό είναι προοπτικόν, δι’ οί ήτοι σωφτες βούτο δι’ των τεχνικών τό γνωσικόν, δι’ σωφτες, εί ήτοι αυτό τό είναι σωφτες, εί ταύτα ενώσασθε χωρικος αυτίς είναι τας. Οι δημιουργίας άμα είς νοοθέτους πάντων των κατά φύσιν ἀποτελεσμάτων. But if we should choose to define the peculiar character of Ideas by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from natural Principles the Power of effecting, merely by existing, all the things that they effect; and from artificial Principles the Power of comprehending all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that Ideas are at once the efficient and intelligent Causes of all things produced according to Nature. From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. Ρεσ omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad Artem.
The Verses of Orpheus on this subject may be found in the tract De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 23. Edit. Sylburg.

P. 391.—Where all things lie enveloped, &c.

—ὅσα πρις ἤσιν ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δή τινα μεγίστων, τοσαύτα κἄτ' ΤΟ ΕΝ ἑκάσιν σει τὸ μεγίστα κατὰ τὸ σώμαν ἀμείας: ἐ γὰρ ιν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπεύςιππος ἠδοξε λέγειν ἀλλ' ἐν οὐ πάντα. As numerous as is the Multitude of Individuals by Partition, so numerous also is that Principle of Unity by universal Impartiality. For it is not One, as a minimum is one (according to what Speucippus seemed to say,) but it is One, as being all things. Damascius πρις Ἀξιῶν, MS.

P. 408—the wisest Nations—the most copious Languages.] It is well observed by Murétus—Nuli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quae serunt. Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 411—But what was their Philosophy?] The same Muretus has the following passage upon the Roman Taste for Philosophy.—Beati autem illi, et opulentí, et omnium gentium victores Romaní, in petendís honoribus, et in præséntís civibus, et in extrís nationibus verbo composendís, re compilandís occupati, philosophandí curam servis aut libertís suis, et Gracculís esuríentibus re-línguebant. Ipsí, quod ab avaritia, quod ab ambitione, quod
quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Graecum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et profigitam jacere Graeciam somniabant. Var. Lect. VI. 1.
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