SPANISH TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY AND RELIGION
IN THE TIME OF PHILIP II

The ‘de regimine principum’ and
Associated Traditions

BY

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RWT.
ABBREVIATIONS

AGS Archivo General de Simancas.
AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid.
BAC Biblioteca de autores cristianos (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1944–).
BAE Biblioteca de autores españoles (Madrid, 1846–80 and 1954–).

BHR Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance (1941–).
CSIC Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.
JHI Journal of the History of Ideas (1940–).


MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica.


Biblical Citations

In English: The Holy Bible with the Books called Apocrypha: Revised Version (NT, 1881; OT, 1885; Apocrypha, 1895); on occasion as revised in the Revised Standard Version (NT, 1946; OT, 1952; Apocrypha, 1957).

PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study is presented in the conviction, first, that a good deal remains to be established about Spanish intellectual history in the time of Philip II, and secondly, that Spanish treatises of that period related—some closely, some less so—to the centuries-old ‘Mirrors of Princes’ or ‘Rule of Princes’ tradition of writing offer a useful way into further investigation of the issue.

The very importance of this period in Spanish history lends interest to the question. It is a period that has generally been seen as having determined much in the religious and intellectual life of Spain, and in its relations with Europe outside the Peninsula, that would remain largely unchanged until the mid-eighteenth century and later, and to have established self-perceptions and responses in the collective Spanish mind that would retain their power and importance in a social and political sense down to our own times. But these recent times have seen a great renewal of scholarly interest in the examination and re-examination of what the character and conditions of Spanish intellectual and religious life in fact were in a period of Spanish history so important for what followed—the more than forty years of Philip II’s reign—and a wide variety of positions have been adopted as regards the issues arising. Work is very much in progress.

Philip’s reign began with a religious crisis. In 1557 and 1558 there were discovered at Valladolid, then capital of Spain, and at Seville, the country’s largest city and chief commercial centre, groups of individuals who were bound together by a common attachment to a view of Christianity that owed a good deal to the theological emphases of the Protestant Reformers. These groups included persons of social and intellectual consequence: cathedral canons, preachers, former royal chaplains, holders of public office, even some of the nobility. The discovery of such groups—organized, proselytizing, self-confident—greatly troubled the authorities and brought a swift and violent response. From his retirement in Extremadura, Charles V, patron of Erasmus thirty years earlier, now wrote to his daughter Juana, in her capacity as Regent while Philip was still in the Low Countries,
exhorting her to provide a quick remedy by means of exemplary punishment. If so great an evil was not cut short at once, there could be no confidence that the King or anyone else would be able to deal with it later.\(^1\) Charles’s warnings were strongly reinforced by Fernando de Valdés, the aged Inquisitor General, in his own representations to King and Pope. As Henry Kamen has remarked, Charles’s letter marked a turning-point: henceforth heterodoxy would be treated as a threat to the State and the religious establishment (Kamen, 1965, p. 79). The events of 1559 made this abundantly clear. On Trinity Sunday a great *auto de fe* was held at Valladolid. Of the twenty-six ‘heretics’ paraded, twelve were burnt at the stake. In August came the publication of the Index of Forbidden Books, prepared on the instructions of the King and issued by the Inquisitor General. Within a week of this, the only recently installed Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain, Bartolomé Carranza, was arrested by the Inquisitor General. This was on the grounds of false doctrine allegedly contained in his *Comentarios sobre el catechismo cristiano* a work which he had begun in London for the benefit of the English Church, newly reconciled to Rome. With the King back at Valladolid from Brussels, a second great *auto de fe* was held there in early October. Two more of these events were held at Seville, in September and December. Between them came the royal edict of November 1559 banning Spaniards from studying or teaching at foreign universities (save for the Spanish College at Bologna and the universities of Rome, Naples, and Coimbra). This edict complemented that of fourteen months earlier which had established detailed controls over the circulation, importation, and printing of books. These controls would remain in force, substantially unchanged, for two centuries. Taken together, these various events and measures have often been taken to signify that it is no exaggeration to speak of the creation of an intellectual *cordon sanitaire* around Spain as Philip II’s long reign began.

What impact did these things in fact have on the subsequent religious and intellectual life of Philip’s Spanish territories? The question has received much attention from scholars. Marcel Bataillon, in his great study of Erasmus and Spain that first appeared in the 1930s, wrote of the year 1560 as a date by which a profound change

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\(^1\) Charles V’s letter is largely reproduced, in English, by Kamen, 1965, pp. 78–79. For the original, see Fernández Álvarez, 1979, pp. 425–27.
in the situation in Spain had taken place: ‘in 1558 men were burnt
who, some years earlier, would have expiated their guilt with brief
penances’; it was a time that witnessed ‘the painful birth of an ortho-
dodoxy’; and in Bataillon’s judgement, ‘there have been few more mov-
ing crises in the history of Catholicism’ (Bataillon, 1966, pp. 709,
712, 715). More recently, J.I. Tellechea Idígoras has concluded that,
in the sphere of religious thought and expression, the mid-century
crisis induced a fundamental fear and produced a cast of mind char-
acterized by ‘the desire to emphasize contrasts, that which separates
rather than that which unites’:

What was now sought was maximum security, total contrast, the rad-
ical negation of Protestantism, without distinctions or nuances, with no
chink left for dialogue or the smallest measure of acceptance. [...] 
Every point of agreement, even of the merest material or external kind,
with Protestant ideas must be avoided (Tellechea, 1977, p. 30).

This judgement brings to mind Juan de Mariana’s words on the
impact of the arrest and imprisonment of Luis de León by the
Inquisition in 1572: ‘The case in question disheartened many, as
they saw the danger to others and the [tempest] which threatened
those who freely stated what they thought. In this way many changed
over to the other side or decided to bow before the storm’ (Lynch,
1965, i,251).²

In a composite work of 1979 on the Spanish Inquisition directed
by Bartolomé Bennassar, much is made of the role of that institu-
tion in fostering conformist attitudes, both in political matters and
in religious and intellectual life, by the creation of a general ambian-
ces of fear. Here Jean-Paul Dedieu sees the Index of 1583–84, which
greatly expanded and systematized that of 1559, as more than an
instrument for banning or purging a certain number of individual
works to which doctrinal objection had been taken; beyond that, it
was ‘an instrument of ideological regulation that sought to define
the global content of what Spaniards should read’ (Dedieu, 1979,
pp. 295–96). Among Spanish scholars, José Martínez Millán (1979)
and Virgilio Pinto Crespo (1983) have seen the larger purposes of

² ‘Omnino fregit ea res multorum animos alieno periculo considerantium, quan-
tum proceliae immineret libere affirmantibus quae sentient. Itaque aut in aliorum
ciastra transibant frequentes, aut temporí cedendum iudicabant’ (‘Pro editione vul-
gata’), in Tractata VII (Cologne, 1609), p. 34 a–b). The reference to Luis de León’s
misfortunes, though not explicit, is clear enough.
censorship by Crown and Church at that time in similarly comprehensive terms: the aim was to establish an officially approved ideology.

A strongly contrasting assessment has been argued by Henry Kamen, who in the second edition of his study of the Spanish Inquisition concludes that:

> the wholly absurd image of a Holy Office glowering over the intellectual labours of Spanish scholars must be rejected in favour of the dull reality: after the thunderclap of the 1559 Index, which was directed mainly against vernacular piety, no attacks were mounted against Spanish literature and not one in a hundred Spanish writers came into conflict with the Inquisition. [...] Outside of 1559, the Inquisition played a marginal role in intellectual life: clashes with individuals outside that crisis period were normally connected with Judaism (Kamen, 1985, pp. 261–62).

In his recent study of Catalonia and the Counter-Reformation, Kamen has renewed and broadened this argument, especially with reference to the censorship procedures operated by the agents of the secular government. He stresses not only the limited effectiveness of these controls but also the fact that, for much if not all of Philip’s reign, controls over the printing and publishing of books were much less tight in the territories of the Crown of Aragon than in the Kingdoms of Castile, since the terms of the Royal Edict of 1558 determining the matter did not include that part of the country (Kamen, 1993, pp. 395–97). Furthermore, books continued to arrive from abroad throughout this period, whether by the book-trade or by private arrangements. One may add that eloquent testimony as to the scale of the difficulties that this presented to those charged with protecting Spain from ‘error’ is provided, *inter alia*, by the Preface to the 1614 Supplement to the Index of 1612.

Bataillon himself, having stressed the powerful impact of the events of the late 1550s, went on to argue that those years did not mark a complete break with religious and intellectual attitudes that had been significant in previous decades and now had fallen into disfavour or under prohibition. Already in his introduction to Dámaso Alonso’s 1932 edition of the Spanish version of Erasmus’s *Enchiridion militis christiani*, he had concluded that ‘with Philip II on the throne there began a second phase of Spanish Erasmianism, that of Erasmianism without Erasmus’ (Erasmus, 1932, p. 84). He thus suggested that religious and intellectual attitudes characteristic of and fostered by Erasmus continued in Spain in a discreet and disguised manner even when it had become imprudent to mention his name, espe-
cially after the banning of a number of his most significant works by the Index of 1559 (not to speak of the Roman Indices of 1559 and 1564). Bataillon reasserted the same conviction in what appear to have been his last published remarks on the subject, adding that this issue still remained an almost unexplored area whose investigation might well reveal widely varied ‘modalités d’érasmisme’ in this later period (Bataillon, 1972, p. 33).

If we turn to consider the literature of entertainment at this time and the attitude of either churchmen at large or the Inquisition towards it, P.E. Russell has shown how difficult it is to sustain the view that they set out to foster a policy of re-imbuing imaginative literature with religious and moral values and so act in pursuit of principles laid down—it has been influentially claimed—by the Council of Trent and thus integral to the Counter-Reformation (Russell, 1978, pp. 443–78).

This study will be concerned with the literature of ideas, and the standard bibliographical repertories and the catalogues of the major learned libraries quickly reveal how much of the intellectual production of Spaniards in this period remains to be studied in due detail or indeed to be studied at all. That is true of the particular type of material which this study will examine: treatises on the government and ordering of society. Such treatises are of especial interest for our purpose because of the range of the discussion that they contain and the diversity of the positions that their authors adopt. This range and diversity are seen in the discussion of the principles by which society and its rulers should be governed, the values they should cherish and promote, and the purposes which that should pursue.

As already remarked, the dozen works to be considered here relate, for the most part, to the tradition of works ‘on the rule of princes’ that runs back to Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and beyond them back to Carolingian times, if not earlier. Some are concerned with people involved in civic government rather than with rulers. Two offer guidance either to the royal corregidor or to other legal officials. Others present lengthy accounts of the parts and purposes of human society viewed as a whole in terms of the analogy of the human body.

The majority of the writers with whom we shall be dealing were laymen—people who for the most part had studied the humanities or the law, taught the one or the other in universities, or practised as lawyers, or held office under the Crown. One was a professor of
medicine and philosophy. It is in that perspective that the three Jesuits considered in the final part of this study are approached. The works written by laymen fall into two main groups. The first consists of three treatises written and published in the Spanish Netherlands at the outset of Philip II’s reign by members of a predominantly Spanish group of intellectuals established for some time at Louvain. Concern over this group appears to have played a part in persuading the Spanish authorities to issue the edict of 1559 restricting study abroad. The treatises produced at Louvain will serve as a point of comparison with those brought out over the years running from the mid-1570s to the 1590s in the very different conditions of the Peninsula.

I have referred to these works as ‘treatises’ on government and the ordering of society. It needs, however, to be made clear from the outset that these are not primarily or predominantly works of political theory—in the sense of being works presenting an argued account of political principles, structures, and purposes in a sustained conceptual and analytical style of discourse. Large issues of political theory and debate do from time to time come into these works; but for the most part they are untechnical in character and in the main present themselves as discussions giving statement not to intellectual theories but to convictions and aspirations or lines of personal interest—convictions and aspirations regarding the purposes and values to be pursued and cherished either by the ruler or by civic officials or by society at large or by individuals within that society.

The fact that they discuss so wide a range of topics owes much to the pattern which Giles of Rome’s late thirteenth-century De regimine principum did so much to establish in this tradition of writing, treating the prince first as an individual, then as a head of family, and then in his role of ruler, even though the treatises with which we are concerned are by no means tied to that model in their own structure or manner of proceeding. Perhaps their chief interest lies in what they tell us about the values and attitudes of their authors concerning a broad range of matters relating to the individual and to society at large, and this in a period of intellectual and religious conflict, complexity, and flux. The larger sixteenth-century debate makes itself heard a good deal in these works.3

3 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s De regno et regis officio (Lérida, 1571) is an important related work. Sepúlveda writes as one familiar with, and at ease in discussing, the
It is readily conceded that, as regards intellectual achievement, these treatises may well seem, and be, less impressive than the works of the sixteenth-century neo-scholastic philosopher-theologians of Salamanca, whose works have received a good deal of attention from scholars. However, one may recall some words by so distinguished a student of the Italian Renaissance as Paul Oskar Kristeller, when he writes of what he describes as 'the most extensive and direct expression of the thought of the [Italian] humanists [. . .], namely their treatises and dialogues, many of which deal [. . .] with moral questions, including educational, political, and religious problems (Kristeller, 1961, p. 17). He notes that many of these works must appear 'somewhat amateurish' to a reader acquainted with the works of the greater Greek, scholastic, or modern philosophers. Nevertheless, these humanist treatises, he contends, are important in many ways and deserve more study than they have received, since they 'air or express interesting opinions on matters that occupied the heart and thought of the authors and their contemporaries', and do so in a way not found in the works of the professional philosophers of the time (Kristeller, 1961, p. 18).4 One ventures to make the same claim for the Spanish treatises to be considered here. For these offer a substantial amount of significant evidence regarding the values and purposes, both secular and religious, that were of importance to the intelligentsia among Philip's Spanish subjects. To put this in more specific terms, these works cast light (it may be said new light) on such issues as the appeal for Philip II's subjects of the ideology of civic humanism, the relation of this to religious ideas and evaluations, the continuing presence of the values associated with Erasmus, educational values in relation to social purposes, the range of religious attitudes to be found among Spaniards at this time, their

4 In complementary terms James Hankins has recently written 'though the humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries produced no great work of political philosophy, they did change fundamentally the intellectual world within which political thought would henceforward have to live. Their importance lay in producing not a system of thought, but a climate of thought' (Hankins, 1996, p. 118).
responses to Machiavelli (more positive in fact than has usually been argued), and perceptions of the relevance and adequacy (or rather, irrelevance and inadequacy) of aprioristic and prescriptive modes of discourse, whether for considering individual and social purposes or for discussing the principles and aims of government. It is with such things that this study will be concerned. In dealing with them one's endeavour will be to have regard for the various kinds of discourse employed, the intellectual traditions on which these works so largely draw, the more contemporary intellectual contexts outside Spain to which they relate and respond, and also the inconsistencies and conflicts within and between these works that result. It is hoped that what they offer may be found of interest for the further study and interpretation of Philip II's Spain, in particular in relation to Renaissance humanism and the Counter-Reformation.

It follows, but the fact should perhaps be stressed, that this does not offer itself as a study of an area of political thought in the more systematic and professional sense of that phrase, although it owes a large and readily acknowledged debt to distinguished works of that kind. As to the approach adopted to the texts studied here, if these were already, for the most part, works with which the interested reader might be expected to have some familiarity, a broadly thematic or more systematically conceptualized treatment of them might well recommend itself now. But since, for the most part, they been very little studied, if at all—even those by Furió Ceriol, Pedro de Ribadeneyra, and Juan de Mariana have not been much examined as entire texts—it seems more useful to handle them in a different way. The initial need is to present this series of works in a fashion that will, one hopes, give a reliable account of each taken as a whole in its many-sidedness, so that its overall character may be gauged, with its particular focus and terms of discussion, its emphases, complexities and its unresolved or unacknowledged inconsistencies, when these are present. Since the latter are of no less interest than the various writers' avowed intentions and formal positions, it seems important to do what one can to avoid the distortions that come from systematizing and thereby simplifying. Furthermore, the complex statements that constitute these works are of interest in relation

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5 I am mindful of William J. Bouwsma's warning against 'seek[ing] to comprehend the eclectic and non-systematic culture of the Renaissance in overtly systematic terms' (Bouwsma, 1990, p. 21).
to the professional identity and situation of the individuals who composed them. It is on such grounds that it has been decided not to adopt a thematic or topological form of presentation but to present the texts *seriatim*, though arranged in groups according to a variety of obvious criteria that will emerge as the study proceeds. The larger issues arising from the presentation of individual texts are brought together, and their implications considered, in the Conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO

THE 'MIRROR OF PRINCES' TRADITION

A.H. Gilbert has written that 'between the years 800 and 1700 there were accessible some thousand books and large, easily distinguished sections of books, telling the king how to conduct himself so that he might be "clear in his great office"' (Gilbert, 1938, p. 4).\(^1\) Until Machiavelli, these works (together with others of Renaissance times devoted to the republican form of government) concerned themselves chiefly with the translating into practice of religious, moral and social principles and values. It was through the ruler, above all, that principle, whether grounded in the will of God as revealed in the Bible, the nature of the universe and man, and interpreted by the Church Fathers, or as apprehended by the writers of Classical Antiquity, became embodied in, or realized through, the practice of government. Furthermore, it was seen as a primary function of government to promote, directly or indirectly, the pursuit of aims and the cultivation of ways of life, both collective and individual, that were deemed to be consonant with the fundamental nature and purpose of the world in which man found himself. These matters were seen in different terms at different times over the many centuries during which treatises of this kind were produced. These varied approaches constitute the perspective in which we need to see the Spanish sixteenth-century treatises with which we shall be concerned, if we are to appreciate the significance of the different ways in which they handled their basic subject. This chapter will therefore consider a small number of such works from different periods with the aim of establishing a relevant background for the works with which we are primarily concerned.

First, however, as these works are often referred to as 'mirrors of princes', and often bore that title, we may note that this term established itself in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) On the tradition of *de regimine principum* treatises see also Born, 1928, 1933, 1936; Röder, 1933; Kleinecke, 1937; Berges, 1938; on medieval discussions of kingship, see Dunbabin 1988, pp. 482–98.

\(^2\) See Grabes, 1982, pp. 23–30. He notes (p. 29) that '[...] up to the end of
Thus, a century before Giles of Rome wrote his treatise, Godfrey of Viterbo had produced a *Speculum regum*; in the century following Giles, the Portuguese Franciscan and bishop Alvarus Pelagius (or Álvaro Pais) used the same title for a treatise composed for Alfonso XI of Castile, which one finds being quoted by a late sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit. In the middle decades of the sixteenth century, Francisco de Monzón brought out, in Portugal, two editions of his *Libro primero del Espejo del príncipe cristiano*.3

In the course of time ‘mirrors’ came to be produced for the benefit of others involved in government beside the king or prince. In Elizabethan England, George Whetstone produced, in 1584, a *Mirour for Magestrates of Cyties*. In a parallel development, one finds sixteenth-century Spanish treatises employing the scheme of exposition established by Giles of Rome in order, now, to give an account not of princes but of ‘regidores’—that is, holders of public office in the context of city government under the Crown. We shall be concerned with two of these: Joan Costa’s *El regidor o ciudadano*, of the mid-1570s, and *El perfecto regidor*, of a decade later, by Juan de Castilla y de Aguayo, who himself held the office in question at Córdoba.

The works constituting the ‘mirror’ literature, both Latin and vernacular, varied a great deal in subject and scope. There were ‘mirrors’ whose authors attached great importance to giving a systematic and more or less comprehensive exposition of an individual subject or branch of knowledge, as in the *Speculum virtutum*, or ‘Mirror of Virtues’ by Engelbert of Admont. Other ‘mirrors’ sought to give an account of secular society or the Church, or of both together, expounding their structure by presenting ‘all things in their degree’ from highest to lowest.4 A notable Spanish example of this is the late fifteenth-century *Speculum humanae vitae* by Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo,

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3 Antonio de Guevara’s European best-seller, his *Relox de príncipes* (or *A Clock for Princes*), with its declared aim of instructing the prince in how profitably to pass every hour of his life, derives its basic organization from the Mirrors-of-Princes tradition, even though the enormous bulk of the curious and exemplary tales it contains, the disproportion between these and its exposition of views concerning the duties of the prince, together with its element of fictional invention and its interest in literary effect, give it a distinctive character of its own.

4 Bradley, 1954, p. 101, quotes from George Gascoigne’s *The Steele Glas* (1576): ‘[..] a glass of trustie Steele,/Wherein they may be bolde alwayes to look,/Because it shewes all things in their degree’.
the several editions of which ran down to the early seventeenth century. Among the Spanish treatises to be examined here, the one that most comprehensively adopts this scheme is the *Microcosmía y gobierno del hombre cristiano, para todos los estados y qualquiera de ellos*, of 1592, by Marco Antonio de Camós y Requesén. A comparable—though in important respects different—picture of the ordering of society is given by Jerónimo Merola in his *República original, sacada del cuerpo humano*, of 1587, though, again, the ‘mirror’ title is not employed.

In his account of the ‘mirror’ literature of the Middle Ages and early modern period, Hubert Grubes finds that it displays two principal and long-continuing motives and tendencies. The first is to ‘reflect things as they are’; that is, the writer seeks to perform an informative role, presenting a comprehensive and ordered account of the branch of knowledge, or aspect of society or human existence, being dealt with. The second is to ‘show the way things should or should not be’. A ‘mirror of’ becomes ‘a mirror for’ (Grubes, 1982, p. 39); the descriptive function is combined with a prescriptive one, articulated in terms of norms, principles, and *exempla*. This tendency is very prominent in treatises on the rule of princes down to and including the sixteenth century, although on occasion it is also radically questioned.

* * *

In considering the longer perspective in which our sixteenth-century Spanish treatises need to be seen it is useful to go back as far as the political literature of the Carolingian Age; more specifically to the series of short treatises on kingship written by French churchmen of the ninth century: abbot Smaragdus of St Mihiel’s *Via regia*; the *De institutione regia* of Jonas, bishop of Orleans; the *De regis persona et regio ministerio* of archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, together with the *Liber de rectoribus* composed by Sedulius Scotus at Liège—works which represent the start of the *de regimine principum* tradition in the Christian era.5 These share certain common features. They all conceive of kingship in essentially Judaean-Christian terms. The king discharges a Christian duty to God in caring for the Christian people

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which God has committed to him. Writing with particular reference to Jonas of Orleans, H.X. Arquillière has stressed that the De institutione regia sees the prince as forming part of the mystical body of Christ. The secular ruler exercises real power, but power whose character is that of a Christian ministry. This regale ministerium is a matter of governing the People of God (Jonas’s usual term for the subjects of the king) according to justice and preserving it in peace. In so doing, the secular ruler cooperates, in an ultimately subordinate role, with the Church as it discharges its salvific function. To defend ‘the churches and the servants of God’ is the king’s first duty (Arquillière, 1955, pp. 147–52). The essential point is pithily put by Sedulius Scotus: ‘What are the rulers of a Christian people but ministers of the Almighty?’ (Liber de rectoribus, chapter 1). All these writers are in agreement that the primary duty of upholding justice, punishing wrong-doers, and defending the weak, is a religious duty. Rulers are to be guided by Christian principles and to draw on divine strength through prayer and sacrament. They will comport themselves with piety and humility. Much is made of the duty to temper justice with Christian mercy. Both Jonas and Hincmar find a comprehensive account of the good ruler in St Augustine’s De civitate Dei (Bk.V,ch.xxiv), which they extensively quote. Such difference as there is between the virtues of a just man and those of a just king is mostly a difference of scale (Wallace-Hadrill, 1965, p. 34). The treatises themselves draw heavily, predominantly, even exclusively, on the Bible, making much play of the Old Testament and the exemplary figures of King David and Solomon. The Emperor Constantine is also a much praised model. Despite the intervening centuries, such works are brought to mind by a mid-sixteenth-century treatise such as Felipe de la Torre’s Institución de un rey cristiano, where the author, setting his face against the Aristotelian view of political society as belonging to the natural order, returns to the task of portraying an essentially Christian ruler governing Christian people.

Other features of these short works are of interest as regards the subsequent Advice Book tradition. Sedulius already divides kingly rule into three parts: the king’s rule of himself as an individual; his rule of his family and household; and his rule of his people. Jonas offers a comparison of kings and tyrants; Hincmar argues that a king will find it necessary to be loved and feared in equal measure by his subjects. Sedulius writes with particular interest of how important it is to the king to choose good counsellors. Finally, the
tendency of these writers to incorporate the natural order into the sphere of divine operation is seen in Smaragdus’s assertion that the four cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance are the fruits of the royal virtue of wisdom, which is itself bestowed by God (Smaragdus, 1851, col.943).

Wallace-Hadrill has remarked of these Carolingian writers that ‘they had not much time for the large matters of political theory, and when it came to the point were glad enough to accept what they found and could grasp in the writings of the Fathers’ (Wallace-Hadrill, 1965, p. 22). John of Salisbury’s Poliaticus, although ‘a [..] collection of essays written at different times and then brought together in 1159’ (Luscombe & Evans, 1988, p. 327), extends their essential ideas into a much more comprehensive and conceptually developed view of human society. Again the king is seen primarily as God’s representative on earth, responsible to him for faithfully discharging the duty and ministry of caring for God’s people by upholding justice. In this he is subject only to the priesthood. While the author does not adopt an extreme hierocratic position, he does make much of the higher law, identified with the law of God, by which the king is bound if he is to remain truly a king and not become a tyrant (Dickinson, 1927, pp. xxviii–xxxiv). That law is conceived almost wholly in terms of scriptural injunctions. As Dickinson points out, the two Old Testament passages that are of greatest importance here (Deut. 17.14–20, and Job 29.7–25) were ones which had already been cited in the same connexion by Jonas of Orleans. The same passage from Deuteronomy would be treated at some length by Marco Antonio de Camós y Requeséns in the 1590s.

While the scope of the Poliaticus has much to do with its extensive treatment of the relation between law and government, it owes much also to its author’s developed sense of the complex unity of society and the interdependence of its members. This perception (which is the aspect of the work especially remembered) he expressed in terms of the analogy between the body politic and the human body. Such an analogy was far from new, but John of Salisbury employed it to express an inclusive view of the organization of society, seeing all its ranks and parts as being inter-connected in a mutual relationship of functions. Each member had to accomplish its special task in its special place, and in doing so was supported by the others. The task of the ruler was to promote this state of affairs and thus the ‘health’ of society (Struve, 1984, pp. 309–10; Constable,
To this organic image of the body politic ‘all medieval intellectuals were drawn like pins to a magnet’ (Dunbabin, 1988, p. 489). If it found its fullest development in the fifteenth century with Nicolaus of Cusa’s De concordantia catholica, it continued, as we shall see, to hold a powerful appeal for Spanish writers publishing in the last twenty years of the sixteenth century.

The recovery of knowledge of Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics in the West in the thirteenth century is no longer seen as having worked so radical a revolution in political thinking as had long been thought. The ‘political naturalism’ deriving from the Politics and previously seen as the fundamental new contribution of Aristotle—the doctrine, that is, that ‘political association arises directly out of the requirements of human nature instead of divine inspiration or convention’—is now shown to have ‘supplemented rather than supplanted pre-existing traditions of thought’ (Nederman, 1991, pp. 179–81). For naturalistic conceptions of human association had become predominant in political thought (as in other areas of thought) from at least the twelfth century, and the impact of the Politics was to confirm this (Nederman, 1988, p. 3). The way in which the newly available knowledge of both the Politics and the Ethics worked upon political discourse is seen in Aquinas’s manner of approaching the subject of kingly rule at the start of his treatise De regno [or De rege et regno] ad regem Cypri, composed at the papal court in the mid-1260s.6

He begins with the nature and needs of human society. ‘When we consider all that is necessary to human life [. . .] it becomes clear that man is naturally a social and political animal, destined more than all other animals to live in community’ (I,i).7 What this work gives us is ‘an Aristotelian celebration of political life joined with a defence of monarchy’ (Viroli, 1992, p. 42). It is of the nature of a king to serve the common good of the community, whereas the tyrant sacrifices that good to his personal profit (I,i). In more specific terms, ‘the most important task for the ruler of any community is the establishment of peace and unity [“pacis unitatem”]’. Then that community may hope to achieve the goal for which it exists, which

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6 While the whole of the De regno was long received as being by Aquinas, it is now accepted that, of its four books, he wrote only the first one, and chapters 1–4 of the second (the rest being probably by another Dominican, Bartolommeo di Lucca).

7 I quote from J.G. Dawson’s translation (see Aquinas, 1959).
is ‘to live a virtuous life’ (Chapter 14). However, Aquinas now goes on to speak of a further ‘final’ goal of human society: ‘through virtuous life to attain to the enjoyment of God’. He has already, in Chapter 8, quoted the same passage from St Augustine’s De civitate Dei as Jonas and Hincmar had done, urging the king to set his ‘true aim’ and seek his final reward in heaven rather than on earth. Now he observes that the enjoyment of God is not achieved by human virtue alone but by divine grace [‘non [...] per virtutem humanam sed virtute divina’]. Therefore, if human society is to achieve its final goal, it needs divine, not human, government; and that divine government is provided by the Church. As to the relation between the two, ‘under Christ’s Law, kings must be subject to priests’ (Chapter 14). Nevertheless, a king, ‘though subject to that [higher] power and authority, must [...] preside over all human activities and direct them in virtue of his own power and authority’ (Chapter 15). As Dunbabin has commented, Aquinas confines his argument on this subject to the last two chapters of his First Book, and does not draw out the implications of royal subjection to the Church (Dunbabin, 1965, p. 81).

The outstanding medieval work in the ‘Rule of Princes’ tradition, as regards both its scale and its fame, is the De regimine principum by Giles of Rome (otherwise Aegidius Romanus or Egidio Colonna), of the Augustinian Hermits, or Friars. It consists of over 200 chapters and, of the 200 or so known MSS of the work, something over a hundred date from the fifteenth century (Bruni, 1932, pp. 356–58). It was probably composed at Paris in the late 1270s (Bruni, 1932, pp. 344–45), and gives clear evidence that its author was familiar with Aquinas’s treatise of the previous decade. However, Giles’s own treatment of the subject is incomparably more extensive.9

Following, as he says, ‘a rational and natural order’, Giles deals with the ruler considered first as an individual man, then as a head of family, and finally as a ruler, both in time of peace and of war. Within each of the three books a concern with orderly exposition is frequently voiced. Taking the ruler as an individual, Giles sets out

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8 Compare Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, qu. ciii, art. 3: ‘Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas, sive pax. [...] Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest esse causa unitatis convenientius quam multi uniti; unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures’.

9 For further discussion of this work see Dunbabin, 1988, pp. 483–85; Viroli, 1992, pp. 36–43.
in sequence what things he should and should not ‘place his happiness in’, what virtues he must have, what emotions (or ‘passions of the soul’) he shall and shall not permit himself, and what mores of young men and old, of the nobly born and the wealthy, he shall adopt or reject. Turning to the ruler as head of family, he discusses relations between husband and wife, between parents and children (including the latter’s education and upbringing), and the management of servants and household. Coming now to the prince as a ruler of a kingdom or civitas, he begins with a discussion of political society which itself rests on the Aristotelian premises already noted in Aquinas’s De regno. This leads on to an exposition in over thirty chapters of what is required of the ruler himself, first and foremost, then of his counsellors, his judges, and his people. Giles here gives no less than eight chapters to the comparison of king and tyrant and five to examining the different kinds of human law. He echoes Aristotle to the effect that, as much as a ruler exceeds his subjects in power and position, so he must exceed them in goodness and virtue, becoming ‘as it were, a demi-god’ (‘quasi semideus’) among them (III,iii,30 & 32). Following and upholding right reason and the natural law in ruling others, he himself is to be the possessor and exemplar of all the virtues and the promoter of virtue among his subjects. It is for this reason that it is so important to educate the prince properly in the ways of virtue: as Jean Dunbabin again puts it, the doctrine of kingship emphatically taught by Giles of Rome (as by Aquinas in his De regno) is that of autocracy tempered by conscience (Dunbabin, 1965, p. 73).

In the final main section of over twenty chapters on government in time of war, Giles’s chief debt is to Vegetius’s De re militari. Overall, however, his greatest debt is to Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics. These provide him with a whole programme of issues for discussion and an approach for dealing with them. Throughout his treatise he constantly refers to these works, and the impact on him of the recovery of Aristotle is emphasized still more by the virtual absence of references to the Bible and patristic literature.10 The discussion of the virtues and states of mind requisite in the ruler is wholly and explicitly organized on the basis of the Ethics. Thus in Book I, Part

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10 It has been observed that, while there are on average four references per chapter to Aristotle, there is not one to the Bible and only one to St Augustine among the Fathers (Rubio, 1960, p. 38).
ii, the four cardinal virtues are first expounded in ten chapters; then the eight ‘annexed virtues’ enumerated by Aristotle are treated in turn. Subsequently the topics discussed in the section on princely government are derived one after the other from the Politics. But these works also make a fundamental contribution to the conceptual character of Giles’s treatise as a whole. It is in Aristotelian terms that Giles stresses the moral basis and function of political society and government. The teleological ethics of Aristotle are central to his argument: the aim of society is to achieve, and the goal of the ruler is to promote, virtuous living, by which man is brought to his fulfilment. But such virtuous living is seen by Giles as living according to Reason (ratio), and that is in turn conceived of—here his Thomist thinking asserts itself—as the organizing principle of the whole created order established by God. In that order, everything is enabled to achieve its proper end or fulfilment. The king, therefore, who wishes to know how to rule should look to Nature (III,i,8). So Giles integrates the ‘naturalness’, which he stresses, of political society as conceived by Aristotle into the Christian view of the order of nature as something created by God. But, along with this, the teleological principle shown by Aristotle to be inherent in society is brought into relation with the Christian view of God as man’s final end. So, in an introductory section of several chapters, Giles—departing from Aristotle in various respects—tells the ruler not to ‘place his happiness’ is pleasures of the senses, or riches, or in honour, glory or fame, or in ‘civil power’, or physical strength or beauty, but in love of God and in the exercise—as a prince and ruler—of prudence as directed by that love; for the king is God’s minister (I,i,12).

However, if we find here the Thomist desire to set the order of nature as seen by Aristotle in a larger Christian pattern of ends, the work still leaves a sense of deep differences existing between the ‘natural’ order and that which relates to man’s ‘supernatural’ final goal. Giles stresses that marriage (II,i,7), the possession of wealth (II,iii,5), and life generally as lived in a politically organized society (II,i,1), are all ‘natural’ to man and intrinsically good. But those who forego these things out of devotion to God are ‘better than men’ (II,iii,5; see also II,1,7). Almost at the outset of Book I he compares the relative worth of the ‘political’ or ‘active’ life with that of the ‘contemplative’ (I,i,4). Here he concurs with Aristotle in rating the contemplative life above the ‘political’. But the difference is now
very much more than an issue of degrees of perfection in ‘happiness’: contemplation is not a matter of self-sufficient intellectual activity but rather of love of God and delight in Christian love. It therefore belongs to a different order of things from ‘political life’, which is natural to man as man. For this reason ‘natural and human law’ is incapable of bringing man to that ‘supernatural good’ which is his final end. For that, the ‘lex evangelica et divina’ is necessary (III,ii,30). Giles does not explore the far-reaching philosophical and theological issues implicit here; nor, despite the extreme papalist position he was to adopt in his later De potestate ecclesiastica, does he work the matter out in terms of Church and State. However, the issues and potential tensions which one glimpses here were to be matters of importance, sometimes of anxious concern or vigorous argument, in some sixteenth-century Spanish treatises.

Giles’s treatise had great success with the reading public. In addition to the 200 MSS already mentioned, four if not five printed editions had appeared, by 1502, at Augsburg, Rome, and Venice. Rome saw further editions in 1556 and 1607. There were translations (whether complete or partial) into Italian, French, English, and Hebrew. A Castilian version was made, probably in the 1340s, by the Franciscan Juan García de Castrojeriz for the heir of Alfonso XI, who succeeded his father in 1350 and earned the alternative sobriquets of ‘Pedro el Cruel’ and ‘Pedro el Justiciero’.11

Quentin Skinner has commented that the heyday of advice-books to princes came in the latter half of the fifteenth century, in Italy (Skinner, 1978, i, 116–18). This he explains by reference to ‘the

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11 To his translation of Giles’s text Fray Juan García added an extensive series of glosses introducing things notably absent from the original: quotations from the Bible and the Fathers, and from other writers both ecclesiastical and secular—John of Salisbury among them—together with exempla drawn from sacred and secular history. The political outlook revealed by these glosses belongs far more to the older, Augustinian, tradition than to that of a Christianized Aristotelianism. Moreover, no surviving manuscript of this version includes Book III, where matters specifically of government in time of peace and war are dealt with. The most authoritative manuscript stops short at the end of Book II, Part ii; that is, at the end of the section on the education of the Prince’s children. In the printed Seville edition of 1494, Giles’s text is mostly represented by the briefest of chapter summaries, while García de Castrojeriz’s glosses are given in full. Giles is much better served in this respect by the Catalan version made in the fifteenth century by the Carmelite Arnaldo Estayol, printed at Barcelona in 1480 and 1498. See Rubió, 1960, pp. 32–71; 1961, pp. 645–67. (Rubió notes in the first of these articles (p. 57, n. 1) that a Portuguese translation was made by Dom Pedro de Portugal [1392–1449], son of King John I.) See also Shaw, 1961, pp. 55–63.
extension and consolidation of increasingly despotic forms of princely rule’ at the expense of republican forms, ‘the final triumph of the signori’ (Skinner, 1978, i, 113, 115). In the Kingdom of Naples, during the long reign of Ferdinand I (1458–1494), several significant advice-books for rulers were produced by men connected—two of them closely—with the Neapolitan Court. The celebrated humanist Giovanni Pontano, who would be Ferdinand’s secretary from 1471, produced a De principipe in 1468 dedicated to Ferdinand’s heir, Alfonso, duke of Calabria, then aged twenty. The latter received, at about the same time, a Memoriale from Diomede Carafa, who was already one of his father’s most influential counsellors and his own former tutor. Carafa soon produced, in the earlier 1470s, another treatise of more notable character—Memoriale sui doveri del principe—for Alfonso’s sister Eleonora, after her marriage to the Duke of Mantua. Here, as well as speaking in terms of general moral principle, he deals with a variety of financial, economic, and administrative matters in a notably practical fashion (Petrucci, 1976, pp. 524–30). Felix Gilbert has remarked that the exceptional degree of political realism marking this work is due to the fact that it was a private memorandum and not intended for publication. He adds that ‘as soon as an author had literary ambitions, he felt it necessary to set an ideal standard and write of an imaginary world’ (Gilbert, 1939, p. 469).

Just how far a third writer—Francesco Patrizi—in fact wrote of an imaginary world, in his De regno et regis institutione, is perhaps open to question, but it is at any rate clear that he set an ideal standard for the king in what was by far the most elaborate and most celebrated of these Neapolitan treatises—the most celebrated, probably, of all fifteenth-century Italian treatises on the rule of princes. It therefore merits examination in some detail.

Mostly written, it appears, in the mid-1480s, it is another work dedicated to Alfonso, duke of Calabria, and Patrizi’s second on questions of government. In the later 1460s he had written a treatise

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12 Skinner traces the history of advice-books for princes and for others charged with government as these works developed in Italy from the earlier thirteenth century onwards, drawing attention to the elements of continuity that ran from the teachers of the *ars dictaminis* down to Machiavelli as well as to the changes that occurred (Skinner, 1978, i, 28–48, 71–84, 101–08, 113–38).

13 Though soon translated, twice, into Latin, this work was published only in 1668, under the title *De regis et boni principis officio* (Petrucci, 1976, p. 527).

14 In the preface to the second of the nine books of this treatise, Patrizi refers to the conclusion of the Venice-Ferrara war, which ended in August 1484.
commending not princely rule but the republican ordering of affairs, addressed to the governing council of his native city of Siena, from which he had been expelled for his part in a revolt of the nobles a decade earlier. In 1461 his friend and fellow-Sienese, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, as Pope Pius II, had appointed him Bishop of Gaeta. It was in that office that he wrote his two treatises.¹⁵ These enjoyed impressive success, above all in France, and both receive quite frequent mention by various of the Spanish writers with which we are concerned. Beyond that, one Enrique Garces, who had spent many years in Peru, applying his mind to the refining of silver and its use in currency, thought it worthwhile to make a translation of the De regno, which he dedicated to the ageing Philip II in 1591 for the benefit of his heirs (Pérez Pastor, 1891, i, 187).

Like Giles of Rome, Patrizi sees the ruler as essentially one who exemplifies and promotes virtue and justice. Again we read that the ruler must be more virtuous than his subjects: again the contrast is drawn, though more briefly, between a king and a tyrant (II,i). Less is made of practical matters by Patrizi than by Giles. Patrizi expects his ruler to study and excel in warfare (VIII,xii); but he offers nothing along the lines of the final part of Giles’s treatise, where practical advice on the conduct of war, substantially derived from Vegetius’s Epitoma rei militaris, is set out in some detail. And whereas Giles devotes four chapters to the subject of princely counsellors and counsel, Patrizi speaks of such people, and of princes’ secretaries, only to say that others should not regard them with envy (IX, vii, viii). The importance of law and good ‘magistrates’ is stressed by both; but Patrizi lacks Giles’s interest in distinguishing between different kinds of law. Instead, he praises the Romans for developing a corpus of law and establishing its rule throughout their empire (VIII,vi). Patrizi acknowledges that he cannot address his theme on the basis of practical experience—‘it takes a king to advise a king’—but nevertheless offers Alfonso a treatise in nine books and nearly 170 chapters on what he himself calls ‘moralis civilis sapientia’ (I,ii).

The general proposition that virtue brings man to his final end, which is God, is common to both Giles and Patrizi; but in Patrizi we no longer find a sense of a distinction to be made between the orders of nature and grace: the distinction drawn by Giles in terms

¹⁵ The different positions of the two works are illuminatingly compared by Viroli, 1992, pp. 114–22.
of the ‘natural law’ and the ‘law of God and the Gospel’. With Patrizi it is an undifferentiated virtue that brings man to God. As in Giles’s treatise, we find the ‘contemplative’ and the ‘active’ lives compared. Patrizi follows both Plato and Aristotle in seeing ‘contemplative happiness’ as ‘the highest and most perfect form of happiness’; he follows Plotinus in tracing the three degrees of such happiness as achieved by cultivating detachment from the things of this world (VI,i–ii). However, it is clearly of the happiness belonging to the ‘active life’ of men in this world that he speaks with the keener interest. He recalls that it was Socrates who first redirected philosophical enquiry away from fruitless ‘natural speculation’ towards the practical moral issues of human existence (VI,v). He echoes the words of the pseudo-Platonic Letter IX to Archytas, who is urged to remember that he was not born to himself alone and that his country [patria], his friends, fellow-citizens, and all mankind, had by far the greater claim on him. To this Patrizi at once adds Aristotle’s dictum that man is by nature ‘civis ac sociabilis’. There soon follows Cicero’s scarcely less remembered declaration, in his Somnium Scipionis, that ‘nothing of what takes place on earth is more acceptable to that Supreme Deity who governs this whole world than those councils and assemblies of men bound together by law which are termed states’. Patrizi’s outlook remains deeply marked here, as in his De institutione reipublicae, by that revaluation of the life of civic involvement and activity which is especially associated with Florentine humanism of the earlier fifteenth century.16

So far as conscious and immediate intellectual debts are concerned, it would be hard to overstress the importance in Patrizi’s treatise of Cicero. This goes well beyond the advocacy of the civic ideal of existence. As Giles of Rome follows his account of the four cardinal virtues with a discussion of the emotional frame of mind—the ‘passiones animae’—desirable in a ruler, so Patrizi prefaces his account

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16 On Florentine ‘civic humanism’ and its debts to, or affinities with, Aristotle, Cicero, the Roman Law, and the medieval Italian dictatores, see Baron, 1938, pp. 88–93; 1966, pp. 6–7, 121–29; Riesenberg, 1969, pp. 246–50; Pocock, 1975, pp. 49–75; Ullmann, 1977, pp. 100–01, 156–59; Skinner, 1978, i, 71–84, 107–08. Baron’s celebrated thesis that the rediscovery and assertion in early Quattrocento Florence of the values of the life of active citizenship were largely prompted by the struggle for the liberty of Florence against Giangaleazzo Visconti, duke of Milan, is discussed, among these works, by Pocock (pp. 57ff.) and Skinner (i,69ff.).
of the cardinal virtues (in Books VI to VIII) with an examination of a long series of ‘perturbationes animi’ arising out of things desired or feared: irrational emotional disturbances that need to be mastered if peace of mind is to be enjoyed. Here, throughout Book IV of his treatise, Patrizi’s chief guide is Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*. His discussion at large of the virtues and dispositions desirable in a ruler is conducted with reference to the various philosophical schools of Classical Antiquity. He declares it to be his intention ‘to sip’ from the teachings of the Stoics, the Academy, and the Peripatetics as seems most relevant to his purposes. Only the Pyrrhonian sceptics are excluded from the reach of his humanist eclecticism (VI,v).

One notes, as in Giles, a virtual absence of references to biblical and later Christian sources; but now Aristotle, omnipresent in Giles, appears as one authority among others. Plato and Cicero are more prominent. Moreover, Patrizi is familiar with the writings of other Classical authors on the subject of rulers and government. Dio Pрусensis (or Cocceianus), Isocrates, Plutarch, and Xenophon are often drawn on, as are the compilations of Valerius Maximus and Diogenes Laertius. In a characteristically humanist manner, Patrizi’s text is very largely a tissue of definitions and citations on moral themes, greatly filled out by reference to exemplary figures and deeds recorded by Classical authors.

Patrizi offers no separate section on the ruler in the context of his family; but he does give a good deal of space to the education of a king, and here one finds a clear debt to the cultural and educational programme of Renaissance humanism (see Kristeller, 1961, pp. 9–10, 109–11; Grendler, 1989, pp. 117–21 and Part II passim). It is relevant to recall at this point that Giles of Rome, writing of the education to be given to the sons of noblemen, kings and princes, had set clear limits to what was appropriate in this case. The three subjects of highest standing—theology, metaphysics, and natural philosophy—were not for ‘subtle scrutiny’ by the ruler. His task was rather to acquire a sound knowledge of the Faith and of the ‘moral sciences’ which would teach him how to govern both himself and others (II,ii,8). Among these moral sciences Giles included Ethics, Economics (in the sense of the ordering of family and domestic affairs), and Politics. Only in so far as they served the ruler’s ‘moral task’ of government should the other ‘sciences’ be mastered—that is, predominantly, the seven ‘liberales scientiae’ of the *trivium*
and the *quadrivium*: Grammar, Rhetoric, Dialectic; Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy. These Giles briefly enumerates, commenting on the character and value of each (II,ii,8).

In a discussion of Pier Paolo Vergerio’s *De ingenuis moribus ac liberalibus studiis*, composed at Padua in the first years of the fifteenth century and ‘the most frequently copied and reprinted Renaissance pedagogical treatise before the works of Erasmus’, Paul Grendler draws attention to a ‘novel and significant emphasis’ found in this work. This consisted in the pride of place that Vergerio gave to the subjects of history, moral philosophy, and eloquence. These three ‘liberal studies’ equipped a man for making a contribution to public affairs and civic life (Grendler, 1989, p. 118; Garin, 1958, p. 132; Robey, 1980, p. 30). As Grendler notes, Vergerio, instead of developing this idea further, went on to give a brief account of the subjects constituting the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*, and then—again briefly—the professional disciplines of law, medicine, and theology, before, finally, recommending physical training for the future prince. Giles of Rome had himself touched on this latter subject (II,ii,16–18); Patrizi would give several chapters to commending physical fitness and the practice of sports (III,ii–ix). His whole treatise, however, emphasizes the importance of moral philosophy, and he has specific recommendations on how this can best be acquired. After mastering grammar, the young prince will read the poets of Classical Antiquity, its historians, and, above all, its orators, Cicero and Demosthenes foremost among them. These will teach him at once perfect eloquence and ‘the precepts of virtuous living and wisdom’ (II,viii–x). By contrast, Patrizi points out that he does not wish the king to devote himself to formal philosophical study: Socrates, Plato, and Pythagoras are not models for him. His world is that of ‘steel, dust, and the sun’ rather than the peaceful shade of the Academy (II,xiii).

Both Giles and Patrizi present ideal rulers, but Patrizi makes explicit acknowledgement of the fact. He is presenting in this work a Platonic Idea of the best kind of prince—‘such as perhaps no one ever was’ but, nevertheless, such as will provide a model of what a ruler ought to be like.17 One aspect of the moral perfection required in the ruler

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17 ‘Nos igitur de unius viri dominatu aut imperio dicturi in his libris, si ratione ac via dissere volumus, ad ultimam sui generis formam ac speciem sermonem nostrum redigamus necesse est, atque in optimo Principe fingendo talem formemus
is especially worthy of notice. When discussing justice, Patrizi adds to the seven associated virtues enumerated by the Platonists an eighth: ‘fides’, good faith (VIII,vi). Opening the chapter which he devotes to this, he comments that, without good faith, all the other virtues of kings and princes lose their brightness, for from it they receive their radiance as the moon and stars receive theirs from the sun.

Prudence without good faith would be an empty, false thing, mere slyness and dexterous cunning. [. . .] What praise, reputation, or glory can a Prince have who is false, given to lying, and not to be trusted? What is more ugly and abominable than to break faith, not to fulfil promises, not to abide by undertakings and agreements? 

Good faith, he contends, must be kept even with an enemy; no consideration of utility or calculation of power or victory can override it. To break faith is something that cannot be atoned for, a crime which God never leaves unavenged. Never more emphatically than on this subject does Patrizi take up a position exactly contrary to the one adopted by Machiavelli in his *Il principe* of thirty years later.

While it is the revolutionary character of the latter work that makes it the one treatise on the rule of princes to gain lasting fame in modern times, it nevertheless retains recognizable features of the type (Gilbert, 1938, *passim*; Skinner, 1978, i, 118–28). Thus, in Chapter 16, where Machiavelli writes ‘of liberality and parsimony’, he is dealing with a topic—liberality in relation to its opposite—that was a regular feature of earlier princely advice-books. One finds two chapters given to it by Giles of Rome (III,ii,17–18). The subject of Machiavelli’s following chapter (‘Concerning Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be loved than feared’) was another long-established topic. The chapter devoted to it by Giles (III,ii,36) brings the major part of his discussion of princely rule to a conclusion. However, in the course of this discussion he touches on other issues which Machiavelli would later handle in his own memorable way. Especially noteworthy is the chapter (III,ii,15) on ‘What things

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qualis fortasse nemo unquam fuit. Non enim querendum a nobis est, quis ejusmodi fuerit, sed videndum erit qualis debeat esse ille, quem optimum Regem aut Principem esse statuimus’ (Patrizi, 1608, Bk.II, ch.iv p. 90).

18 ‘Prudentia sine fide vana ac mendax esset, & vafr quaedam versutaque calliditas. [. . .] Quid laudis, famae, aut gloriae Princeps habere potest, qui vanus, mendax, aut infidus est? Quid turpius aut foedius esse potest, quam fidem fallere? promissa non praestare, aut dictis conventisque non manere? (Patrizi, 1608, VIII, xx, p. 533).
undermine kingly rule and how many things the king should do to maintain himself in his princely position' (‘... et quot oporteat regem facere ut se in suo principatu conservet’). Here, in a discussion owing something to Aristotle’s ‘Tips for Tyrants’ in Politics, V.x–xi, one finds Giles commenting on the particular situation of ‘the new prince’ and how he can strengthen his position by inspiring his subjects with fear of attack from outside.

Other perspectives present themselves for elements in Machiavelli’s Prince. Vegetius’s Epitoma rei militaris, of the later fourth or earlier fifth century, is a princely advice book of a notably specific kind; but in view of its great popularity (as indicated by extant manuscripts) in the late Middle Ages especially, it should be recalled at this point for those of its observations in particular that have a strikingly ‘Machiavellian’ ring.19 Here (III,i) already we find the maxim that he who desires peace should prepare for war, and the reflexion that he who desires a successful outcome in war must deploy technical skill ['ars'] and not rely on chance ['casus']. Here already too (III,xxvi) we find an acute awareness of the importance of opportunity ['occasion'] and of the role of Fortune in human affairs. This also deserves to be borne in mind as possibly lying in the background sometimes when Spanish writers of the sixteenth century follow a line of reflexion that more immediately seems to run parallel to passages in Machiavelli.

Returning to Patrizi one finds that a number of Machiavelli’s strongest concerns and convictions are in any case present in his De regno. Patrizi repeatedly states his belief that the aim of the ruler is fame and glory in this world. Again, Machiavelli’s statement at the start of Chapter 14 of Il Principe that ‘a prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline’ finds a striking parallel in the earlier work (VIII,xii).20 Patrizi also displays in his substantial chapter ‘On Fate and Fortune’ (I,xii) a lively sense of ‘the changeability and varied turns of events’ characteristic of human existence, an aware-

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19 On Vegetius, see Lester, 1988, pp. 11–17; Russell, 1997.
20 ‘Nulla enim disciplina aut exercitatio magis ei utilis ac necessaria est, quam rei militaris ac bellicae, cui longe tutius confidere debet, quam omnibus opulentis ac copiis. Rex enim qui ocio gaudet, & armorum strepitum ac laborem exhorret, fortunam suam ut in consilio habeat oportet, quae ei caveat polliceaturque perpetuam pacem’ (Patrizi, 1608, p. 504).
ness which has a good deal in common with Machiavelli’s concern with the role of Fortune in the lives of rulers.

Machiavelli’s own words, on a number of occasions, indicate a general familiarity with the tradition of advice-books for princes (Gilbert, 1938, pp. 5–15); nowhere more clearly than in his famous statement in the opening lines of Chapter 15 of Il principe that many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen. By contrast, his own aim is ‘to follow up the real truth of a matter [rather] than the imagination of it’. So he concentrates his attention and advice on the ruler who, having come to power by Fortune and foreign arms, now seeks to maintain his position (‘salvare/mantenere lo Stato’) and, beyond that, achieve glory for himself (Skinner, 1981, pp. 23–31). The world—the real world—in which he will set about this is one where ‘how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner learns his ruin than his preservation’. And so ‘it is necessary for a prince wishing to maintain his position to learn how not to be good, and to apply this or not according to necessity’ (Chapter 15). This means that, if necessity requires it, he will, to that end, act in a way contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion (Chapter 18). It is thus, as Skinner has stressed, that Machiavelli effected a revolution in the prevailing assumptions of humanist writers of mirrors-for-princes (Skinner, 1978, pp. 128–38; 1981, pp. 34–41; 1988a, pp. xv ff.). Beyond that, Machiavelli was reversing the assumptions of that genre as we have seen it cultivated over the course of the Middle Ages. The absolute priority of moral and religious demands over political needs has been abandoned. Now it is allowed that the prince will not practise the virtues if to do so will harm his position; he will not consider himself bound by oaths; but he will take care to appear virtuous to his subjects and skilfully dissemble in his dealings with other powers. This is the way of virtù and valour in a world where ‘Fortune is arbiter of half of our actions but still leaves the governance of the other half, or a little less, to us’ (Chapter 25).

A.H. Gilbert has remarked that Machiavelli emphasizes Fortune as no other writer de regimine principum does. Fortune, together with the associated notions of occasion, chance, and time as the ‘mother of many mutations’, pervades Il principe because Fortune is of the essence of Machiavelli’s theory of life and affairs (Gilbert, 1938, pp. 206, 219). The world is no longer seen as a place ruled according
to the decrees of a just and benevolent Providence whose principles at least can be known. It is rather a place where man’s well-being depends on his own efforts in a situation where rapid, dramatic, and unforeseeable reverses of Fortune occur. But since, as Machiavelli says, Fortune is a woman, she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly (Chapter 25). Machiavelli’s concluding recommendation to the Prince is, therefore, that he act with audacity.

Here it is worth making a brief comparison with Patrizi’s position on the matter. As already mentioned, he shares with Machiavelli a lively sense of the instability of human affairs. They are in agreement also that Fortune is nevertheless not all-powerful in human life. But at this point a clear difference between them becomes apparent. Machiavelli’s comment that Fortune is a woman implicitly refers to, and adopts, the Classical view that Fortune is a goddess. This Patrizi (I,xii) rejects. He explicitly repudiates the familiar representation of Fortune as a goddess both blind and deaf, with her cornucopia and her hand on a tiller, setting the course of human life and bestowing good things and bad on men not according to their moral deserts but merely at her whim (‘ex temeraria quadam voluntate’). It is not that Patrizi is inclined to minimize the variability of human life; but the response that he looks for from the ruler in such a situation has a different moral character and, in practical terms, is marked by that very caution which Machiavelli finds less promising than audacity. Patrizi’s prince will not allow himself to be surprised by any turn of events; his guide will be careful judgement, reflexion, reason: those various aspects and operations of prudence which he later expounds in detail (VI,vii–xv). But here—precisely in a chapter discussing Cunning and Craftiness (‘De versutia et cal- liditate’)—one finds Patrizi declaring that ‘in truth no one can truly be prudent unless he is a good man’ (‘Verum enim vero prudens nemo esse potest, nisi idem sit vir bonus [. . .]’) (VI,xv). These words briefly sum up the difference between Machiavelli and the long tradition of princely advice-books against which he was reacting.

The question of the relationship between moral and religious principle on the one hand, and political expediency on the other, was a recurring matter of concern in the works with which we shall be dealing. However, the Spanish treatise which, first among these, quotes from Machiavelli’s Il principe—Sebastián Fox Morcillo’s De
regni regisque institutione—raises a wider question. Taking a keen interest in practical matters of public administration, it explicitly asks how adequately these issues can be discussed in terms of the four cardinal virtues. As we have already seen, the exposition of princely duties in terms of justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude, together with their various derivative virtues, was central to the de regimine principum tradition from the time of Giles of Rome onwards. However, in the Spanish treatises of the second half of the sixteenth century, not only the relevance but the fundamental status of these pagan, natural, virtues becomes an issue of concern. Thus, on the one hand, one finds the relevance of these virtues to daily living urged by writers eager to press the claims of practical living against ‘irrelevant’ intellectual theorizing, or the claims of the lay, secular, life against those of the ‘religious’ or cloistered life. On the other hand, the traditional scheme of virtues, deriving pre-eminently from Aristotle and Cicero, proves not always easy to accept, precisely for the reason that its roots were in the world of pagan antiquity. Were these virtues, therefore, ‘real’? How relevant were they to a specifically Christian ruler (and his Christian subjects)? How were Christians to regard those in the Ancient World who were cited as exemplary figures of virtue? One response was to propose an ideal of kingship expressed wholly in Christian and biblical terms. Another was to accept the traditional moral scheme while denying that the Ancients who established it themselves possessed true virtue, and to seek other valid grounds for continuing to employ it. This discussion could include an assertion of the claims of the spiritual order, and the institution embodying it, against the secular, civic order. This is a range of issues with which, as we shall see, our sixteenth-century Spanish writers were, in differing ways, much concerned.
PART TWO
SPANISH WRITERS IN THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS IN THE 1550s

Introduction

When Bartolomé Carranza had been arrested by the Inquisitor General in August 1559, less than a year after his arrival at Toledo as archbishop, he recalled at an early point in the ensuing proceedings the very unsatisfactory state of affairs which he had found in the Low Countries in 1557, when he had gone there from London. Heretics were not being punished, the inquisitors were lax, books brought from Germany by the heretics were being sold openly at the very doors of the palace at Brussels—even within the palace itself (Tellechea, 1962, iii, 30–31; 1972, p. 25). He had gone to Louvain to discuss the situation with the Dean of the University; and there he had heard of ‘certain Spanish students who lived in the said university of Louvain and were suspect in the Faith’ (Tellechea, 1962, iii, 31). It was to this group of Spanish ‘students’ that the first three writers to be considered here belonged.

A good deal has come to be known about this group with Tellechea’s publication of the lengthy report on it submitted in May 1558 to the inquisitors of Seville by Fray Baltasar Pérez, O.P., who had himself previously been one of its members (Tellechea, 1963a, pp. 21–45). In substantial measure it appears to have consisted of Spaniards who had moved to Louvain from Paris at the time of the outbreak of hostilities between Henry II of France and the Emperor, after Henry's alliance with the German Protestant princes and his invasion of Lorraine early in 1552, though it seems to have become a distinct entity only late in 1554 or early in 1555, at the time of a lively theological dispute in the university over the teaching there of Michel de Bay. According to Pérez, this teaching had brought the Spanish students now at Louvain into violent conflict with each other. The group to which our writers belonged began with a number of those who took de Bay’s side, and subsequently grew. It consisted of both laymen and clergy and met at the house of one Pedro Ximenes, born in Zeeland of Portuguese parents, about whom too little is yet
known.\(^1\) Pérez attests that at Louvain Ximenes had a reputation for his knowledge of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, and taught there privately in the eight months he spent in that city each year; the other four he spent at Antwerp, where, Pérez observes, many evil religious doctrines circulated (Tellechea, 1963a, pp. 36, 39, 42). He recalls that, when a theological question at issue between Roman Catholics and Protestants had been the object of a formal university disputation in the morning, members of the group made it their practice to reconsider it among themselves in the afternoon. Led by Ximenes, they regularly reached conclusions wholly contrary to those of the university theologians (Tellechea, 1963a, p. 36). The group was apparently ready with criticism of the contemporary Church, arguing that the bishops showed themselves to be tyrants rather than pastors and should be deprived of their revenues. It also turned its criticism on to the religious Orders and with great frequency attacked the Spanish Inquisition, saying that its procedures were ‘mere butchery’ and that it often delivered false verdicts on the accused, sometimes in the interests of preserving its own reputation (Tellechea, 1963a, p. 41).

Baltasar Pérez speaks of Sebastián Fox Morcillo as having been a member of the group from the very first and particularly associates him with its critical attitude towards the contemporary Church and the Spanish Inquisition (Tellechea, 1963a, pp. 36, 41). He was therefore the object of particular suspicion, despite the fact that he had been appointed Master of the King’s Pages. As for Fadrique Furió Ceriol, Pérez’s remarks centre on his apologia for vernacular translations of the Bible, published at Basel in 1556. Bataillon has described this as the boldest work on the subject ever to come from a Spanish pen, containing as it did all the essential teaching of Erasmus’s Paraclesis ad philosophiae christianaee studium of forty years earlier (Bataillon, 1966, pp. 552–53). Furió’s own work soon found its way on to the Spanish and Roman Indexes and stayed there. Pérez tells us that, when it first appeared, it prompted much debate among Spaniards in the Low Countries. Ximenes’s group thought well of it; others regarded it as heretical. Pérez notes that its author had

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\(^{1}\) Biographical summaries are provided by Ennen, 1863, iv, 741–42, and by Delcourt & Hoyoux, 1950, ii, 244–45. For an account of his intellectual connexions and religious position after his move to Cologne in the early 1560s, see Truman, 1993a, pp. 254–59; 1998, pp. 373–81.
been imprisoned for it but was later released without his making any retraction. In Pérez’s view, it would be well to get Furió back to Spain: he was very ‘impiious’, ‘a friend of novelty’, ‘forever associating with Germans’, and much more forthright in his views than Pedro Ximenes (Tellechea, 1963a, pp. 38, 43–44).

As regards Felipe de la Torre, Baltasar Pérez chiefly stresses his association with Dr Juan Morillo at Paris before coming on to Louvain and joining Ximenes’s group (Tellechea, 1963a, p. 37). In the 1540s Morillo had been in the service of Cardinal Pole in Italy and it appears that, in his thinking about the key Reformation issue of Justification, he was close to the position then held by Pole, which, in turn, was very close to that of Luther (Fenlon, 1972, pp. 171–80). At Paris, while de la Torre was living at his house, Morillo received three notable religious refugees from Seville: Dr Juan Pérez de Pineda, translator into Spanish of the New Testament and the Psalms; Luis Hernández del Castillo, and Diego de la Cruz. By the time Pérez was writing his report, the last two, with Morillo, had moved to Frankfurt, where all three became elders of the French Calvinist Refugee Church, and Morillo had died (Kinder, 1976, pp. 345–50). It is not surprising that, according to Pérez, de la Torre had voiced unease at Louvain about the company he had kept in Paris. Nevertheless, his own treatise on kingship leaves little doubt that behind it lies a reformist outlook of a kind that would have been congenial to Ximenes’s group as Pérez portrays it. So too would have been the section of Fox Morcillo’s treatise where he comments on the Church as he found it in his own day (see below, pp. 44–45). But Fox Morcillo’s treatise goes far beyond religious matters. It is a notably complex discussion of the forms, principles, and aims of government. These would be central—though in a very different fashion—to Furió Ceriol’s treatise also. Together, these three works embody a range of deeply felt concerns that give them considerable interest as regards both Spanish intellectual life in the Low Countries at the beginning of Philip II’s reign and also the long tradition of treatises on kingship to which they belong.
CHAPTER THREE

SEBASTIÁN FOX MORCILLO

Sebastián Fox Morcillo was born into a family of prosperous *converso* artisans at Seville in the late 1520s (Pike, 1968, pp. 877–92). Having studied Latin and Greek there under Fray Alonso de Medina, he moved to Louvain in 1548 to study at the Collegium Trilingue (Vocht, 1951, iv, 438–41). His first books—an examination of Cicero’s *Topica* and a treatise *De inventione dialectica*—appeared in 1550. More than a dozen others followed, several presenting a familiar humanist pattern of interest: a compendium of moral philosophy, a treatise on the study of history, another treatise *De imitatione*, another *De honore*, together with a further study of dialectic, commentaries on Plato’s *Timaeus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, and a harmonization of Plato and Aristotle on natural philosophy. His *De regni regisque institutione* was among his later works and contains a reference to the abdication of Charles V in October 1555 (sig.Y1r).¹

Dedicating this treatise to Don Juan de la Cerda, fourth Duke of Medinaceli, Fox stresses that this work will be different from many earlier examples of the type.² He is not, he says, interested in the

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¹ There is a paucity of studies of Fox Morcillo. Only that of González de la Calle (1903) attempts a general account of the author and his work, addressing itself in turn to his philosophical, logical, and moral doctrines before considering his political ideas. Its account of the *De regni . . . institutione* is very limited in extent and fragmentary in coverage, and offers almost nothing on the central issues presented by the work. The same writer’s account (1913) of Fox Morcillo’s ideas on economics and public finance does not go beyond a factual summary of the relevant part of Fox’s treatise. There is some worthwhile comment on this work in Hinojosa, 1890, pp. 107ff. Menéndez Pelayo, whether in the lecture bearing the name of Gumersindo Laverde y Ruiz (1884) or in his *Historia de las ideas estéticas en España* (1883–91), examines Fox Morcillo’s broader philosophical and literary ideas but not his political thinking. Other studies are those of Lueben (1911) and Kuiper (1941). Maravall (1966) and (1972a) makes only very brief comments on Fox’s political treatise. Tuck (1993) presents the *De regni . . . institutione* as illustrative of what he designates a broadly ‘Ciceronian’ approach to questions of government (see pp. 33–34). Biographical data are provided by Vocht, 1951, iv, 438–41.

² Fox remarks (sig.A2v) that the Duke was almost the only person at Court to show favour to learning and scholars. A descendant, the seventh duke, would show similar interests and become the friend of Quevedo. See Elliott, 1986, pp. 553, 557.
kind of prince once portrayed by leisure philosophers tucked away in their universities (‘in angulis scholarum’). What earlier writers had said on this subject was too remote now from ordinary experience to be grasped by the mind and little suited to the needs of the present day. His purpose, therefore, is to present a prince of the kind required by his own times and by his country (‘patria’), to the benefit of which, he says, his own studies and efforts are devoted (sig.A3r–4v).

A century and more earlier, Matteo Palmieri, at Florence, had written dismissively, in his Della vita civile, of works of this type which concerned themselves with adumbrating ideal constitutions and (as he put it) ‘the imaginary goodness of citizens never seen on this earth, such as Plato and other great intellects dreamt up, perfect in virtue and wisdom’ (Palmieri, 1982, p. 7). The point was made by other writers of the time. As Hankins (1996, p. 124) comments, ‘Plato’s whole theoretical approach was held to be useless and impractical. Even humanists who defended Plato, such as the Decembrios, Bessarion and Ficino, admitted that the “celestial polity” described in the Republic, while it might have some value as an ideal for saints or unfallen men, could certainly not be regarded as a blueprint for human society in its present state’. More famously, Machiavelli, in Chapter 15 of his Prince, had declared his interest in following up ‘the actual truth of the matter rather than the imagination of it’. Similarly, Fox Morcillo tells us, as he approaches the subject of princely prudence, that he does not seek ‘some imaginary king such as never existed’ but rather ‘one who will emerge from our instruction a man of highest excellence [“quam optimus”]’ (sig.G3v). The kind of excellence that he has in mind is, as we shall see, of a notably complex kind.

In other works of his Fox assumes an intellectual posture similar to that adopted in his Epistle Dedicatory here. In his De historiae institutione, written in the earlier 1550s, he criticizes the view that there is nothing to be added to what the Ancients have said, and mockingly refers to those who ‘always following in the same footsteps, fail to look at things as they really are, or to sharpen their own minds and direct them to the actual subject’. In the preface to his com-

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3 ‘[...] nihil certe ab imperitis incultisque rusticis aut vetulis differant, qui eisdem semper vestigiis insistentes, naturam rerum ipsum non contemplentur, non animi sui aciem exaucent & intendant, non iudicent ea quae in usu sint, sed opinionibus sine ratione credentes ducantur, non iudicio, non recta ratione, non ex-
mentary on Plato’s Republic (written after the treatise on kingship) he declares that the truth of a matter properly investigated has more authority for him than the plausible arguments of even the most learned of men. It is therefore of interest to see, in his De regni regisque institutione, how far Fox Morcillo succeeds in his declared aim of writing things relevant to his own day. But the work raises the further question of how far Fox himself thought he had succeeded in his aim. These are, perhaps, the central and most interesting issues presented by the work for the modern reader.

The treatise is cast in the form of a dialogue in which one speaker—Aurelius—argues in favour of monarchical rule while the other—Antonius—argues for the republican point of view. The monarchist’s arguments occupy by far the greater part of the work; at the end, however, the republican is still not persuaded. What is significant here is that the republican’s counter-arguments seem of a kind which the author takes seriously and to relate to genuine trends in his own thinking. To identify his mind on the central theme of his treatise is therefore not a straightforward matter; and the complicating factors have a wider significance in the intellectual context of the time.

The comparison of the merits of monarchical and republican forms of government had become an established topic in treatises on the Rule of Princes since the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics. Aquinas gives no less than five chapters of his De regno to the question, discussing rule by ‘the few’ with laudatory reference to the republican era of Roman history even while arguing that monarchical rule is the best of all (Chapters 1–5). Giles of Rome closely follows the arguments of Aquinas supporting a preference for monarchy (III,ii,3), though he also pays serious attention to Aristotle’s arguments in favour of rule by several rather than by one and seeks to answer them (III,ii,4). Patrizi, writing after the development in Italy of a republican ideology cast in terms of civic virtue and service—a development especially linked with the Florentine humanists—composed, as we have seen, two treatises: the first in favour of republican rule as exemplified

permento (quo in dies paritur), non observatione, non correctione errorum quos deprehenderint in alis, non additione utilium, detractioneve rerum inutilium & otiosarum? (De historiae institutione dialogus (Antwerp, 1557), fo.108r–v).

4 ‘[...] certe apud me plures est veritatis ad eam quam perfectissimam esse Reip[ublicae] formam constet examinatae au[c]toritas quam vel doctissimi viri praetextu verisimilium rationum adumbrata defensio’ (Commentatio in decem Platonis libros de republica (Basel, 1556), sig.a4v).
in the government of his native city of Siena, the second in favour of princely rule. In the decade immediately before Fox Morcillo’s treatise was written, two major works had appeared praising the republican system of Venice: Donato Giannotti’s Libro della repubblica de’ Veneziani (Venice, 1540), and Gasparo Contarini’s De magistratibus et republica Venetorum (Paris, 1543). Fox Morcillo’s republican spokesman, Antonius, is introduced as an admirer of the constitutions of Venice, Genoa, and Siena, together with the Swiss cantons (sig.B3r). His treatise as a whole carries on the debate in a particularly developed fashion.

This is chiefly done in the third and final book, which takes up a series of preliminary considerations set out early in Book I. The rest of this first book sets about the discussion of the Prince’s early education and is mainly concerned with his physical training and a healthy regimen. The leads on to Book II and the Prince’s need to be educated in the ways of religion and virtue. There follows an extensive account of the various virtues requisite in a ruler. However, this, as we shall see, tends to transform itself into a discussion of a rather different kind concerning the practical needs facing the ruler and the tasks of government generally.

The importance of physical fitness in the Prince lies in the fact that it is essential to the proper discharge of his duties to society (sig.D3r). So Fox Morcillo stresses the necessity, over the years from infancy onwards, for healthy, virtuous nurses; the dangers of indulging and pampering children generally and of flattering royal infants in particular; the importance of protecting the young from anything morally corrupting; the value of physical exercise and sports when not carried to excess, together with moderation in food and drink (sig.D3r–E5r, E8v–F1v). On the value of the different forms of physical exercise he writes a good deal less discursively than Patrizi. Throughout this section there is frequent reference to, and a discriminating acceptance of, the views of Plato, especially as set out in the Republic. Fox shares Plato’s and Aristotle’s nervousness about music (sig.E7r).

Book II begins with Aurelius insisting that the first duty of the Prince is to uphold religion and reverence [‘pietas’] for God (sig.Glr–2r). These give authority to the laws sustaining society and help to bring

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5 For an extended examination of these works, see Pocock, 1975, pp. 272–328.
man to his final end. They also provide a ‘norm’ amidst all the errors of the human mind and the variety of human opinion, something fixed, to which all matters of dispute can be referred. So all law-makers, whether of Classical Antiquity or the Old Testament, have made the maintenance of reverence for God their primary concern, as Plato, in his *Laws* [X, 907–10], prescribes. But such reverence is a duty not of the prince alone but of the whole of society; and since the practice of religion must be closely bound up with the practice of virtue, both prince and people need to be educated in both. Fox now expounds his thoughts on this matter.

While Aurelius says (in a phrase that will be thrown back at him) that the Prince must possess ‘all the virtues’ (sig.G3r), Fox’s more practical optimism shows itself in the further reflexion that, provided the ruler is moderately endowed by nature with a capacity for virtue, education may be counted on to do the rest (sig.G5v). This presupposes that the Prince’s tutors are men of integrity who will carefully adapt their instruction to his particular inclinations and needs.

His education in the ways of virtue is the prime necessity, but he needs also to be taught something of various branches of learning: languages, eloquence, history, antiquity, and the different usages of mankind; arithmetic, geometry, and ‘that part of astrology which explains the succession and variety of the seasons’; cosmography; ethics and social refinement (‘civilis cultus’) (sig.G8r). Both Giles of Rome and Patrizi, on the subject of princely education, recommend, as Fox Morcillo does here, the study of ethics (‘disciplina morum’); in other respects this scheme owes obvious debts—as did Patrizi’s—to both the medieval *quadrivium* and the educational programme of Italian humanism. Fox’s commitment to the values of the latter leads him to argue at some length that the prince should not allow the attractions of study ‘to lead him away from his public responsibilities to embrace useless contemplation’. His terms here bring to mind not only Patrizi’s similar warning but also his words in praise of the active rather than the contemplative life. Repeatedly Fox Morcillo insists that what is to be sought is a prince ‘of moderate learning’ who devotes all his efforts to the well-being of society and whose learning will be both an ornament and a pleasure to him. This, he points out, is different from the philosopher-ruler envisaged by Plato in his *Republic*, ‘complete in all virtue and learning’.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) ‘Nec vero [.] doctum aliquem, & eruditum plane principem quærimus [.]’
hand, he welcomes the remark of Challicles in Plato’s Gorgias that the purpose of study is action, not empty meditation of the sort indulged in by idle philosophers; and he sees Cicero’s preference (as stated in De officiis, Book III) for the life of public activity as against that of private leisure as particularly applicable to the prince. 7

Turning to the education of the Prince’s subjects, Fox gives us not only an example of the robust criticism of prelates for which Baltasar Pérez remembered him but, more broadly, an emphatic statement of the values and convictions of Christian humanism. In the first place, the Prince must take greater interest than usually happens now in the proper provision of schools for young children (‘triviales scholae’) (sig.H8v). Since such schools have so formative an influence on their pupils, those teaching in them should be appointed by public authority and only after careful examination of their character and zeal. Such teachers will be paid from the public purse and will be required to follow an approved scheme of instruction (siggs.H8v–I1r). An important part of the task of such schools is to teach the Christian religion. Here we come upon Fox’s first outburst against the bishops of his time. The responsibility for the proper teaching of Christianity in schools lies with them. He recalls the care taken by bishops such as Demetrius at Alexandria, Cyprian at Carthage, and St Augustine, in the appointment of catechists. But that was in the time when the Church still retained its original purity. As for the bishops now, ‘I cannot express sufficient amazement at [their] scandalous negligence, or rather their ignorance combined with avarice and ambition’ (sig.I1v). It would be better if they showed as much interest in restoring the admirable practices of the Early Church as they do in obtaining their revenues, and in ‘the pomp, the display, the appearance rather than the reality of being a bishop’. The observance of Christian piety and knowledge of its principles concern everyone equally; but how many people, Fox asks, does one

find who know what Christianity is and what its profession requires? As for the bishops, which of them is to be seen setting aside ambition, arrogance, the pretence of virtue, greed, ignorance of a bishop’s office, residing continuously in his diocese and devoting all his efforts to the instruction of the people? (sig.I1v–3r).

Turning to schools for more advanced pupils, and to universities (‘publicae scholae’ and ‘academiae’), Fox praises rulers and others who established such institutions in their own times: Charlemagne; Cardinal Pedro de Luna, reformer of Salamanca university; Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, archbishop of Toledo, founder of Alcalá; John III of Portugal, the Council of Venice, Cosimo de’ Medici, and the Dukes of Brabant, who established the university of Louvain (sig.I4r–v). The good king will satisfy himself that, in such institutions, the ‘liberales artes’ are taught in an uncorrupt and straightforward manner (‘purē castequē’), without ambition, arrogance, or contention on the part of the teachers (sig.I4v). This, Fox points out in good humanist fashion, means restoring the ‘old sources’ in the teaching of the different subjects, cleansing them of the squalor and rescuing them from the chilling dullness brought upon them by the barbarism of more recent times (‘si veteres earundem fontes purgati barbarici recentioris sordibus & insulsa frigiditate restituantur’) (sig.I5r). So the students of language and literature (the ‘grammatici’), contenting themselves with a brief exposition of the rules of their subject, will read only ‘the most select authors’; students of dialectic will devote themselves exclusively to Aristotle and what is consonant with his teaching on this subject. Rhetoricians will take Cicero, Quintilian, or other early authors as their models; philosophers will recognize only Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Seneca, with others of the same kind, many of these being Greek writers and very few Latin. Students of medicine will embrace Galen, Hippocrates and the like; and lawyers, the iurisperiti of ancient times and those who follow in their steps. As for students of theology, they should equip themselves with knowledge of the Scriptures, the Early Fathers, and early ordinances of the Church, thus enabling themselves to grasp almost all the rest of their subject—all those things ignored by the rabble of modern theological light-weights (‘vulgo […] Theologastrorum novorum’). Fox nowhere mentions either Erasmus or Juan Luis Vives, but this whole section of his treatise clearly stands in their tradition and expresses a view of medieval intellectual activity and a conviction concerning godliness and good learning that are entirely at one with
their. In particular, this section of Fox Morcillo’s treatise brings to mind Vives’s *De disciplinis*—another work by a Spanish intellectual of *converso* origins, composed in the Low Countries a quarter of a century earlier.

This part of Book II moves exceptionally far from the figure of the ruler himself. The Book as a whole is organized to set out the virtues to be required in him: the four cardinal virtues together with the subordinate ones related to each. As each successive cardinal virtue is presented, its associated virtues are enumerated and then expounded in turn. Thus described, the work will seem to be of a markedly traditional character; and this traditional aspect needs to be stressed. However, even in the treatment of so personal a virtue as temperance, where one would expect to find, and does find, moral analysis and exhortation couched in traditional terms and categories, new features are present that indicate concerns and ways of looking at things which repeatedly find expression in the work and give it a distinctive character.

Like Patrizi, Fox Morcillo discusses temperance in terms of *abstinence* and *continentia*, *sobrietas*, *castimonia* or *castitas*, *modestia* or *moderatio*. Examples of virtue and vice from the world of Classical Antiquity are again ready at hand; but Fox does not enclose himself in that world as Patrizi does in the corresponding part of his treatise, and Fox’s discussion is by no means the catena of such examples that Patrizi’s is. His discussion here and throughout the work belongs also to the world of his own time. He alludes to aspects of contemporary social life and he extends the discussion of individual virtue into that of the ruler’s public activity and public role.

Thus when Fox moves on from *abstinence* to *continentia*, (whose function he sees as being to control cupidity of possessions (sig.S4v)), condemnation of the greed of kings quickly develops into a prolonged attack on the way in which rulers devise and impose ever new taxes, burdening and impoverishing their subjects. Fox is indignant at the injustice of this; but he stresses social and political consequences too. Noting that ‘now’ even food is taxed, he recalls the civil disturbance caused by such taxes not only in the time of the Emperor Augustus but also ‘within the memory of our parents in Spain’ (sig.S6v). On both scores he protests against the practice of taxing the poor more heavily than the rich and argues against tax immunities for the nobility. All should pay taxes according to their income (sig.S7v). Just how this should be arranged he will leave to
officials specially appointed for the task, who will have due regard to the particular circumstances obtaining. All well-ordered societies, he notes, have such officials.

Next come sobriety and chastity, followed by clemency, which restrains anger (sig.T2v). Pointing out that this is a feature of conduct distinguishing the king from the tyrant, Fox notes the favourable effect which clemency produces on a ruler’s subjects. This consideration again receives emphasis in his account of ‘moderation’, which he expounds chiefly in terms of royal demeanour: a fitting gravity of manner in facial expression, speech, physical bearing and deportment, and a dignified consistency and orderliness of action (sig.T4r–5r). Here Fox shows himself much concerned with how a lack of these qualities will lower the king in the estimation of others. However, he qualifies this in the following section, on ‘courteousness and affability’, where he condemns the overbearing arrogance of the kings of ancient Persia who demanded to be treated like gods—‘an arrogance always detested in civilized nations’—and deplores the fact that their behaviour is ‘nowadays’ imitated in Spain. There every petty prince or man of wealth (‘vel regulus quisque, aut opulentus homo’) displays the same arrogance and demands as by right the same subservience as those oriental monarchs did. They make show of their wealth and social position by their very way of speaking and looking, as though, without this puffed up insolence, their greatness might otherwise go unnoticed (sig.T6r). Perhaps behind such behaviour may lie some contagion from their uncouth racial origins (‘ex contagione fortasse illius Gotticae, vel Arabicae horriditatis’ (sig.T7r)).

As for restraint in personal adornment, Fox praises both the sumptuary legislation of the ancient world and also that which ‘at the present time’ is in effect in Venice, Genoa, and other Italian cities—as it used also to some extent to operate ‘in Spain and especially Portugal’ (sig.V3r). What needs to be emphasized in all this is Fox’s interest in the world of his own time as well as in that of Classical Antiquity; his interest in social and political realities as well as in the principles of personal conduct; and his inclination to develop his discussion of the king’s personal practice of virtue into a consideration of aspects or spheres of public administration. These features are still more marked in his discussion of the other three cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, and fortitude.

Prudence in a king has two aspects: private and public. Armed with the first, he avoids the vices of rashness, negligence (letting the
proper moment for action slip by), cunning, and roguery. But this serves only as a brief introduction to 'public prudence', with which Fox deals at considerable length. 'Public prudence' has a triple concern: 'with administering, preserving, and extending the commonwealth ["publica [prudentia] porro vel ad rem[ublicam] administrandam, vel ad eandem conservandam, & amplificandam pertinebit"]' (sig.H2r). All three aspects are now discussed in turn.

The prince cannot handle the whole of government by himself but needs the assistance of prudent and just men. Therefore he must take care in choosing such people and appointing them to their tasks. That done, he must exercise general oversight over them so that he is seen as the one who alone has the care of the whole community (sig.H3r–v). Therefore public office is not to be bestowed as a reward but rather given to those suited to what the task requires. Fox's spokesman, Aurelius, voices here the first of his warnings against the ambitious and flatterers. The ruler must ensure that he acquires good personal knowledge of at least some individuals, so that he can assess their qualities and appoint them accordingly. Energetically, Aurelius speaks of what happens—to the great detriment of society—when princes, as so frequently occurs, rely in making appointments on the recommendations of the schemers around them (sig.H4r–v). So he again insists on the importance of the prince's choosing his immediate advisers with great care. Within the royal council as well as outside it, he must guard against and discourage flattery, and show that he will listen only to advice that is right in itself and of benefit to society at large (sig.H4v–5v). After a further outburst against 'flattering parasites and men-about-town', Aurelius reflects that he has wandered further from his subject than he had intended (sig.H7v).

His interlocutor, Antonius, concludes from this that the prince's intimates and counsellors need, like the prince himself, to be educated for their responsibilities. This leads on to the discussion of the education of the prince's subjects which was examined earlier. What Aurelius says here, though of interest for the modern reader, seems to Antonius to miss the point. For Aurelius, he remarks, has not shown how men of prudence, suited to the conduct of public affairs, are in fact to be produced—unless Aurelius is arguing that all royal counsellors should be men possessed of great formal learning, which, he says, would be no less absurd than to include no such men in the council (sig.I6v). In reply, Aurelius asks how one can state in general terms how experience and prudence are to be acquired, espe-
cially when the natural endowments of people differ so much from one to another. He agrees with Antonius that age, experience in administration, sharpness of mind, and travel, may all be expected ‘to increase prudence without formal instruction’ (sig.I7r). The royal council should, moreover, include some who are trained not in the civil law (‘as happens nowadays’) or medicine, or theology, or any one subject, but who are trained ‘in all subjects, if that is possible’, or at least in philosophy and ‘humaniores literae’, these two subjects being highly appropriate for governing society (sig.I7v). Beyond that, the council should include not only men of highest rank but also others of lower standing, so that the latter will feel that they too can contribute to society, while the former will grow in prudence by listening to the advice offered by these others (sig.I8r). Another warning against ambition and greed among royal counsellors brings the discussion of this part of ‘public prudence’ to a close.

But this is by no means the end of what Fox Morcillo has to say about the administrative aspect of government. We have seen how his discussion of the cardinal virtue of temperance leads him on to talk about taxation. It is when expounding the virtue of justice, however, that he writes of such things at greatest length. First, though, he reiterates and develops points we have just been considering. Starting upon distributive justice (sig.M5v), he emphasizes that this as well as prudence requires that public office should not be granted to the unworthy out of personal favour or as a reward; nor must it be sold, whether by the prince himself or by those holding office under him (sigs.M6r–N1r). Furthermore, no post under the prince should be held in perpetuity, for this deprives good men of the opportunity of gaining office and honour while also corrupting those in possession of them (sig.N1r–v). A new question now arises: should those appointed to office be natives of the place where they are to serve, or from elsewhere? (sig.N2r–3v). Fox takes different cases, the first of these being offices placing a man in control of a ‘universa civitas’ (by which he seems to mean a given city in its entirety). Here Fox recommends an outsider, since a native would govern wholly for himself, for his relatives and friends. In the case of ‘provinces’ similar to each other in character and way of life, the one should be placed in the hands of someone from another of these, for the same reasons and also to prevent contention and undesirable lobbying of the king on the part of the chief local figures of a given place. As for a province different in character from the prince’s own,
he would do well to appoint an outsider to govern it if he is not sure of that province’s loyalty to himself; otherwise, he can appoint a native. This, in fact, is preferable with such provinces ‘unless we are sure of their treachery’, since empires should be sustained by the love and good-will of their citizens, and in this way one avoids giving offence by conveying an impression of arrogance and lack of confidence (sig.N3v). The case of the Low Countries, where Fox was writing, was no doubt in his mind at this point.

Particular issues of public policy are considered when we come to commutative justice, which, Fox explains, is concerned with the exchange of things and services and with mutual contracts, all in accordance with the principle of ‘aequalitas’ (sig.O3v). From this Fox quickly draws the conclusion that the king should have a careful regard for matters relating to the currency, ‘since the power of minting coin and setting its value has been given to him by the republīca’ (sig.O4r). He must therefore not cheat society by temporarily increasing or decreasing the value of the currency in order to extract more taxes. It must be maintained in weight and quality of metal and at a single value throughout the prince’s territories. It must also be properly related to currency values elsewhere, to avoid the movement of coin abroad for profit, with a resulting shortage at home. Fox notes that such a shortage especially afflicts Spain, where little remains of all the gold and silver brought from the Indies. He comments on the skill the Venetians have shown in this matter and recommends that officials be appointed solely for such things, as one used to find in many cities and in some still does (sig.O5r).

The subordinate virtues which Fox now considers as so many aspects of commutative justice are those traditionally regarded as constituent elements of justice generally: ‘gratitude’, ‘liberality’, magnificentia, and ‘friendship’. The subject of gratitude—the due rewarding of service done to the prince—moves Fox to yet further vehement and lengthy warnings against the improper bestowing of public office and the dangers of flattering schemers (sig.O5v–7v). He again notes that he has allowed himself to stray from his subject.

It is when he discusses liberality that he reveals more of his economic and social thinking. The king, in practising liberality, must not rob one set of people in order to be generous to another (sig. O8r–v). More generally, no one group in society must be allowed to acquire excessive wealth, because this is inevitably at the expense of the rest, as Plato, Aristotle, and others have pointed out. When
such a situation arises, it is likely to have far-reaching political consequences, including the overthrow of rulers (sig.Plv–2r). Fox here makes use of Aristotle’s two sets of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of government. In order that wealth should be distributed through the whole of society, he recommends that, in the case of Spain, no more mayorazgos (entailed estates inherited by primogeniture) should be granted, or at least that no individual should possess more than one such estate (sig.P2r–v). He rejects, however, Plato’s view that a fixed limit of wealth should be prescribed for each person, the excess being transferred to others. Something like this, he thinks, lay behind the Peasants’ War of the 1520s, ‘led by that impious man Thomas Müntzer’ (sig.P2r–3r). Finally, the prince should reward a man with honours and dignities for his life-time rather than bestow these things on his family in perpetuity. Any further liberality to his friends, relations, and children should be limited to those standing in need of it (sig.P3r–v).

Magnificentia, he explains, following Aristotle, differs from liberality in involving expenditure on a larger scale than the other. However, a Prince’s magnificentia must not be for the sake of personal show or involve personal extravagance. He must behave as a ‘parents ac dispensator’ to his people, not as a ‘dominus’, and his magnificentia must be of benefit to the many rather than to the few (sig.P4r–5v). While this includes bestowing riches and honour on men who are truly deserving, it has still more to do with expenditure on the erecting of fine buildings in towns and the construction of things such as highways, aqueducts, bridges, ports, waterways and irrigation systems. Fox mentions various major works of this kind, constructed in Spain by the Romans, which have been allowed to fall into decay or have been deliberately destroyed for private ends—just as, recently, Pope Paul III had taken stone from the Roman amphitheatre for his building projects (sig.P5v–6v). But questions of food-supply and trade are of still more interest to him. It is an important part of the prince’s magnificentia to ensure that his subjects have a sufficient provision of primary food-stuffs. Taking Italy and Spain as naturally more fertile than France and the Germanic lands, Fox notes that the supply of the necessities of life is, nevertheless, much more adequate in the latter than in the former, and finds the explanation in the fact that, in the northern countries, the supply of wheat and live stock is not in the hands of the few. He therefore suggests a number of measures to prevent large-scale farmers from holding back
supplies from the market in order to drive up prices. As regards wheat, he speaks approvingly of modern Venice, with its ‘farinarii’, and of ancient Rome, with its ‘aediles cereales’; as regards sheep and cattle [‘pecud[es] aut arment[a]’], he refers to the measures taken, as he thought, by ‘that learned and upright man Thomas More’ to restrict the number of cattle that any one person might own (sigs.P7v–Q1v). Turning to wider issues, Fox deplores the practice of exporting things necessary to society and importing things of no value to it (sig.Q2r). Thus merchants in Spain send fleeces, silk, and other commodities to the Low Countries and, in return, import things which could easily be produced in Spain itself. The prince, if he is concerned with the well-being of the patria, should prevent this kind of thing with laws like those proposed by Plato [Laws, VIII,847], even without the pressure of present shortages. In such a way, Fox thinks, a wider range of production would flourish within a country—stimulated by craftsmen from abroad if necessary—and those now destitute would have a means of livelihood. ‘No one would be allowed to be idle.’ Fox is mindful here both of Plato and of the state of affairs in contemporary Spain and England, where large numbers of men, he claims, attached as servants to the great, spend their time doing nothing (sig.Q2v–3r). He is greatly concerned with the threat this situation presents to public order, both directly and through the economic depression into which others are forced by the reliance of great men on the labour of their own servants for the provision of their wants.

At this point Fox again observes that he has wandered from his subject and proceeds at once to the further subordinate virtue of friendship. To this subject he devotes a long section (sigs.Q3r–R1v) which, for the most part, is yet another denunciation of the scheming flatterers around a prince. Repeating his earlier exhortation to the prince to choose his counsellors carefully on the basis of integrity and concern for the commonweal, he urges the counsellors them-

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8 More was not responsible for any such action, and no Act regulating this matter was passed during the time that he was Lord Chancellor. Fox appears to have in mind ‘An Act concerning Fermes & Shepe’ (25 Henry VIII, c.13) dating from 1533–34. This Act decreed that from the Feast of St Michael the Archangel, 1535, men might not, generally, possess more than 2000 sheep each (Statutes of the Realm, 10 vols, London, 1810–28, iii,451–54). Fox may have been led to link this Act with More by the latter’s condemnation of enclosures in his Utopia, Book I, and his declaration that these should not be allowed to continue.
selves to enhance their usefulness by presenting their advice in a persuasive fashion, thereby leading the prince towards the right decisions (sig.Q8v). A final warning against the harm done by flatterers to the prince and society at large rounds off his discussion of justice as a whole.

Fox’s treatise was published when Spain was experiencing its first major financial and economic crisis of the sixteenth century and within a year of the declaration of State bankruptcy in 1557, when Philip II suspended all payments to his bankers. Among Spaniards who in the 1550s pondered the reasons for the inflation and other economic problems of the time, Martín de Azpilcueta, Professor of Canon Law successively at Salamanca and Coimbra, is remembered for linking—precisely in 1556—the high cost of living with the import of South American gold and silver (Lynch, 1965, i, 123–24). Two years later, the crisis drew a lengthy analysis and set of recommendations from Luis Ortiz, comptroller of the royal finances, whom Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson describes as ‘the first of the Spanish political economists and one of the earliest mercantilists to appear in any country’ (Grice-Hutchinson, 1978, p. 127). She does not mention Fox Morcillo; however, there is a striking similarity between his economic and financial views and what one finds in Ortiz’s Memorial. Ortiz too voices a concern to see an end to a situation where raw materials are exported from Spain cheaply and foreign manufactures imported expensively. He too is anxious for home manufacturing to be stimulated as a matter of urgency, inter alia by attracting foreign artisans into the country. Again, once the loss of wealth abroad has been stopped, he looks forward to the construction of roads, waterways, irrigation works, and fine buildings (Grice-Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 127–29). In 1556, Ortiz was already writing to Philip II outlining his thoughts on public finance, but from Valladolid, and any personal contact between him and Fox seems unlikely. What prompted Fox’s thinking to take the direction it did on these matters is not clear. He speaks of himself as ‘inquiring exactly and at length’ into questions of agricultural supply and prices (sig.P7v). This approach to a whole complex of problems, social, financial, and economic, vexing contemporary Spain, entitles him to be remembered alongside Azpilcueta and Ortiz in this regard.

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The practical issues of government considered so far are presented without reference to the question of war and its effects. However, Fox does give a good deal of attention to matters to do with war. We saw earlier that Giles of Rome devotes the final part of his *De regimine principum* to this subject; but discussion there keeps to strictly military questions (such as the selection and training of soldiers or techniques of capturing fortified cities) and is very little, if at all, related to the prince himself and his purposes. Fox's treatment of the matter is very different in these respects. Much of his discussion of military matters comes into his account of the cardinal virtue of fortitude as required into the prince. Indeed, most of his discussion of this virtue is devoted to military issues. This is in marked contrast to what one finds in Patrizi’s *De regno*. For although Patrizi has a lively sense of the prince’s need to interest himself in warfare, his account of fortitude is cast in terms of individual psychology and moral effort: fortitude is the virtue by which the prince (like other men) masters himself and subjects his inner being to the dictates of prudence and justice (VII,i). Fox Morcillo, for his part, even in his account of the prince’s ‘private’ fortitude, is wholly concerned with the prince as a ruler who must accept and continually face up to the responsibilities and burdens of public office (sig.R1v–4r). What this means for the undertaking and conduct of war is the aspect of the matter that chiefly interests him.

First, however, he thinks it necessary to justify the proposition that the prince should engage in war at all. He acknowledges that ‘there are some who deny that a Christian prince may wage war’, arguing instead that occasions for war should be made occasions for Christian charity and long-suffering instead (sig.R4v–5r). It seems most likely that Fox was here thinking of Erasmus and his repeated passionate pleas that Christian rulers should not turn to arms.10 Erasmus’s *Institutio principis christiani*, written for the youthful Charles V in 1516, at the beginning of his reign, concludes with just such a plea. There Erasmus concedes that St Augustine had taken a different view; and it is to him that Fox Morcillo turns for his reply, invoking the principle that God does not wish society to perish or

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10 See Bainton, 1970, pp. 150–58. Bainton observes that, according to Erasmus, ‘one of the most imperative duties of the prince is to keep the peace within and without his land. On no subject did Erasmus speak so often and with such passion’ (p. 150).
the laws of people to be overthrown when these are not repugnant to the Eternal Law (sig.R5r). In this conviction Fox explicitly broadens the grounds laid down by Cicero on which war may be justly waged. Thus, war may be resorted to not only if someone is judged an enemy, or for the recovery of things wrongfully taken, but also for the purpose of avenging an injury to society, or if the general well-being of the citizens requires it.\(^{11}\) Fox has already voiced his agreement with the view of Cleinias, in Plato’s *Laws* [I,625–26], that a society will not survive without frequently waging war. His endorsement of the legitimacy of war does not involve the careful definitions and qualifications of Aquinas and the Salamanca neo-scholastics.\(^{12}\) On the other hand—following Augustine—he strongly condemns recourse to war by a prince motivated by greed, ambition, anger, or the desire to ‘increase the glory of his name’, or simply to extend his kingdom or subject rival princes to himself (sig.R5r).\(^{13}\) Therefore he argues that a prince should not be able to resort to war by himself, without first obtaining the agreement of his subjects, at least through their leaders (sig.R5v). This will be a safeguard against his acting like a tyrant, concerned only with his own good rather than with that of society at large.

Having addressed these large preliminary issues, Fox Morcillo devotes himself to urging the ruler to display care and efficiency in all practical matters relating to war: men, equipment, weaponry, supplies (sig.R6r–v). These are, he agrees, matters for professionals and he does not wish to tell them their business. Much of what even Plato had to say about the conduct of war is no longer relevant (sig.R6v–7r). Nevertheless, Fox does allow himself a few points. Referring to a question much discussed by fifteenth-century Italian political writers—whether military forces should be drawn from one’s own people or made up of mercenaries—he dismisses it as of no importance: what matters in either case is that they should be well-behaved, reliable, and devoted to the ruler. Beyond that, the prince

\(^{11}\) ‘Iustae aut[em] belli causae erunt, non tantum ut arbitratur M. Tullius, si primum hostis quis iudicetur, aut si idem repetendis de rebus suscipiatur: sed si facta Reipublicae inuria sit vindicanda, si bona usurpata repetenda, si pro communi salute & commoditate civium pugnandum’ (sig.R4v). Compare Cicero, *De Officiis*, I,34–36; *De re publica*, III, 34–35. Fox’s words recall Augustine’s celebrated definition of the just war as found in his *In Pentateuch*. VI, q.x.


\(^{13}\) See Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, bxiv; *De civ.Dei*, III,xiv.
should choose men for senior command from among those peoples most highly regarded for their military qualities (sig.R8v). Berating the Christian princes of his own day for paying so little heed in peace-time to effective military preparation (sigs.R8v–S1r), Fox comes to his last point: should the prince take the leading part in wars himself or leave the matter to his generals? Should he even, in case of need, lay down his life for his subjects or allow them to sacrifice themselves for him? Having surveyed the arguments to the contrary, he concludes that the prince should indeed play the personal role and take the personal risk—on the grounds that the prince’s whole raison d’être is to serve the well-being of the respublica (a point that Fox repeatedly stresses) and that this is the best way of achieving that end (sig.S1v–3v).

At this point we may usefully return to Fox’s account of princely prudence and in particular to the two aspects of the prince’s ‘public prudence’ not yet examined, since they are closely concerned with the commonwealth’s ‘preservation and extension’.

Here already Fox Morcillo is stressing how necessary it is that the prince should prepare for war in time of peace. The terms in which he does this are of particular interest. The prince, he says,

should set before himself someone from among the greatest men—men of outstanding renown—whom he may imitate (as Caesar took Alexander, and the latter Achilles, and as Scipio took Cyrus, king of the Persians, and in short as other outstanding men took other emperors, whom, by long imitation, they came closely to resemble). In short, let him in time of peace so concern himself with military matters that in war-time he will always be thinking of peace, and in peace of war; as was universally praised in Philopoemen, prince of the Achaeans [. . .].

14 ‘[. . .] proponat item sibi [princeps] aliquem summis ex viris, et rerum bellicarum gloria praestantibus imitantum (ut Caesar Alexandrum, hic Achyllum, Scipio Cyrum Persarum regem, alij denique viri praecellentes alios imperatores, quibus imitatione longa persimiles evasere)[. . .] in ipsa denique pace curam eam rei militaris habeat, ut ipso in bello de pace cogitet semper, in pace vero de bello: id quod vel in Philopomene [sic] Achaecorum principe a cunctis laudatur [. . .]’ (sig.K3v–4r). The text continues: ‘qui nullum pacis tempus usque adeo tranquillum existimasse fertur ut non saepi de bello cgitaret: ac si apud amicos interdum esset, diligenter sciscitaretur, qui hostes repellendi, si urbem eam, in qua is esset, obsiderent: quo in loco castra ponenda, qua forma exercitus instruendus, qua parte hostis vitandas fugandusve, aut persequendus videretur; reliqua demum omnia, quasi bello implicatus ipso disquereret.’
Here, clearly, Fox is echoing Chapter 14 of Machiavelli’s *Il principe.* Alongside these lines can be set Fox’s discussion of how the king may best keep new kingdoms which he has acquired:

These new people are either of the same province, language, and way of life as those of the old kingdom he has inherited, or they are different. If they are the same, they will easily be kept loyal, by maintaining their laws and their social order [. . .] [but] if they are different in way of life, language, and character, more caution will be needed, and the more different they are, the more caution will be required.\(^\text{15}\)

The prince should in that case frequently reside in that territory, so as to leave no room for sedition to grow and to uphold his authority there, gradually winning these new subjects over to himself. He should also establish ‘colonies’ of his own people among them ‘to keep them loyal’ (sig.L7v). Again it is clear that Fox is borrowing from *Il principe*, this time from Chapter 3 (‘De’ principati misti’).

The fact that Fox Morcillo was familiar with this work, that (as seems likely) he was the first Spaniard to quote from *Il principe*, and that this work had a considerable impact on certain areas of his thinking, has so far, it appears, gone unnoticed. Fox does not draw attention to his borrowing. He nowhere in his treatise mentions either Machiavelli or *Il principe*. Moreover, he replaces Machiavelli’s illustrative references to recent or contemporary Italian history with others of his own relating to the world of Spain. Thus, as regards the acquisition by a prince of a new province similar to his own in language, character, and way of life, Fox speaks of how the kingdom of Aragon has been ‘retained without difficulty’ by Castile since Aragon was joined to it by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella. Speaking of

\(^{15}\) ‘Filopomene, principe degli Achei, infra le altre laudi che dagli scrittori gli sono date, è che ne’tempi della pace non pensava mai se non ai modi della guerra; e quando era in campagna con gli amici, spesso si fermava e ragionava con quelli: “Se i nimici fussero in su quel côte, e noi ci trovassimo qui col nostro esercito, chi di noi avrebbe vantaggio?” [. . .] Ma quanto all’esercizio della mente, debbe il principe leggere le istorie [. . .] e sopra tutto fare come ha fatto per l’addietro qualche uomo eccellente che ha preso ad imitare se alcuno è stato innanzi a lui lodato e gloriatito, e di quello ha tenuto sempre i gesti ed azioni appresso di sé, come si dice che Alessandro Magno imitava Achille, Cesare Alessandro, Scipione Ciro’ (ed. Burd (1891), pp. 280–81).

\(^{16}\) ‘Nam vel eiusdem provinciae, linguaeque ac morum homines sunt novi illi cum veteris patriisque regni hominibus, aut diversi: si iisdem sint, facile, conservatis eorum legibus, atque Reip[ublicae] ratione, in officio contineri poterunt: [. . .] si autem moribus, lingua, ingeniorum disiunctores populi sint (sig.L7v–v).’
the planting of colonies, he instances those established by Spain in the New World as well as those founded by the Romans in Egypt, Gaul, and Spain (sig.L7v–8r).

Just how much of Fox’s discussion of the means the prince should employ to keep and extend his domains can be traced to *Il principe* cannot be investigated here in detail. However, one seems to hear Machiavelli’s reflexions behind Fox’s account of the dangers that threaten to overthrow a *republica*: either popular sedition and discord or the continual waging of war (sig.K1r). Fox is much interested in the question of sedition. This in part derives, as he makes clear, from his reading of Aristotle’s *Politics*. He summarizes Aristotle’s account of the causes of sedition (*Politics*, V, ii–iii) and urges the ruler to remove these before trouble actually occurs (sig.K1v–2v). But, of course, this topic also runs through *Il principe*, and it is difficult not to sense that presence when, at this point, Fox praises the severity with which Charles V treated the leaders of the revolt of Ghent (no doubt that of 1539), thus administering effective ‘medicine’ to a grave illness (sig.K2v). A further echo is heard when Fox writes of how the Prince can prevent tumult and sedition from occurring if he takes care to keep a given society, once pacified, attached and faithful to himself. This, he says, is readily achieved by those who obtain a kingdom by inheritance and the will of the citizens, for these ‘never change their prince unless afflicted by the greatest calamities’ (sig.K4v). The prince will easily dispose them favourably towards himself if he upholds their laws and treats them with kindness. This, moreover, will make them firm against enemy attack (sig.K4v–5r).

Fox Morcillo is much concerned with how wars can lead to the overthrow of social order. That is why, as we have seen, he urges the ruler to make himself skilled in warfare and prepare himself adequately for it. He lays particular stress on the need to fortify not only border areas and towns but all towns so far as possible. Machiavelli touches on how these things are done in Germany (*Il principe*, Chapter 10). Fox speaks in the same connexion of Germany and

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17 Compare the words of Machiavelli: ‘Perchè i Romani fecero in questi casi quello che tutti i principi savi debbono fare, i quali hanno ad aver non solamente riguardo agli scandali presenti, ma ai futuri, ed a quelli con ogni industria riparare, perchè prevedendosi discosto, facilmente vi si può rimediare, ma aspettando che ti si appressino, la medicina non è più a tempo, perchè la malattia è divenuta incurabile [...]’ (*Il Principe*, ch. 3 (ed. Burd, 1891, pp. 191–92)).

18 Compare *Il principe*, Chapter 2.
the Low Countries, though clearly drawing on his own observation (sig.L1r–v).

As for the extension of the respublica, we have seen what Fox Morcillo takes from Machiavelli here. We may note that he believes new territories, once acquired, should be held by a policy of equity and justice and not only by force of arms and severity towards their people, ‘although the latter is to be used in its place’ (sig.L7r), as he says more than once. However, in general, Fox argues that the ‘amplificatio’ of a respublica or imperium should be seen more in terms of its regard for justice than of territorial extent (sig.L5r). New lands may be legitimately acquired, through inheritance or marriage, or when one people freely subjects itself to another. However, one country must not attack another simply to extend its dominion, but only when the first has repeatedly suffered at the hands of the second and so takes it over in order to secure peace within its own borders (sig.L5v–6v). We have already seen that Fox does not approve of a prince who wages war simply out of greed, ambition for power, and the desire for glory (sig.R5r). In these respects his position is akin to that of Augustine rather than to Machiavelli’s.

He also emphatically rejects one of Machiavelli’s most notorious propositions: that a prince need not always keep good faith if it is in his interest not to do so. Fox’s reference here to the behaviour of Pope Alexander VI in this regard indicates that he had in mind Chapter 18 of Il principe, where Machiavelli discusses this matter, though Fox’s only explicit allusion is to Plato’s Republic, at the point [III,388] where it is argued that a ruler and others in public office may tell lies in the interests of the well-being of society, though the private citizen may not (sigs.N8v–O1r). This Fox finds wholly unacceptable: ‘quid turpius, absurdius, aut perniciosius?’ Not to keep one’s faith is to abandon piety and religion and to violate the whole law of nature (sig.O1v). It is indeed true that a ruler may legitimately disguise or hide his intentions, feigning one thing and doing another. That is a matter of prudence, but very different from going back on one’s word when it is once given. This is the most obvious respect in which Fox rejects Machiavelli’s position. But he also, in the second of the passages from Il principe quoted above, omits Machiavelli’s ruthless recommendation that the family of a supplanted ruler should be destroyed; while, more generally, Machiavelli’s preoccupation with the role of fortune and necessity in human affairs, and his conception of virtù, are absent from Fox’s treatise. Il principe has clearly
sharpened his vision of the actual world in which princes govern and has played a part in bringing him to accept and indeed stress the importance of political calculation; but Fox remains attached to the traditional fundamental principles of law and morality.

This is evident when he discusses law and equity at large, the relation of the prince to these, and such particular virtues related to justice as religion, reverence for parents, and obedience to one’s superiors. To live according to the law (‘lex’) is to live according to reason and virtue (sig.M1r). Taking up a topic beloved of jurists and political theorists, Fox argues that the prince, insofar as he promulgates and enforces particular laws, may be thought of as being superior to them; but insofar as he lives according to what they prescribe, as he should do, he is subject to them as other men are (sig.M2r); for ‘the source of laws, and the supreme ratio from which individual laws derive and to which they refer back, are superior to the king, and are established as a norm for living and law-giving not by the king himself for himself, but by God [. . .]’.

Therefore, in extreme cases, the laws of the earthly ruler may have to be resisted out of respect for the higher law (sig.M4v). The ruler himself must follow the principles of distributive justice in rewarding and punishing and appointing to public office (sigs.M5v–N4v).

As to the virtues associated with justice, the king must, first, practise religion himself and ensure by law that his subjects do likewise, taking care that the impious do not go unpunished, since without religion the whole respublica must necessarily perish (sig.N4v–5r). This leads Fox to another fierce outburst against the negligent bishops of his time, and further exhortation that worthy men be chosen for that office (sig.N5v). The ruler, like his subjects, will also show respect towards parents and relatives and the whole respublica, and hold grave, learned, and pious men in honour, as ‘pietas’ and ‘obedientia’ require (sig.N5v–7v). It is at this point that Fox addresses himself to the virtue of ‘fides’, or good faith.

It will be clear by now that Fox Morcillo’s thinking presents distinct facets. He is markedly interested in the practical aspects of government—with government as concerned with such things as agriculture, trade, finance, and taxation. He also has an appreciation of

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19 ‘Itaque fons legum, & ratio suprema, ex qua leges singulæ derivantur, & ad quam reductur, superior Rege est, quae veluti norma vivendi, ferendarumque legum, proposita est non ab ipso sibi sed a Deo: [. . .]’ (sig.M2v).
princely rule as a matter of power politics. All this leads him to
develop in an interesting fashion the treatment of the virtues tradi-
tionally required in the prince. On the other hand, he is still respon-
sive to the a priori view of princely rule that saw it fundamentally
in terms of moral categories, placing it in a universe conceived as
essentially one of moral and rational order which derives from its
creation by God. So the discussion moves to and fro between different
sets of terms, the figure of the prince being considered almost simul-
taneously in different perspectives. There is no discussion of the rela-
tion or relative importance of these as Fox’s spokesman, Aurelius,
progresses through his account of the cardinal virtues. Indeed, it is
striking that, from time to time, when he has made what for the
modern reader is a particularly interesting series of comments on
practical affairs requiring the intervention of government, he apol-
gizes for straying from his point. Thus, having got on to the ques-
tion of currency controls in the course of expounding commutative
justice, he remarks: ‘but I am spending too long on minor matters
and have wandered far from my line of argument. Let me return
to the other aspects of commutative justice’.20 A similar remark occurs
later when, in the course of discussing princely magnificentia, he talks
about questions of food-supply, international trade, and the danger
to society of having large numbers of people without work to keep
them busy (sig.Q2v–3r). At the end of this series of wholly practical
observations, Aurelius virtually repeats his earlier words.21 It appears
at such moments that Fox Morcillo’s interests are tending in a direc-
tion that he could not wholly justify to himself on the basis of the
kind of exposition he had chosen to adopt. That is to say, when
Aurelius, expounding the kingly virtues, gives them a notably prac-
tical application, this is not straightforwardly the outcome of the
prior intention of either spokesman or author.

This is of particular interest in view of Fox’s initial declaration of
intention: to write a treatise on kingship portraying a ruler of a kind
required by his own age and country, thereby providing something
very different from those who, tucked away in the academic world
of their own time, had written things too remote now from ordi-
nary experience to be grasped and little suited to the needs of the

20 ‘Sed nimir exilia persequor, a communi ratione longe digressus. Redeam ad
caela commutationis officia [. . . ]’ (sig.O5r).
21 ‘Sed nimir exilia consector, & longe ab instituto digressus sum’ (sig.Q3r).
present day (see above, p. 40). We may perhaps hear now a stronger echo of Machiavelli’s words to that same effect in the opening lines of Chapter 15 of *Il principe*, but we are left with the question of how far, or in what sense, Fox Morcillo achieved that aim, and how far he thought that he had done so.

From time to time Aurelius refers to the prescriptions of Plato, only to dismiss them as irrelevant to present-day needs. These prescriptions relate particularly to the question of the education of the prince and his subjects (sigs.E3r–v, H1r, H8v, I1v). As we have seen, Aurelius stresses that he does not desire a prince like Plato’s philosopher-king, complete in all virtue and learning (sig.H1r), nor does he wish to apply a whole course of education as conceived by Plato to the prince’s subjects (sig.H8v). Rather, he wishes him to possess only so much learning as will enable him to perform his duties properly; and when he considers in general terms the kind and degree of virtue requisite in the prince, he reveals an inclination to consider him along with other ‘good citizens’ and to desire from him, albeit in special measure, what is to be desired from other men. He is to be educated in the service of society as any citizen should be, and he will observe the same offices of virtue as others, so that ‘when he has learnt to be good as an individual man, he may be of greater service in a public role’.22 Such an approach on Fox’s part provides the grounds on which Richard Tuck (1993, pp. 33–34) places Fox with (in the political sense) the Renaissance ‘Ciceronians’.

The fact remains that, although Fox’s manifest desire is not to set the prince on an especially high level as compared with ‘citizens’ and ‘good men’ generally in this respect, one still finds a clear tendency to do so. Thus, although Aurelius may say that ‘all the virtues will be present in the king in such fashion that he will cultivate them in his own living like any private citizen and then learn to apply them in his dealings with others’,23 it is still deemed to be particularly ‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’ that the king should have ‘all the

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22 Quocirca ut reipublicae universae mores formantur, quo cuncta melius virtutum officia possint obiri a civibus, fiantque probi omnes, ac sancti, ita quoque rex instituendus est, quod velut reipublicae summa in eo sit constituta, quodque cadem debeat ipse tueri virtutis officia, quae aliis ut cum privativim bonus esse discederit, publice possit esse commodior: [...]’ (sig.D2v–3r).

23 ‘Sic ergo regi virtutes omnes inerunt, ut ipse per se illas colat tanquam privatus aliquis civis, tum iljdem uti apud alios consuescat, quasi ex privato vitae genere ad id solum delectus’ (sig.G3r).
virtues’ in a special degree. It is, after all, the exposition of these as applicable to the king that gives substance and shape to the whole of what is by far the longest of the three books of this treatise. It is this fundamental issue that Aurelius’s adversary, Antonius, takes up and challenges.

Already at the start of Book II, having heard Aurelius’s account so far of the education desirable in a prince, Antonius has told him that he is slipping into a description of a king such as there never was and never could be, and thus doing as Plato did in describing his ‘imaginary republic’, even though Aurelius has disowned any such aim (sig.F7v). Having subsequently listened to the latter’s long account in Book II of kingship in terms of the various virtues, Antonius, at the start of Book III, dismisses the whole exercise as worthless:

Let [Aurelius] imagine to himself what he will, let him construct at his pleasure a prince who is just, prudent, strong, temperate, equipped in short with all the virtues, and he will have achieved nothing at all, since princes like that have never been found and one should keep one’s instruction for those things which men can in fact sometimes achieve.24

What prince, he asks Aurelius, has he ever read of who possessed even some of these virtues, let alone all of them? Who, does he think, is going to display the various attributes which he is imagining? The reality is that kings are moved by ambition, or greed, or arrogance, and in every case by a concern with their own good (sig.V6r). Again Antonius charges Aurelius with presenting a Platonic ideal (sig.V6v). Sometime later in Book III, when Aurelius has been comparing the best and the worst forms of government with reference to Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of them, Lucius, the shadowy arbitrator between the other two, suggests that Aurelius’s talk now of ‘a perfect form of kingship’ hardly corresponds to his initial intention (sig.X6v). Antonius reinforces the point: ‘You earlier promised to describe kingly government suited to the present time, but now you say you require a perfect king and perfect kingship’.25 Aurelius replies is that it is one thing to form an intellectual notion of a ruler

24 ‘Fingat sibi quidquid velit ipse, instituat arbitratu suo principem iustum, prudentem, fortem, moderatum, omnibus denique officijis virtutum instructum, nihil sane effecerit: quando nec tales unquam principes sunt inventi, & ea praecepit describi oporteat, quae homines aliquando re ipsa consequi possint’ (sig.V6r).
such as could never be, but quite another to seek—as he is doing—a king complete in all respects insofar as experience and life as it is permit. Antonius, at least, is unpersuaded, and his comments on the matter at various points in the book suggest that Fox Morcillo himself felt some lack of confidence regarding the procedure he had adopted, even though he was committed to it. His own manifest interest in the practicalities of government and power indicate that Antonius’s interventions on the issue were not merely a formal device of literary polemic.

In various ways within the book Antonius effectively brings into question the persuasiveness of Aurelius’s arguments for kingship as the best form of government. Already at the start of Book I he makes a powerful attack on the rulers of the time, declaring that many were called kings who were in fact tyrants, caring only for their own personal advantage, selling office to the unworthy for profit, and placing themselves in the hands of flatters who merely multiplied the tyranny. In the mouths of such people, the terminology of virtue and public concern was a disguise for the actions of greed and self-seeking (sigs.A7r–B2r). He returns to the attack in Book III: short of a miracle, present-day princes would not so much as read Aurelius’s advice (sig.V6v).

So much the worse for Aurelius’s apologia for kingship as compared with other forms of government. When at last Aurelius sets about proving its superiority, he notes that it is an old topic of debate (sig.Y2r). The ensuing discussion, consisting of argument and counter-argument, is conducted very largely in terms of Plato’s and Aristotle’s treatment of the matter, and the pros and cons argued by Aurelius and Antonius in turn are particularly derived from the Politics. These need not be followed in detail here. What does call for attention is Antonius’s response to what Aurelius presents as the ultimate argument in favour of monarchy: that it was the form of government most in harmony with the structure of the whole created order, which was itself monarchical in character.

This view Aurelius presents at some length at the very outset of his exposition of kingship in Book I: ‘kingship is established not by the ordinances of men but by force of nature’ (sig.B4v). Fox con-

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26 ‘Nam aliud omnino est, cogitatione animi eum fingi, qui nusquam sit; aliud vero, quoad rerum usus, vitaeque consuetudo patiatur, absolutissimum quaerit’ (sig.X7r).
continues with an account of the kind which found so much favour with writers of the sixteenth century and earlier, where order and harmony, sustained by the monarchical principle of subordination to a single ‘ruler’, are seen on the various levels of macrocosm and microcosm alike (sig.B4v–6v). We meet the familiar analogies of the human body and the harmony of music as conceived by Plato (sig.B6v). While Fox Morcillo acknowledges that the social order of mankind has been seen to arise out of the corruption of human nature, he himself holds that it arose out of man’s rational character and social instinct (sig.C2v–4r). As he has already said, man is a social animal who requires the context of an ordered society; the king provides both order and unity and brings society to its goal, which is ‘the common good’ (sig.B7r–v). Aurelius somewhat extends this teleological argument in Book III. Government exists to uphold law and thereby promote the peace of society; that peace promotes the commoditas publica of the citizens ‘as so many parts of a single body’; from this there follows ‘a right way of life congruent with virtue’, while the ‘end’ of this is ‘that ultimate good to which all others refer’ (sig.Y3r). The interconnectedness of the lesser goals is stressed, and Aurelius sees monarchy as the form of government best able to lead men on from the one to the other. This view is soon reinforced when he returns to the argument for kingship in terms of the whole created order. ‘We see in any well established thing that all order derives from, as it were, a single head, to which all other things are subject, and that the excellence of the head resides in the fact that it presides over the rest’ (sig.Z1r). But since earthly things are images of the heavenly, which are ordered by God himself, who is One, ‘shall we not say that monarchy is the best form of rule?’27 This was indeed the argument regarded as decisively important by Aquinas in Chapter 2 of his De regno, and by Giles of Rome following him; and Aurelius at this point seems to belong with the fusty scholars mocked by Fox Morcillo in his introduction to his treatise rather than with readers of Machiavelli. Antonius, in his response, simply ignores such argument and concentrates his attention on practical

considerations: one man cannot deal with all the business of government by himself; one man ‘cannot always be good’; one man will be more immediately disposed to favour his own and his friends’ interest than many men will (sig.Z3r). Later still, however, when Aurelius returns to the topic, Antonius does voice his dissent. Aurelius eloquently evokes the principle of unity sustaining all things: there is one ruler of the universe... one sun in the heavens... one final end; all things in short emerge out of unity and return to it (sig.Aa6r). Therefore he would like to see, here on earth, one single supreme ruler, to whom all other princes would be subject—‘as the energies of the mind are subject to reason’. The advantages of this, he contends, have already been shown by the Roman Empire (sig.Aa6r–v). All this brings to mind Dante’s idea of a world-ruler, a ‘curator orbis’, as described in his De monarchia (I,xiv;III,xvi). But Antonius is unimpressed: Aurelius is talking like the sophists Gorgias and Thrasymachus, more eager to sweep people along with their flow of speech than to persuade them with acuity of reasoning (sig.Aa3r). One man simply could not rule the world, least of all those who have had a taste of liberty, and as for the Roman Empire, it did not cover one tenth of the globe (sig.Aa7r).

Both in Aquinas’s De regno (Chapter 4) and in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum (III,ii,4), it is acknowledged that there are respectable arguments to be advanced in favour of republican rather than monarchical rule. Patrizi’s separate works for the most part keep the rival claims of the two forms of rule at a distance. Fox Morcillo’s dialogue, which becomes effectively such in Book III at least, adds polemical vigour to the matter. Thanks largely to Aristotle’s Politics, he allows Antonius some good arguments, and we may take it that he accepted them as such. The lively exchanges between Fox’s two interlocutors are likely to persuade the reader of that too.

However, the modern reader will probably find a wider interest in all this than the specific issue under debate, for the exchanges between Aurelius and Antonius in Book III are at various points vividly indicative of two ways of thinking about government and society. As we have seen, for Aurelius the view of earthly monarchy as part of the cosmic monarchical structure of all-embracing order and harmony clearly has considerable appeal and importance. It has no such appeal or importance for Antonius, who looks at government wholly in terms of earthly society and the political values of free men. One might say that Antonius sets a wholly this-worldly
conception of government against Aurelius's, which sees the things of this world in a larger framework of structures and purposes. But it is important not to simplify here. Both speakers respond strongly to the notion of society being one's *patria*, the embodiment of shared civic values and a proper object of one's loyalty and service. This notion plays an important part in Aurelius's views of the ruler as one whose whole task and justification in office is to care for and serve his people. By contrast, the teleological view plays a relatively small part even in Aurelius's account of monarchy; and we have seen in some detail how, throughout Book II, he takes a lively interest in the purposes, needs, and circumstances of government as it operates in this world. So it becomes clear that Fox Morcillo was drawn both to the cosmic, aprioristic way of thinking about govern- ment and society—setting these in a comprehensive context of moral and ultimately religious order—and also to the empirical way of thinking which saw government and society in terms of power and public administration and as something directed towards political and material purposes belonging wholly to the context of earthly existence, one element of which was political conflict.

The terms in which, some years ago, A.B. Ferguson described the 'Commonwealth' literature of early Tudor England (in which he includes works by Edmund Dudley, Thomas Starkey, Sir Thomas Elyot, Sir Richard Morison, and John Hales) at any rate readily lend themselves to being applied to Fox Morcillo's treatise (see Ferguson, 1955, pp. 287–305). According to Ferguson, the authors with whom he was concerned, while recognizing the moral basis of society, were not content to talk only in ethical terms. They showed an interest in tracing economic cause and effect, and desired legislation that embodied practical policies and was capable of remedying the ills of society. This does not mean that they made a clean break with old habits of thought. They still saw society in terms of the analogy of the human body; their formal ideal of society was still a static one. However, as Ferguson puts it, in the interests of an essentially conservative ideal they invoked a creative policy. If their work indicates

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28 Thus: '[Aurelius:] Unus igitur princeps hic, sive monarcha, qui solus reip[ublicae] procurationem velut paterfamilias habet, omnemque & operam & laborem suum in patriae commoda confert, neglecta utilitate propria, codem plane modo, ut Aristoteles inquit, instituendus est, atque civis aliquis optimae rei: cum probus rex nihil sit alius, quam eiusmodi civis: [...]' (sig.D1v).
a move towards empiricism, that empiricism remained undoctrinaire and all but unformulated (Ferguson, 1955, pp. 291–93).

It will by now be evident that in Fox Morcillo’s treatise there is a curious distance between his declared intention—to portray the ruler in terms relevant to the present, thus making a break with the theorizing of earlier practice—and how he in fact sets about it. In summary, when he is most obviously fulfilling his aim, and despite his manifest interest in doing this, he feels the need to apologize for having ‘wandered from his subject’, which throughout the all-important Book II is still conceived and presented in terms of the four cardinal virtues, themselves introduced by a highly aprioristic account of kingship in the universal order of things. Fox’s interests repeatedly carry him beyond the ambit of the basic terms in which he envisages kingly rule; but those terms are still such as to give a central position to the personal concept of government and to moral categories and ideals of conduct. On the other hand, through Antonius, Fox Morcillo voices an awareness of the danger he is running of portraying another imaginary ideal ruler in the Platonic manner, not only departing thereby from his original aim in writing the book but adopting an approach to his whole subject that is of no real value.

In these various ways one is conscious of unreconciled elements and divergent tendencies in his treatise: a situation well represented by the fact that it offers a powerful statement of reformist Christian humanism in the tradition of Erasmus and Vives while also making important (though discreet) borrowings from Machiavelli. In its style of presentation, the work is highly bookish in a typically humanist fashion, with an ever ready supply of illustrative episodes and exemplary figures from Classical Antiquity to amplify and give tone to his arguments and injunctions. Yet, not infrequently, one is aware of crossing a boundary-line into another field and mode of discourse, even though one crosses back again. The ultimately unresolved character of the work is caught in Antonius’s final words to Aurelius: ‘many things which you have taken as established truths, I would call into question again’ (sig.Aa7v–8r). The two interlocutors give expression to a genuine and continuing dialogue within the writer’s mind. It seems that Fox Morcillo had some sense of being at the limit of a great complex tradition of discourse. It is the expression of this in his treatise that gives the work its fundamental interest when seen within the larger perspective of continuity and change manifest in the sixteenth-century discussion of government and society.
CHAPTER FOUR

FELIPE DE LA TORRE

In Felipe de la Torre we have another writer who, aware that many treatises on kingship continued to be written in his own time, declared it his wish to offer something different. However, the kind of difference he aimed at was very unlike that which Fox Morcillo had in view. It is true that de la Torre also, in a certain sense, sought to present a prince relevant to the needs of his own time; but these were now centred on the need for a Christian prince. Moreover, what was required was a Christian prince whose character was formed by the reading of the Bible, and by bringing a particular kind of disposition to its reading. The Institución de un rey cristiano offers the unusual interest of a work written in the mid-sixteenth century by one who would very soon become a chaplain of Philip II’s and yet had close Protestant connexions and contrived, with a calculated degree of reticence and ambiguity, to express some of his deepest religious convictions in this exhortation to Philip at the outset of his reign.¹

In his Dedicatory Epistle, de la Torre regrets the extent to which writers on kingship have drawn on ‘the precepts of the Philosophers or the examples of pagans’ (sig.A3r/p. 5).² As he says, it is not that the pagan sources are not good in themselves, but rather that Christian ones are better. He himself, as we shall see, recommends a few Classical moralists and historians; but the whole tradition of moral and political discourse deriving from Plato and Aristotle is virtually absent from this work. There is nothing here corresponding to Fox Morcillo’s use of the Classical topology of the natural virtues. De la Torre commends rather than expounds the virtues, and does so in

¹ The one fairly detailed, though quite properly restricted, study of de la Torre’s Institución is that of Maravall (1972c), first published in 1970. This presents the work primarily as an important example of religious and political protest in the years that saw the transfer of monarchy from Charles V to Philip II. A valuable study of the context in which de la Torre’s treatise should be seen is again provided by Maravall (1960) (Part III, ch.ii [pp. 181–231]), though it should be noted that the later study revises some aspects of this earlier one.

² Textual references will be given both to the original edition and to the somewhat shortened version edited and annotated by Truman (1979a).
terms of the Old and New Testaments. As for political, legal, and constitutional matters, and questions of administration and taxation, these are for the most part ignored, or receive attention only insofar as they bear on issues that for de la Torre are matters of strong Christian conviction. The authority of the king is discussed only in religious and biblical terms; but in those terms it is much stressed; and the religious perspective shapes the structure of the whole work.

Felipe de la Torre begins with what for him was the heart of the matter: there is no authority except from God, and the powers that be have been instituted by God. From this principle he derives and emphasizes the conclusion that kings are at once the servants of God and of the people whom he has committed to their charge. The following chapters produce a steady broadening of perspective as, first, de la Torre points out to the king his need to read works that will show him what the will of God is (Chapters 2–4), then sets out the king’s duties towards the Church (Chapters 5–6), and finally expounds his duties towards his people at large (Chapters 7–10). Here he speaks of the choosing of royal advisers, provincial governors, and legal officers; of their character and responsibility; and of the spirit in which both they and their royal master are to carry out their work. The whole argument is brought together in a concluding chapter which takes the form of an exposition of the final four verses of Psalm 2.

Chapter 1 establishes the religious and biblical character of the work. Here, as so often, the text is very largely a catena of biblical citations (identified by marginal references) worked together and rendered in fluent and sometimes eloquent Spanish prose. One cannot but be impressed by the intimacy of de la Torre’s knowledge of the Bible, the powerful significance it had for him, his delight in quoting from it and referring to figures and events in it, the extent to which his knowledge of the Bible had permeated his whole way of thinking and feeling about the subject he was treating. In this respect it is a suitable work to come from one who had studied, as de la Torre had done, at the university of Alcalá. From the time of its foundation by Cardinal Cisneros in the first decade of the sixteenth century, special emphasis had been laid there on the direct study of the Bible, supported by knowledge of its original languages: an approach that would lead to the completion there, as early as 1517, of the great Polyglot Bible (Bataillon, 1966, pp. 16–22, 38–39). De la Torre took his bachelor’s degree in arts and philosophy at Alcalá
in 1544. He had come there from Tarazona, in Aragon—a fact which may have some bearing on his later Protestant connexions, since a number of these associates themselves had an Aragonese background (Truman, 1984, pp. 86–90; Kinder, 1985).

In his first chapter Felipe de la Torre concerns himself with first principles: all power is of God; ‘By me kings reign . . .’, and he who resists the king resists the ordinances of God. Kings are sent to uphold justice, rewarding the good and punishing the wicked. They have been set high above other men, but God is much higher than they; therefore they must show him gratitude and reverence in performing the duties of their office with a due sense of responsibility. Here we meet the first of a series of eulogistic references to the Emperor Constantine (fo.5v/p. 17), while the chapter ends with an affirmation that, just as there are three virtues in the Heavenly King—supreme power, supreme wisdom, and supreme goodness—so power, wisdom, and goodness must be found together in earthly rulers (fos.6v–7r/p. 18). The particular significance which this formula had for de la Torre emerges in the following chapters.

It is a cardinal point with him that, while all the workers of wickedness shall perish, the righteous shall flourish like a palm-tree. So, as he stresses at the opening of Chapter 2, if kings desire to enjoy their thrones and kingdoms, they must (in the words of the Book of Wisdom) be wise and honour wisdom (fo.8v/p. 19). If a kingdom is to enjoy peace and abundance, this will result less from human effort or counsel (‘although this also helps somewhat’) than from the king’s care over ‘divine matters’ (fo.12v–v/p. 21). He will promote the worship of God and govern in accordance with his law. Therefore he must be a diligent reader of the Scriptures, as were Solomon, Joshua, Joash, and Jehoshaphat (fos.9r–12r/pp. 19–20). Constantine earns special praise because he sent ‘preachers of the law and Gospel of Jesus Christ’ through his dominions and ordered Eusebius to prepare ‘una popular instrucción’ to teach the people the Christian religion (fo.12v/pp. 21–22). This leads on to the first point where one perceives de la Torre as clearly having more in mind than he is saying. He recalls the rediscovery of the Book of the Law in the Jewish Temple in the time of King Josiah [II Chronicles 34]; the latter’s grief that, as de la Torre puts it, his predecessors had been

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3 A.H.N., Universidad de Alcalá, lib. 397F, fo.172v.
so neglectful in religious matters; and God’s anger that his law had
gone so long unread. In a comment parenthetically addressed to
Philip II, de la Torre adds: ‘May your Majesty understand what
may be gathered from this, as the course of my story [about King
Josiah] compels me to go on’. The truth of the matter was rather
that de la Torre, without explicitly saying so, was telling Philip that
he should himself be diligent in obeying the law of God as declared
in the Bible (and as understood by de la Torre himself) and that
the law thus declared—and hitherto ignored among Philip’s subjects,
it is implied—should be made known to his people. This is one’s
first glimpse of a religious conviction beneath the surface of this work
which the author avoids expressing openly.

A significant pointer towards the nature of that conviction will
soon be given in Chapter 4, but first, in Chapter 3, de la Torre
stresses the need of kings to take due account of the fact that they
lack people around them to tell them the truth or point out their
faults. A ruler should therefore encourage two or three especially
close and trusted servants to do so; still more should he seek out
what books have to offer him in this matter. As de la Torre makes
clear late in the following chapter, with an implicit reference to the
old debate between Arms and Letters, he rejects the view that kings
should not be readers (fo.24v/pp. 29–30). On the other hand, he
strongly holds that they should not read ‘books about love and those
called Books of Chivalry’. Beyond that, they should not allow their
subjects to read them either, since such works afford no profit but
rather corrupt the mind and character and cast a spell on people
with their inanities (fos.25v–26r/p. 30). This was, of course, a point
of view reiterated in Spain over the greater part of the sixteenth cen-
tury by those hostile to, or at least suspicious of, imaginative fiction
generally—writers ranging from those in the tradition of Italian
humanism and Erasmus to the Augustinian Malón de Chaide in the
1580s.

The kinds of book that kings should read are indicated in some
detail in the main part of Chapter 4, and are two in number: ‘books
of piety’ and books on government. The books of piety are them-
selves divided into two kinds. First there are the biblical books: the
Wisdom literature of the Old Testament and Apocrypha and a range

4 ‘Entienda V.M. lo que de aquí se puede colegir, porque a mí me lleva el curso
de la historia’ (fo.13v/p. 22).
of historical books: Joshua, Judges, Kings, Chronicles, Judith, Esther, Machabees and Esdras, subsumed in ‘finally, all the New and Old Testament’ (fos.22v–23r/p. 27). In all this it is understood that the ‘Book of the Law of God’ is primary and must never fall from the king’s hands (fo.21v/p. 26). To these de la Torre adds a commendation of some Classical pagan moralists and historians—Cicero, Seneca, Livy, and Plutarch—for their teaching on government and ‘some aspects of virtuous living’ (‘algunas buenas costumbres’) as well as for the ease with which their ideas are apprehended, ‘though at times one has to beware’ (‘abrir los ojos’) (fo.23v/p. 28). Already, despite his initial remarks, he has drawn on Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and Isocrates in arguing, in Chapter 3, that reading can be of great benefit to a king.

It is, however, his recommendations regarding modern spiritual writers that are of principal interest, in that they provide as explicit an indication as de la Torre gives of his own religious sympathies. He mentions with little or no comment three names, Dr Constantino Ponce de la Fuente, Fray Luis de Granada, O.P., and the Italian Serafino da Fermo, but the bare mention of their names is full of significance, in that all three express a view of the Christian life which the Spanish Inquisition, by the end of the 1550s, made it its business to eradicate. It was an approach where inner spirituality was valued more than external forms; where that inner spirituality was apprehended more as a living experience than as a matter of doctrinal formulation authoritatively imposed, and where this living experience was perceived as an immediate personal relationship between the individual Christian and the Christ who died on the Cross, through whom a new life of grace, freedom, and renewal was made readily available to those who genuinely desired it. It was emphatically Christocentric, biblical, and Pauline. The writings of Dr Constantino, pre-eminently, represent a kind of catholicism that was far from repudiating all that Luther had stood for. In the 1540s he had published a series of works where he contrasted the religion of external observances with that of living faith in the work of Christ and the life of grace. Renowned for his preaching at Seville cathedral, he accompanied the future Philip II in 1548 to the Netherlands, where his sermons were highly esteemed at the court of Charles V. Back in Spain, his appointment as canónigo magistral at Seville cathedral in the year when de la Torre was writing was followed by his arrest by the Inquisition in 1558. After his death in prison eighteen
months later, he was burnt in effigy as a heretic. As for Fray Luis de Granada, the work of his to which de la Torre refers would be his celebrated Libro de la oración y meditación, which first appeared, at Salamanca, in 1554. Here, as Bataillon has commented, one finds an Erasmian stress on the essentially interior character of Christian spirituality combined with a Dominican tradition of mental prayer deriving from Savonarola (Bataillon, 1966, p. 594). In this work Luis de Granada commended those of Serafino da Fermo to ‘all lovers of true wisdom […] seeking the way to perfection and the knowledge of the truth’ (Truman, 1979a, p. 85). These, however, together with Dr Constantino’s and Luis de Granada’s Libro de la oración (along with his Guía de pecadores), were placed on the Spanish Index of Forbidden Books of 1559.6

De la Torre also recommends contemporary secular works to his royal reader: histories of Spain—in particular, Pero Mexía’s Historia imperial y cesárea, of 1545—and books on government. Among these he singles out Fox Morcillo’s treatise for recommendation, though he at once adds that the reader must remember to ‘pick out what is good and flee what is bad’ (fo.24r/p. 28). It is not entirely clear whether this observation applies to the many books written, as he says, in his own as in past times ‘de Instituciones de Reyes y de Repúblicas’, or to Fox Morcillo’s in particular. Certain features of the latter may well have offended him, especially Fox’s acceptance of war as a political necessity for rulers. This was deeply at variance with de la Torre’s own conception of kingship and his sense of the needs of his own time. Nevertheless, he shows a certain appreciation of worldly wisdom in adopting the view that kings, in reading history, should seek to learn the causes and occasions of trouble and dissension in society, and flee them (fo.24r/p. 28).

After this account of how the king should prepare himself for his task, de la Torre goes on to tell him what he should do. First, in Chapters 5 and 6, he offers instruction to kings in general and Philip

5 His other best known work, Guía de pecadores, appeared only in 1556–57. For Luis de Granada’s significance, see especially Bataillon, 1966, pp. 593–603, 750–54.
6 It is noteworthy that Archbishop Carranza was another admirer of Luis de Granada’s treatise on prayer. In his Comentarios sobre el catechismo cristiano—the work that was to result in his long imprisonment by the Inquisition—Carranza remarks that ‘de la virtud y fruto de la oración y de las otras partes de ella ha escrito tan bien el padre fray Luis de Granada en el libro que hizo de la oración mental, que pudiera yo excusar este trabajo’ [i.e. his own chapter ‘De la virtud y fruto de la oración’] (Carranza, 1972, ii, 391).
II in particular concerning their duties as regards the Christian religion and the Church. Chapter 5, apart from its concluding denunciation, worthy of Fox Morcillo, of flatterers at court, is wholly concerned with the ruler’s duty to remove ‘two public abuses’, namely ‘errors and heresies’, and to guard against heretics and hypocrites; for heretics wholly corrupt sound doctrine while hypocrites mix it with superstitions and obscure it with vanities of their own devising (fo.28r/p. 32). As de la Torre points out in the next chapter, Philip II has clear rights and duties in this matter since to him has been handed on from his forebears ‘the tutelage, protection, and patronage of the Church, and particularly that of Spain’ (fo.39r/p. 40).7 Above all, he must provide the Church with clergy who will be worthy teachers and ministers of the Gospel and true shepherds of Christ’s flock. Like Fox Morcillo, de la Torre believes that there is no better means of advancing religion than well-ordered places of learning (fo.49v/p. 48). He too praises Charlemagne for establishing universities and restoring learning in Europe; and, with him, those kings and others who have founded and endowed colleges and universities in Spain (fos.51r–52r/p. 49). Since, as he comments, these institutions are better endowed and offer better salaries than such institutions elsewhere, they should now be reformed more thoroughly than the rest. Unlike Fox Morcillo, however, de la Torre does not go into detail as to how the different branches of learning should be reformed. ‘Two or three’ learned and prudent men, God-fearing and concerned for the public good, will be able to make the necessary recommendations to the King (fo.52r–v/p. 50). De la Torre’s characteristic disinclination to apply his mind to the practical tasks of government in the sphere of everyday administration is again apparent.

Another significant difference of emphasis between de la Torre and Fox Morcillo is seen in the way they speak of the clergy. Both writers are anxious that the clergy should be dedicated teachers of the Christian religion; but whereas Fox Morcillo, in making this point, mainly attacks worldly prelates as he in fact finds them, de

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7 De la Torre is referring here to the large measure of control achieved by the Spanish Crown over the Church, especially in the matter of appointments to benefices and bishoprics, through the royal Patronato of the Church, secured from Rome and effective first in the newly reconquered kingdom of Granada (1486) and then in the Spanish dominions of the New World (1508). In 1523 Charles V obtained the right to present to bishoprics throughout Spain.
la Torre writes chiefly, at considerable length and with evident feeling, of the character and disposition that they should ideally possess. His ideal is that of Christian caring love as exemplified in the shepherd seeking the sheep that was lost. This is the love of Jesus Christ, the Shepherd of our souls (fos.40r–41r/pp. 41–42). We are here dealing with one of de la Torre’s deepest and most urgent convictions. It is at the root of his attachment, especially clear in his later chapters, to the New Testament image of the Church as the Body of Christ, in whom all are made one, brothers in Christ without distinction of Jew or Gentile, Barbarian or Scythian (fos.85r–v, 98r–v/pp. 62,68). De la Torre also takes over from Ephesians 2 the image of the Church as a temple fitly framed together, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone (fo.98v/p. 68). This temple Philip II will raise and restore, de la Torre tells him in Chapter 10, if, in the first place, he provides the Church with pastors such as he has described in Chapter 6 (fo.95r/p. 66), as we have seen.

While much here is in the language of explicit religious conviction, the reader is likely to become increasingly aware of another level of meaning, left deliberately inexplicit but very much affecting the significance of the part which de la Torre looks to Philip II in particular to play. Early in Chapter 5, he says that it belongs to the office of a king to root out public scandals and errors so that the way will be clear for the ministers of God to sow the seed of the teaching of the Gospel (fo.27v/p. 31). He will punish, after careful examination, ‘those ill-disposed towards true religion’ (fo.29r–v/p. 33). Following the example of ‘pious and Christian kings’, he will foster ‘pure religion’ and set himself against ‘the false sort, abuses and superstitions’ (fo.30r/p. 33). De la Torre speaks in general terms of ‘many other examples [. . .] of Catholic kings [among whom he includes Old Testament ones] who punished idolaters and those who blasphemed against the Name of God, removing every occasion for heresy, superstition, and idolatry [. . .] and afterwards took care that God was served with purity in the new law’ (fo.31v/p. 34). Constantine, after rooting out prevalent ‘errors in the worship of God’, issued laws to ensure that God should be paid proper and genuine honour (‘da orden como sea Dios legítima y sinceramente honrado, y haze para ello nuevas leyes’) (fo.32r/p. 34). De la Torre invites Philip II to ‘honour good men who preach good doctrine and things redounding greatly to the glory of Jesus Christ our Redeemer and
Master, and, on the contrary, to hate evil and false doctors, heretics, and hypocrites' (fo.32r–v/pp. 34–35). De la Torre makes 'heretics' and 'hypocrites' the object of vehement and prolonged attack, but wholly in terms taken from the Bible: he never identifies the objects of his attack in the context of his own time and makes no mention here or at any point of the Protestant Reformers. On the contrary, the terms applied to 'hypocrites'—on whom de la Torre spends more time than on 'heretics'—bring to mind characteristic Protestant polemic against the Roman priesthood: pharisees and doctors of the law who shut up the kingdom of heaven against men, neither going in themselves nor suffering them that are entering to go in, etc. (fos.28v–29r/p. 32). Moreover, the terms in which he speaks of the Church have a reformist ring to them. It is true that he makes mention on occasion of bishops and abbots, and refers to the 'estado Sacerdotal' as one of the five essential elements in society (fo.71r/p. 57). The Church is founded on Christ, on St Peter, 'confessor' of that spiritual 'Rock', and on the doctrine of the Apostles and Prophets (fo.98v/p. 68). However, he could hardly say less of the papal office, while the clergy emerge from his pages not as a sacerdotal order but as preachers of the law of God and the Christian Gospel, as shepherds or pastors of the Christian people, 'fattening them with the sacred reading of the Scriptures' (fo.97r/p. 67). In the Early Church, he tells us, it was from the preachers, teachers, and interpreters of the Scriptures that bishops were chosen: an example for Philip II to follow (fos.45r–46r/pp. 44–45). De la Torre shows a desire to relate the orders of the clergy in the Church of his own day to those mentioned in the New Testament and to subject them to the same moral demands as the Bible makes of the ministers of God (fos.96r–99r/pp. 66–68). Furthermore, his whole concept of the duties and authority of the king in relation to the Church is deeply indebted to the Old Testament and inevitably brings to mind the Northern Reformers' ideal of the Godly Prince. Felipe de la Torre

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8 Thus Cipriano de Valera writes, in the preface to his translation of the Bible (Amsterdam, 1602): 'Para que pues no entiendan los hombres la religion y doctrina destos hypocritas y falsos prophetas ser falsa y contraria a la que Dios instituyó en su sancta palabra, mandan so gravissimas censuras que no lean la sagrada Escritura' ['Exhortación al christiano lector a leer la sagrada Escritura' (sig.*4r)]. Valera's Protestant affiliation is emphasized when he recalls (sig.*3r) his close association many years earlier with Juan Pérez de Pineda, Casiodoro de Reina, and Julián Hernández.
looks to Philip II to play a decisive part in ‘the purging of the Church of some scandals’ by bringing about the summoning of a Council (fo.95v/p. 66); and if this cannot be done for the Church at large, Philip should do it at least for his own realms and territories, acting with due regard for ecclesiastical canons and with the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, yet ‘without anyone preventing it’ (fos.95v, 99v/p. 66). In the late 1520s, Alfonso de Valdés, Latin Secretary to Charles V and a devotee of Erasmus, had addressed a similar plea to the Emperor in the aftermath of the Sack of Rome; but it is surprising to find one who was soon to be a chaplain of Philip II making such a proposal in the mid-1550s, when the Council of Trent had already been meeting over the course of a decade. That de la Torre nowhere makes the least mention of the Council of Trent cannot be by chance.\(^9\) It will, in his view, be for Philip II thus to build and renew the temple of God, ‘restoring to his people the Ark of the Covenant, which is true religion and the ordinances which the Church had in early times’ (fos.95v−96r/p. 66). So he will become another Solomon (fo.95r/p. 65).

In a number of ways, therefore, the text of Felipe de la Torre’s treatise suggests an outlook that has a good deal in common with the values and convictions of the Reformers. This is borne out by external evidence. De la Torre’s association with Dr Morillo in Paris, before he came to Louvain, was mentioned earlier. The year after his treatise was published, Julián Hernández, who had been caught distributing Protestant literature at Seville, told the Inquisitors there that de la Torre had been in the habit of attending Protestant conventicles at the houses of Antwerp merchants (Longhurst, 1960, pp. 111–12). More decisive still are the comments made about him by Dr Juan Pérez de Pineda two years earlier, in 1555. By then Juan Pérez had himself adopted a thoroughgoing Protestant position, and in a letter to a fellow Spanish Protestant, Miguel de Monterde, rector of the studium generale of Zaragoza, he recommends de la Torre as ‘vere theologus . . . el qual unice amo propter pietatem quam dominus animo illius insevit ministerio evangelii’. Monterde is to receive de la Torre, when he comes to Zaragoza, as he would Pérez.

\(^9\) His statement, quoted on the previous page, that the Church is founded on Christ, St Peter, and the doctrine of the Apostles and Prophets, continues with what may be a covert and unfavourable comment on the Council of Trent: ‘(y tras esto ninguno puede poner otro fundamento del que ya está puesto, que es Christo Jesu)’; […].
de Pineda himself (Truman, 1984, p. 85; Kinder, 1986, p. 96). These words imply that de la Torre had, in Pérez de Pineda’s view, adopted a clearly Reformist theological position by that time. The *Institución de un rey cristiano* contains no theological discussion and leaves it uncertain how far de la Torre was committed to a defined doctrinal position. What cannot be doubted is his sympathy with the Reformers’ religious outlook at large; and that sympathy has profoundly coloured his whole view of the part he wishes Philip II in particular to play as regards the reform of the Church and the re-establishment of true religion in his own day.

De la Torre now turns to the secular aspect of government, writing in successive chapters of how the king is to appoint royal counsellors, provincial governors, and legal officers, and of the way in which all these are to conduct themselves in office. Though he earlier minimizes the importance of human effort and counsel as contrasted with divine favour (fo.12r–v/p. 21), he here allows that good counsellors are necessary, that they need to be chosen with great care, and deserve to be rewarded for good service (fos.54r–56v/ pp. 51–52). His conviction in all this, and the context of his discussion, is overwhelmingly biblical in character. The Old Testament provides a whole series of good and bad counsellors, while, in the familiar idiom of more recent centuries, de la Torre warns of how God allows those who abuse high office to suffer a sudden reverse of fortune and to be brought low (fo.61r/p. 53). Near the end of Chapter 7, he stresses the duty of kings to avoid causing hurt to the innocent, or doing injustice, or taking revenge, through an unwillingness to change their minds and reverse an edict which they have issued (fos.63v–66v/pp. 53–54). Rather must they display a spirit of clemency, gentleness, and humanity. The emphasis which de la Torre places on this follows from the fact that he is here urging a secularized version of the ideal of caring love which he has already urged upon the clergy.

Those who govern in the name of the king must be God-fearing, faithful, prudent, committed to following the examples of Moses, Samuel, Nehemiah, and St Paul—these being men who used their office wholly for the service of the people in their charge and not for their own profit (fos.66v–70r/pp. 54–55). Enlarging on this point in almost lyrical terms, de la Torre comes to the point of acknowledging that ‘it will seem to some that it is not possible in government to maintain the perfection of which we speak, and that this is
easier to talk about than to imitate’ (fo.70v/p. 56). His reply is that people should get as near to this perfection as they can and at least follow the dominical injunctions to the publicans and soldiers: to demand no more than is appointed, to do violence to no man, and to be content with their wages (fo.70r–v/p. 56).

De la Torre begins Chapter 6 with the ringing declaration that any society in the world rests chiefly on the two virtues of religion and justice, and that neither of these can endure without the other (fo.36r/p. 38). In Chapter 9 he reasserts his high (and strongly traditional) view of justice: it is of God, not man (fos.74v, 79v/p. 59), and therefore a primary responsibility of the king, who will both hear especially important cases himself (as Moses did) and take care to appoint upright God-fearing men to the various kinds of legal office. For the conduct of such people as they discharge their duties the king is responsible before God (fos.83v–84r/p. 62). However, de la Torre asks more of judges than that they be impartial and refrain from using their position to oppress or tyrannize the people (fos.74v,80r/pp. 59–60). They must also offer care and protection to those who stand in need of them: strangers, wards, orphans, widows, the poor generally (fos.74v,76r–v/pp. 59–60). As to the spirit in which they do their work, it must be a spirit of Christian charity, for ‘we must not think that, on account of the sins or errors of our neighbour, we are permitted to cast off the Christian virtues and affections, which are charity and sorrow at the fall of our brother and [a desire] to handle his situation with all goodness and truthfulness’.  

While the point is made with a succession of citations from the Pauline Epistles, the tone is one which we now recognize as characteristically de la Torre’s own when writing of the ideal of Christian loving care and compassion—a topic on which he always writes with especial depth of feeling.

It may well be that the criticism here of judges who fail to display this disposition had another specific, though unstated, object. In Chapter 5, in the course of describing heretics and hypocrites, de la Torre makes a passionate plea that things done in the name of God’s service must be undertaken in a Christian fashion and that

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10 ‘Ni devemos pensar que por los pecados o yerros de nuestro próximo nos es lícito desnaturalizarnos de las virtudes y afectos Christianos: como son charidad, dolor de la caída d’el hermano, y tratar su negocio con toda bondad y verdad’ (fo.81r/p. 61).
in all our actions a Christian disposition and Christian charity must
shine through; for 'under the guise of religion to defame one's neigh-
bour, to seize the goods of a Christian, and seek the death of one
to whom Jesus Christ gave life, is not justice but tyranny, not piety
but cruelty, not religion but the very failure to fear God'. In the
light of what has been seen of de la Torre's religious outlook and
affiliations, it seems likely that these words are directed against the
practices and procedures of the Spanish Inquisition, with its reliance
on private delations, encouraged through the Edicts of Faith, and
its practice of seizing the goods of the accused. Earlier in that same
chapter, de la Torre had already urged the truly Christian king to
punish 'false accusers and false witnesses' (fo.29v/p. 33). On the
other hand, the king must not be the minister of anyone's cruelty
or passions (but only of justice) (fo.29r/pp. 32–33); and as de la
Torre draws nearer to the passage which has just been quoted, he
insists that royal zeal in favouring the things of God and pursuing
those who appear to be corrupting them must be 'according to
knowledge'. Above all, kings must take care not to do anything in
the name of religion that is in fact to the detriment of religion. For,

on the basis of false information or a false show of religion, with-
out further examination of the matter, to cause the death of some-
one or permit his persecution, is, in the words of Jeremiah, to spill
the blood of the innocent in the place where God's name is invoked
and to turn his house into a den of robbers (fo.33r–v/p. 35). To do
such a thing is unworthy of any Christian, and even more so of the
king, who in his office of judge acts in the place of God.

When one recalls that the Spanish Inquisition was directed by a
royal council and acted in the name of the King, de la Torre's words
seem to have a clear bearing. J.A. Maravall has argued that the

11 'Porque las cosas que se hazen a título de servicio de Dios, han se de empre-
der Christianamente, han se de tratar Christianamente, y en todas nuestras obras
y acciones, ha de resplandecer el ánimo y charidad Christiana: pero se especie de
religión infamar al próximo, quitar sus bienes al Cristiano, y buscar la muerte a
quien Jesu Christo dió vida, no es justicia, sino tyrania: no es piedad, sino cruel-
dad: no es religión, sino falta de temor de Dios' (fo.34r–v/p. 36).
12 The marginal note at this point refers to Romans 10[.2], where 'those who
have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge' are the Gentiles, who, says
St Paul, 'being ignorant of God's righteousness, and seeking to establish their own
[... ] did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God' (Romans 10.3). It is
a characteristic instance of the way in which de la Torre's remarks and references
tend to suggest implications of a clearly significant but often elusive kind.
entire purpose of de la Torre's work was basically to urge the new King to introduce reforms in both the religious and political spheres aimed at guaranteeing a respect for individuals and their consciences, and at replacing cruelty by humanity in the concrete procedures of Spanish government (Maravall, 1972c, pp. 88, 92). That is perhaps an overstatement, but Maravall's words fasten on an aspect of the work that is of the highest importance, and relate not only to de la Torre's implied references to the officers of the Inquisition but to his explicit comments on secular judges also.

In all this the king will find his model in the Emperor Constantine. He, as we read in Chapter 9, was all his life devoted to the care of wards, widows, impoverished maidens, strangers, and the poor (fo.75r/p. 60). De la Torre's source here is the *Vita Constantini* of Eusebius, whose eulogy of the emperor (Bk.I, ch.xxxvi) is summarized more fully in Chapter 10 (fos.92v–93v/pp. 64–65), where it acquires de la Torre's own resonance of feeling. Constantine exemplifies his ideal of the ruler as the modest and easily approached 'father and shepherd of his people' (fo.90v/p. 63). The reciprocal relationship of ruler and ruled as de la Torre sees it is summed up in his words that 'the king must govern with the love of a brother and the charity of a Christian, and with the same love and charity the people must obey'. This remark is made with regard to King David and the Tribes of Israel; and it is on him and his son Solomon that Chapter 10 at large ('On the office of the King regarding his people') is centred: on David the warrior and on Solomon who in the time of ensuing peace built the Temple at Jerusalem. We noted earlier that these two figures, together with Constantine, were exemplars of whom much was made many centuries before, in the Carolingian Mirrors of Princes (see above, p. 15). De la Torre gives contemporary meaning to the Old Testament figures by drawing an extended comparison between them on the one hand and Charles V and Philip II on the other (fos.94r–102v/pp. 65–70). Like David, Charles V has been involved all his life in the fighting of wars. This was not his desire, but he was driven by the necessity of defending the *reública* and protecting his people, like a good shepherd, from those who

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13 '[...] el Rey ha de governar con amor de hermano, y charidad de Christiano, y con el mismo amor y charidad ha de obedecer el pueblo' (fo.86r/p. 63).

14 This contrast between David and Solomon was elaborated in the *Glossa ordinaria* on I Chronicles 22, 8–10 and became an established *topos*. 
sought to devour them (fo.102r/p. 70). By no means a man of violence himself, he performed notable acts of clemency, as was seen in his freeing of Francis I of France, captured at Pavia; in his treatment, years later, of the rebels of Ghent; and in his treatment likewise of Johann Friedrich, Elector of Saxony; Philip, Landgrave of Hesse; and William V of Jülich-Cleves. For the most part this represents a highly partial view of the matter, just as it was a notable understatement to say that Charles, at the end of his reign, had, albeit unwillingly, ‘burdened the people with some taxes and levies’ (fo.102r/p. 70). That de la Torre’s concern with such ills was nevertheless real can be deduced from the earnestness with which he exhorts Philip II, at the start of his reign, to grant ‘some rest’ to his people, ‘for it is certainly afflicted and loaded with debt’ (fo.102v/p. 70). His concluding plea to Philip in this chapter is that, for the sake of him who brought us all liberty, he should be a man of peace, to bring his people renewal, consolation, and joy.

This will be the second of the two ways in which Philip, like a second Solomon, will peaceably build the Temple which it pleased God not to allow the Emperor his father to build (fo.95r/p. 65). The first way will be to renew the Church, by the calling of a Council and other means, in the manner we saw earlier. And if, in a previous chapter, de la Torre writes of the ruler’s duty to assist the clergy with their material needs (fo.53r-v/pp. 50–51), he here stresses the duty of all those in a position to do so (the clergy clearly being included among them) to come to the aid of the king in his financial need, and not to take refuge in privileges and immunities, for as he points out with reference to the classic texts of Romans 13 and I Peter 2, all men are subject to the ‘magistrates’, and the ‘magistrates’ are the ministers of God (fos.103v–04r/pp. 71–72).

De la Torre’s concluding chapter takes the form of an extended gloss on verses ten to thirteen of Psalm 2. Like the opening chapter, it emphasizes the primacy of his religious concern in his approach to kingship. He seeks a similar primacy of religious concern in the ruler, and returning to the topic, touched on in Chapter 1, of the inadequacy of human counsel separate from religion, now offers

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15 For further details, see Truman, 1979a, pp. 100–03.

16 ‘Pero séanos V.M. por amor d’el que a todos nos libertó pacífico: para nos reheazer, y consolar, y alegrar: y finalmente séanos en sus días dado el tiempo de paz, y amor d’el Dios de paz y dilección. Amen’ (fo.103r/p. 72).
reflexions on the theme that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God (fos.108v–09v/pp. 73–74). It is not that human prudence and wisdom are not good and useful in themselves; but they must be ‘accompanied by Jesus Christ and his doctrine’, and a concern with ‘the laws of God’ (fos.107v,109r/p. 73). What de la Torre now stresses is that the king who thus serves God will enjoy an inward state of mind which he characterizes as ‘very great confidence in God’s goodness and mercy’ (fo.113v), ‘the testimony of his conscience’, and ‘inner joy’ (fo.115v). This last point is especially emphasized as the words ‘gozo/plazer interior’ repeatedly appear; and it is in the confidence of this belief that de la Torre exhorts Philip II to recognize Jesus Christ as his Lord and Saviour both in his heart and in his deeds (fo.125r/p. 76).

It is somewhat surprising to find Philip, at the start of his reign, receiving so heartily evangelical an exhortation, particularly when that exhortation was offered in a work by one about to become a royal chaplain: a work which had, furthermore, been passed for publication by a Dominican appointed for the task by the University of Louvain, Dr Johannes Hentenius, regent and then prior of the Dominican house at Louvain and Inquisitor for the Province of Liège. His approval contrasts with the response of a Spanish reader, apparently of the sixteenth century, who in his copy of the work commented on its author: ‘A deceiver. What subterfuges and disguises he has for dressing up, varnishing, and concealing what he is saying!’17 The Spanish reader was, it seems, more perceptive than the Dominican, both in seeing that much lay beneath the surface of this work and in appreciating that this was expressive of a religious outlook profoundly at variance with what was acceptable in Spain from the end of the 1550s at latest.

It is not, however, in character an isolated work. There is a striking similarity between de la Torre’s conception of Christian kingship and that of Alfonso de Valdés as embodied in his portrait of King Polidoro in his Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón, composed nearly thirty years earlier.18 Here too kingship is presented not only as a Christian office but in terms of a particular kind of Christian motivation and disposition on the part of the individual ruler. Polidoro’s

17 ‘Un embustero. ¡Qué de rodeos, qué de disfraças tiene para afeytar, lucir y enmascarar lo que dice!’. Quoted by Maravall, 1972c, pp. 73–74.
exemplary conduct follows from his repentance over his previous behaviour in office, especially the harm and suffering he had brought upon his subjects by continually waging war. After his repentance, the pursuit of peace and concord becomes a primary goal for him. He sees himself as the father and shepherd of his people, charged with their care by Jesus Christ. He is humble, approachable, keeps his doors open to all; he travels through his kingdoms seeking to do good everywhere, building or rebuilding hospitals, bridges, and the like, removing unjust or excessive taxes, marrying off orphaned maidens and others without doweries, coming to the aid of widows and others in need. Immediately after his conversion he reformed his court and put virtuous men in charge of government and justice. He took great care over the appointment of the clergy to bishoprics and benefices, and, armed with ‘very wide powers’ from the pope, obliged the bishops to discharge their pastoral function in a worthy manner, so that religion and Christian piety quickly flourished in his kingdom. In his own court he rejected flatterers and those who sought to gain credit with him by means of ecclesiastical status and vain superstition. In consequence, all those around him endeavoured to live ‘like Christians’, and, following their example, all his subjects also, ‘so that everywhere people lived with so much joy, love, and charity, each seeking to outdo the other in good works, that right away we began to know that blessedness which the saints enjoy in heaven’.

The note of Christian utopianism here is very close to what one finds in de la Torre’s treatise. Maravall has commented that Alfonso de Valdés’s political thinking is marked by a fusion of the temporal and the spiritual. It lacks any notion of an order of nature possessing autonomy and its own ends and means. For this reason Alfonso de Valdés and writers like him were little concerned with juridical and political issues as such (Maravall, 1960, p. 215). The temporal order is wholly drawn into the religious order and the political order is essentially structured on religious values and dispositions. In that sense, it belongs to the world of political Augustinianism, as the Carolingian treatises had done. Clearly, this is very largely true of

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19 ‘[...] de manera que se vivia en todas partes con tanto plazer, amor y caridad, procurando cada uno de vencer al otro con buenas obras, que desde allá comencéramos a sentir aquella bienaventurança de que gozan los sanctos en el cielo’ (Alfonso de Valdés, 1954, p. 173).
Felipe de la Torre’s treatise also. In the *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón*, King Polidoro’s conviction that he is ‘father, king, and shepherd’ of his people is bound up with his devotion to Christ, after his conversion, and his essentially Christian conception of his office (Valdés, 1954, pp. 168, 179). As for Felipe de la Torre, we have already noted his words that ‘the king must govern with the love of a brother and the charity of a Christian, and with the same love and charity the people must obey’ (see above, p. 82). The king should indeed treat his subjects ‘as companions; which he will do if he recalls that he is their father and shepherd, and not a tyrant’ (fo.90v).20

However, behind Alfonso de Valdés’s conception of kingship stands that of Erasmus. Its essential elements are already set out in the section on kingship in ‘Rule VI’ of Erasmus’s *Enchiridion militis christiani*, composed in the first years of the century and translated into Spanish in the mid-1520s. Here the Christian prince is urged to model himself not on the great figures of Classical Antiquity—Hannibal, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, or Pompey—but on ‘that supreme king, Jesus Christ’.21 Wealth, power, and majesty will have little interest for him; his pre-eminence will lie rather in outdoing his subjects in the performance of good works. He will strip himself of empire rather than of Christ, and will exercise not power but love over his subjects, mindful that he who is greatest must be the servant of all. Developed at much greater length, these remain the essential convictions of Erasmus in his *Institutio principis christiani* of 1516, where the ruler is warned that, as often as he reflects that he is a prince, he must remember that he is a Christian prince, and that he must therefore be as different from even the most lauded princes of pagan antiquity as a Christian is from a pagan (Erasmus, 1703, iv, 567B). He will, moreover, be a peace-maker. Erasmus draws the comparison we have already met between David and Solomon, concluding that the Christian prince must imitate that greater Solomon, Christ himself, who reconciles all things in heaven and earth (610D).

It seems clear, therefore, that Felipe de la Torre’s *Institución de un

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20 Felipe de la Torre, speaking of the relationship of love that should exist between ruler and ruled, makes an unspecific reference here to the *De cívitate Dei*. He would seem to have in mind Augustine’s comparison of the earthly and heavenly cities in Bk.XIV, ch.xxviii: ‘Illi [civitati] in principibus eius vel in eis qua subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac serviant invicem in caritate et praepositi consulendo et subsidii obtemperando’.

*rey christiano* stands in the Erasmian tradition of thinking regarding kingship. It is Erasmian in its idealistic and utopian character and in the inner core of its ideals, attitudes and values—in what its author understood by ‘true’ religion. It was noted earlier that its author studied at the university of Alcalá. Rather over a decade before he had gone there, this had been, in the later 1520s, the chief centre of enthusiasm for Erasmus’s teaching in Spain, apart from the Court, and it may be that de la Torre’s conception of kingship owed something to his time there. In any case, the work remains an interestingly late example of this tradition of thinking in the Spanish context.22

Nevertheless, the time and circumstances in which de la Torre was writing led him to be more guarded in the way he expressed either the positive religious values that he was commending or his criticism of ecclesiastical institutions that distorted or betrayed those values. He was prompted to write his *Institución* at the start of a new reign by the force of his religious aspirations and the existence of a long literary tradition of princely advice-books which he could turn to his own purposes; but those purposes now had to be pursued in terms that, to some extent, were encoded. It is clear, both from his text and from what has now become known of his connexions around the time he was writing, that de la Torre was not temperamentally disinclined to adopt a measure of ambiguity in both expression and conduct. Even the less than explicit statement of ideals and aspirations no doubt afforded him a certain satisfaction. In any case, he could, in his chosen fashion, safely and eloquently say much of what he deeply felt, whether or not he really hoped that the royal dedicatee would listen.

De la Torre’s personal connexions with Spaniards who were moving towards, or had moved over to, Calvinism may be felt to present some difficulty as regards the claim that this work, in the substance of its ideals, attitudes, and values, stands fundamentally in the tradition of Erasmus’s political and social thinking. However, it is relevant to recall here, as Basil Hall has pointed out, that ‘Calvinism’ in the life-time of Calvin meant something less rigorously defined and systematic than it did after Beza had taken over leadership of the movement, when the earlier concern to base doctrine on biblical

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22 This has been recognized by Maravall in one of his later studies (1972c), and accepted by Bataillon in the posthumous 1991 edition of his *Erasme et l’Espagne.* see Bataillon, 1991, ii, 252–53.
exegesis and sound learning gave place to a restored Aristotelianism and scholastic formalism (Hall, 1966, pp. 25–27). Furthermore, as H.R. Trevor-Roper has remarked, 'Calvinism, far more than is generally admitted, was the heir of Erasmus: [...] everywhere the European bourgeoisie, if it did not renounce its Erasmian views altogether, turned to Calvinism as the only form in which it could defend them' (Trevor-Roper, 1972, p. 26). One is perhaps justified in seeing Felipe de la Torre’s *Institución de un rey cristiano* and the religious connexions of its author as together exemplifying the continuities between Erasmianism and mid-century Calvinism to which Trevor-Roper refers.
CHAPTER FIVE

FADRIQUE FURIÓ CERIOL

At the beginning of Furió Ceriol’s *El concejo y consejeros del príncipe*, published three years after the treatises of Fox Morcillo and Felipe de la Torre, we are again promised a work on kingship different from past examples of the genre.¹ Its author does not hesitate to say that, while many excellent men have laboured to teach the prince how to govern, believing that nothing less than the life or death of those over whom he rules hangs on the good or bad instruction he receives in this matter, all these writers have adopted a mistaken approach to their subject, right down to the present day (sig.A3r/p. 90).² Furió had already adopted this radical attitude towards the past in his first published work, *Institutionum rhetoricarum libri tres* (Louvain, 1554), where he promised to offer instruction for an orator such as no one before him had done (sig.Blr). His independence of approach is evident again in the vigorous and extensive defence of vernacular renderings of the Bible that constitutes his *Bononia sive de libris sacris in vernaculam linguam convertendis libri duo*, which Oporinus brought out at Basel in 1556, five years after all vernacular versions of the Bible had been banned in Spain.³ His grounds for rejecting now so comprehensively past treatises on the instruction of princes are set out in the substantial Introduction which he provides to his own, where he dedicates it to Philip II. This Introduction therefore merits detailed consideration.

Furió starts from the proposition that the prince can be seen as two ‘persons’. He is an individual human being as others are, consisting of body and soul, but he is also a ‘public person’, a prince;

¹ The fundamental studies of this work are those of Mechoulan (1973, pp. 41–81) and Risco (1977). Both are concerned with the general character of Furió’s political thought and its wider significance. See also the briefer account by Fernández-Santamaria (1977), pp. 271–94. Earlier studies, severely criticized by Mechoulan, are those of Semprún Gurrea (1934, 1935) and Sevilla Andrés (1952).

² References will be given both to the original edition and to that by Mechoulan (1973).

³ For further details, see Gilly, 1985, pp. 191–96.
therefore any such ruler can be considered either as a man or as a prince. It is true that the ruler’s individual attributes of body and soul are instruments for him to employ in the business of government; and this helps explain why previous writers, while recognizing the two aspects of the prince’s identity, have nevertheless ‘confused’ them in the process of telling him how to be a good prince (sig.A2v–3r/p. 90). Different areas of discourse, or ‘artes’ (Furió continues) are at once linked, as in a chain, and distinct from each other. Each has its own principles (‘precetos’), and to mix these up is against reason and order. But few understand this truth and almost no one observes it in practice. So it is that those who undertake to write works of instruction for a prince instruct him in theology, natural and moral philosophy, law, mathematics, medicine, and other subjects. In all this there is a double error: such people deal with the prince as a man, not as a prince; and they fail to distinguish between different ‘artes’.

Underlying this there is the mistaken assumption, according to Furió, that ‘good prince’ means a man who is good and is also a prince (sig.A4r–v/p. 92). He agrees that goodness is ‘the finest piece in the prince’s armour’; nevertheless ‘men of powerful minds and exceptional experience in government [‘hombres de grande espíritu i de singular govierno’] do not talk in this fashion’. Rather they praise a good musician as a good musician even if he is a great rogue, just as people speak of a good diamond, a good horse, a good painter or pilot or doctor; or as Sannazaro once remarked of a pope of his time, he was a very good prince but a very bad man (sig.A4v–5r/p. 92). Furió, for his own part, now states that the good prince is one who possesses full understanding of his profession and

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4 The point is succinctly stated by Erasmus in Chapter 1 of his *Institutio principis christiani*: ‘Si potes simul esse Princeps & vir bonus, fungere pulcerrimo munere: si minus, abijce Principem potius quam ut ea gratia vir malus fias. Virum bonum invenire licet, qui bonum Principem non possit agere. At bonus princeps esse non potest, qui non idem sit vir bonus’ (Erasmus, 1703, iv, 583B).

5 Furió seems to have in mind Jacopo Sannazaro’s epitaph on Pope Alexander VI. Here, after speaking of the enormities perpetrated by this pope in pursuing his political schemes, Sannazaro adds: ‘Et tamen in urbe Romuli hic vel undecim/prae-sidet annis Pontifex’ (Sannazaro, 1540, pp. 175–76). Furió interprets this remark as meaning that Alexander VI possessed the skill to survive his opponents and so was good at being a prince. As we shall see, the similarity between Furió’s implied endorsement of Sannazaro’s comment on Alexander VI and the assessment of that same pope explicitly stated by Machiavelli in *Il principe* is not fortuitous.
applies that understanding with sharp intelligence and prudence. By means of prudent effort and contriving he is able to preserve himself and his subjects in such a fashion that he not only maintains himself honourably in his state and establishes this for his successors but also, as necessary, extends it, gaining victory over his enemies whenever he wishes or the time requires. Restating the point in a form which he emphasizes by repeating it textually, Furió says that the good prince is one who is capable both of reflexion by himself and also of profiting from the counsel of others, and of implementing both (according to the nature of the business in hand, the people involved, the place and the time) in such a way as to bring his purposes to a glorious conclusion. As for the instruction of a prince, it is a matter of tried and tested advice derived from the long experience of great periods of history, forged in the understanding of life’s most illustrious figures, and confirmed by the words and deeds of those who by their conduct of royal government and their memorable exploits have earned the title and reputation of a ‘good prince’.

Scornfully dismissive of the efforts of past writers—both Classical and modern, whether Italian, German, French, or Spanish—who have written books of instruction for princes, Furió stresses how demanding the task is. It requires a man richly endowed by nature, of exceptional learning and wide reading, curious, observant, and of broad experience. He claims that he himself, from his earliest years, has sought to learn about and understand the different forms of good government. He has read many books about the peoples of the

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6 For text, see below, p. 104.
7 ‘[. . .] digo que buen príncipe es aquel que puede por sí solo tomar consejo y aprovecharse del ageno, y ambos a dos consejos[, el suyo y el ageno[,] (según los negocios, personas, lugares, y tiempos) guiarlos y llevarlos gloriosamente hasta el cabo’ (sig.A5v–v/pp. 94,96).
8 ‘La institución del Príncipe no es otro, sino una arte de buenos, ciertos, y aprovados avisos, sacados de la experiencia luenga de grandes tiempos, forjados en el entendimiento de los más ilustres hombres desta vida, confirmados por la boca y obras de aquellos que por su real gobierno, i hazañas memorables, merescieron el título i renombre de buen Príncipe’ (sig.A6v–7r/p. 96).
9 He makes no specific references, but his tone is trenchant: ‘Muéstrate esta dificultad en que Griegos, Latinos, Italianos, Alemanes, Franceses, i Españoles por bien que se han esforzado a ello, no la supieron comenzar, ni llevar adelante. Todos la toman a repelo, rompenla a pedaços, nada está en su lugar, i lo peor de todo es que prometen dar institución del Príncipe, la qual tiene todas las partes que arriba dixe, i ellos apenas tratan su milésima parte; que es un vicio que suele caer en hombres botos, imprudentes, i de poco saber’ (sig.B1r/p. 98).
Ancient World, and other books about the government of peoples in modern times: the Turks, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and others. As for the lessons of experience, he has taken an interest in the conflicts between the princes of Europe within his own lifetime and compared what has happened in them with what the histories of ancient times tell. Beyond that, his understanding of things has been greatly helped by his friendship and conversation with men employed in the most difficult of public affairs ‘by their Republics or their Princes’ (sig.B2r–v/p. 100).

All this fits in well with what he reveals of his life in a formal application, many years later, for the post of ‘Vice-canciller’ (or president) of the Council of Aragon. He was born at Valencia in 1527, within a week of Philip II’s own birth, and was thus a close contemporary of Fox Morcillo and, it seems, Felipe de la Torre also. He speaks of himself as a student of various languages and different kinds of learning from the age of seven. Luis de Requeséns, writing to the King as Governor of the Netherlands in the mid-1570s, was to take it as a matter of common knowledge that Furió had grown up in the household of an archbishop of Cologne. Furió himself, in his application, claims to have studied theology for five years and to be not only a graduate but a licenciado in it. Beyond that, he had studied (though, again, it is not clear where) canon and civil law for seven years and by 1564, if not earlier, could describe himself (in his first will) as a doctor utriusque iuris. He says further that he had given years of study to natural and moral philosophy, politics and history, and had long interested himself in matters of state and war. It was thus that he came to be at Metz in 1552 (when Charles V attempted to recover the city from Henry II of France) and at all

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10 It should perhaps be noted that his reading would not have included Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia, whose publication in 1561 came only after El consejo . . . had itself been published.
12 As Dr Miguel Almenara Sebastiá has recently revealed in an important study of hitherto unknown legal documents, Furió’s original name was Miquel-Joan Ceriol (Ceriol, Seriol). He had adopted the names by which he has been known ever since by 1554, when he published his first book (on Rhetoric); but more precisely when, and for what reasons, remains unclear. Much else to do with the course of the earlier part of his life is still obscure. See Almenara Sebastiá, 1995, pp. 90–92.
13 AGS, Estado de Flandes, 563–1 (= letter of 4 February 1575). If Requeséns was right, the archbishop in question would have been Hermann von Wied, who held the see for over thirty years until deprived of it in 1547 for Lutheranism.
the other major engagements of the French army in the Low Countries down to the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. Beyond this, he speaks of having been outside Spain for eighteen years at a stretch, travelling through France, the Low Countries, England, Germany, Denmark, Austria, and Italy ‘for the sole purpose (apart from my study of letters) of observing and understanding the characters ['los humores'] of men, their government, laws, and customs’. These years may well have covered the time when he wrote the work we are considering. It is clear, in any case, that it is the product of a man who combined learning and experience of the world in an exceptional measure.

Furió conceived his own Instruction for Princes on a large scale: it was to be a work consisting of five ‘treatises’ and twenty-four books (sig.A7r–8v/pp. 96–98), covering all aspects of the princely office and task of ruling. The work with which we are dealing was to be merely the first of the projected eight books of Treatise V. It is, however, all that he appears to have written, and he presents it to Philip II as a ‘memorial’—a memorandum or outline scheme—fit for a busy ruler. It is, above all, practical in intention and scope, systematic and compact in presentation, often colloquially direct in style, and without the adornments of classical learning. Furió concludes his introduction with more than conventional words—understandably—on the likelihood of his being criticized by others for his approach, but with a reassertion of his view that the art of governing well is a particular skill, requiring particular instruction, like good horsemanship (sig.B2r–4r/pp. 100–02).

In his first chapter he sets out a series of seven councils which he believes the prince will need if he is to rule efficiently and successfully. First there is the Treasury, responsible for bringing in, keeping, and increasing the prince’s revenues. It will see what special taxes can be imposed, how, and when. It will also endeavour both to increase revenue without harming the public good and to do away with taxes that are ‘superfluous, harmful, or unjust’ (fo.4v/p. 108). At the same time it will exercise general control over expenditure in time of peace and war alike. The Council of Peace (or ‘Council of State’), which follows, discharges three distinct functions. It makes

\[14\] In *El concejo...*, he recalls seeking a passport to leave France in 1551 from Cardinal Louis de Bourbon (fo.73v/p. 190).
payments, on time, out of Treasury funds; it oversees all those—both civilians and military—who govern on behalf of the prince, seeing whether they are performing their duties properly, whether their time for replacement has come, and, if so, who should take their place; and it concerns itself with policy questions regarding peace and war: with whom to make peace, or war, or an alliance; with whom to maintain friendship; with whom to use pleasant words without deeds, and with whom deeds' (fos.5v–6r/p. 108). In all this the Council will consider ways and means, scale, timing, and whether to proceed secretly or openly. It will be the head of all the other councils.

The War Council will be responsible not only for effective defence and army administration but also for making military appraisals of the strengths of the prince’s actual or potential enemies, neighbours, and allies, in relation to his own, assessing all this in the context of recent diplomatic and military history, and recommending policies of peace or war accordingly. In these matters ‘sharp wits are worth more than force of arms (‘más vale ingenio que fuerça’)’ (fo.7r–v/p. 110). The Council of Supply (‘Concejo de mantenimientos o provisiones’) will ensure an adequate provision of food and other necessaries in time of peace and war. To this end it will need to be well informed of the resources of the prince’s own territory and also of the pattern of its economic dependence (fo.8v/p. 112). The last three of the seven councils have interrelated concerns. The Law Council’s first task is to determine what posts and officials are needed for the government of the prince’s territories, and what powers these require. However, it is also responsible for making or renewing necessary laws while getting rid of unnecessary and obsolete ones. Furió thinks that ninety-five per cent of legal actions arise out of laws that neither can nor should be kept effective (fos.10v–11r/pp. 114–16). Finally there will be a Penal Council (‘Concejo de pena’), responsible in ways not specified for the punishment of crime, and a Council of Grace and Favour (‘Concejo de mercedes’), which will have exclusive responsibility for rewarding merit, both in those who seek reward and in those who, not seeking it, are therefore usually ignored (fo.12r/p. 116). Furió stresses the general point that any one counsellor should serve on only one council. To burden just a few individuals with all the multifarious tasks of government ‘is death’. Those royal counsellors who see this truth but fail to act upon it are clearly, Furió reflects, on the make.
Furió gives no indication of how he arrived at the scheme of councils which he proposes: he makes no reference to any conciliar system of government in existence in his own or earlier times. Some of his more detailed remarks concerning the tasks of the councils which he has in mind strongly suggest a debt to Aristotle’s account, in *Rhetorica*, I, iv, of the five main matters on which the political orator offers counsel.¹⁵ He gives his own scheme a general application: he is writing ‘for any prince’ (fo.34v/p. 142). So he takes no apparent interest in the particular system of conciliar government operating under the Spanish Crown, where some councils were responsible for the government of particular territories while others were concerned with broad policy or departmental matters. It is nevertheless clear that he envisaged a wider range of departmental councils, with clearly differentiated functions, than Philip II had recently inherited, and in particular a much more recognized and active role for his Council of Peace (or ‘of State’) than that of the Spanish ‘Consejo de Estado’, whose part in government remained, throughout the period with which we are concerned, much less than its title suggests.¹⁶ Furió shows relatively little interest in the effective relationship of the councils he recommends either to the prince or to each other. It is true that, at the start of this chapter, he envisages them as existing to advise the prince and he describes their general function in terms traditionally used to characterize the virtue of prudence. He also describes the prince as the head while his councils are the limbs of his body (fos.1v–3r/pp. 104–06); but he does not make it clear how far these councils would be free to operate on their own account in carrying out the executive functions which he seems to see them discharging. What chiefly interests him is the range of matters with which each of his proposed councils might usefully concern itself (however this was actually managed in practice), especially when manned by the kind of counsellors he had in mind.

In his next chapter Furió enumerates fifteen ‘qualities’ desirable in a prince’s counsellor. Broadly speaking, half of these represent skills or capacities; the other half, moral characteristics. It is of the

¹⁵ These are: ‘ways and means [by which Aristotle means the actual and potential sources of a country’s revenue and the objects of its expenditure], war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation’ [= *Rhetorica*, 1359a–1360b] (see Aristotle, 1984, ii, 2161–62).
¹⁶ See Lynch, 1965, i, 47, 181–82.
skills or capacities that Furió speaks first, beginning with *ingenio* (fo.15v/p. 120). The counsellor must be a person ‘of high and exceptional mental capacity [“de alto i raro ingenio”]’, since this is ‘the beginning, middle, and end of great and more than human undertakings’. Without such *ingenio*, all the virtues that may be found in a man ‘lose their force and are almost nothing’. Next, Furió looks to the counsellor to be an accomplished and persuasive speaker, capable of serving his prince thereby in a variety of diplomatic or political situations. Furió’s view of the dignity and purposes of ‘the art of speaking well’ is essentially that promoted by the Italian humanists. The counsellor should, furthermore, be a good linguist, knowing in particular the languages of the prince’s own peoples, his allies, and enemies. Thus a counsellor in the service of the King of Spain needs to know Latin, Italian, Arabic, French, and German. There are, Furió stresses, considerable political and diplomatic advantages, apart from intelligence-gathering, in not requiring the services or presence of an interpreter. He also sets great store by the counsellor’s being a great reader of history, going so far as to say that such a man, provided that he is capable of deriving true profit from his historical reading, ‘is a most perfect counsellor’, lacking nothing required for his office (fo.22r/p. 128). Again one is conscious of a background of humanist evaluations here; but what Furió says on this point is clearly rooted in strong personal conviction. The reading of history, he insists at some length, bestows much more understanding of human affairs than any one individual’s lived experience of such things can do—provided, again, that history is read in order not to pass the time but to gain it. Few people, he claims, understand the value of historical reading, ‘and so we see that few know how to govern’ (fo.24v/p. 130).

Furió stresses that the intelligent study of history makes a man ‘plático’ [= ‘práctico’] in the affairs of his ruler, and lists it as the sixth of this series of *desiderata* that the counsellor should be ‘plático in all that concerns government in time of peace and war and in matters relating to it’ . . . that is, the counsellor must be ‘político’.17 In view of the importance of the term in the sixteenth century, Furió’s use of it merits examination in some detail.

So far as peace-time is concerned, the term applies to both the

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17 ‘La sexta calidad […] es que sea político, digo, que sea plático en el gobierno de paz i de guerra, y cosas a ello pertenecientes’ (fo.28r/pp. 134–36).
'body' of the república and its 'soul'. By 'body' Furió here means the siting and construction of towns according to the geographical conditions obtaining (fos.28v–29r/p. 136). By 'soul' he means the government ('gobierno') of society, which will be found in different constitutional forms. The counsellor who is 'político' and 'platónico' will display the fact in his knowledge of how, in any of these constitutional forms, 'the State is won, increased, preserved, and lost', and so, consequently, in his advice on how the State is preserved from a diminution of its strength by the establishing of laws and the appointment of 'magistrados' to that end.\(^{18}\) The other part of 'policía' is concerned with the successful conduct of war—the selection and equipping of officers and men, the carrying out of military operations—and with the avoidance of the errors usually made in such matters. Therefore the counsellor must be a 'grandissimo político'.

In his recent study of the history of the word 'político' in Early Modern Europe, Nicolai Rubinstein has pointed out that while, in the sixteenth century, the term notoriously acquired, under the dual impact of Machiavelli and anti-Machiavellianism, the connotation of 'cunning, and altogether amoral conduct based on expediency, deceitfulness', it was also used in the sense of 'the science of politics' and 'political craft' (Rubinstein, 1987, pp. 54–55). In the present passage of Furió's treatise it chiefly signifies 'political craft' and tends towards the amoral pursuit of expediency. Without this quality, says Furió, the counsellor will not know how to advise his Prince on his dealings with friends, allies, and enemies—how to help the one and harm the other.\(^{19}\) The questions provided by Furió for use by the Prince when selecting counsellors emphasize the point: 'In how many ways is the Principate usually lost? In how many ways is government ['gobierno'] diminished?' [...] 'In how many ways can war be declared with a show of moral legitimacy ['honestamente'] on a Prince who has given no just occasion for it?\(^{20}\)

\(^{18}\) 'Es menester, en cada uno destos goyernos, que sepa el Consejero cómo se gana, aumenta, conserva i pierde el Estado; qué peligros corre, cómo se pueda proveher que no se gaste, i para ello saber ordenar leyes i magistrados qual conviene' (fo.30r–v/p. 138).

\(^{19}\) 'El Consejero que esto no sabe, no es posible que [...] sepa aconsejar a su Príncipe cómo se deva haver con este amigo, o con aquel aliado, o con este enemigo, o con el otro, ni cómo les podrá aprovechar, ni dañar, con otras cosas infinitas' (fo.30v/p. 138).

\(^{20}\) '¿De quántas maneras se suele perder el principado? ¿De quántos modos se gasta el gobierno? [...] ¿En quántas maneras se puede honestamente romper guerra contra un Príncipe que no ha ha dado justa ocasión para ello?' (fo.31r–v/p. 138).
The seventh ‘quality’ or qualification sought by Furió is that the counsellor should have travelled widely, especially in the territories of his own prince and those of his opponents, allies, and neighbours (fos.31v–32r/p. 140). Just as when urging the value of historical reading, Furió stresses that the counsellor must undertake travel in order to derive relevant benefit from it, ‘not like a man wandering around a fair’. So he must inform himself of how foreign rulers govern their peoples, what income they have, how they are regarded by their subjects, what the different characters and customs of men are, and the like. All this enhances prudence and equips a counsellor to serve his ruler in any situation that may arise. Comparison of his own land with others will further suggest improvements that could be made at home; for to condemn foreign lands outright and to praise one’s own without qualification is, says Furió, a sign of prejudice, carelessness, or stupidity (fo.35r/p. 144). He clearly felt strongly on this point. Earlier, when writing of ingenio, he had declared:

It is a sure sign of dull intelligence to speak ill or passionately of one’s opponent, or of the enemies of one’s prince, or of those of different religion, or foreign peoples, whether they be Jews, Moors, Gentiles, or Christians. For a man possessed of force of mind sees seven leagues of bad road across any land; there is good and bad everywhere. The good he praises and embraces; the bad he condemns and rejects without condemning the nation where it is found.21

The distance between such an outlook as this and the attitudes prevalent in mid-sixteenth-century Spain, with its concern with limpieza de sangre and obsessive vilification of ‘Lutherans’, does not need to be stressed. As we shall see, Furió makes a further similar statement later. Meanwhile, the last of his first series of desiderata amplifies a point made when he urges the importance of intelligent travel: the counsellor must have knowledge of the strength of his own prince and of the latter’s allies, enemies, and neighbours: their financial resources and military capacity, the state of their alliances, their economic position, and the like. For want of such knowledge, counsellors prompt their prince to make war when there should be peace,

21 ‘Mui cierta señal es de torpe ingenio, el hablar mal i apasionadamente de su contrario, o de los enemigos de su Príncipe, o de los que siguen diversa secta, o de peregrinas gentes; agora sean Judíos, agora Moros, agora Gentiles, agora Cristianos: porque el grande ingenio vee en todas tierras siete leguas de mal camino, en todas partes hai bien i mal; lo bueno loa i abraça, lo malo vitupera i deshecha sin vituperio de la nación en que se halla’ (fo.17r–v/p. 122).
and urge peace when there should be war (fo.35r–v/p. 144). In this, he says, as in the matter of alliances, people move, for the most part, like men in the dark.22

The second series of qualities which Furió seeks in the counsellor begins with the requirement that he be devoted to the public good, so much so that he is willing to sacrifice his own good name, life, and possessions to it (fos.36v–37r/p. 146). This means that the counsellor must set aside all personal considerations of friendship, kinship, et alia similia, assuming instead ‘an unbending and prudent rectitude’ and responding to all who come seeking his aid as ‘reason and virtue’ dictate (fos.40v–41r/p. 150). It is not a question of who the person seeking his aid is, whether he is of ‘us’ or ‘them’, but whether that person or the thing he seeks is virtuous and just. This brings Furió back to his earlier point:

there are only two lands in the whole world: that of good men and that of bad. All the good men, whether they be Jews, Moors, Gentiles, Christians, or of another religion, belong to the same land, the same household, and are of the same blood; and all bad men likewise.23

Among the latter Furió warns against those who ‘are so devoted to the Church that, to further its interests right or wrong, they will turn a kingdom upside down’. Such men are very dangerous and destroy the principado (fo.42v/p. 152). This anti-clerical note will be heard again later.

The counsellor must be ‘just and good’, rewarding the good and punishing the evil according to their merits, and desiring peace and

22 Compare Aristotle, Rhetorica, I, iv (1359b–60a): ‘As to Peace and War, [the intending speaker] must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the nature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength. With that end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results’ (Aristotle, 1984, ii, 2162).

23 ‘No hai más de dos tierras en todo el mundo: tierra de buenos, i tierra de malos. Todos los buenos, agora sean Judíos, moros, gentiles, Cristianos, o de otra secta, son de una misma tierra, de una misma casa i sangre: i todos los malos, de la misma manera’ (fo.41v/p. 152).
war as time and place make appropriate (fo.43r–v/p. 154). Such a man is loyal and the very foundation of the prince’s council. His words have weight, he speaks the truth and is straight-dealing. He is not a gossip, not two-faced, and will on no account speak of anything which ‘he has not first seen with his own eyes and touched with his own hands’ (fos.44v–45r/p. 154). He minds his own business and aims to come by reputation and wealth (‘honra i hazienda’) only by virtuous effort. Such a man is loved by the whole people. He is further commended to them by being generous, not extravagant but not mean either (fos.46v–47r/p. 158). Such a man will marry off honest women, help the poor, redeem captives, pay the debts of honest friends, and show favour to men of high understanding likely to be of service to the public good. In his own devotion to this he will show himself to be ‘benefico, that is, a friend of doing good’ to society in whatever ways offer themselves. He will concern himself with public works and communications. He will help onwards those who deserve it and upwards those who seek to rise to ‘the summit of honour and glory by the steps of virtue’, while rejecting the rest. He will endeavour to make good laws and see that they are kept. Such a man is ‘the father of the nation [‘patria’], the honour of the prince, and almost God on earth’ (fo.49r/p. 160). In his dealings with the prince’s subjects he is, furthermore, ‘gentle and affable’, attentive, encouraging and tactful, his door ever open to all (fos.49v–50r/pp. 160–62).

It will be seen that Furió, in discussing the moral qualities desirable in the counsellor, presents them entirely in terms of the counsellor’s dealings with the prince and the prince’s relations with his subjects and foreign powers. He feels no obligation, as Fox Morcillo did, to shape his discussion with reference to an established conceptual model of moral discourse. All is focused on the figure of the counsellor, who is himself envisaged in the context of the relationships and duties where he will have to act. That Furió is aware of what he is asking of him emerges in his remarks on the final quality he seeks in him: inner strength, ‘that on account of which men are called “heroic”, that is, more than men’ (fo.51r/p. 162). It is the strength of men who are ‘friends of truth’ and who will defend it come what may, whether this means favour or disfavour, riches or poverty, commanding or being commanded, rest or labour, life or death, being content with what favourable or contrary fortune brings them. The Stoic note is predominant in this final section. Amidst
the lying and flattery and deception around him at Court, amidst the chances and changes of fortune, the counsellor possessing inner strength stands firm for truth, undisturbed, master of his own mind ('el fuerte está sobre sí, no se turba, es señor de su razón') (fo.52v/p. 164). It is clear that Furió is stating here something that mattered deeply to him. Indeed, all that one knows of him suggests that it was the statement of a personal ideal.

As one moves from the first series of qualities requisite in the counsellor to the second, a change in moral perspective occurs. The first series—as expressed in Furió's successive accounts of them and in the questions he helpfully provides the prince with for finding out whether a potential counsellor in fact possesses them—pictures a world where calculation, deceit, and war are part of the normal order of things. A counsellor speaking to a foreigner in his own language may give an impression of friendship ('amor') which he does not in fact feel for him; but though the other is mistaken in this, 'deceit is still useful' (fo.20v/p. 126). The study of history will reveal what pretence and double-dealing lay behind the ending of a given war (fo.23v/p. 130). This is something from which practical lessons can be learned, not a matter for moral condemnation. As we have seen, it is part of a well-informed counsellor's role to know when to advise his master to make war rather than peace (fo.35v/p. 144). The decision is seen simply as a calculation of self-interest. If we turn to the most obviously moral desideratum in the second series (that the counsellor be 'just and good'), we see, and have already noted, that it is part of the office of such a person to 'love peace and war as time and place make appropriate' (fo.43v/p. 154). But this remark comes after age-old definitions and discussions of moral qualities have been echoed. Behind the primary assertion that the counsellor who is 'just and good' deals with each man according to his merits, punishing the evil and rewarding the good, in either case maintaining a due balance between too much and too little, are Ulpian, the Roman Civil Law, and Aristotle. Furió's desire that the counsellor should be 'franco, liberal, manso, afable' brings to mind long established discussions of such qualities in relation to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues and their many derivative virtues. These echoes and associations heighten one's sense that a set of moral ideals of conduct is being proposed, and dedication to them sought. However, as already noted, these ideals are proposed not in abstract terms but in terms of the counsellor's service to the prince and the prince's
subjects. Norms and principles of moral conduct have become ideals of service within the framework and limits of the prince’s own dominions. In that sense, the second series of requisite qualities fits in with the first.

Questions of course remain, not only of principle but as regards Furió’s own thinking on the matter. This is not greatly illuminated by his remarks concerning the one *calidad* not considered so far: that the counsellor should have a perfect knowledge of ‘the aim and substance of each virtue, its mode and range of operation, and the occasions for its exercise [“que sepa bien i perfetamente el fin, la materia, el cómo, quándo, i hasta quànto se estienda cada virtud”]’ (fo.26r–v/p. 132). Nearly all men, he says, get their moral estimates of others wrong, calling a quiet man timid, an astute man traitorous, a crude and inept man good, etc., seeing the opposite of what is the truth. The importance of this lies in the fact that ‘in all counsel and deliberations the first thing to be examined is whether the matter at issue is or is not contrary to what is morally right, when all its circumstances are taken into account [“en todos los consejos i deliberaciones, lo primero que se consulta es, si es contra honestidad, o no, aquello de que se trata con todas sus circunstancias”]’ (fo.27r/p. 134), so that the counsellor needs to be able to make true moral assessments. The sentence quoted here presents obvious problems. In its main thrust it seems to reassert the central contention of Cicero in his *De officiis* (III, 33–37) that only what is morally right (‘honestum’) is truly expedient (‘utile’), and that nothing except what is morally right is worth seeking for its own sake. But such a proposition is very hard to square with what we have seen Furió saying in a number of other places, where he not only envisages but commends calculation and pursuit of self-interest (with regard to foreign powers at least)—and this of a kind that would seem to fall under the same condemnation as the pursuit of unprincipled expediency receives from Cicero. So one is driven to wonder whether Furió’s concluding reference here to attendant circumstances has a more extensive reach and force than at first appears. He leaves us without an answer. The difficulty is heightened by a similar case of apparent incompatibility in his previous chapter, where his account of the operation of the different councils which he is recommending is introduced by the statement that ‘the prince and his council are lieutenants of God here on earth’ (fo.2r/p. 104). As will already be clear, this assertion is very different too from the language of Furió’s introductory chapter at large.
Indeed, the character of the latter is such that, from the outset, it prompts the question whether, or how far, the presence of Machiavelli is to be detected there—or in Furió’s treatise as a whole. Since that presence has been variously suggested, doubted, and even denied, the question merits further investigation at this point.

Maravall, in his illuminating study of Machiavelli and Machiavellianism in Spain, notes Furió’s rejection of the long-established view that the phrase ‘good prince’ meant a good man who happened to be a prince. He notes also Furió’s insistence on the different proposition that the good ruler is one who has complete understanding of the specific profession of being a prince (Maravall, 1972b, pp. 84–85). Maravall sees the distinction made here between the notions of the good man and the good prince as one that provided the basis for the principle of what came to be known as ‘reason of State’. Thus it serves, in a retrospective view, to place Furió within the ambit of Machiavelli’s influence among Spaniards. However, he does not find evidence in Furió’s text of a direct debt to Machiavelli’s Il principe.

Mechoulan (1973, p. 65), for his part, remarks at one point ‘how close Furió Ceriol and Machiavelli are without, however, being similar’. What, in his judgement, they have in common is a pessimistic view of human nature, an intelligent patriotism, free from all chauvinism, and a marked liking for efficiency in all spheres. On the other hand, Furió does not draw the same conclusions as Machiavelli from his perception of human nature: he does not ‘celebrate’ duplicity and trickery. If he recommends lying as a means of bringing peace to the Low Countries in the 1570s, this is to be seen as an exceptional measure rather than as an ordinary means of government.

Antonio Risco, in his study of Furió’s political empiricism, stresses the similarity between Machiavelli’s conception of political rule and the State and that of Furió, as also the similarity between their intellectual styles. He thus comes closer than Maravall to claiming an immediate connexion between Il principe and El concejo y consejeros del principe (Risco, 1977, pp. 127–29, 134, 149–50). On the other hand, J.A. Fernández-Santamaría puts more emphasis on what, in his view, separates the two works and the two writers. He agrees that the influence of Machiavelli on Furió’s conception of the prince cannot be discounted as a possibility; nevertheless,

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24 ‘El concejo [. . .] traduce aspiraciones enteramente profanas, a las que no parece ajena la lectura de Machiavelli’ (Risco, 1977, p. 127, n. 15).
Regardless of how similar some passages of El concejo may seem to be to portions of Il Principe the crucial ingredient is missing: the open acknowledgement that Christian virtue and political action are mutually exclusive. The ambiguous statements of the dedication notwithstanding, one thing remains clear: Furió never makes the choice or even proposes that a choice is needed—pragmatic approach to the ars gubernandi, yes; Machiavellianism, no (Fernández-Santamaria, 1977, pp. 292–93).

There are, of course, large issues of assessment and interpretation involved here, and it may well be that the relation between Machiavelli’s treatise and Furió’s political outlook as expressed in El concejo . . . is not of a kind to be formulated in a clear-cut fashion. However, it does seem possible to assert on the basis of specific evidence that Furió had at some stage read Il principe.

Of particular interest here is the passage of Furió’s Introduction that follows his description of the good prince as one who has perfect understanding of his princely profession and prudently puts that understanding into effect. Amplifying the point, Furió writes that the good prince is one

que sepa i pueda con su prudente industria conservarse con sus vasallos de tal modo, que no solamente se mantenga honradamente en su estado, i lo establezca para los suyos, sino que (siendo menester) lo amplifique, i gane vitória de sus enemigos cada i quando que quisiere, o el tiempo pidiere [. . .].

These words (not the most decisive in this matter) seem not only to echo Machiavelli’s concern with the importance to the prince of keeping his subjects well disposed towards himself (see Il principe, Chapter 9) and acting as occasion offers and ‘le qualità dei tempi’ require (Chapters 6, 25), but also to take over one of Machiavelli’s most characteristic concepts: ‘mantenersi nel suo Stato’. His concern, in Chapter 15 of Il principe, is with ‘un principe volendosi mantenere’ and ‘salvare lo Stato’. It is ‘per mantenere lo Stato’ that the prince, as Machiavelli explains in his notorious Chapter 18, must be willing to go against the principles of good faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. As early as Chapter 2, Machiavelli relates this idea to that of avoiding the hostility of one’s subjects. It is sufficient, he says, for a prince, if he is to hold on to a hereditary state, not to trans-

25 See p. 91 above for an English rendering of this passage.
gess the customs of his forebears and to deal with circumstances as they arise, so that ‘se tal principe è di ordinaria industria, si man-terrà sempre nel suo Stato’ (Burd, 1891, p. 182). The similarity to Furió’s own words in the passage quoted is striking.

It is now that Furió goes on to describe the good prince as one who is capable of deliberating by himself as well as profiting from the counsel of others, putting all into effect in such a way as to achieve glory. The pursuit of glory is, of course, an aim set before the prince by Machiavelli, but, as Skinner has pointed out (1978, i, 120–21), that had already been done by the fifteenth-century Italian humanists. However, we now come to certain resemblances between points in *El concejo* and points in *Il principe* that seem to put it beyond doubt that the latter was a work which Furió had read and which had marked his thinking.

Furió’s remark on the benefits of combining deliberation by oneself with the taking of advice from others leads him on to reflect on three kinds of mind or intelligence:

Porque vemos que hai tres maneras de entendimientos: uno entiende, comprende, i sabe por si solo; otro siendo amonestado, o enseñado; otro ni con lo uno, ni con lo otro. Este postrero es inútil, i nació esclavo en perpetua servidumbre. El segundo es bueno, pero el primero es divino, i nació derecho para mandar i governar’ (sig.A5v/ p. 94).26

Machiavelli, in Chapter 22 of *Il principe*, writes:

E perché sono di tre generazioni cervelli; l’uno intende per sé; l’altro discerne quello che altri intende; e il terzo non intende per sé stesso, nè per dimonstrazione di altri: quel primo è eccellentissimo, il secondo eccellente, il terzo inutile (Burd, 1891, pp. 347–48).

An earlier sentence of this same chapter of *Il principe* is of interest in this regard. Machiavelli is arguing that the reputation of a prince is bound up with that of the men whom he has around him:

E la prima coniettura che si fa di un signore e del cervel suo, è vedere gli uomini che lui ha d’intorno; e quando sono sufficienti e fedeli, sempre si può riputarlo savio, perché ha saputo conoscerli sufficienti e

26 ‘For we see that there are three kinds of mind. One understands, grasps things, and achieves knowledge by itself. Another does this by being advised or instructed. The remaining one succeeds in neither case. This latter is useless and was born a slave in perpetual servitude. The second one is good; but the first is divine, and was rightly born for command and government’.
maintenersel fedeli. Ma quando siano altrimenti, sempre si può fare non buon giudizio di lui, perchè il primo errore che e'fa, la fa in questa elezione (Burd, 1891, p. 347).

Furió, in Chapter 4 of his own work (‘On the Choice of Counsellors’), writes:

Vemos primeramente que el primer juicio que se suele hazer sobre el Príncipe i de su habilidad, es de la reputación de los de su Concejo; porque quando son sabios i suficientes, siempre es reputado sabio el Príncipe, pues supo entender quales eran los suficientes, i después conservarse fíeles i leales. Pero quando no son tales, no se puede esperar buena reputación en el Príncipe, pues ierra en lo principal; i el que ierra en lo que más importa, es casi necesario que en todo lo otro ierre (fo.64r−v: p. 178).27

In the next section of this same chapter Furió speaks of the prince’s need to hear the truth from his counsellors. This he will find difficult because of the crowd of flatterers at court. Not that he must allow people indiscriminately to tell him ‘simple and naked truths’, for that would undermine his ‘reputation and authority’. The privilege must therefore be restricted to carefully chosen counsellors, who will, for their part, be encouraged to speak out (fo.66r−v/pp. 180−82). There is a marked similarity between this passage and a section of Chapter 23 of Il principe (Burd, 1891, pp. 349−50). However, the passages quoted above seem sufficient by themselves to establish the point that Furió was writing with verbal memories in his mind derived from a direct reading of Machiavelli’s treatise. He may thus be placed, in this regard, alongside Fox Morcillo.

More generally speaking, there are many places in El concejo . . . where Il principe seems very close, as when Furió promises to show (in his unwritten Fourth Treatise) how possession of a kingdom or principado is obtained in one of four ways, namely, inheritance, election, force, or cunning (sig.A8r−v/p. 98); or when he speaks of the need for the counsellor to understand how ‘the State is obtained, increased,
 retained, and lost’ (fo.30r/p. 138); or in the many comments on how counsellors must further the interests of their prince and the _principado_ vis-à-vis other powers by calculation, deception, or force, as the circumstances of time and place indicate. There is a clear similarity between the moral vision that each writer has of the dealings between princes, and of human nature generally. All men, says Furió, are covetous (sig.A6r/p. 94); all seek to take private vengeance under the guise of public justice (fos.42v–43r/p. 152); ‘we are all men who deceive ourselves and habitually deceive others [‘Porque todos somos hombres, que nos engañamos, i solemos engañar a los otros’]’ (fo.73r/p. 188). The view which we have already found Furió indirectly expressing of Pope Alexander VI (‘a very good prince but a very bad man’) (sig.A4v–5r/p. 92 [see above, p. 90]) is closely similar to that voiced by Machiavelli in Chapter 18 of _Il principe_ when he takes him as an example of the success to be obtained by breaking faith and practising deception. Furthermore, there is a clear resemblance between the way in which each writer introduces his work. Machiavelli offers Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici his ‘knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired through long experience of the affairs of modern times and continual reading about those of ancient times’, all diligently reflected upon and digested into one small volume. Furió, in his dedication to Philip II, speaks, as we have seen, of how he has investigated what has occurred, in his own time, in the wars between the princes of Europe; of how he has set this alongside ‘the ancient histories’; and how he has taken advantage of his friendships and dealings with contemporary men of affairs (sig.B2v/v/p. 100). The result he offers to his King in the form of a _memorial_, where brevity is a primary aim (sig.B1v/p. 98).28

It does not need to be stressed that the focus of the two works is different. Furió’s is devoted in its entirety to a subject which Machiavelli deals with in one brief chapter. This difference partly explains the fact that Furió does not address himself directly to the discussion of fundamental issues of political practice and ethics in the way that Machiavelli does. It also helps to explain how it is that, for all the ‘Machiavellian’ character of his treatise, his view of government leaves room for an ideal of public service and personal integrity in the service of the public good and of the prince himself. Furió emerges, once more, as one who did his own thinking, with that

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28 See also: fo.21v/p. 128; fo.24r/p. 130; fo.38r/p. 146; fo.69v/p. 186.
same independence of mind as he looked for in the princely coun-
sellor whom he was portraying. Nevertheless, it seems that his read-
ing of Il principe did have a far-reaching effect on his notion of the
‘good prince’ and on his view of the character of the world in which
such a prince pursues his purposes as regards his ‘friends, neigh-
bours, and enemies’.

Mechoulan remarks that Furió’s view of government and its pur-
poses is wholly secular: ‘Furió Cerial reste laïc d’un bout à l’autre
de ses analyses’ (Mechoulan, 1973, p. 44). Risco makes the same
point: ‘What Furió Cerial offers is a lay conception of the State’
(Risco, 1977, p. 134). His treatise is the expression of ‘a new men-
tality in process of formation’—a mentality seeking to construct a
modern, absolutist, State and to make it the efficient, well-constructed,
instrument of the prince (Risco, 1977, pp. 132, 144). Like Mechoulan,
Risco remarks on Furió’s desire to emancipate understanding of the
nature of the State from any admixture of theological or providen-
tialist elements. Furthermore, in Risco’s words ‘the prince will obtain
his knowledge of public affairs by rational means (“philosophy” and
in particular empiricism) [...]’. By taking this position, Furió brings
about the separation of the two truths of reason and faith and breaks
with the Platonist and Augustinian traditions of political thought. He
proclaims the autonomy of the political sphere and its independence
of ethics (Risco, 1977, pp. 131, 134, 135: compare Mechoulan, 1973,
pp. 44–46).

One can agree with Risco when he says that absolute principles
and ultimate goals of a moral and religious kind have, to all intents
and purposes (even if not entirely), been replaced here by criteria of
achievement internal to political activity itself. This is what, as we
have seen, the Introduction to Furió’s treatise so much stresses.
Moreover, the instruction of the prince ‘is a matter of tried and
tested advice derived from the long experience of great periods of
history, forged in the understanding of life’s most illustrious figures
[...]’ (see above, p. 91). Risco draws attention to the importance in
this work of the notions of ‘experience’ and ‘comparison’—compar-
ison of the past with the present as a means of acquiring experience
or its equivalent (Risco, 1977, p. 149). ‘Experience’ is now heeded
as a primary source of guidance; and by giving prominence to this
view, Furió earns a prominent place among those who brought
empiricism into Spanish political thought of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. All this Risco is inclined to attribute to the influence
of Machiavelli, even though he does not go so far as definitely to affirm the connexion between them. His position would seem to gain strength from the textual evidence adduced here which puts it beyond reasonable doubt that Furió had indeed read *Il principe*.

In the third chapter of his treatise Furió adopts a different approach from that followed in the first two. He speaks now of the physical characteristics desirable in counsellors, in the belief that these enable one to conjecture the mental characteristics of those in whom they are found (fo.56r/p. 168). So he argues that the prince should select as counsellors men who are of middle age (between thirty and sixty), of middling height and weight, and with well proportioned limbs and facial features. Furió brings in traditional ideas and evaluations regarding the four humours making up a man’s *complexio* (‘complisición’) (fos.57v–59v/pp. 170–72). The counsellor should be a man of Sanguine or Choleric complexion, but on no account Melancholy or Phlegmatic; for the Phlegmatic Man is sluggish and stupid while the Melancholy Man is worse: ‘malicious, a vial of poison, superstitious to such a degree that those of this complexion have undermined and destroyed all the religions of the world with their dreams and stupid phantasmic imaginings’ (fo.59r/p. 172). They are, moreover, subject to the planet Saturn, ‘and it is dreadful to see how greatly those under Saturn are hated by all philosophers and astrologers’. The authority of the latter is invoked again against those who are very tall and thin, with a long neck, for such are sure to be stupid as well as looking comic. No less comic and ill-suited for government is the short fat man (fo.60r–v/p. 174) . . . words that cannot fail to bring the *Quixote* to mind. The prince will avoid both.

Furió’s final chapter tells the prince by what process he should select his counsellors. Here, after making the points which we have already considered in relation to Machiavelli, he goes on to stress that, where a prince rules over many diverse provinces, he must draw his counsellors from all of them, for each of us knows and cares for his own region better than he does others, and a province without its own sons on the prince’s councils will be justifiably resentful, becoming disaffected and a likely centre of sedition (fos.66v–69r/ pp. 182–84). The prince is ‘a public person’, the father of all: therefore he should not behave like a step-father to any. It follows that he must make efforts to seek out good potential counsellors wherever they are to be found throughout his provinces, summoning the most promising for further examination by himself and providing for
their travelling expenses (fos.69r–71r/pp. 184–86). Furthermore, he must take time over the selection of candidates, endeavouring to inform himself fully about their qualifications. In all this it is most important that he should arrive at his own conclusions and not trust the recommendations of others, for (once more) ‘we are all men, capable of deceiving and being deceived’ (fo.72v/p. 188). At this point, Furió’s far from reverential attitude towards the clergy reveals itself again. It will not do, he says, for the prince to justify an appointment by claiming that good things were told him of the person in question by ‘a duke, a bishop, a learned prelate, a holy priest, or this person or that, because behind the cross lurks the devil [….]’ (fo.72v/p. 188). He concludes that ‘to take as a matter of belief what can easily be tested by experience was never good sense [“Creer lo que se puede fácilmente probar por la experiencia, nunca fue cordura”]’ (fo.73r/p. 188). In this matter the prince should be like Doubting Thomas, believing no more than he can see with his eyes and touch with his hands. So he must never make an appointment without himself examining those seeking office, whatever their social position and wealth, and conducting that examination in accordance with the ‘rules’ laid down by Furió earlier in this work (fos.74r–76v/pp. 190–92). Finally, he will publicly deliver a solemn charge to the new counsellor and require an oath of loyalty and service from him. If the new man subsequently fails to honour that oath, he will be shown up more effectively as one who scorns good faith and, still more, God. His oath will also strengthen his position against those seeking to obtain from him what they should not.

In his Conclusion, Furió claims to have discharged the duty of men, according to divine and human law, to help each other, especially in matters of the common good. He will pray, he says, for two things: first, that princes will have their eyes opened to the need to reform their councils and counsellors; second, that those around princes will open their doors to good advice and seek to promote the public good rather than their private profit. These will no doubt criticize his work; but if the prince would apply the precepts set down here, the court and all the nobility of his land would be changed at once. In words for once reminiscent of Alfonso de Valdés and Felipe de la Torre, he looks for the transformation of the prince’s court into ‘a school of virtue and wisdom’ (fo.82r/p. 200). Princes supported by counsellors of the kind recommended by Furió will not only hold on to their states but increase them; peace and war will
be in their hands; they will be loved by their subjects, feared by their enemies, honoured and praised by all. They will pass on the *principado* securely to their successors and, after their death, be remembered as 'great, good, and invincible princes'.

* * *

While each of these three works would seem to have offered much of interest to sixteenth-century readers, they found little or no response in Spain itself. The only one of them to receive occasional mention there is Furió Ceriol's; but such references to it as one finds are mostly concerned with his proposed scheme of councils and ignore the political and moral vision of the work.29 Neither Fox Morcillo's nor de la Torre's treatise was ever printed in Spain; Furió's saw its first edition there only in 1779. They fared better elsewhere. Fox Morcillo's treatise was reprinted—twice—at Antwerp in 1566, and in the early seventeenth century appeared again at Frankfurt. De la Torre's *Institución* . . . had no further edition after 1556 save for an Italian version which had already been dedicated to the Doge of Venice by mid-October 1557 and was published there in 1558. Its translator was Alfonso de Ulloa, who rendered many Spanish works into Italian and remarks here that he had translated this one at the urging of his 'dear friend and patron' Duarte Gomes, a wealthy Portuguese merchant residing in Venice, who already had it in his library.30 One deduces that de la Torre's work had quickly found favour with a member of the Portuguese merchant community at Antwerp. Subsequently, the Italian version would be referred to by the Portuguese writer Bartolomeu Filipe in his *Tractado del conseio y de los conseiros de los príncipes* (Lisbon, 1584), which, however, reveals

29 In Pt.II, ch.21 (dating from 1634–39) of his *Política de Dios*, Quevedo quotes a few lines from Furió's suggestions on how the Prince should establish that a would-be counsellor possesses the requisite devotion to the good of his subjects (see edition by James O. Crosby (Madrid, 1966), pp. 269–70). However, Quevedo's reference to Furió's work is muddled, and he in any case sets Furió's remarks in a religious field of reference in precisely the way that Furió himself rejected.

30 *Instituzione d'un Re Christiano raccolta principalmente dalla Sacra Scrittura & da' Sacri Dottori* (Giovanni Andrea Valvassori). See fo.3r for Ulloa's comments. Grendler (1977, pp. 102–15) points out that, down to the mid-1560s, many reformist or explicitly Protestant works continued to circulate in Venice, whether or not they were listed in Indices of Forbidden Books. These would have been read with particular interest by members of the reformist conventicles that flourished there through the 1550s and earlier 1560s.
a far larger debt to Furió. The latter's treatise had by far the greatest success of the three. In 1560, only a year after its first publication at Antwerp, two Italian translations were brought out at Venice, one by Lodovico Dolce, the other—again—by Alfonso de Ulloa. Ulloa's version seems to have been the one then put into Latin by Simon Schard. This Latin translation was published at Basel, by Oporinus, in 1563. Over the twenty years from 1588 onwards, this Latin version was republished on a further seven occasions in the German territories—four times at Cologne. A second Latin version was published at Cracow in 1597; while, in England and in English, Thomas Blundeville brought out in 1570 'a briefe collection of the substance' of Furió’s already compact work, derived from Ulloa's Italian version, assuring the Earl of Leicester that 'amongst al the tryfles that ever I wrote, there was none in mine opinion that ought to please you better than this little Treatise'.

The report on the Louvain group around Pedro Ximenes which Fray Baltasar Pérez had prepared for the Seville inquisitors in May 1558 was sent on to the Council of the Inquisition with urgent speed: a receipt for it had already been received at Seville by mid-June. Pérez there made the suggestion that all the Spaniards then at Louvain university should be ordered home and that, for the well-being of religion in Spain, the authorities should not allow any other Spaniards to go to the Netherlands to study (Tellechea, 1963a, p. 42). Tellechea here (p. 33) judged it very probable that the Council of the Inquisition transmitted the contents of Pérez's report to the King at Brussels and that this lay behind his orders, in July of the following year, when he was soon to sail for Spain himself, that all those studying at Louvain should return to Spain within four months, and, once there, report their arrival to the local tribunal of the Inquisition (Bataillon, 1966, pp. 720–21). This view of the matter seems to be confirmed by a letter, preserved in the Belgian archives, dated 30 April 1559 from the King to Inquisitor Drutius [Michel Drieux] at Louvain instructing him to make enquiries—in the greatest secrecy—into Pedro Ximenes ('ses actions, meurs, et conversation') and into various of his associates. It is made clear that what

31 A very briefe and profitable Treatise declaring howe many counsellis and what maner of Counsellors a Prince that will governe well ought to have . . . (London, 1570), fol.A2r–v.
32 AHN, Inquisición, Lib.575, fo.65v.
33 Archives générales du Royaume: Conseil d'Etat et Audience, 1720/1, Exp. 33 [Brussels].
had prompted this letter was a communication from the Spanish Inquisitors; the document that they had sent was being forwarded to Drutius together with this letter from the King. Although nearly a year had elapsed since Pérez had submitted his report at Seville, it seems likely that it was that report that lay behind these subsequent developments.

Pérez there asserted that Fox Morcillo had come to Seville shortly after the appearance of Furió Ceriol’s treatise on the translation of the Scriptures, claiming that he had five months’ leave from his duties (i.e., as Master of the King’s Pages), and had not returned to the Low Countries (Tellechea, 1963a, p. 41). This is in part confirmed by an annotation on the report (presumably added before it was despatched to the Council of the Inquisition) to the effect that Sebastián Fox Morcillo ‘is now in Seville and is a native of here’ (Tellechea, 1963a, p. 36, n. 4). These references call into question the long-established view that he was drowned the following year, when sailing from the Netherlands to Spain to take up the post of tutor to Philip II’s son, Don Carlos. Nevertheless, nothing, or almost nothing, is heard of him subsequently. As for de la Torre, one soon finds him mentioned in documents of the Spanish Inquisition in association with Dr Morillo and Dr Juan Pérez de Pineda. Later, in 1561, back in Spain, he was questioned about these two when summoned to appear in the course of the proceso against Archbishop Carranza. De la Torre now ‘named many’ of Morillo’s friends. After this, no more is heard of him (Truman, 1984, pp. 92–93). By contrast, Furió Ceriol, even though he returned to Spain in exceptionally unfavourable circumstances, went on to spend most of the rest of his life in Court circles. In the 1570s he appears to have played, so far as he could, the part of a counsellor himself. During the period in which Luis de Requeséns was Governor of the Netherlands (which Furió now revisited), he wrote a series of memoranda and letters proposing measures for bringing peace to those troubled parts.

34 Gilly (1985, p. 190) argues that Sebastián Fox Morcillo returned to Spain on account of the arrest of his brother Francisco by the Inquisition, and that Sebastián himself met his death when fleeing from the Inquisition after his brother had been burnt. The annotation already mentioned refers to the brother’s imprisonment in the Inquisition’s prison at Seville.

35 For details of this episode, see Truman (1979b).

36 Another of his employments was, it seems, to compose on the orders of the King a ‘universal history’ of the discovery of the New World. See Truman, 1993a, p. 259. The work, if ever finished, is lost.
J.H. Elliott credits Furió with the formulation of the coherent policy for the pacification of the Spanish Netherlands which the Eboli faction at Court was able to present to the King after the Duke of Alba’s very different approach had failed (Elliott, 1963, p. 256). Furió’s proposals indicate a view of matters clearly in line with what he had written in his Concejo . . . fifteen years earlier when he urged the prince’s need to take account of the feelings of his subjects in a given province and to secure their loyalty by good and sensitive government. These proposals of the 1570s were to secure him posthumous praise from Jacques-Auguste de Thou, one of the negotiators of the Edict of Nantes, in his Historiarum sui temporis libri CXXXVIII, of 1603. What Furió did not secure was the post of ‘Vicecanciller’ of the Council of Aragon, for which he applied in 1581; nor, it seems, did he obtain any other post in the councils of the King during the remaining eleven years of his life at Court.

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37 See Lib.CIV, sectio vii [for 1592].
PART THREE
ON REGIDORES AND CORREGIDORES

Introduction

We turn now to treatises composed in Spain. The three that will be considered first are concerned not with kings and princes but (formally or actually) with those who, in the Spain of Philip II as in earlier reigns, were at the heart of city government under the Crown of Castile: the regidores and corregidores.

The regidores were the urban councillors who constituted the city councils by which municipal affairs were administered. In the major cities of Andalusia these figures were known as 'veinticuatro', although their number was not restricted to twenty-four. One of our writers—Juan de Castilla y de Aguayo, himself a 'veinticuatro' of Córdoba—tells us (El perfecto regidor, fo.76r) that the city council (or cabildo) there consisted of forty-eight such people, plus the corregidor and two alcaldes, together with other legal officers.¹

It was the corregidor who presided over the meetings of the regidores. J.H. Elliott summarizes the office of corregidor in these terms:

Like the English Justice of the Peace, whom he resembled in many of his functions, he formed the essential link between the central government and the localities, but he differed from the J.P. in being a specifically royal official, unconnected with the locality to which he was appointed. His duties were both administrative and judicial. The famous decree of 1500 in which these duties were codified shows that he was expected to watch over all the affairs of the commune, to organize its provisioning, to be responsible for the maintenance of public order, and to prevent any attempts by nobles and clergy to usurp jurisdiction. (Elliott, 1963, p. 83).

¹ For some comparative figures relating to other cities in Castile, see Pelorson, 1980, p. 285. The office of regidor in Castilian cities may be thought of as that of senior urban councillor (akin to the former office of alderman in England), appointed by the Crown, usually for life. By the sixteenth century the post was customarily treated as one of hereditary entitlement. (I am grateful to Dr J.H. Edwards for advice on this matter.)
Whereas the regidores held their posts indefinitely, corregidores served in a given place for a limited time, after which their conduct in office was subject to official review (the ‘residencia’).

Castilla y de Aguayo regards it as commonplace for ‘veinticuatro’ to purchase their office (at an outlay, he tells us, of less than 3000 ducats at Córdoba). In the eyes of the central authorities the office of corregidor was incomparably more important, for its larger function was to maintain the authority of the Crown. J.N. Hillgarth, writing with particular reference to the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, notes that the special duty of corregidores was ‘to maintain royal jurisdiction against the Church and the nobility, but they also ensured the strict subordination of the cities to the Crown’ (Hillgarth, 1976, ii, 509). Richard Kagan, in his study of Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500–1700, notes that surviving ‘residencia’ reports show most corregidores to have been ‘conscientious, hard-working officials who were particularly aggressive in extending the king’s prerogative at the expense of municipal and seigneurial courts’, animated by the thought that ‘by actively supporting the royal prerogative, they also improved their chances of being rewarded by the monarch with a permanent judgeship in one of the Audiencias’ (i.e. provincial High Courts) (Kagan, 1981, pp. 112–13). As we shall see, Castillo de Bobadilla, himself a corregidor, was particularly strong on the issue of royal prerogatives vis-à-vis the Church.

Clearly, relations between regidores and corregidores were not likely to be easy. Castilla y de Aguayo portrays the corregidor as a menacing figure ‘who holds the key to our money-chests and a knife to our throats’ (El perfecto regidor, fo.77r). On the other hand, Castillo de Bobadilla remarks in his Política para corregidores, of 1597, on how demanding a thing it was to ‘fight’ (as with a bull) city councils (ii, 162b). His account (ii, 174b–75a) of the violence that broke out between rival bands of regidores at Salamanca in 1560 because of a dispute about precedence in the council assembly gives added point to Castilla y de Aguayo’s eagerness to see more civilized standards of behaviour prevail in such a milieu.

According to Ramírez de Arellano (1922, i, 119a), Juan de Castilla y de Aguayo was born in 1553. He became a veinticuarto of Córdoba

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2 Pelorson’s figures suggest that veinticuatro at Córdoba were nevertheless substantially more expensive to purchase than the post of regidor at Alcalá and Salamanca at about the same time (Pelorson, 1980, p. 285).
in 1575 (Astrana Marín, 1948, i, 335). On both sides of his family he belonged to the office-holding governing class of the city. On his mother’s side, the Aguayo family had provided veinticuatro of Córdoba over several generations. A Don Rodrigo de Aguayo is recorded as a colleague of our author’s in the municipal cabildo in 1580 (Ramírez de Arellano, 1912, p. 247); others included representatives of both sides of the family of the poet Luis de Góngora y Argote, who himself contributed a sonnet to the preliminaries of El perfecto regidor, praising the writer’s chaste prose style as well as his doctrine (sig.b1r). Castilla appears to have remained an active regidor or veinticuatro of his city for many years (Ramírez de Arellano, 1922, i, 119a). It was as such that he was granted a privilegio for the printing of his book (31 March 1585). Early the following year he empowered another member of the Argote family, Juan Fernández de Argote, of the Colegio Mayor de San Bartolomé at Salamanca, to sell or transfer this privilegio with a view to securing the printing and publication of the work there rather than at Córdoba (Ramírez de Arellano, 1922, i, 121b–22a; Astrana Marín, 1948, i, 335–36). This treatise (which he describes as his first literary work (sig.a5v)) would therefore appear to date from the author’s early thirties, when he had had the experience of a decade, more or less, in the office with which his book is concerned.3

Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla was born at Medina del Campo in 1546–47 into an hidalgo family with something of a tradition of royal service. He speaks of himself as the son, nephew, and grandson of servants of Philip II, Charles V, and the Catholic Monarchs respectively (Castillo, 1597, sig.*a5r). Having matriculated at Salamanca at the age of eleven or twelve, he studied canon law and graduated bachiller in May 1563. Five years later—it is not certain that the intervening time was spent at Salamanca—he received his licencia there, again in canon law (Tomás y Valiente, 1975, pp. 161–67). Kagan (1974, p. 212) has pointed out that, beginning in the middle years of the sixteenth century, there was a steady shift away from the study of arts and theology in the universities of Spain to that of law, particularly canon law, ‘gateway to both clerical and secular careers’. Castillo’s career exemplifies this. Having obtained his licencia, he brought his academic studies to an end. At the age of only

3 According to Ramírez de Arellano (1922, i, 122a), Juan de Castilla died at a date prior to 16 May 1598.
twenty-one he found himself in a legal post under the Crown at Badajoz, apparently as a ‘teniente letrado’, assisting the corregidor. In 1574 he became corregidor himself at Soria; his final post of this kind was at Guadalajara, where, in the 1580s, he appears to have made serious difficulties for himself by his firmness of purpose (Pelorson, 1980, p. 93, n. 96). In the intervals between these (and perhaps other similar) posts, he practised in a private capacity as a lawyer. In 1592 a new chapter of his life began with his appointment as ‘letrado de las Cortes’ (or ‘letrado del Reino’)—that is, as a technical consultant to the Cortes (without a fixed salary) rather than as an established official of that body (Tomás y Valiente, 1975, p. 174). After ten years in this post, and after declining the correimiento of Vizcaya, he was appointed a fiscal at the royal audiencia (or cancillería) at Valladolid. He thus had a particular responsibility for defending the interests of the royal patrimony.4 He was apparently still in that post at the time of his death, which occurred not later than 1605.5

The remaining member of the trio of writers with which this chapter will be concerned had a career quite distinct from that of the other two. Joan Costa y Bertrán spent his life in the milieu of universities and, save for a fairly short period at Salamanca, within the confines of the Crown of Aragon (Jiménez Catalán, 1925, pp. 314–18). He was born at Zaragoza in 1549–50. While it is not clear where he received his university education, he tells us that, before moving to Salamanca, he had taught in a number of universities (El regidor o ciudadano, fo.7r). When the first edition of this work appeared at Pamplona in 1575, Costa was already Professor of Rhetoric at Huesca. In that edition (sig.A8r–v) he mentions that he had previously taught rhetoric at Barcelona, when Pedro Juan Núñez—‘that great restorer of eloquence in this Spain of ours’—was teaching the subject there; he himself brought out at Barcelona a work entitled Eloquencia oratoria, which was already his second book, at the age of twenty-two. His first, De utraque inventione dialectica & oratoria, was written at the

4 Tomás y Valiente, to whom this summary of Castillo’s career is greatly indebted, remarks (1975, p. 176) that he has no information regarding his activities as a fiscal. Some evidence is provided by the surviving records (one being a printed document signed by Castillo, the other a MS) of a case in which Castillo performed this role in the first years of the seventeenth century. See British Library, 1322. l.6 (3) & (6). Details of the post of fiscal are given by Kagan, 1981, p. 11.
5 According to Tomás y Valiente (1975), p. 177, who says that the licencia for the printing of the 1608 edition of the Política and itself dated 12 September 1605 speaks of Castillo’s widow.
age of nineteen. When the third edition of his treatise on the regidor appeared at Zaragoza in 1584, Costa could announce himself as 'Doctor and Professor of Law' at that university. His later De conscribenda rerum historia (Zaragoza, 1591) paved the way to his appointment as official chronicler to the Crown of Aragon. He died in the mid-1590s.

The immediate occasion for his bringing out the considerably enlarged second edition of his treatise—El regidor o ciudadano—was his appointment to a new Chair of Rhetoric at Salamanca, established to remedy what was recognized to be a serious lack of provision in the subject (Beltrán de Heredia, 1970, iv, 304–05). It is true that Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas ('El Brocense') had been appointed to a full Chair of Rhetoric in the university in 1573 and would continue to occupy it for the next twenty years. However, in June 1576, with the retirement of León de Castro—the celebrated antagonist of Luis de León—from the Chair of Greek, it was decided to give El Brocense responsibility for the teaching of that subject and to make a new appointment in Rhetoric (Esperabé, 1914, ii, 339,393). Costa took possession of his chair the following month and in 1578 published a new, enlarged edition of his book—El regidor o ciudadano—as a mark of appreciation. Of the still further amplified third edition (entitled Gobierno del ciudadano) a substantial number of copies have survived into the twentieth century (Sánchez, 1913, ii, 320).

It will be suitable to examine Costa’s treatise before the other two, not only because it precedes the others in date but also because, in its character, it relates more closely than they do to the traditional three-fold pattern of the advice-books for rulers considered earlier.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{6} All references will be to the 1578 edition of Costa’s treatise unless otherwise indicated. The additions found in the third edition are mostly of an illustrative and anecdotal character.
CHAPTER SIX

JOAN COSTA

In his Introduction to his *El regidor o ciudadano* of 1578 Costa explains why he has now added ‘regidor’ to the bare ‘ciudadano’ in the title of his first edition: ‘because in the Crown of Aragon they term “ciudadano” the person who is called “regidor” in Castile; not the officials who work in cities but only those who have administrative charge in society [“los que goviernan los cargos en las repúblicas”]’ (fo.7v).¹ So his book will be of use in all parts. Costa gives it the form of a dialogue, in which three young men from Zaragoza discuss matters in a *locus amoenus* on the banks of the river Tormes outside the walls of Salamanca: Lactancio, described as a theologian; Theóphilo, a jurist; and Theopompo, ‘a humanist’. It is Theopompo who takes the leading role and acts as Costa’s spokesman. The three parts of which the work consists follow the pattern established by Giles of Rome’s *De regimine principum*, to which occasional reference is made. The first part (‘Del regimiento de sí mismo’) is concerned with the regidor’s conduct as an individual; the second views him as a husband and head of family and household; the third (‘Del gobierno de la república’) deals with his public role in society. Costa does not make explicit the extent of the ‘república’ in which he sees the regidor playing his part. However, his preliminary remarks concerning his title indicate that what he has in mind is primarily government of a city rather than that of a country. The discussion as a whole falls within this perspective. The third part is considerably shorter than the previous two and it is clear that Costa is much less interested in the administrative aspects of government or the politics of power than in the principles, values and goals to be esteemed and pursued by the regidor, whether as an individual or in the context of his family and civic society.

¹ For an account of the role of the *ciutadans honrats* of Barcelona, who came, in the sixteenth century, to constitute a citizen oligarchy in preponderant control of the city’s affairs, see Amelang, 1986, pp. 24–52 especially. Amelang (p. 52) draws a parallel between the Catalan *ciutadans* and the Castilian *regidor*. 
Most of Part I is taken up with an account of the cardinal virtues: temperance, fortitude, prudence and justice in that order. But this account is preceded by two chapters on the importance of self-command and self-knowledge, while Part I as a whole is introduced by a substantial preface arguing, as many a Renaissance humanist had done, for the superiority of moral philosophy as compared with natural philosophy. This preliminary discussion raises issues that recur in other works and merits consideration in some detail.

Costa notes that the philosophers of his time have little regard for moral as compared with natural philosophy. It is the latter that is treated by professors in their chairs and in public disputations, and they receive a better income for it than those who profess moral philosophy, even though the latter is more necessary for the well-being of the life of society (fo.*5v). The fault lies not with the natural philosophers themselves, who have to follow established practice, but with those who, in founding universities, paid so little heed to the public good.

If it was their aim to foster wisdom (‘sabiduría’), what greater wisdom is there, asks Costa, than that which teaches a man how to find salvation? (fo.*6r). In the acquiring of such wisdom, a great contribution is made by ‘that which can rightly be called Christian Philosophy’; and to this, in turn, Classical moral philosophy has made an important contribution. ‘What lofty observations, what notable things we read were spoken by Socrates, Plato, Plutarch, Cicero, and other pagans—things of the greatest profit for furthering the salvation of Christians in the true law of God’. Christians will feel shame and amazement when they read the works of these ancient writers and perceive how far they penetrated into the high mysteries of the moral virtues, ‘and so show us the way to our salvation if we will but apply them to our advantage and profit’ (fo.*6r–v). It is from such philosophers, among many other authors, that Costa says he has drawn his material. Therefore he has avoided ‘doubtful contradictions and scholastic quæstiones’, leaving ‘metaphysical discourses’ to those who hold public chairs in the universities, though (he tells us) he could handle these things if he wished. Instead he will follow the way of ‘sure conclusions and established truths’, which he will set out straightforwardly for the non-specialist, thereby putting public benefit before personal display (fo.*7r). His stylistic model throughout will be the dialogues of Cicero’s De oratore.

Clearly, in the line of argument followed here and in the values
and attitudes expressed, one hears the emphases of Italian Renaissance humanists concerned with the values of civic life, eager to urge in their own time the claims and advantages of a moral philosophy based very largely on the teachings of the Ancients.\textsuperscript{2} We noted earlier (see above p. 24) the interest that Francesco Patrizi shows in moral philosophy for what it has to tell men of their duties towards their fellow-citizens and patria, and the admiration he expresses for Socrates as the philosopher who first redirected philosophical inquiry away from fruitless natural speculation towards the practical moral issues of human existence. Costa speaks in similar terms: ‘Socrates was the first who found this adornment for [human] souls, converting the contemplation of things of the natural order into knowledge of things that are necessary to virtuous living and blessedness’ (fos.*4v–5r). Like Patrizi, Costa goes on to refer to those ancient philosophers or schools that had followed Socrates and developed his work in different ways.\textsuperscript{3}

The rival claims of natural and moral philosophy constitute an important theme in the treatise of Jerónimo Merola which will be considered in a later chapter. At this point, however, it is worth briefly noting (although the work as a whole lies outside the scope of this present study) that a discussion very similar to that found in Costa’s Introduction is contained in another Spanish treatise de regimine principum—Francisco de Monzón’s Libro primero del Espejo del príncipe cristiano, published at Lisbon first in 1544 and again, in a revised edition, in 1571.\textsuperscript{4}

In his 1544 Preface, Monzón tells how Socrates, after spending

\textsuperscript{2} For a fuller study of Costa’s indebtedness to the Italian humanist tradition see Truman (1993b).

\textsuperscript{3} In writing in these terms about Socrates, both Costa and Patrizi were taking over a view of him found in St Augustine, De civ. Dei, VIII,iii; Cicero, Tusc. Disp., V,i, and Acad. I,iv; and Xenophon, Memorabilia, I,11–16.

\textsuperscript{4} Monzón was born at Madrid around 1500, graduated at Alcalá in Arts and Theology, and lectured on Arts and Philosophy there 1528–32. (The records of Alcalá university note his appointment to a ‘Regencia & Cátedra de súmmulas’ in October 1528, thus suggesting that he taught elementary logic, and refer to him as holding, in 1531, a ‘cathedra[m] Philippophorum’ (AHN, Universidad de Alcalá, lib.397F, fos.25v, 45v). Having gone to Portugal in 1535 with a view to obtaining a post at Coimbra, he first taught theology at Lisbon before moving to Coimbra in 1538 to teach theology and Holy Scripture. He remained there until 1544, when he was appointed canon (‘cónego magistral’) of Lisbon cathedral. This post he held until his death in 1575. By the time he published the first edition of his Espejo del príncipe cristiano, John III had made him a royal chaplain and preacher (Beltrán de Heredia, 1970, iv, 25–26, 29; Silva Dias, 1975, p. 247, n. 1).
many years in the study of logic, the mysteries of natural causes, the
influence of the planets, the movements of the heavens, the virtues
of herbs and properties of rocks, the substance of the mathematical
sciences and all the causes and effects taught by natural philosophy,
came at last to see that 'none of these had the effect of making men
live more virtuously' (fos.5v–6r). Enlarging on this point, Monzón
argues that moral philosophers were always esteemed more highly
than natural philosophers, since what they taught was 'more profitable
and necessary for human life' than the speculative sciences (fo.53v).
He even claims that Aristotle earned the title of Prince of Philoso-
phers more on account of his books of moral philosophy, about
which he had written more excellently than any of his predecessors,
than for the great knowledge of natural philosophy which he had
besides (ibid.). In his second edition, Monzón sees the excellence of
moral philosophy as residing in the fact that

> it is not achieved with words, nor does it consist in knowing about
> virtues, but in practising them; it cannot be achieved by those who
> go after nonsensical subtleties nor by those who seek to be regarded
> as wise and acute, but by those who labour to be virtuous.\(^5\)

It is Monzón's claim that, according to the common opinion of
learned men in ancient times, 'those who only knew natural philo-
sophy merited the name neither of wise men nor of philosophers'
(ibid.). If Socrates was the first to teach moral philosophy, Plato
amplified his teaching, while Aristotle was the first to reduce it to a
system, as can be seen from his *Ethics, Economics*, and *Politics* (fo.2v).
Thus it comes about that the function of moral philosophy is to
teach men of every estate how, by putting themselves under the
guidance of reason, they may live virtuously as individuals; how, by
following the guidance of prudence, they may rule their homes and
families well; and how, by keeping laws dictated by justice, they may
govern the commonwealth as it ought to be governed (fo.72v). It is
the scheme of Costa's own treatise.

In that work, as we saw earlier, Costa speaks of the contribution
of the moral philosophers of Classical Antiquity to 'that which can
rightly be called Christian Philosophy'. The phrase has immediate

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\(^5\) ' [...] aquesta sciencia no se alcança con palabras, ni consiste en saber, sino
en obrar virtudes, no la pueden alcanzar los que buscan devaneos de subtilezas, ni
los que pretenden ser tenidos por sabios y agudos, sino los que trabajan de ser vir-
tuosos' (fo.72v).
resonances; and when seen in relation to the ensuing discussion, it can hardly fail to bring to mind Erasmus’s commendation of the ‘philosophia Christi’, perhaps most notably stated in his *Paraclesis, id est, adhortatio ad christianae philosophiae studium* which prefaces his 1516 Greek edition and Latin version of the New Testament. The ‘Christiana philosophia’, Erasmus there declares, is found in human dispositions rather than in syllogisms; it is a matter of living rather than of disputation, inspiration rather than erudition, transformation rather than reasoning. He speaks of the Classical moral philosophers who arrived at fundamental insights in harmony with this Christian Philosophy, and makes special mention of Socrates, Diogenes the Cynic, and Epictetus. By contrast he warns against thinking oneself to be Christian because one engages in subtle scholastic disputation ‘de instantibus, de relationibus, de quidditatibus ac formalitatibus’ (Erasmus, 1703, vi, fo.*4r). The similarity between the tenor of Erasmus’s remarks and the position of both Costa and Monzón as noted above is evident, and it appears likely that Costa’s debt to Erasmus goes well beyond the rather few explicit acknowledgements (mainly to the *Adagia* and *Apophthegmata*) made in his marginal references. It thus seems all the more appropriate that the *licencia* for the printing of the Salamanca edition of Costa’s treatise was granted by Juan López de Hoyos, the priest-headmaster of the grammar-school run by the municipality of Madrid who has been shown by Américo Castro to have had some interest in the writings of Erasmus, even drawing on one, in a work of his own, ten years after it had been banned in the Index of 1559 (Castro, 1931, pp. 333–35).

The Latin version of the *Paraclesis* had not been banned in Spain when Costa was writing. However, another source where Costa could have found encouragement to take the view he did of the Christian relevance of Classical moral philosophy was Conrad Gesner, whose edition and Latin version of Stobaeus’s *Sententiae* (a huge anthology dating from the fifth century AD of excerpts from Greek poets and prose-writers of antiquity) he cites from time to time. In a lengthy preface Gesner argues that the human *sapientia* of the ancient writers is not to be scorned by Christians: earthly philosophy has much to contribute to the heavenly sort, and in the dialogues of Plato we find principles enunciated that are basic to a Christian’s moral existence and the properly ordered life of society. In terms reminiscent of those employed by Erasmus in one of his most famous *Colloquies*—the ‘Convivium religiosum’—this Swiss Protestant polymath suggests
that Socrates, Pythagoras, and the like, if they were alive today, would be regarded as saints even among Christians (Stobaeus, 1555, pp. 14–15).\(^6\)

Costa’s eagerness to argue for the validity and value of Classical pagan moral philosophy for Christians shows itself at various points in the earlier chapters of Part I of his work, and Theophilo’s words on the subject in Chapter 5 offer another striking similarity to Gesner’s preface to Stobaeus. Among the authoritative statements which Costa calls in aid are St Augustine’s classic remarks on the subject of ‘despoiling the Egyptians’ in his _De doctrina christiana_, Bk.II, ch.xl, and Aquinas’s in his _Summa theologica_, I, qu. 84, art. 5, where he quotes from this passage of Augustine. Again Costa observes that, had Plato, Pythagoras, or Diogenes the Cynic lived in modern times, they would have been regarded as saints (fo.30v). Indeed it is Costa’s contention that the writings of the Ancients could be of great value not only for the Christian’s moral life but for his religious life too. He recalls (mistakenly in the case of Ficino) points where Petrarch and Marsilio Ficino had remarked in their Letters that almost the whole of St John’s Gospel, with its Prologue: ‘In the beginning was the Word [. . .]’, was to be found in the dialogues of Plato (fo.31v). The claim was frequently made by writers influenced by Renaissance neo-Platonism. Evidence of Costa’s responsiveness to that tradition is seen in his enthusiasm for the Hermetic writings (from which Plato was held to have derived the religious truths found in his works) and perhaps also in Costa’s admiration for that most contentious of the Early Fathers, Origen. His discussion of both is found in passages newly interpolated in the second edition of his work.

Costa’s remarks on Hermes Trismegistus follow an account of how pagan philosophers of the Ancient World had found God, or had come close to doing so, through the contemplation of the order of the created universe (fos.46v–48r). The way in which Costa has revised this section for his second edition, describing more closely than before the scope and limits of Natural Reason and making explicit the part played by God’s response to man’s seeking, indicates an awareness that this was a subject requiring careful handling (fo.47v; cf. Costa, 1575, fo.40r). Nevertheless his point remains that ancient philosophers found God, calling him ‘Prime Cause, Prime

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\(^6\) Compare Erasmus, 1703, i, 683A. Gesner’s edition first appeared in 1545, at Zurich.
Intelligence, Prime Mover’. Here Costa refers to the Hermetic Asclepius, Plato’s Timaeus, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics (fo.48r), and goes on to tell the familiar spurious story of how Hermes (alternatively Mercurius) Trismegistus learnt spiritual wisdom from Moses in Egypt.\(^7\) Hermes Trismegistus, says Costa, achieved more in the understanding of divine truth than all pagans before and after him ever did, arguing for monotheism against the ‘vain and blind superstition’ of the polytheistic pagan world. This he did particularly in a work entitled Theologia ‘which we are reading nowadays’ (fo.49).\(^8\)

D.P. Walker has remarked that ‘the whole structure of the Ancient Theology rests on the belief that the Ancient Theologians wrote with deliberate obscurity, veiling the truth, and, correlative, that religious texts should be interpreted allegorically’ (Walker, 1972, p. 85). Among the Church Fathers it was Origen’s achievement particularly to vindicate the claims of allegory to a place in Christian exegesis, arguing that most passages of Scripture had figurative meanings above, and spiritually more important than, the literal sense (Chadwick, 1967, pp. 107–08). His belief that man had to be educated to rise from the letter to the spirit, from the world of sense to the immaterial realm, commended him both to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and to Erasmus.\(^9\) On the other hand, during the three centuries following his death, Origen had been officially condemned in the Christian East as heretical, and, as Walker elsewhere remarks, the first printed editions of Origen’s works presented and prompted the same mixture of reverence and distrust as one finds in the early Christian centuries (Walker, 1959, p. 105). When Pico included among his nine hundred theses of 1486 one to the effect that ‘it is more reasonable to believe that Origen has been saved than to believe him damned’, he had subsequently to argue in defence of that view against

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\(^7\) For an account of the Hermetica as viewed in the Renaissance, see Walker, 1972, pp. 1–84 especially.

\(^8\) None of the Hermetic works bears such a title. Costa’s reference seems to be to the Theologia Trismegistica composed by Symphorien Champier in 1507, arranging under a dozen thematic headings the Hermetic material translated by Ficino and commented on by Lefèvre d’Étaples (Marcel, 1973, p. 142). Domingo de Soto, in the preface to his De natura et gratia (composed at Trent), while arguing for a renewal of scholastic theology, acknowledges the current appeal of the Hermetic writings: ‘Ut quisque impensissime studet trilinguis evadere, tanquam fabuloso illo fonte proliisset labra, ita maxima authoritate inter sacrorum mystas Trimegistus prodit’ (Paris, 1549, fos.2v–3r).

those ‘magistri’ who judged such an opinion ‘temerarious, reprehensible, savouring of heresy and against the judgement of the universal Church’ (Pico, 1557, p. 199). Costa, who refers to Pico on various occasions, echoes the terms of his response to this charge in the substantial passage on Origen which he introduces into the 1578 edition of his treatise (fos.29r–30v). He notes that ‘some of our theologians’ have held that something of pagan thought had attached itself to Origen in consequence of his devoting himself so much to human learning. Having listed various of Origen’s most celebrated soteriological ‘errors’, Costa nevertheless goes on to stress Origen’s holy life, the good example he set to others, the conversions he worked among pagans. Like Pico he suggests that the errors in Origen’s writings were not his but had been introduced by the very heretics he was opposing; if they were in fact his, they were expressions of opinion, not formal assertions; and if they really were the latter, that was a great pity, for ‘as regards the rest he wrote, all the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church declare that no one had sounder inclinations or spoke better’ (fo.29v). Costa follows this with an account of Origen’s life and virtuous character.

Having praised Socrates for being the first to direct philosophical reflexion away from the natural order towards the values and goals of human existence, Costa praises him again, in Chapter 2, on rather different grounds: as the supreme example of those wise men whose wisdom lay in their recognition of the fact that they knew nothing:

for man’s understanding being [finite]\(^{10}\) and every branch of learning infinite, it will emerge as a certain and manifest truth that, the further [a man] advances into the depths of any branch of learning, the wider sweep of difficulties he will discover; and the greater he discovers these to be, the more it will appear to him that he knows less [than before]; for at every step he will know only doubts, beginning [truly] to know something at the time when he begins to doubt much.\(^{11}\)

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\(^{10}\) In both the 1578 and 1584 editions the text here reads ‘infinito’, which makes nonsense of the argument. The 1575 text reads: ‘[…] si entre lo finito y infinito, no aay proporcion alguna, como sienten los Philósohos, siendo el entendimiento del hombre (quanto al mortal vivir) finito, y cada una de las ciencias infinita […]’ (fo.16r).

\(^{11}\) ‘Porque siendo el entendimiento del hombre [finito], y cada una de las ciencias infinta, verdad será cierta, y manifiesta, que cuanto más entrará en el hondo de alguna de ellas, mayor campo descubrirá de difficultades, y más le parecerá que sabe menos, quanto las irá descubriendo mayores. Pues no sabrá sino dubdas a cada passo; comenzando entonces a saber algo, quando comenzará a dubdar mucho’ (fo.17r).
In the 1584 edition, this passage is almost immediately followed by a newly interpolated one where Costa reflects further on Socrates's dictum that ‘one thing I know, and that is that I know nothing’. We now read that, according to some philosophers, Socrates held that there was nothing in life that was not the object of probable rather than certain knowledge: a man was not truly wise who dared to affirm that he knew something so certainly that he could not be mistaken about it, and that it could not turn out to be the contrary of what he thought it was. For everything that can be known has so many pros and cons to it that, when a man feels himself to be most certain of what he knows, doubts can occur to him and make the matter uncertain again. So Socrates disclaimed knowing anything today in such a fashion that further knowledge tomorrow might not show it to be false. Other philosophers, according to Costa, emphasized the other aspect of Socrates’s dictum—that infallibly certain knowledge was possessed only by God, but of this Costa himself makes little (Costa, 1584, pp. 93–94).

His treatment of the subject suggests some relation with the revival of interest in philosophical scepticism at Paris around the middle years of the sixteenth century (see Schmitt, 1972, pp. 57–90 especially). While it was only in the 1560s that two Latin versions of Sextus Empiricus were published there, some years earlier, in 1547, Omer Talon (Audomarus Talaeus) had published what Schmitt calls the first serious study to appear in print of Cicero's Academica—the major source of ancient sceptical ideas for Western thinkers until the recovery of Sextus (Schmitt, 1972, pp. 12–13, 81–82). Talon’s study (Audomari Talaei Academia) was republished in 1550, together with his commentary on the Lucullus (i.e., Cicero’s Academica priora). Here Talon praises the sceptics among the Greek philosophers for their willingness to confess their ignorance, their unwillingness to assert anything as certainly the case, their principle of ‘assensionis retentio’ or suspension of judgement, their disposition to be content with the probable rather than the certain. Their wisdom was to know that they knew nothing, and first and greatest among them was Socrates ‘whose whole philosophy was a search for truth, not its affirmation [“cuius omnis philosophia veritatis inquisitio fuit, non affirmatio”]’ (Talon, 1550, p. 9). Over against this position Talon sets the ‘Aristotelians’, who were not only confident of the mind’s power to know the truth but based their philosophical teaching on the principle of authoritative declaration. Talon aligns himself with his friend Ramus
in his opposition to such people (Talon, 1550, pp. 4–20).

In his first published work, *De utraque inventione dialectica & oratoria*, Costa refers to both Ramus and Talon, along with Vives and Sánchez de las Brozas, taking issue with them over the place of ‘inventio’ in rhetoric and continuing: ‘I esteem the writings of Talon, I esteem the writings of Vives, but I esteem truth most of all’ (Costa, 1570, fos.23v–24r). This may imply a familiarity with Talon’s work beyond the particular treatise in question, his *Institutiones oratoriae* of 1545. The fact that Pedro Núñez was an admired senior colleague of Costa’s at Barcelona university may have a bearing on this. In 1554 Núñez published the Latin text of a lecture he had given the previous year at the university of his native Valencia ‘On the causes of Aristotelian Obscurity and the Remedies thereof’—where he takes a clearly Ramist line. In a small work on Dialectic attached to this, he declares himself to have been the first follower of Ramus at Valencia (Núñez, 1554, fo.92v). This was quite soon after his return from Paris. It may be that he later fostered and broadened Costa’s interest in both Ramus and Talon. That remains uncertain. What is clear is that Costa felt some sympathy for philosophical scepticism and that his words on this issue were very much in tune with recent tendencies at Paris. It was, of course, in the mid-1570s that Montaigne had his famous medal struck with its motto: ‘Que sais-je?’

In so far as this kind of disposition could have been reinforced by the anti-Aristotelian polemic of Ramus, Costa’s position is of all the more interest in the light of Eugenio Asensio’s discussion of Ramism at Salamanca in these years. Asensio is inclined to see enthusiasm there for Ramus as at its peak in the early 1560s. In 1568, the Inquisition carried out an inquiry into Ramist sympathies in the university. Statements recorded then indicate that these sympathies were particularly to be found in the circle of friends around Luis de León. It was also claimed that Ramus had followers among students from Valencia and Aragon in particular (Asensio, 1981, pp. 63–65). In 1568 the Inquisition ordered Ramus’s works to be withdrawn from circulation in a number of university towns; in the Index of 1583–84 they were banned *in toto* as those of a ‘heresiarch’. As Asensio remarks, we still lack a comprehensive study assessing the influence of Ramism on the teaching of grammar, logic, and rhetoric in Spain (Asensio, 1981, p. 55)—or on Spanish intellectual life generally. The section of Costa’s treatise which we have been considering offers evidence of obvious interest in that regard.
When we turn to consider the specific scheme of the first book of Costa’s treatise, we find him introducing it with remarks reminiscent of Fox Morcillo’s in his own Introduction: he does not intend to portray a model of perfection as in their different ways did St Augustine, Quintilian, Cicero in his De oratore, Castiglione, Xenophon, Plato, and others, ‘all of whom pursued with their intellects what they were never able to see with their eyes’ (fo.6r). So he will confine himself to what the regidor or ciudadano essentially needs to know and understand, and without which he cannot govern even moderately well. And that means such moral understanding as will enable him to govern himself as an individual, his family, and the república, as he ought. Furió, as we have seen, spoke of virtue as being ‘the best piece in the ruler’s armour’, adding however that men of outstanding intelligence and experience in government did not use that kind of language. By contrast, Costa employs the same phrase to state a primary conviction.

This brings him to the question of the future ruler’s education. While most matters in government, he contends, can easily be resolved with the exercise of ‘good natural intelligence’, some will present themselves where understanding formed by education will considerably help (fo.8v). No branch of study will do the ruler harm, all will be of profit; but those without which he cannot but err at every step are those which teach him how to govern himself and others in the three spheres already mentioned. That is not to deny that rhetoric and dialectic—especially the former—will bring him much lustre. Not surprisingly, in view of his professional position, Costa gives an almost lyrical account of how the ruler’s ‘authority’ is enhanced by skill in rhetoric, by the ability to use language persuasively in the various purposes of government, employing words that are elegant, refined, and euphonious (fo.9r–v). Dialectic, for its part, will sharpen his perceptions of truth and falsehood and make him more probing in argument (fo.10v). Nevertheless, these skills need to be grounded in a sound knowledge of, and commitment to, virtue, and it is therefore with instruction in ethics that the education of the future ruler should begin (fo.11r–v). Costa recalls that the Ancients, such as Homer and Cicero, saw all the ‘artes humanas’ as linked together, as by a chain.12 Their ideal, moreover, was to

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12 See Cicero, Pro Archia, I,2: ‘Etenim omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum et quasi cognitione quadam inter se continentur’.
master all such ‘artes’ to perfection, beginning with the ones they regarded most highly. In Costa’s view, however, to subject the future ciudadano to an encyclopaedic scheme of education of this kind was wholly inappropriate. For his purpose was limited to governing well, and he needed to know only what was requisite for that. Therefore he must start with the subjects that would teach him to be virtuous (fos.14v–15r).

The next chapter, where self-knowledge is presented as the basis for the cultivation of virtue, sets the tone for the following three, two of which are devoted to temperance and the third to fortitude. Here at the outset we meet themes and emphases that will recur: a vigorous denunciation of a vainglorious spirit, an insistence on the baseness and transitoriness of the body as compared with the soul, and warnings against the dangers of prosperity insofar as this makes men forgetful of the fragility and chanciness of the human condition. Costa strikes a note heard on various occasions in these chapters when he warns against the vainglorious self-satisfaction likely to be induced in the ciudadano by the thought that he enjoys greater gifts of fortune than others—wealth, ancient lineage, prominent public office:

But if, like the peacock, [such men] looked at their feet; if they considered that they are men made of earth, dust, mire and ashes, and that, if they examine well their genealogy from its beginnings, they are children of Adam, Adam the child of the earth, and the earth the child of sheer nothing, so that the only family arms they have to boast of are those of children of Adam, grandchildren of the earth, and great-grandchildren of sheer nothing, no doubt they would feel a proper shame at their swollen conceit and vainglory.

The homiletic contemptus mundi note of such a passage is reminiscent of such works as Rodrigo Sánchez de Ár evalo’s mid-fifteenth-century Speculum humanae vitae, Pierre Boaistuau’s Le Théâtre du monde

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13 For the ‘encyclios disciplina’ (or ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία) of Classical Antiquity see Marrou, 1938, pp. 107–09, 211–35; also Simone, 1976, pp. 235–37.
14 See below, p. 139.
15 ‘Mas si se mirassen los pies, como el pavón; si considerassen que son hombres de tierra, polvo, lodo, y ceniza, que examinando bien, desde sus principios, su genealogía, son hijos de Adam, Adam hijo de la tierra, y la tierra hija de nada, y que desta manera no tienen otro blasón de que preciarse sino de hijos de Adam, nietos de tierra, y bisnietos de nada: sin duda se correrían de su hinchazón y vanagloria’ (fo.22r–v).
of 1558 (Costa, who later refers to this work, presumably knew it in its eloquent Spanish version), and parts of Mateo Alemán’s Guzmán de Alfarache, at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Costa’s power in this vein needs to be remembered along with those other passages where he adopts the tones and values of Renaissance humanism. The authorities he cites in portraying the misère of earthly existence include Classical pagan writings as well as biblical and Christian ones. He can swing rapidly from one view of the human condition to another. Having pictured again the miseries and sinfulness of earthly life, with references to Cicero, Plato, Pliny, Clement of Alexandria, and St Augustine, he adds quite simply: ‘Although if we turn the page, we shall see man’s excellence and magnificence, of which you can read at length in Levinus Lemnius [...] and Gaudenzio Merula’.16

The two chapters on temperance devote more attention to excess in matters of food, drink, and dress than to sexual indulgence, though the continence of Scipio is admiringly recalled (fos.44v–45r). Costa’s disapproval of lavish expenditure on display and self-indulgence prompts him to voice sharp comment on the ways of the wealthy in contemporary Spain. He does not, he explains, disapprove of people spending what they can afford on display suitable to their social position. However, he does disapprove of the extravagant expenditure he sees ‘many caballeros’ undertaking on jousting and tourneys, claiming that such things are matters of reputation (‘honra’)―‘as though’, says Costa, ‘reputation lay in the financial disarray which they create and which others will inherit’ (fo.36v). In these as in other matters the rule should be the Golden Mean. Soon afterwards he wonders what the philosopher Anaxagoras would say if he could see how people build sumptuous houses for themselves when quite soon six feet of earth will meet their needs, or how the wealthy urge their cooks to devise ever new expensive dishes while the poor go hungry to bed, or have snow brought for themselves from afar but would let a poor man die at their door before they would give him so much as a cup of water. Faced by such things Anaxagoras would

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16 See Levinus Lemnius, De occultis naturae miraculis (Antwerp, 1559), i,ii. Lemnius (or Lemmens) was a renowned Dutch physician and writer on medical and astrological matters. See also Gaudenzio Merula, Memorabilium libri V (Lavezzari, 1546), i,i. Here Merula is following Hermes Trismegistus.
laugh at the foolishness of the world, like Democritus, or weep out of pity for it, like Héraclitus (fo.40r).

Costa’s discussion of fortitude, in Chapter 5, moves in a number of different directions. Returning to the importance of self-knowledge, Costa renews the homiletic tone of earlier passages as he expresses what it means to possess self-knowledge before God: a sense of sins committed and mercies received. If a man is moved to the words of the ‘De profundis’, he also has confidence in God’s help (fo.47v). Later Costa contrasts God’s forgivingness with the vengefulness of men, and recalls at some length the forebearance and fortitude of Seneca in accepting his sentence of death (fos.53v–54r). Before this, however, Costa’s words regarding God’s disposition to assist men to salvation lead him to the discussion we were considering earlier of how pagans in Classical times, including Hermes Trismegistus, sought and found him. Costa draws a good deal on Cicero and Seneca in portraying fortitude as the virtue that enables men, in this uncertain life, to face the future with firmness and patience rather than fear (fo.58r–v). But this commendation of Stoic endurance in facing life’s misfortunes comes after he has argued that it is a fine thing to venture one’s life in two causes: the defence of one’s country and the preservation of the Faith (fo.56v). We shall see that about service of the patria especially he has a good deal more to say.

Turning to prudence, Costa voices impatience with those whose difficulties arise from their own thoughtlessness. Once more he attacks the wealthy and nobly born in Spain—people who often can hardly write—for their frivolity and ignorance (fo.60r). Prudence is a virtue especially relevant to rulers. It shows men how to acquire and cultivate the other virtues and how to exercise them, whether fortune is kind or hostile (fo.63r). Here, in terms reminiscent of Patrizi, Costa attacks the Ancients’ view that Fortune was a goddess; instead he insists that Christians contend as of faith that not even the leaves on the trees move without the will of God (fo.66r). The role of prudence is therefore to recognize coming ‘good events’, while mature counsel makes sure of them, wisdom ‘receives and enjoys’ them, and sound discretion preserves them (fo.66r–v). Thus it is, says Costa, echoing a phrase used by both Patrizi and Machiavelli, that only the prudent and wise man manages to be ‘half-master’ of that which is to come.

The discussion of prudence here is conducted in general terms,
not in terms of public administration, as in Fox Morcillo’s treatise. Nevertheless, the expansion of this chapter in the 1584 edition (see pp. 244–51 especially) shows that Costa was seriously interested in the subject. What is most notable now is the emphasis he places on the value of experience as compared with formal learning in matters of government. In this passage, as frequently elsewhere, he draws on a work which he clearly had read only after preparing his second edition: the *De optimo senatore* of Laurentius Grimaldus Goslicius, published at Venice in 1568.¹⁷

To possess experience, Costa says, with Goslicius, is like having an extra eye for the course of practical matters, since ‘prudence is nothing other than the course of “sapiencia” and is as much better than its theoretical counterpart, that is, wisdom [*sabiduría*] as the man who actually finds salvation is better than one who knows how to be saved but is in fact condemned’ (Costa, 1584, p. 249). Costa contrasts, among the Ancients, those who knew only as a matter of theory (‘*per sciencia*’) how cities should be governed with those others who combined theoretical wisdom with practical experience and were thus ‘perfect in all respects’ (pp. 249–50).¹⁸ This brings to mind the sceptical drift of certain passages noted earlier and Costa’s impatience with natural philosophy as compared with moral philosophy on the grounds of their respective contributions to the public good. Fox Morcillo’s observations noted earlier, in his treatise on kingship and elsewhere, regarding the uselessness of abstract theorizing, also come to mind. Nevertheless, concerned as Costa is with government guided by practical experience, he still does not, in the third edition of his work, elaborate that concern in terms of actual administration, nor does he address himself here to possible conflicts between prudence and moral principle.¹⁹

Coming finally to the virtue of justice, Costa brings much less weight of argument to it than one would expect from a future Professor of Law. His chapter begins with a series of general statements.

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¹⁷ Wawrzyńiec Grzymała Goś licki (?1533–1607). Having studied at Cracow and then at Bologna and Padua, Goślicki returned to Poland, where he became secretary to King Sigismund II.

¹⁸ Those placed in Costa’s list of honour are Pericles, Solon, Lycurgus, Plato, Demosthenes, Cato, and Cicero.

¹⁹ A more detailed examination of Costa’s views regarding theoretical and practical wisdom, as stated in the third edition of his treatise, would show that he occupies a place of some interest in the process, traced by Eugene Rice, by which the concept of wisdom became secularized in the Renaissance period (see Rice, 1958).
The ruler must possess justice; no people can be governed without it; it is chief among the virtues and contains all the rest within itself. The ruler must uphold justice without fear or favour, seeking to prevent crime and punishing evil-doers as the law provides. Costa refers readily to relevant parts of the Roman Law and its commentators; also to places in the Bible, Aristotle’s Ethics and Plato’s Laws. St Augustine’s familiar dictum that, without justice, kingdoms are but gangs of criminals on a large scale (De civ.Dei, IV,iv), is quoted. The De principe vero of the fifteenth-century Bartolomeo Sacchi (il Platina) is also mentioned. But thereafter the chapter is given over to a series of exemplary stories, mostly from Classical sources, illustrating how justice is to be honoured and upheld. Part I of Costa’s treatise ends with an allegorical and somewhat ironical account of Virtue coming to Theopompo’s house in search of her sister Wisdom in the Salamancaan Schools. The regidor should take Lady Virtue as his wife.

With Part II we turn to the ruler’s family life. Here Costa is clearly following the scheme of topics offered by the corresponding part of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum. However, his own discussion is no merely derivative exercise. Thus, at the outset, it is evident that Costa writes as one convinced that marriage is an honourable estate instituted of God, and this gives his discussion an emphasis different from that of Giles, who, following Aristotle, stresses the ‘naturalness’ of marriage rather than its Christian status.

It is striking too that Costa, in emphasizing the latter, says almost nothing about the celibate life devoted to the things of God. He mentions it only in a passage repeating Aristotle’s view, adopted by Giles, that one who does not marry, and therefore ceases to live ‘as a man’, does so either to embrace a higher existence of religious contemplation or to live on a less than human level, like a beast (fo.81v). By contrast he several times says in this opening chapter that it is appropriate for ‘any man’ to marry; for households are the foundation of cities and cities the foundation of society at large, which in turn is the basis of the public good (fo.80r). This view—which also Aristotelian—is reinforced by references to the pseudo-Platonic Letter IX to Archytas and Cicero’s De officiis, where it is stressed that man was born not for himself alone but to promote the common good.

After a chapter enthusiastically enumerating women of the past (among them Isabella the Catholic) distinguished in arms and letters, Costa considers what kind of wife the regidor should choose. He
agrees that beauty is desirable, and also a good dowry—especially in view of 'the idiocies we invent and the extravagant expenditure we undertake' in present-day Spain (fo.107v); but more important than either is virtue. Costa eagerly adopts the Renaissance commonplace that virtue confers a truer nobility than high birth, and recalls Cicero's celebrated words on the subject in the speech attributed to him against Sallust (104r–06v). The difference at this point between Costa and Giles is marked. As to the way the regidor should 'govern' his wife, Costa wishes them both to hear Mass daily, to fast and pray (fo.112v); and since life is over in the twinkling of an eye, the husband will not allow his wife to be idle (fos.112v–13r). However, Costa approves of Giles of Rome's view that Eve was made to be man's help-mate, not his slave (fo.121r), and in a passage at once echoing Giles (De regimine principum, II,i,22) and of interest as regards Spanish Siglo de Oro literature, he warns the husband not to take his concern for his martial honour to extravagant extremes (fo.123r–v).

Having observed that the care shown by the pagans of Classical Antiquity in bringing up their children was an example to Christians, Costa sets out his ideas on the education of the regidor's offspring. Here he both follows and departs from Giles of Rome. Like him (II,ii,5) he agrees that the truths of the Christian faith are best instilled during early childhood, and declares it to be more important to make a child a Christian than a scholar (fo.138r). It is also important to teach future rulers what they need to know in order to govern well. Giles restricts this to the 'moral sciences' (II,ii,8). Costa, referring to Giles on this point (fo.137v), and somewhat qualifying his own earlier remarks on the subject (see above, p. 134) introduces a distinction between bright children with a capacity for learning and those lacking these gifts. The former, he holds, should not only study the seven liberal arts and moral philosophy but also devote some years to law and the age-old customary ways of their own cities; the less able, however, should be taught only what is essential to good government: the four cardinal virtues, reverence for God, understanding of his laws, self-control and truthfulness (fos.142v–3r). In broader terms Costa argues that the instruction of a child should be related to its particular abilities and temperament. He is also concerned with the character and manner of the teacher. It is important that the young child should not be unduly frightened by its master. At these points one notes the presence of the tradition of pedagogical thought deriving from the fifteenth-century Italian
humanists—from Pier Paolo Vergerio in particular—and from Quintilian. Costa’s own discussion makes passing reference to Plato’s *Republic*, *Phaedrus* and *Alcibiades*, to Plutarch’s *De educatione filiorum*, to Quintilian and Erasmus’s *Apopthegmata*.

In Part III of this treatise, on the government of society, it becomes especially evident that Costa does not undertake anything like the detailed consideration of the practicalities of government which Fox Morcillo and Furió Ceriol in their different ways offer. Nor does he present a view of government worked out in detailed religious terms, as Felipe de la Torre does. Indeed, Costa says relatively little about the religious aspects of government. It is characteristic that his opening discussion is predominantly related to the writers of Classical Antiquity: Cicero’s *De officiis* and *De legibus*, Isocrates, Plato (both direct and as mediated by Ficino), Aristotle, Demosthenes, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Macrobius’s Commentary on Cicero’s *Somnium Scipionis*. To these must be added the texts of the Roman Law, and the *De republica* of Nicolas Bièse, from Ghent, who had spent some years in Valencia; also St Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* and, again, Giles of Rome.

Costa’s own definition of civil society or a commonwealth is that ‘it is a polity that lives in peace with its own laws and statutes’.20 He stresses that there must be peace between the three elements making up society: the rulers (‘regidores o ciudadanos’), the mass of people who work on the land or at other necessary tasks, and the knights (‘cavalleros’) who provide military protection. He reinforces the point by recalling St Augustine’s words (*De civ.Dei*, II, xxi, quoting Cicero, *De rep.*, II, xlii) where he likens concord and unity between the three elements of society to the harmony of music (fos.149v–50r). Arguing that all three elements must obey ‘the king and the law’ (fo.151r), he enlarges on the function of law in society. The laws uphold the order of society and safeguard our humanity by saving us from sinking to the level of beasts (fos.151v–52r); their concern is with equity and the common good (fo.154r–v); they prescribe ‘cosas honestas’ and proscribe things that are not, punishing the wrong-doers (fos.154v–55v). So, says Costa, with reference to the Roman Law, the laws are ‘just, holy, and good’, and are rightly called a ‘sacred philosophy’ because they accord with God’s divine law and

20 ‘[...] república es una ciudad que vive en paz con sus propias leyes y estatutos’ (fo.149v).
particularly the Canon Law (fo.154v). He emphasizes the respect which the Ancient World felt for justice, citing Aristotle (Ethics, Bk.V) for the view that it was the soul of polities, and Macrobius’s words (Commentarii . . ., I,iv) that those who administered justice in commonwealths, and those who provided these with a good defence, would receive special glory in heaven (fos.155v–56r). It is at this point that Costa makes an interesting comparison, as regards their respective merits, between people such as these and those, on the other hand, vowed to the religious life:

And St John Chrysostom on St Matthew in Homily 44 in the penultimate column says that when a judge dispenses good justice, his virtue shines more brightly in public than that of those who do penance in deserts, all the more so since it is better to benefit many than one alone. And even Jason [del Maino] and Albericus [da Rosate], on Book I ‘De iustitia et iure’ [of the Digestum vetus] at the beginning, referring to Hostiensis in the proem to his Summa [aurea] in column 4, say that on those grounds [such a minister of justice] has more merit than preaching friars.21

Here Costa takes up a topic that had been repeatedly dealt with by the civil lawyers over the preceding centuries and, as we shall see, remained a matter of interest in the Spain of his own time. Costa adopts on his own account the claims which the lawyers habitually advanced regarding the dignity and value of their profession vis-à-vis the clergy and religious Orders. However, his multiplication of sources and authorities suggests that he was conscious of touching on a sensitive issue. Certainly the reaction of the censor to the almost identical remarks of Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla near the end of the century suggests as much.22 Nevertheless, Costa’s own sentiments emerge clearly enough, all the more so when one looks more closely into his sources.

Chrysostom is concerned in the passage in question to exhort his hearers to lead such a life of virtue in the midst of society that they will ‘make earth heaven’ and bring others to the Christian Faith.

21 Y.S. Chrysostomo sobre S. Mattheo en la Homilia.44, en la col. penul. dize, que haziendo un juez buena justicia, resplandece mas su virtud en publico que la de los que hazen penitencia en los desertos: y tanto mas cuanto es mejor aprovechar a muchos que a uno solo. Y aun Jason, y Alberico sobre la I.I. in prin. ss. de iust. & iu. referiendo a Hostiense en el proemio de la suma en la col.4. dizen, que merece por ello mas que los frayles de predicadores (fo.156r). On this issue as treated by Petrarch, Salutati, and (especially) Valla, see Trinkhaus, 1970, ii, 651–82.
22 See below, pp. 177–78, 180.
He is not, he says, requiring anything difficult, such as refraining from marriage or withdrawing from the city or abandoning worldly affairs, but rather that in these very things his hearers should be radiant with virtue. ‘I desire you who pass your lives in the midst of the city to shine with a still more dazzling glory of virtue than those who have withdrawn to hills and desert’, for the reason that ‘all men derive great benefit thereby. No one, having lit his lamp, hides it under a bushel’.23 From this it emerges that Chrysostom is not making any distinctive mention here of the value of the administration of justice apart from the practice of Christian virtue at large; nor is he, as Costa suggests, making a general comparison between the worth of an existence given to administering justice and that of the eremitical life.

As for Jason del Maino (1435–1519), the renowned professor of civil law at Pavia, one does find that a movement towards the position ascribed to him has already taken place with Hostiensis (i.e. Henry of Susa, Cardinal of Ostia (d.1271)). The latter, in the passage mentioned, is concerned to emphasize the existence of two kinds of people—laymen and members of the religious Orders—who lead two different kinds of life, the active and the contemplative, and are therefore concerned with two different kinds of learning: the ‘civil’ and the ‘divine’. In the process, he makes a comparison between the Religious, whose lives are ‘ruled by theology’ and those, on the other hand, whose lives are ‘ruled by the civil law’. Here he mentions ‘faithful advocates and just judges’, leading the vita activa in an upright manner. He adds that ‘if such a life were led in a worthy fashion, it would be more fruitful than the contemplative’.24 This is not yet the same as saying that conscientious and responsible lawyers lead a life that is ‘better’ than the contemplative life. Nevertheless, we find Jason del Maino invoking Hostiensis’s authority to that effect:

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24 ‘Hac [theologia] principaliter reguntur religiosi, specialiter freres cartusienses, praedicatore[s], & minores & hi qui in contemplatione positi, temporalia despiciunt & terrena. […] Civili [lege] vero, principaliter reguntur advocati sидеis & justi iudices vitam activam sine plica ducentes: quae si bene duceretur, magis fructifera esset, quam contemplativa’ (Summa aurea super titulis decretalium (Lyons, 1548), fo.2v).
'upright judges and advocates, applying the laws as they should, lead a better life than preaching friars or other Religious'. This is a conclusion that Costa is happy to take over—giving (as it seems) his own gloss as to merit. The point of view which he thus cautiously but unmistakably suggests here is of the greater interest since, in his treatise at large, he says so little about the Church as an institution.

The duty of the ruler to devote himself to the well-being of the república is the issue upon which Costa next insists. He begins his second chapter with the assertion that it is the duty of the regidor to work in every way possible for society so that its 'authority' is maintained and its happiness increased daily (fo.156v). Here, as he acknowledges, he is echoing words from Patrizi’s De institutione reipublicae, Bk.V, ch.ii, where we find a powerful statement of the Italian Renaissance ideal of man in his role of citizen. Costa goes on to recall Socrates’s words in Plato’s Crito (51a–b) to the effect that our country is more to be valued than our parents and all other forebears. The point is reinforced by reference to Cicero’s De finibus (III,63) and (in the 1584 edition) to De officiis (I,160) where one’s duty to the patria is placed immediately above that owed to one’s parents and immediately behind one’s duty to the gods. Such are its claims upon a man that not even its ingratitude releases him from his debt and obligations towards it.

Extending his argument in Chapter 3, Costa says that it must be the first care of the ruler not only to punish the wicked but to reward the good, thus preventing the former from harming society and...

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25 ‘[..] recti iudices & advocati, utentes legibus prout debent, meliorem vitam faciunt quam frates praedicatores, vel aliqui religiosi’ (In primam Digesti veteris partem praelectiones (Lyons, 1545), fo.4v). (He has just expressed the view, found in the Digest and fostered by the Roman Law generally, that theorists and practitioners of the law are rightly called ‘sacerdotes’). The comparison and claim made here by Jason del Maino was familiar to Pedro de Mercado, in whose Diálogos de philosophia (Granada, 1574) [first edition, 1558], one interlocutor remarks that ‘Y mejor vida dize una glosa que hazen los buenos abogados, que los frayles Francisc[an]os, y con razón. [..]’ (fo.111v).

26 Thus the laudatory terms which Hostiensis at once goes on to apply to Religious, and his criticism of unworthy lawyers, are lost: ‘Sed quod sent hi [sc. the ‘religiösi’] & laudabimus; [ii] enim fecerunt mirabilia in vita sua [..] multi etiam contra veritatem leges & verba a iustitia deviant, divinis saecularia praepostenes’ (loc.cit.).

27 At one point he makes the perhaps significant remark that ‘by the word “church” we understand not the walls of a building but the congregation of faithful people’ (‘[..] por la yglesia no entendemos las paredes, sino la congregación de los fieles’) (fo.77v).
encouraging the latter to serve it. The fitting reward for good men is public honour. However, that reward is not to be sought ‘greedily’: men should desire more to deserve it (by genuine service of the *patria*) than to obtain it (fos.161r–64r). With that important proviso, it is nevertheless right for good men to put themselves forward for public office; indeed failure to do so is tantamount to leaving the well-being of the *patria* abandoned (fos.165v–66r).

The bestowing of public honour on good men is urged as something to be done in imitation of the Romans, whose care in the matter so greatly profited Rome that it made her ‘mistress of the whole world’ (fos.163v–64r). After the same point had been made by Francisco de Monzón in the first edition of his *Espejo del príncipe cristiano*, he was attacked for it and went to the trouble of answering the attack in some detail in his second edition of 1571 (fos. 175r–78r). It emerges that a canonist had protested against the view that the Romans, stirred to deeds of virtue by love of glory, had thus deserved their empire and were favoured by God in the winning of it. This was essentially the view propounded by St Augustine (*De civ.Dei*, Bk.V, ch.xv). Nevertheless, Monzón’s canonist had argued that the Romans were idolaters, and in seeking renown they were in reality seeking vainglory, which is condemned by Christ. This reference to vainglory recalls another passage of Augustine’s work (*Bk.XIX*, ch.xxv) where he argues that there can be no true virtue where there is no true religion.28 Monzón’s counter-argument is in effect a defence of the reality of natural virtue, which he sees as being within the reach of pagans, as issuing in the four cardinal virtues, and as meritig temporal rewards (of which renown is chief), though not the reward of eternal glory, which is kept for the children of faith. The canonist had apparently denied the moral value of the Romans’ deeds with the traditional argument that these were not performed by Christians and were not animated by Christian love (‘charidad’) (fo.178r). His protest against Monzón’s moral endorsement of the Romans’ imperial achievement in fact brings into focus an issue of fundamental importance for Christian admirers of Classical Antiquity: how far and on what grounds could they regard the Ancients as having been capable of truly virtuous acts? As we shall see, the Jesuit Pedro de Ribadeneyra would later find himself in

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28 For a detailed examination of Augustine’s views on this issue, see Wang (1938).
acute discomfort over the matter in his *Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano*. It was, of course, an issue brought to the fore especially by Erasmus in a number of his writings. Costa, from the outset of his treatise, stresses the relevance of the moral teaching of Classical Antiquity to Christians (thereby at least implicitly acknowledging the reality of enlightened pagans’ virtue) rather than that which separated them. It is not surprising, therefore that Costa unproblematically sees the Romans and their empire as providing an example to be followed.

In Chapters 4 and 5 he approaches what are, potentially at least, more practical matters: the qualities requisite in the counsel offered to the ruler and in those who tender it, and the proper discharge of public office by the ruler’s officers. However, he begins by taking up a position of unqualified moral principle. With any matter coming under discussion there are, he says, three points to be considered: first, whether the action in view is morally right or wrong; whether it is beneficial or not to the república; and which of these two should be chosen if they appear to conflict with each other (fo.170v). Costa’s words here closely follow Cicero’s in the *De officiis* (III,7), to which he refers; and the answers he gives to the questions raised amount to an unqualified adoption of Cicero’s position regarding them. The ruler will not take action that is morally wrong, that is not ‘honesto’; nor will he do anything harmful to the república; and where what is morally right appears to conflict with what is beneficial and expedient for the república, he will opt for what is morally right. That which is expedient without at the same time being ‘honesto’ can only have the appearance of being of benefit to the ruler and those he governs, while all that is ‘deshonesto’ is in reality harmful to the república (fo.171r–v).29

The views of the Italian humanists on this issue were not wholly at one. Walter Ullman has pointed out passages in Pontano’s *De obedientia* where it is accepted that, in some circumstances, probity (the honestum) may properly be sacrificed to the interests of public utility (Ullman, 1982, p. 67), and Garin has remarked of Pontano’s *De principe* that it already manifests concepts and impulses to which Machiavelli would give unequalled force (Garin, 1952, p. 1021).

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29 Costa sums the point up in a syllogism: ‘ [...] sólo lo honesto es bueno, y como sólo lo bueno sea provechoso, de aquí se sigue también que sólo lo honesto es provechoso’ (fo.172r).
Nevertheless, Quentin Skinner speaks of how Italian humanist authors of advice-books for Renaissance princes tirelessly reiterate the argument that, where probity and utility might seem to clash, 'honesty is the best policy' (Skinner, 1981, pp. 36–37). Costa in effect alines himself with that position. He makes no mention of Machiavelli, and in alluding to situations where moral right and expediency might seem to conflict, employs notably tentative and general terms: there may in such cases be 'some appearance of doubt [as to the action to be taken] because of the place which the world gives to self-interest, so that what is expedient is often chosen rather than what is morally right' (fos.170v–71r). On the other hand, it is of interest that, throughout this discussion, Costa introduces no specifically Christian objections to the separation of political practice from moral principle.

Turning now to the advice to be offered to the ruler, Costa wishes it to be well-pondered, consistent in direction, and just (fo.173v). The debt he acknowledges here to Giles of Rome (III,ii,[17]) is not obvious; but from Bartolus de Sassoferrato’s brief fourteenth-century treatise *De regimine civitatis* he certainly does derive his remarks on the need for counsellors to be able to distinguish the just from the unjust and to have a right and pure intention in pursuing the public good rather than their own, together with that steadfastness of purpose which is an essential part of justice (fos.174v–75v). Beyond that, Costa is anxious that counsellors should be able to guard their own tongues, and that, when they speak, they do so with a compact brevity (fos.175v–79r).

He makes much of the fact that the chief posts in government go to the rich and well-connected, who then rule as they wish, while men of learning ('letrados') and those who deserve honorific positions by reason of their personal qualities, having no helping hand, are overlooked (fo.180v). In terms reminiscent of Renaissance treatises on nobility and with reference to the French jurist André Tiraqueau’s well-known *De nobilitate*, Costa argues that nobility of birth should bring preference only when noblemen are at least the equal of the more humbly born in their personal qualities and abilities, and when they measure up to their ancestors in their own nobility and virtue (fos.181v–82v).

As for the principles of good government, what Costa stresses is the need for unfailing devotion to the well-being of the whole of society (fo.183v). This is a matter primarily of upholding the laws
and statutes, guided by experience and the advice of experts; for ‘law is of the essence of the government of a city’, but it has only as much life as the ruler gives it (fos.184r–85v). Rulers must also protect the city from the ills arising from idleness and the gatherings of evil men (fo.187v); though judges, punishing the guilty according to the law, will show mercy rather than severity where any doubt about guilt arises (fos.186v–87r).

The treatise ends with reflections on what the ruler may profitably read. In government as in any other activity, the way to perfection is by imitation of models (fo.189v). It was by imitation of good government in the past that Republican Florence had flourished so greatly and Venice continued to do so (fo.191r–v).\(^{30}\) History holds up the exemplary virtues of figures of the past so that we can reform our lives by imitation of them (fos.191v–92r). Rulers in particular will be stirred by the study of history to the performance of heroic deeds that will bring them renown (fo.194v).

In good humanist fashion, Costa finally notes that the advantage of works of history (like those of orators and poets) lies in the fact that they combine profitable content with attractive presentation (‘meollo y corteza’). By contrast, the works of philosophers and mathematicians offer only ‘the bare truth of things’, while works of entertainment, such as Romances of Chivalry and amorous tales, offer nothing more substantial than entertainment (fo.195r–v). In 1578 Costa’s tone on this point is fairly tolerant: such works, even if they do not benefit the reader with the truth as regards the matters with which they deal, at least offer the attraction of a ‘well-devised fiction’ and distract readers from thinking and doing things that are worse (fo.195v). In 1584 he adds that, among such works, there are some that are ‘a pestilence to society’; for with their lascivious tales, their inanities (‘vanidades’) and superstitions, they incite young men and even old ones to evil desires and corrupt behaviour. Such works would be better banned, and ‘it would be of no small value for our Christian religion if bookshops were inspected as mints are’ (Costa, 1584, p. 798).\(^{31}\) It is of interest that Costa, whether he was writing

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\(^{30}\) Costa cites Bartolus de Sassoferrato’s *De regimine civitatis* again for both, and for Venice alone refers to Flavio Biondo, Marcantonio Sabellio, Contarini and Bembo as his authorities (*loc.cit.*).

\(^{31}\) This more censorious attitude towards secular imaginative literature and its alleged immorality seems to have become widespread in Spain in the 1580s, though it did not mark the Index of 1583–84 (see Russell, 1978, pp. 459–67).
in Salamanca or in Zaragoza, implies that this was not happening, despite the Pragmatic of 1558 and subsequent instructions on the subject. Again in 1584 he somewhat expands his earlier remarks on how historical study will aid the ruler in addressing himself to practical issues of his own day: he mentions now the prevention of hunger and shortages among the people and the need to promote honest trading and prevent profiteering, especially in food and wheat. Such profiteering drives the poor to eat things that make them ill, thus spreading disease through society (Costa, 1584, pp. 801–04). However, we again find that Costa still only briefly touches on practical matters of the kind that had so extensively engaged the interest of Fox Morcillo in his own endeavour to portray a ruler who was not merely an abstract concept. Costa’s own range is narrower, and his discussion, despite his similar declaration of intent, largely confines itself to abstract considerations. These, however, relate to issues of primary importance in the intellectual context of his time. His work is, on that account, a valuable document for what it tells us about aspects of intellectual life at Salamanca in the 1570s markedly distinct in outlook and character from the neo-scholasticism with which Salamanca at this time is more readily associated.

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32 Costa refers here to the Declaración de motu proprio que concedió la Santidad de Gregorio XIII en Roma a 14 de mayo de 1578 en materia de panes y frutos (Lérida, 1579) written by Felipe de Urries, O.P., bishop of Barbastro, in Aragon.
CHAPTER SEVEN

JUAN DE CASTILLA Y DE AGUAYO

The title of Juan de Castilla y de Aguayo’s treatise—El perfecto regidor—at once suggests similarities with that of Joan Costa. As we shall see, what chiefly interests the second writer, like the first, is the matter of personal conduct in a public role rather than the larger issues of government, and both set out their ideals of the regidor largely in terms of the four cardinal virtues. However, there is a clear difference between their works. In Costa’s we noted a degree of indefiniteness as regards the office of regidor as envisaged by the author. The scale of the society over which he governs is not made altogether clear. In Castilla’s treatise there is no such uncertainty. It is true that its author recalls the traditional three-fold scheme of advice-books for rulers when, in his Introduction, he declares his aim to be that of ‘portraying [...] a caballero combining such excellent qualities that, both in the government of his own person and household and in that of the commonwealth where he exercises the office of regidor, he might deservedly be described as being perfect in it’ (sig.a3r). Nevertheless, the body of his treatise is concerned—and concerned only—with the regidor seen as one holding a quite specific office within the structures of local government as these existed within the Kingdoms of Castile in the time of Philip II. He is a member of the municipal council presided over by the corregidor on behalf of the King.

The occasion for the colloquy in terms of which the work is cast arises from the fact that a young man, Don Félix—described as a ‘cavallero moço [...] de illustre generación y sangre’—has recently been admitted to the office of regidor at Córdoba, and two more senior regidores, Don Ambrosio and a Doctor of Law, have called upon him with their congratulations. Don Félix had been prompted to purchase the office in question by his sense of ‘the obligation which caballeros have to be useful to the society to which they belong’ (fo.1v–2r). His two senior colleagues now take the opportunity of offering advice on how he should fulfil this obligation. This constitutes the greater part of the ensuing work. Don Ambrosio is presented as a caballero of fine intelligence, much experience of government,
and wide reading in history both ancient and modern. It is from him that we get a number of satirical accounts of the scheming and self-interest at work in local government. The manner of the Doctor of Law tends to be more oppressively learned, especially when, in support of some point he is making, he produces a catena of references to figures of Classical Antiquity. He thus becomes a device whereby Castilla y de Aguayo can make a display of learning about which he appears to feel somewhat apologetic.

Before these two figures settle to offering Don Félix advice on how to perform the role of a veinticuatro, they discuss at some length other broader issues, the first of which is the value to be set on practical experience as distinct from book-learning for those holding public office. Both agree that Don Félix, despite his intelligence and his instruction in Rhetoric, Philosophy and the other Liberal Arts, may not use the title of ‘master’ in his new role until he has graduated in the university of experience (fo.6r–v). Nevertheless, the Doctor is disposed to see book-learning as of more value to a young veinticuatro than Don Ambrosio is, and a debate between them on the matter follows. Ambrosio speaks of ‘the small value of theoretical knowledge without practical experience, not only in matters of government but in almost all the rest [of the things] dealt with in the world [‘lo poco que la scienza Thêôrica aprovecha sin la práctica, no sólo en las materias de governación sino quasi en las demás que se tratan en el mundo’]’ (fo.14r–v). It would make little sense, he reflects, if one wished to pass through the Magellan Straits, to entrust oneself to a vessel whose pilot had never till then sailed ships, even though he was a master in the making of sea-charts at Seville (fos.19r–20v).

In a similar vein much later, in Book III, where the virtue of temperance is under discussion, Ambrosio notes that many Christian and pagan authors had written at length on this topic. He could do the same, presenting once again some part of what they had already said. However,

since much of their philosophy has so little relevance to the practical discharge of the office of regidor that to expound it here would be mere self-indulgence and mean losing the opportunity to seek some [practical] benefit for don Félix, let us leave superfluous things aside and take in hand only what is useful.¹

¹ ‘[... ] mas porque mucha de su philosophia hace tan poco al caso de lo que en el officio de regidores se platica que tratar aqui della seria contentarnos con
In Book I, two whole chapters are taken up with the Doctor of Law's lists of 'kings and captains' of ancient times—great figures including Cicero—whose achievements were bound up with their cultivation of learning and eloquence. Ambrosio's dismissal both of the Doctor's central contention and his way of establishing it has an interest that extends beyond the particular situation:

Let us leave these stories of princes and captains so great and so ancient that what is told about them seems a dream rather than something real and true. Let us instead adjust ourselves to modern things to do with ordinary life. For without our going all the way to Rome, or searching out old men in the Senate, or calling to mind Cicero and Catos, every day provides evidence right outside our front doors to prove the advantages that come from study.²

The question is: what kind of study and what kind of advantages? These words of Ambrosio's bring us to the theme which occupies most of the rest of Book I: how study is of benefit to a man in contemporary Spain, and especially to caballeros and their sons.

'It is truly said that, as there was an Age of Gold and another of Silver, the one we have now is the Age of Learning' (fo.34v). As Ambrosio makes clear in saying this, there are many occasions when arms seem to him better than books, and he also has high regard for those who go off to seek their fortune in places like Peru. However, neither of those ways of life offers as sure a way to position and wealth as 'studying well in colleges', and that, in turn, has much to do with the care with which the King selects men for appointment to public office (fos.32v–33r). It is a time when virtue and hard study will raise some to eminence while vice and idleness will bring others down in the world. The son of a poverty-stricken peasant is able, by study, to become a wealthy prelate, while the idle son of a rich caballero will be reduced to the level of a poverty-stricken escudero, or squire (fo.35r).

² '[...] déxese de contar historias de Príncipes y de Capitanes tan grandes y tan antiguos que lo que dellos se cuenta ya más parece sueño que cosa real y verdadera, y acomódense con las modernas y caseras, que sin yr hasta Roma, ni buscar las vejeces del Senado, ni acordarse de Tulios, ni Catones, bien junto a nuestras casas tiene cada día materia para poder provar con evidencia el fructo que se saca del estudio' (fo.32r–v).
Castilla y de Aguayo clearly approaches this topic not only as an established literary and moral theme but as a feature of contemporary social reality. However, he finds it to be a fact of life that most caballeros and their sons seem quite unwilling to recognize, and on this point Don Ambrosio's language becomes almost violent. It exhausts his patience, he says, to see young second sons of men of consequence so passively accepting the paltry subsistence provided for them by their land ('tan rendidos a la escuderil vivienda de sus tierras') that they do not lift their thoughts beyond it. Indeed, his ears sometimes burn with shame at the very lack of shame felt by these caballeros when they see so many of their social inferiors everyday overtaking them in standing and position, and see too that tomorrow they may very well be only too glad to serve those whom their fathers would not have to serve them yesterday (fo.35r). As regards work in the classroom, he contrasts the attitude of idle, spoilt boys from well-off families with that of poor boys determined to do well, and returns to his point that the day may well come when the former, who at school would not have boys of the latter sort sitting on the same bench with them, will be glad to court their favours (fos.35v–36v). The predominant note continues to be that of shame regarding the more privileged rather than admiration of the less so.

This is true also of the Doctor of Law, who spends some time berating caballeros for generally failing to have their sons educated properly. Such men, he says, bring up their sons at home as if they had wealth enough to leave each of them a mayorazgo. Then, when the father dies, his sons are very often forced by necessity to marry beneath them and often go on to behave in a way that brings dishonour on their families. Fathers fail to have their sons educated by masters possessing 'both Christianity and learning'; they do not make their sons persevere in their studies until they are of an age and discretion to order their own lives and 'to understand the obligations which they have as Christians and gentlemen [caballeros]' (fo.37v).

In a lighter moment, the Doctor gives a satirical account of caballeros who view the study of rhetoric as something only for preachers; see philosophy as best left for melancholy old men; and as regards the learning of languages declare that they are happy with speaking their own as their grandfathers did, who knew no language but Castilian, and pray that their grandsons will do likewise (fos.38v–39r). So, comments the Doctor, the sons of such men 'grow up with their eyes
shut to all the things of the mind but wide open to the commonplace and the trivial’.

All this adds force to Ambrosio’s arguments in favour of the value of education away from home and at a university. That value remains even if a young man learns nothing more than ‘the style and ability to express oneself [“el estilo y buen lenguaje”]’ that one finds in such places; for that in itself will be a valuable possession as regards any manner of life he may wish to take up subsequently. People who have been educated at the university rather than at home can, Ambrosio remarks, be recognized a mile off (fo.41r).

The social value of education is a point further stressed in the following chapter. Fathers should try to make their sons understand that education advances a man to ‘high dignities’. They should themselves realize that an education helps a man to gain credit and standing in the eyes of others and recognition as a man of honour and valour; and that those who are so regarded will find their way to a much better situation, even though they have but a single cape and sword, than rich men who have never emerged from the recesses of their homes. Good fortune is never lacking for the man who possesses the drive and intelligence to go after it (fos.48r–49r).

Castilla y de Aguayo’s concern with the value of education leads on to one of the most notable chapters in the whole of Part I of his treatise: chapter 11, which in its entirety is a eulogy of the work of the Jesuits in his own city of Córdoba. It is with their educational work that he begins. Those who emerge from the discipline and training of the Jesuits, he notes, have a different stamp from those taught by other masters. This he attributes largely to the Jesuits’ concern with the moral and spiritual training of their pupils and the care they devote to ‘the bringing on of plants which will so bear fruit on earth that they will afterwards deserve to be transplanted to heaven’ (fo.56r). This is a point to which Castilla returns: the Jesuits provide an education equipping pupils to gain honour (‘honra’) in this world and blessedness in the other (fo.56v). They teach them to be ‘doctos’, but to be ‘sanctos’ first (fo.57r). In this, their own good example counts for much.

Castilla remarks on the great change in educational achievement brought about by the Jesuits. Previous masters teaching Latin grammar, themselves as skilled in their subject as any subsequently to be found in the Jesuit College at Córdoba, had given priority to
narrowly conceived intellectual aims and, having failed to establish the necessary control and discipline over their pupils, had only negligible success; whereas the Jesuits, attending to discipline and orderliness and establishing these on the basis of Christian doctrine, have few failures (fos.57r–58r). (This was testimony to encourage the Jesuits in the year that saw the publication of their own draft Ratio studiorum, or Scheme of Studies.)

Moreover, as Castilla goes on to stress, the Jesuits have brought about wider changes in the city. They have made the clergy learned and holy, and the laity virtuous and devout (fo.58r). Castilla paints a picture of what one finds taking place if one visits the Jesuit house at Córdoba. One discovers caballeros making their confession, merchants engaged in consultation over the propriety of their transactions, confessors themselves resolving doubts over problems facing them, regidores taking counsel over matters relating to the government of the city, and justices seeking guidance over grave issues (fo.58r–v). Castilla concludes by emphasizing that the Jesuits make their discretion and learning available to all, rich and poor alike, and, whatever the demands on their resources of strength, unwearingly place themselves at the disposal of everyone, responding to the approaches of both the tiresome and the intelligent with an unchanging countenance and suavity of manner (fo.59r).

The following chapter, which brings Part I to a close, is devoted to ‘the great benefit that the blessed Order of the Society of Jesus has brought to the Catholic Church’ (fos.59v ff.). Here Castilla makes

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3 There is an interesting resemblance between this account of Jesuit pedagogy and that found in Cervantes’s ‘El coloquio de los perros’. In his earlier La Galatea (Bk.VI: ‘Canto de Caliope’) Cervantes devotes an encomiastic stanza to Castilla y de Aguayo’s ‘ingenio’, adorned with ‘mil varias ciencias y primores’ [see ed. by J.B. Avalle-Arce, Clásicos castellanos, 2 vols (Madrid, 1961), ii, 219]. This work was published the year before El perfecto regidor, but Astrana Marín (1948, i, 335–36) concludes that Cervantes had already had sight of it or knew that it was soon to appear. Biographers of Cervantes have conjectured that, as a boy, he was for a year or two a pupil at the Jesuit College at Córdoba in the mid-1550s, during his parents’ residence there (Astrana Marín, 1948 i, 349–52; Predmore, 1973, p. 35). If 1553 is accepted as the date of Juan de Castilla’s birth, this excludes the possibility that, as sometimes claimed, Cervantes’s appreciative stanza harks back to a schoolboy association at Córdoba.

4 In an anthology of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish comments on the developing Society of Jesus, Astrain (1912, pp. 672–73) cites a passage on the activities and impact of the Jesuits at Córdoba which he ascribes to ‘el doctor cordobés Andrés de Morales’, writing at the time of Philip III. Morales himself, it is clear, derived much of this passage from the concluding part of Chapter 11 (fos.58r–59r) of Castilla’s treatise. Castilla is not mentioned by Astrain.
much of the heroic and self-sacrificial endeavours of the Order in remote parts of the world, the remarkable ability of its members to adapt themselves to the ‘style and language’ of each region, their skill in securing a favourable disposition from the rulers of the lands to which they have taken the law and truth of the Gospel. As for Ignatius Loyola himself, Castilla sees him as the divinely provided answer to Luther and his followers. On the subject of ‘el endemniado lobo Heresiarcha y sus sequaces’ (fo.60r), Castilla’s words take on a stridency not found at any other point in his work. Indeed, in his treatise at large the polemical tone is rather noticeably absent.

At the outset, the young Don Félix is introduced as one educated in ‘the Jesuit College’ (fo.12r–v)—by implication, the one at Córdoba. This raises the question whether Castilla was himself educated at the same institution. Ramírez de Arellano (1922, p. 119a) remarks that nothing is known of Castilla’s life and studies prior to his becoming a veinticuatro in 1575. On the other hand, the Jesuits established their College at Córdoba in the very year, as it appears, that Castilla was born there, in 1553, and according to Farrell (1938, p. 112) it had three hundred students only three years later. The Jesuits’ own official correspondence shows that the education which they offered there soon came to be appreciated by the local nobility. One Jesuit, writing to Francisco Borja, by then General of the Order, in September 1572, reports that the College then had more than 600 students, among them all the sons of the caballeros of the city.\(^5\) Nearly ten years earlier, in August 1563, the Conde de Lerma, with his sons, and the Marqués del Campo, along with ‘many caballeros’, had been among those who attended the College for the celebration of the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament (ARSI, Hisp.100, fo.270r). The College was deemed a suitable establishment for the education of the young Luis de Góngora. It seems very likely, therefore, that Juan de Castilla was himself a pupil there. If so, his treatise takes on further interest as the statement of a well-born Spaniard educated by an Order that was to have a far-reaching influence on Spanish Siglo de Oro culture.\(^6\)

In any case, Castilla’s admiring account not only of the Jesuit College but also of the Jesuit house at Córdoba calls for comment.

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5 [A]rchivio [R]omano [S]ocietatis [I]esu, Hisp.117, fo.156r–v. For this and the following information relating to the situation of the Jesuits at Córdoba at this time, I am much indebted to the kindness of my colleague Dr Nigel Griffin.

6 Castilla’s account of the educational and social role of the Jesuits at Córdoba should now be seen in the context of J.W. O’Malley’s illuminating study of The First Jesuits (1993); see especially chapters 6 and 7.
A Jesuit writing from Seville to his Vicar General at Rome in December 1572 reported that, while the noble classes of Córdoba sent their sons to the College there, they did not (save for a few individuals) visit the associated Jesuit house—on the grounds that those residing there included people with Jewish blood in their veins (ARSI, Hisp.118, fo.30r–v). For the same reason the sons of well-born Córdoba families, should they feel called to the religious life, would take themselves to the local Dominican or Franciscan houses, not to the Jesuit one, even when they had been educated at the Jesuit College (ARSI, Hisp.117, fo.156r–v; 118, fo.30r–v). In the decade after El perfecto regidor was published, another Jesuit at Córdoba was again writing to Rome about the intensity of local feeling regarding any trace of Jewish ancestry and the great care that the Society had in consequence to take over accepting those few there who sought to join its ranks (ARSI, Hisp.136, fo.73r). Seen in this context, Juan de Castilla’s eulogistic portrayal both of the Jesuits’ College and of their house at Córdoba appears interestingly untypical of the local attitudes of the class to which he belonged and perhaps even indicates a reaction against them.7

His work at large displays various features which, taken together, suggest Jesuit influence, however mediated: a stress on respect for the institutional Church, a sense of the importance of formal religious observance, a regard for demonstrative expressions of piety, a belief in the value and importance of frequent confession. Again, Castilla takes a view of the life of virtuous activity in this world that is wholly at one with the central aim and achievement of Jesuit education as he describes it: the equipping of pupils to gain honour in this world and blessedness in the other. For him virtues are means for attaining not only eternal but also temporal bienes; on the other hand, the practice of virtue in this world ‘buys’ the ‘enduring treasures of heaven’ (fos.155r–56r).

With Book II, Castilla addresses himself to the specific subject of his treatise: how the young Don Félix is to make himself ‘a perfect regidor’. His first task on joining the city council will be to establish moral credit in the eyes of his colleagues. This will be the more

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7 It is perhaps significant in this context that Castilla does not, in his treatise, indulge in anti-Jewish or anti-converso remarks. Dr J.H. Edwards points out to me that, in the fifteenth century, various members of the Aguayo family at Córdoba had been prominently hostile towards the conversos.
difficult because those colleagues will be inclined to interpret his motives in terms of the self-interest that generally characterizes their own. A man who has bought himself a post as a regidor will not find it easy to believe that Don Félix has joined the city council with a view to spending his own resources in promoting the public interest rather than to seek private gain (fos.68r–71r). Two basic rules therefore must be observed by the young man: he must never get involved in bargaining with colleagues for their votes, and he must maintain a position of complete moral consistency both inside and outside the council chamber (fos.71v–72v). On these principles his freedom of action to work in the interests of the public good rest; put in other terms, ‘no one will be able to perform the office of a veinticuatro well if he performs that of a Christian badly’ (fo.74v).

Castilla now begins his exposition of the particular virtues that Don Félix will need to practise. He at once excludes the ‘theological virtues’ of Faith, Hope, and Charity, which, as Ambrosio says, are better dealt with by Professors of Holy Scripture or someone with greater understanding than he possesses (fos.75v–76r). He will keep to the cardinal virtues, and at once acknowledges that the two of these most necessary for a man involved in government may well seem to be prudence and justice. However, since Don Félix will be one of a body of fifty or so people, ‘an average measure of prudence’ will suffice for him as he seeks to do what he ought to do as one of that number; and the same goes for the virtue of justice, so long as he seeks to ensure that the laws of the kingdom and the ordinances of the city are upheld (fo.76v). Already we see here an approach that will characterize the whole of Castilla’s subsequent account of a ‘perfect regidor’. He employs the traditional scheme of the four cardinal virtues, but subordinates this scheme to his perception of what is required for the discharge of the specific office with which he is concerned and which he sees as belonging to the world of everyday reality. He does not allow the inherited scheme to take over his discussion and thereby give it a generalized and theoretical character. It is a point stressed by Castilla himself, especially at the end of Book II, where he explains why he has omitted from his discussion certain traditional subordinate parts or aspects of the virtues of fortitude and justice. In the words of the Doctor:

in any matter we examine here, my aim is not to make a display of what I know, but to say what I should like you to know in order to perform the office of regidor as perfectly as you perform that of a
caballero. Therefore, of the moral virtues, it has seemed to me right to deal with only so much as is relevant to that aim.\footnote{[...] en cualquiera materia que tratamos no pretendo mostrar lo que yo sé sino dezir lo que querría que v.m. supiesse para hazer el oficio de Regidor con la perfección que hase el de Cavallero. Y así de las virtudes morales solamente me ha parecido tratar aquello que hiziere al propósito desto (fo.134r–v).}

Accordingly, he begins his account of the cardinal virtues with that of fortitude, which Don Félix will need more than any of the other three in the situation in which he finds himself. It is to that virtue that he must look for strength to resist four powerful enemies, that is, things contrary to the proper discharge of his duties as a regidor. These are: (1) fear of angering the Corregidor; (2) a morally compromising sense of obligation to one’s friends and relatives; (3) resentment against those who have done one an injury; (4) love of one’s own self-interest (fos.76v–77r). This and the next four chapters elaborate the various ways in which these concerns tend to undermine a regidor’s integrity and resolution to do as he ought.

We have already seen that the corregidor emerges from these pages as a threatening and fearsome figure. As for the picture of city councils at large, it is anything but idealized. The proceedings of such bodies are dominated by calculations of individual or group interest. ‘Certain it is that the debts that one regidor owes another lie at the root of most of the ills of society’ (fo.103v). ‘For everything that one regidor does for another in the council is done with a view to being thanked for it’ (fo.107r).

Against all this Don Félix must stand firm. In the face of each of the four different kinds of pressure that will bear upon his judgement and his actions he will hold to a resolute desire to please God and serve the república. If he does this he can count on it that ‘in payment for his labours he has a bill of exchange accepted in the bank of heaven’; and if meanwhile, here on earth, he cannot do without some help with expenses on the way, let him content himself with the honour and esteem that he will earn by discharging his office with such independence and virtue (fo.101v).

In the remaining six chapters of Part II Castilla y de Aguayo moves on to his next cardinal virtue: justice. Broadly following Aristotle’s Ethics (Book V), he divides this into two kinds: ‘legal’ and ‘moral’. The former ‘covers the whole manner of governing societies and the laws made to that end’; the latter relates to the activity of
the individual and 'proceeds from reason' (fo.108v). The second interests Castilla more than the first. However, he does air the question whether, or how far, a regidor who has sworn to uphold his city's ordinances should feel obliged to do so when these ordinances are very ancient and long since out of date. Ambrosio notes that regidores generally vary their position on this issue according to their own interests, either declaring that they must stand firmly by the ordinances they have sworn to uphold or urging that times change and men must change with them (fos.114v–15r). The Doctor of Law characteristically shows himself an arch-conservative in this matter. He is reluctant to concede that established ordinances may ever be changed, and allows the possibility only in the face of the most pressing and evident necessity and on the basis of total unanimity among the members of the council (fos.115r–19r). Castilla, however, gives much more space to expounding the second of his divisions of justice in its bearing on the regidor. The scheme in terms of which justice is analysed and expounded is, in its core, the one that came down from Cicero and which we found Fox Morcillo following. So we are again taken through 'piedad', 'faithfulness', 'truthfulness', 'virtuous fear', 'obedience', 'severity', 'affability', 'gratitude', and 'religion'.

These are all now seen as virtues which the individual regidor must practise within the context of the cabildo, or council, of which he is a member. Thus, he will speak out the truth plainly and not, as so often happens, do so with such ambiguity, for fear of offending anyone, that no one, hearing it, will recognize it for what it is (fo.122v). 'Severity' here means not allowing one's personal feelings for friends and kinsmen to stand in the way of doing what is right (fo.126r). As for 'affability', he presents it in markedly contemporary and social terms. Thus he urges afabilidad among regidores no less when they have voted against each other than when they have been in agreement. This is a matter both of justice and of good policy (fos.127v–28r). He looks for it also in regidores carrying out special commissions of the cabildo. But beyond that he holds it up as a general ideal applicable to a certain level of society: 'Assuredly, affability is a thing

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9 However, 'piedad', as used by Castilla, does not quite correspond to Cicero's 'pietas'. The latter was that part of justice 'per quam sanguine coniunctis patriaeque benivolum officium et diligens tribuitur cultus' (De inventione, II, 161). For Castilla, 'piedad' has the sense of 'pity' and 'compassion'—for the poor in prison, for widows, for those who go hungry when crops fail.
that appears well in *caballeros* and people of consequence, and the
higher their social standing, the more affable they should show them-
selves with the ordinary people with whom they have to do' (fo.128v).
This, however, is far from what is often the case. In words that
recall Fox Morcillo on the same point (see above, p. 47), Castilla
remarks that too often such people assert their authority over others
in the form of boorish behaviour and rest their esteem for them-
selves on contempt for their fellows, 'so that one can say of them
what is said generally of Spaniards, that the only honour they are
capable of possessing is that which they can take from others'.
As regards 'religion',

> It is the particular obligation of *regidores, caballeros*, and persons of stand-
ing in the society to which they belong, to make more display than
others in matters of religion, by frequenting churches and behaving
with much devotion there, showing respect for the priests and minis-
ters of the Church and humbly obeying her precepts, bestowing favour
and help on those performing public acts of piety or penitence, going
to witness them and being the first to attract attention in these and
all others matters of Christian observance, for devout and religious
*caballeros* can and do confer no small benefit in the towns where they
live.'

Thus, if men of the ordinary sort saw that all *caballeros* made their
confession frequently, as some of them do, there would not be so
many who waited from one year to the next to do it (fo.178v). Castilla is very much aware that actual practice is often far from
what he is recommending. He laments that some men of high stand-
ing in the community behave in church as improperly as they might
in the town square, and attend divine service as they do 'farsas' in
the theatre, setting a deplorable example to the people (fo.132r).
Reflecting that 'some *caballeros*, young in years or brains, act as lewdly

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10 '[...]' porque ponen su autoridad en la mala crianza, y la estimación de sus
personas en el menosprecio de las agenas, y que por ellos se podrá dezir aquello
que generalmente se dize de los Españoles, y es, que no saben tener más honra
de la que pueden quitar a los otros' (fo.128v).

11 'Y es la obligación particular que los Regidores y cavalleros y personas prin-
cipales en sus Republicas tienen de tratar las cosas de su religión con mayor demon-
stración que los otros, frecuentando los sacros templos y estando con mucha devoción
en ellos, respetando los sacerdotes y ministros de la yglesia, y obedeciendo con
humildad los preceptos della, dando favor y ayuda a los que hacen actos públicos
de piedad o penitencia, assistiendo con ellos y siendo los primeros que se señalan
en estas y en todas las demás cosas de Christianidad, que no es pequeño el fructo
que pueden hazer y hazen en sus pueblos los Cavalleros devotos y religiosos (fo.131v).
in church as they might do in the countryside’, Castilla fears that the same divine punishment may fall upon Spain as once fell upon Constantinople for the same reason (fo.133v).

In Book III Castilla moves on to the remaining cardinal virtues: prudence and—briefly—temperance. Claiming to follow Aristotle’s *Ethics* (Book VI), he lays it down that ‘prudence is that which shows us how to distinguish between the false and the true and to make a good choice’ ['hacer buena elección'] in things causing us perplexity and doubt’ (fo.137r). Echoes of the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises* seem to be heard here. In the course of the ensuing three chapters, Castilla commends ‘virtuous astuteness’ in the regidor, especially when it comes to ensuring that good, well-qualified, men are appointed ‘commissaries’ of the city council to carry out its agreed will in a given matter. Many of the ills, he remarks, suffered by the cities of Castile derive from the small care taken over this matter (fos.145r, 148r). As regards prudence more broadly conceived, it leads men ‘to fear what self-interest and opportunity are capable of when they come together’ (fo.146r). Most of the ills of the world have their origin in that conjunction. Castilla picks out two further sub-divisions of prudence for particular mention. ‘Caution [“caución”]’ addresses itself to the danger of being deceived by others. Thus, the regidor will suspect and scrutinize the hidden motives behind a proposal made by a colleague ‘because no one in city councils lacks reasons to prove that what is good for him in particular is the common good’ (fo.149r). On the other hand, Castilla is anxious to distinguish this ‘caución’ from ‘cautela’, which seeks to deceive others, and also from ‘an ill-disposed suspiciousness’ of mind (fo.148r–v, 150r)—though how effectively, in the second case, one may doubt. With ‘caución’ he brackets ‘ providencia’, or foresight, by which the present ills of the república are mended and future ones are prevented. In this virtue lies ‘almost the whole office of regidores’ (fo.151r).

As for his one chapter on the virtue of temperance, we have already noted (p. 150 above) Castilla’s disinclination, on grounds of irrelevance, to go over again what many Christian and pagan writers have already written on the subject. More particularly, it would in his judgement be a waste of effort to spend time condemning extravagant expenditure on dress and food such as one sees in Spain nowadays (fo.153r–v). It is better to let God provide the remedy or time work its usual way with superfluities. What is relevant to the particular case of regidores is the consideration that most of the errors
they commit in office have two sources: greed for riches and the desire for power. Temperance controls both (fos.153v–54r).

Castilla concludes this chapter by insisting—as, he notes, Cicero had done in his own discussion of temperance [De officiis, III, 116–20]—that the ‘useful’ and the morally good (the utile and the honestum) are inseparable (fo.154r–v). On this he stands entirely with Costa.

Thus Castilla’s account of the cardinal virtues in their bearing on the regidor comes to an end. A further ten chapters remain. Of these, the first four are centred on the topic that true honour or reputation (‘honra’) is necessarily based on true virtue. This leads Castilla to the conclusion that, when caballeros cease to be more virtuous than the common people, their right to be treated with higher honour than the rest also ceases (fo.160r). He shows little inclination to hold inherited social pre-eminence in esteem when it is no longer accompanied by personal virtue. This theme continues through the next three chapters, which are on the origins of the term ‘hidalgo’ and the essence of ‘hidalguia’. He writes in pessimistic terms of the moral character of society in his own time (fo.169r), but on the other hand claims that those who have reached positions of social eminence have almost all done so by virtue rather than by favour and scheming (fo.171r).

Looking at this matter from another angle, Castilla stresses in three further chapters the value to society at large that derives from the example set by ‘virtuous, Christian caballeros’. ‘Virtue’ and ‘holiness’ in such people have more effect on others than the same qualities in a friar, where they are more expected (fo.177v). Castilla therefore goes on to observe that however fine a figure a caballero cuts in a fiesta, he will look still better in the eyes of the world visiting a prison, seeking to advance the cases of the poor, and coming to their help with his own resources (fo.180r). The houses of Christian caballeros derive more honour from the patched capes of the poor than from the curious livery of footmen and pages, and no retinue of servants does so much for a man’s standing as to be surrounded by orphans and widows seeking and receiving support and assistance (fo.180r–v).

The final section of this treatise takes on a more homiletic tone as Castilla argues, at some length, that ‘just as, without virtue, one cannot achieve true honra [. . .] neither can one who lacks holiness possess true contentment in this life’ (fo.185r). Echoing St Augustine, Ambrosio declares that ‘the heart of man has so great an emptiness within it that it cannot be filled by any other than God’ (fo.186r).
The pleasures of this life, and especially those of the senses, obtained by way of moral error, are things merely insubstantial (fos.186v–87v). On the other hand, 'it is a plain fact, easily recognized, that, in the contentment they know, virtuous and good Christians have the advantage over those who are not’ (fo.201r–v).

For most of this treatise, Castilla’s concern with ‘virtuous and good Christians’ is of a different kind. In his Dedicatory Epistle to Francisco de Mendoza, Admiral of Aragon and Marqués de Guadaleste, Castilla acknowledges that it is his aim in this work to show that it is a more practical possibility than is commonly thought to combine holiness with the character of a caballero (‘juntar la sanctidad con la Cavallería’) (sig.a5r–v). This is the ideal he embodies in the figure of the young Don Félix, in whom, we are told, ‘virtue and ability, holiness and learning join together’ (fo.12v). Thus he holds the promise of becoming ‘a perfect regidor’, combining—as the treatise as a whole urges him to do—a genuinely Christian character with the personal and social attributes of a caballero in the fulfilment of a defined social role—that of a veinticuatro—through which he achieves his personal commitment to the public good. It is an ideal at once personal and civic, expressed in terms of an active participation in the life of contemporary Spanish urban society. As we have seen, Don Félix is presented as a product of the Jesuit college at Córdoba, and it is very likely that the author of this work was also one. On those grounds one may see this treatise as expressing, within the limits that he set for it, the particular pattern of values which that Order sought to inculcate through its schools with the purpose of creating an educated Catholic laity.
CHAPTER EIGHT

JERÓNIMO CASTILLO DE BOBADILLA

Myron P. Gilmore, concluding his study of ‘The Lawyers and the Church in the Italian Renaissance’, observed that ‘it is clear that the lawyers not only reflected but also positively contributed to the growth of a secular attitude in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italy’ (Gilmore, 1963, p. 83). In the course of this study, Gilmore examines the outlook of Jason del Maino and two of his most celebrated pupils, Filippo Decio and Andrea Alciato. Of particular interest for our own purposes is Alciato’s treatise *Contra vitam monasticam* of ca. 1515, where he attacks the very *raison d’être* of the monastic life, arguing, in Gilmore’s words, that ‘the life of Christians who live in the world as Christians but free from sacred vows is more acceptable to God than a separate order set apart from the world and presumed to accumulate a special merit in heaven’ (Gilmore, 1963, p. 80). (The work, as Gilmore points out, was of considerable interest to Erasmus.) We have seen a similar view expressed, though somewhat less radically, by Joan Costa. We shall find it in the works of other Spanish writers. It was an evidently contentious feature of Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla’s *Política para corregidores y señores de vassallos* (Madrid, 1597). This is a work that serves to justify Gilmore’s remark that ‘the many tomes of [legal] consilia, case books, commentaries, and treatises on special subjects need to be searched to investigate further the attitude of the lawyers toward the ecclesiastical establishment’ (Gilmore, 1963, p. 83). While Castillo’s *Política* is too extensive to allow a detailed study here of the treatise as a whole for the

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1 A decade later, in his study of ‘Lawyers and Early Modern Culture’, Bouwsma wrote: ‘Lawyers represented the growing assumption that life in the world is only tolerable when it is conceived as a secular affair and that the world’s activities must be conducted according to manageable principles of their own rather than in subordination to some larger definition of the ultimate purpose of existence. By applying this assumption to solve the constantly changing problems of their societies, lawyers were, in a manner far more effective than that of any abstract philosopher, the supreme secularizers of their world’ (see Bouwsma, 1990, pp. 129–53 (p. 142)). D.R. Kelley’s discussion of ‘The Philosophical Significance of Renaissance Jurisprudence’ (1976) is another study of fundamental importance; see also Kelley (1988).
purpose indicated by Gilmore, certain significant features of Castillo's outlook, and of his work's reception, can nevertheless be noted.  

As he explains, he wrote his *Política para corregidores y señores de vas-sallos* to assist, in particular, 'los corregidores de espada y capa'—men of intelligence but lacking professional legal training—in the discharge of their duties: hence its being written in the vernacular (sig. *a3v*). He clearly felt that this needed some justification. At one point he observes that many works dealing with such weighty matters as theology and the mysteries of the Faith had been permitted in the vernacular: *a fortiori* it must be acceptable for a vernacular treatise on legal matters to be brought out.  

It is not clear whether this passage was interpolated after Castillo ran into difficulties on this score with the authorities, but those difficulties did occur. At first, the Council of Castile refused a licence for the printing of the work, stipulating that it be published in Latin. In response, Castillo turned to the Cortes (2 May 1595) for its support and that body agreed to take the matter up. A year later the work in its vernacular form had been approved and a licence for its printing issued (Tomás y Valiente, 1975, p. 181).

Its character is that of a *vademecum* offering guidance and instruction on how the *corregidor* should conduct himself in office and deal with the multitude of different issues likely to present themselves. Its approach is practical. In terms that recall the words of Fox Morcillo and others on the same point, Castillo makes plain that his aim is *not* to present an ideal picture of the perfect *corregidor* in the manner of Plato, for that would be a notion devised in the mind rather than something encountered in nature; and human nature is frail and perfection rarely found (i, 380a–b). The work is a good deal enlivened by Castillo's references to persons and features of life in the Spain

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2 Castillo receives repeated mention in L.A.A. Thompson's illuminating recent discussion of 'Absolutism, Legalism and the Law in Castile 1500–1700' (= Thompson, 1996).

3 With regard to vernacular religious works in circulation he writes that 'aun las [materias] deste género (por tenerse por conveniente instruir al pueblo Christiano) andan impresas en Romance, como son las Epístolas y Evangelios y diversos tratados, que debaxo de diversos títulos son sermonarios y declaraciones de los Evangelios, sin muchos otros libros de sumas y casos de conciencia, y otras materias que contienen mucha Teología y Artículos de Fe, cuales son las obras de los doctíssimos padres fray Luys de Granada, fray Alonso de Orozco, fray Luys de León, fray Bartolomé de Medina, fray Antonio de Córdova, y fray Manuel Rodríguez, y mil otros: [...] (i, 741b–42a).
of his time and by his reflexions of a more general character. He was familiar with various of the works with which we are concerned in this study. He praises Castilla y de Aguayo’s *El perfecto regidor* for its words on the education of the young and refers frequently to Camós y Requesens’s *Microcosmia*, to which we shall come later. He had also read Cerdán de Tallada’s *Visita de la cárcel*. However, the feature of the work of chief interest here is its insistence on the authority and claims of the secular order of government as contrasted with those of the ecclesiastical order.

Already in his Preface he makes clear his sense of the importance of maintaining justice and peace as a means of promoting the power and wealth of society (i, 4). A concern with the importance of the material aspect of society underlies the whole of his introductory chapter, which addresses itself to the question: ‘Which is the better kind of society, the one drawn up by Plato, or the one set out by Aristotle?’ Castillo has admiring words for both writers, but as regards this issue declares himself firmly for Aristotle, on the grounds that Plato, in his *Republic* [III,416D; V,457C–D], proposes that all things should be possessed in common [by his ‘Guardians’] while Aristotle allows private property. The importance of this lies in the fact that Castillo sees the possession of private wealth as essential for the exercise of virtue and the performance of socially important acts, such as the building of churches and hospitals (i, 16b). Thus, to advance from the virtue of liberality to that of ‘magnificence’ is not possible ‘without having one’s own resources and living a civic existence in secular terms [“sin tener propios, biviendo en vida ciudadana secularmente”]’ (i, 16b). Castillo is wholly unpersuaded by Plato’s belief that, in a society where all is held in common, individuals will find a sufficient reward and stimulus for performing virtuous deeds in the acquiring of honour among their fellows thereby [see *Republic*, V,465D–E.]. His own estimate of human nature is very different: people do not greatly care about the common benefit, and in the kind of society portrayed by Plato, individuals would not in fact perform the sorts of deed that ought to be performed for others because they would lack the reward that self-interest looks for (i, 16b–17a).

Castillo has already noted on the basis of his own experience that

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4 All references will be to the edition of Madrid, 1597.
5 Castillo renews this point in Book II, Chapter i (i, 383a).
he never came across concord save where people were in possession of their own things, ‘porque cada qual defiende su capa’ (i, 15b).

It is implicit that the possession of property is a proper attribute of the family, and Castillo now goes on to develop the argument that a well-ordered family is the image of the city and that ‘the just government of a household is the true model for the government of society [“la república”]’ (i, 20a–b). The importance for him of this analogy lies in the fact that he sees the authority of the head of a household as being of the same kind as the ‘supreme authority’ attaching to the ruler of a society, and as a pointer to what this authority in society should be like.

This concern with authority gives a particular nuance to Castillo’s treatment, a few pages earlier, of the topic of the analogy between the human body and society. His purpose is to establish the contention that monarchy is better than any of the other recognized forms of government. So he lays it down that forms of government are of greater excellence in the measure that they approximate to the number ‘one’, and monarchy is government by ‘one head and leader [“caudillo’”] (i, 13b). The more a thing resembles the divine, the more perfect it is; and because kings rule on behalf of (‘por’) God, and God is one in substance and nature, and because every soul must be subject to the higher power (‘súbdita al poder más supremo’), and ‘as the members of the body are subject to the head, which signifies the lordship [“señorío”] of one, so government by one is more excellent than other kinds’ (i, 14a). The echoing of relevant biblical commonplaces here adds force to the stress which Castillo places on the proper supremacy of the monarchical ruler over the society he governs.6

He brings his chapter to a close with a series of definitions of society. Thus, with reference to Aristotle’s Politics [III,i; IV,i], he asserts that ‘society is an ordered association of citizens, or [. . .] an ordered association of those who govern cities’. Finally, it is ‘the wealth [“la hacienda”] of the people’.7 Or again, in conclusion,

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6 When Castillo returns to the analogy of society and the human body at the opening of Book III, it is again to stress that ‘in the body of society there are parts inferior to others’, and that the very basis of social order is ‘the reverence and respect of subjects for those who govern them’. (ii, 4a–b)

7 ‘República es un orden de los ciudadanos, o es un orden de los que gobernán las ciudades, según Aristóteles, o según Cicerón y otros, República es la hacienda del pueblo [. . .]’ (1,21a). In this second case, Castillo refers to Cicero, De república,
'society consists of the just government of many families, and of what is common to them, with the exercise of supreme authority ["[. . .] República es un justo gobierno de muchas familias, y de lo común a ellas, con suprema autoridad" (i, 21a)].

Throughout this chapter and in particular in its concluding section, Castillo’s account of society, apart from a reference to churches and Religious (along with hospitals) as desirable features of society, has nothing to say about purposes and ends beyond the limits of earthly existence. His treatise as a whole conveys the impression that his primary interest concerning government is very much directed towards this world. However, the most arresting feature of the conclusion of this chapter is that, as Castillo acknowledges, his final definition of society is taken from the work which has come to be seen as in a particularly decisive way ushering in the modern world of political thought: *Les Six Livres de la République* of the French lawyer Jean Bodin.8

T.M. Parker (1955, p. 169) has written of the latter as follows:

[. . .] Bodin, the king of *politiques*, was broadly Aristotelian in outlook, even though he regarded the Stagirite as an opponent and attacked his views in detail. That is to say, Bodin conceives the State as a natural and necessary feature of human life and studies it upon historical lines. Political science is for him, as for Aristotle and Machiavelli, an inductive study with its own rules, not a department of theology. And his main doctrine is, as has been said by Mesnard, an affirmation of ‘the value and power of order’.9

The manner in which *Les Six Livres* . . . developed this doctrine soon drew criticism, and a few years before Castillo published his own work, the question had arisen whether the Spanish version of Bodin’s treatise made by Gaspar Añastro Ysunza and published at Turin in 1590 should be allowed to circulate in Spain.10 Its publication at

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8 The original French edition appeared in 1576; the revised Latin version by Bodin himself appeared in 1586. For a discussion of the character and relations of the two editions, see McRae (1962, pp. A10b, A28a–38b).

9 Parker’s reference is to Mesnard, 1951, p. 546.

10 Gaspar Añastro Ysunza was Treasurer General to Philip II’s daughter Catalina, now married to the Duke of Savoy. In his prefatory remarks, he takes a dismissive view of most earlier writing on government, even that of Plato and Aristotle (fo. 2v). The experience of the intervening 2000 years shows us, he says, that political
Turin had, it was claimed, been ‘with the permission of the Inquisitors’. After it had arrived in Spain, announcing itself as *Los seis libros de la república de Iuan Bodino [. . . ] emendados cathólicamente*, and had been held up by the inquisitors of Murcia, the Council of the Inquisition sought a report on it from two of its examiners. One of these, Francisco Dávila, was severe in his condemnation. This author, he declared, never mentioned the Trinity, rarely mentioned Jesus Christ, and though he talked of different forms of society and government, failed ever to speak of the Christian society (‘la República christiana’) established by the wisdom of God. Dávila concluded that he must be a heretic (see Pinto Crespo, 1983, p. 222). His characterization of Bodin’s treatise was in fact taken over from a denunciation of the unamended version of that work by the Italian Jesuit Antonio Possevino, whose observations were published at Rome in 1592 (see below, p. 278). The *Suprema*, however, adopted the more moderate judgement of Dávila’s colleague and, in August 1594, ordered not the banning of *Los seis libros . . .* but its further expurgation.11 There is some probability that Castillo had himself used Añastro’s translation of Bodin’s treatise.12

This work begins with the definition which Castillo has adopted: ‘République est un droit gouvernement de plusieurs ménages et de ce qui leur est commun avec puissance souveraine’, or, as its English translator renders it, ‘A Commonweale is a lawful government of many families, and of that which unto them in common belongeth,

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11 Pinto Crespo, 1983, p. 222, gives further details. I have been unable to consult the work by M. Avilés to which he refers: ‘A propósito de la censura inquisitorial de “Los seis libros de la República” de Juan Bodino’ (Ponencia del Simposio interdisciplinario de la Inquisición Medieval y Moderna, Dinamarca, septiembre de 1978).

12 The 1597 edition of the *Política para corregidores* provides a few page references to an edition of Bodin’s work. These correspond more closely to the pagination of Añastro’s version than to any of the Latin editions that I have been able to consult. It does not seem likely that Castillo read French. His rendering, at the end of his opening chapter, of Bodin’s definition of society corresponds exactly to Añastro’s rendering of it as found at the very start of Bodin’s treatise.
with a puissant soveraigntie’ (Knolles, 1606, p. 1). In Bodin’s own revised Latin version, the definition reads: ‘Respublica est familiarum rerumque inter ipsas communium summa potestate ac ratione moderata multitudo’, and to this Castillo’s Spanish rendering, as is evident, closely corresponds.\(^{13}\)

While this and other allusions to Bodin have been noted by various scholars, it apparently remains to be pointed out that Castillo’s introductory chapter as a whole is based on Book I, chapter 2 of *The Six Books*. . . . Thus Castillo’s attack on Plato’s *Republic* for advocating common possession of things (and even of wives) in a world where the words ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ would not exist follows that of Bodin, though perhaps reinforcing it; his words holding up the well-ordered family as an image of the city, and the government of a household as a model for the government of society, are a straight translation of the other text. Furthermore, his assessment of human nature corresponds to that of Bodin, who writes that

> that which thou shoudest dearely love must be thine owne, and that also all thine: whereas communitie is [...] the mother of contention and discord [...] for wee ordinarily see things in common and publick to be of every man smally regarded and neglected, except it be to draw some privat and particular profit thereout of (Knolles, 1606, p. 12 [following the expanded Latin version of 1586, p. 12]).\(^{14}\)

Again, as regards the origins of human society, Castillo concurs with Bodin: ‘Yea Reason, and the verie light of nature, leadeth us to beleeve very force and violence to have given course and beginning unto Commonweals’ (Knolles, 1606, p. 47);\(^ {15}\) and just as Bodin rejects the ‘heroicall and golden worlds’ conjured up by Classical writers claiming that the first kings were chosen for their justice and virtue, so Castillo rejects the ‘imaginaciones poéticas’ of ancient writers who presented society as having taken its origins in the practices of peaceful trading whose patron was Mercury (i, 10a). Rather, it arose out

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\(^{13}\) Maravall (1955, p. 90), notes that Spanish writers habitually render Bodin’s celebrated definition in the terms ‘con autoridad suprema [or] superior’—rather than employ the word ‘soberanía’. It appears that Castillo was the first writer in the Iberian Peninsula to take over Bodin’s definition (Albuquerque, 1978, p. 162).

\(^{14}\) For Knolles’s treatment of the 1576 French and 1586 Latin editions of Bodin’s treatise, see McRae (1962, pp. A38a–52b).

\(^{15}\) ‘La raison & lumière naturelle nous conduit à cela, de croire que la force, & violence a donné source, & origine aux Républiques’ (1576 edn., p. 50 [= Bk.I, ch. vi]).
of the need to confront the basic fact that ‘by nature all men want more for themselves than for others’ (i, 11a). Thus, in order to maintain the social existence of mankind and remedy the prevalent ‘scorn for the common good’,

it was necessary to check and put down the frenzy and arrogance of men by means of laws and judges, prison and sword, and other punishments, in order to keep under control those who, refusing the restraint of reason, lived according to their appetites.16

For Castillo, it is Cain, not Mercury, who stands at the beginnings of human society. There is a stark contrast on this issue between him and Fox Morcillo, for whom the origins of society are to be found in man’s rational nature and desire for association with his fellows, and not in the need to suppress lawlessness.17

Neither here nor subsequently does Castillo present, or argue on the basis of, a developed theory of ‘sovereignty’. Instead, he is concerned with royal jurisdiction, especially in cases where this may come into conflict with jurisdiction and privileges of an ecclesiastical kind. No doubt, his studies in canon law were of assistance to him in dealing with these issues. However, the emphasis of Castillo’s argument very much falls not on the limitations of the royal jurisdiction but on its extent and prerogatives, together with the powers of the courts and officers of the Crown, in the promotion and protection of the good of society at large; and his eagerness to emphasize this may well owe something to his reading of Bodin as well as to his evident familiarity with the tradition of the Roman Civil Law.

Castillo looks back to the medieval debate concerning the Two Swords.18 In this he was assisted by his reading of Camós’s recently published Microcosmia on the subject, as his references show. However, the position at which he arrives is significantly different in emphasis.

Camós echoes the fundamental claim of the papalist theologians at the start of the fourteenth century that Christ’s power, and so,

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16 ‘[. . .] de donde se colige, que [. . .] (porque naturalmente todos quieren más para sí, que para otros) necesariamente avía de aver leyes de República, y para el remedio del desprecio del bien común, y del desorden de la compañía humana, era forçoso enfréné y reprimir el furor y soberbia de los hombres con leyes y juezes, cárcel y cuchillo, y otras penas, para tener a raya a los que rehusando el freno de la razón, vivían a voluntad del apetito: [. . .]’ (i, 11a–b).

17 See above, p. 65.

18 On this see CHMPT, chapter 14 (pp. 370–87 especially).
by derivation, that of popes, was both regal and priestly (III, 57b). However, he at once draws a distinction between papal dominion and that of secular rulers. The dominion of the latter consists in ‘execution and administration’, whereas that of Christ’s vicars on earth consists ‘not in execution but in the confirming, proper ordering, and correcting of those temporal kings and kingdoms’. Nevertheless, he does accept the principle that the papacy is entitled to intervene directly in matters of temporal government for a number of broad purposes: *viz.* the preservation of peace on earth, the attainment of the peace of heaven, the preserving and edifying of souls, the promotion of virtuous behaviour, the extirpation of corrupt ways, and the extension of the worship of God (III, 56b–57a). Comprehensive as these purposes are, Camós was adopting in this debate the middle position set out by Juan de Torquemada (to whom Camós refers) in his *Summa de ecclesia*, of the mid fifteenth century.\(^\text{19}\) Castillo de Bobadilla, for his part, takes a more sharply defined position: while St Peter and his successors have indeed received from Christ ‘two empires and swords: the spiritual and the temporal’, they hold the temporal only in a potential, not an actual, sense (‘en hábito y potencia, y no en acto’) (i, 894b). The exercise of temporal power has been handed over to the secular authority (i, 894b, 895b). He goes on to borrow from the passage where Camós discusses the dominical utterance that ‘my kingdom is not of this world’ (III, 44a). Camós claims that Christ did not wish to concern himself with ‘the trivialities of “mine” and “thine” that human beings occupy themselves with’. Nor did Christ wish those who were to govern for him in the Church to occupy themselves with these temporal things unless they were bound up with matters of ‘spiritual government’. Otherwise these temporal matters should be left to ‘the kings of the earth and [other] men of power, whom [Christ] wished people lovingly to obey as ministers of God on earth’.\(^\text{20}\)

It is true that Castillo accepts the principle that the secular powers should no more seek to wield ‘both swords’ than the ecclesiastical powers should (i, 922b). He is in any case convinced that what chiefly undermines good government in human affairs is the unwillingness of men to carry out scrupulously what it properly falls to each to do, according to his ‘quality, state, and office’ (i, 992a). How-

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\(^\text{19}\) See edition of Venice, 1561, fos.262v–63r.

\(^\text{20}\) Compare Castillo, *Política*, i, 895b.
ever, Castillo’s treatise as a whole, far more emphatically than that of Camós, conveys the conviction that the business of the Church is restricted to spiritual government, and that kings have supreme authority in temporal, secular matters.

Castillo presents it as a general conclusion that ‘bishops and the rest of the ecclesiastical order are subject to kings in the temporal order, in matters concerning the king and the kingdom, and the sphere of [secular] power [. . .]’ 21 In working towards this conclusion he has argued that ‘the exercise of temporal lordship and jurisdiction which bishops and ecclesiastical persons have is not something pertaining to them as priests but as dukes, or counts, or as other temporal lords [. . .]’ (i, 905b). It follows that, when churches and ecclesiastical persons possess townships and temporal jurisdiction and legal disputes arise concerning them, such disputes must not be dealt with in their own ecclesiastical courts or referred to higher ecclesiastical authority (even that of the pope) but rather must be brought before the king, his council, his chancelleries, or his secular judges; for in such matters the litigants, whether laymen or clergy, are subject to the royal jurisdiction (i, 974a–b). Castillo insists on the point: in these matters, pre-eminence (‘la mayoría’) and supreme jurisdiction remained reserved to and rooted in kings, and were never transferred to, nor ever could be transferred to, the bishops, who in such cases were vassals and subjects of kings, like other temporal lords, and indeed in this regard were considered as laymen.

Castillo writes with vigour of the sanctions which kings are entitled to apply to bishops and ecclesiastics who resist royal mandates, thereby offending against the king, or society at large (‘la República’), or the royal jurisdiction, or the king’s subjects (i, 1019a–b). The king may order such people out of his realms and territories and proceed against their temporalities. Castillo extends the application of this principle. Not only kings but other ‘lords of vassals’ may so act; 22 and kings may proceed thus even when they do not have formal jurisdiction over such persons (‘aunque no tengan contra ellos jurisdicción’), because the latter are duty-bound to maintain faithfulness, obedience and reverence to their king and lord, and have a proper

21 ‘[.] los Obispos y los demás Ecclesiásticos en lo temporal, por lo que toca al Rey y al Reyno, y a la orden de la potestad[,] están sujetos a los Reyes [. . .]’ (i, 1020[1]a).
22 In the British Library copy, this clause has been blacked out.
regard for ‘public peace and quiet’. Castillo returns to the analogy of the head of a household:

just like a *paterfamilias* who has power to throw a clergyman or a person who is disobedient and harmful out of his house, in the interests of its peace and good government, the king is similarly able to throw a clergyman out of his kingdom (whose mystical head he is) if he is a rotten and disobedient member [*i.e.* of the body politic] [...] for rotten flesh must be cut away, and the many sheep driven from the flock lest it infect the rest with its malady.\(^{23}\)

Such disobedience can be incurred in resisting not only a formal command but even a royal request.

The general character and thrust of Castillo’s argument as presented here in preceding paragraphs give added force to I.A.A. Thompson’s comment that ‘Crown lawyers, their professional mentalities formed in the unitarist and centralist culture of the Roman law, were undoubtedly regalist—often more so than the King—notably with respect to the extension of the authority of the King’s courts as against the privileges and exemptions of seigniorial, and especially Papal, jurisdictions’ (Thompson, 1996, pp. 202–03). However, he warns against seeing these lawyers as committed to an ideology of royal absolutism and points out that Castillo, like other contemporaries, declares ‘absolute authority’ to be ‘nothing other than a derogation from civil law’ (pp. 196, n. 27, 202–03). While that warning is undoubtedly justified, it remains a striking feature of Castillo’s treatise that he contemplated the practical exercise of royal supremacy with such evident satisfaction.

He takes pleasure in enlarging on the extent of the rights of the Crown to make nominations to ecclesiastical posts in Spain, among them thirty-six bishoprics and nine archbishoprics, including those of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia though excluding those of Portugal and prelacies attached to abbeys (i, 1093b). The Crown has the patronage of all the cathedral churches, while its rights of nomina-

\(^{23}\) ‘[...] bien así como [...] el padre familias que puede echar de su casa al clérigo, o a la persona inobediente y perniciosa por la paz y buen gobierno della, así el Rey puede echar de su Reyno (cuya cabeza mística es) al clérigo si fuese miembro podrido y desobediente [...] que las carnes podridas se han de cortar, y la oveja rojosa echar del rebaño, porque con su contagión no inficione las demás’ (i, 1019b). In the debate concerning the Two Swords, ‘the spiritual sword was the instrument which cut off diseased members of the body of the Church: the sword of excommunication, of anathema, of due canonical retribution, of apostolic indignation [...]’ (*CHMPT*, 1988, p. 371).
tion extend to some parish churches in the mountains of the North and, in the South, to all dignities and prebends of the cathedrals of the Kingdom of Granada (since the Catholic Monarchs reconquered it from the Moors), together with all other prebends, benefices and ecclesiastical offices in those parts ‘hasta una minima sacristanía’ (i, 1091a–93b).

Castillo takes his larger argument to its extreme point in setting out what the temporal ruler is entitled to do when his country is invaded or finds itself engaged in fighting a war for its safety, or when there is an imminent threat of either. Here Castillo makes great play of the concept of ‘necessity’, seen as something which, in circumstances of sufficient urgency, overrides all usual principles of conduct and legitimacy.

Thus, in time of invasion or war, actual or imminent, the king is entitled to avail himself to the utmost (‘a más no poder’) of the wealth of churches and the clergy. The latter are as obliged to contribute to his needs as lay people are, for the necessity which presses bears as much on the one as on the other, and immunities have no force where it is a matter of defending ‘the common good’. As Castillo says: ‘the public benefit [‘la pública utilidad’] has to have precedence over any immunity, and so ecclesiastical persons come within its scope’ (i, 1117b).

If, in such circumstances, the bishops refuse the king financial aid, or delay over instructing their clergy to supply it, the king and his secular legal officials are entitled to proceed on their own account to ensure that such aid is forthcoming from that source. This is a matter of natural right, and from that no one can claim exemption.

When lay people thus forcibly avail themselves of the wealth or possessions of churches and the clergy, they are doing so not of their own volition but as a matter of necessity; and

danger arising from delay knows no legal restraints, and, rather than acknowledging law, imposes its own, and makes permissible what was not permissible, and gives legal competence to a legal official who would otherwise lack it, and often, through necessity, the precepts not only of human but of natural and divine law are changed and go into abeyance.24

24 ‘[...] porque el peligro en la tardanza carece de ley, y no la recibe, sino antes la da, y hace lícito lo que no lo era, y juez legítimo al incompetente, y por la necesidad muchas veces se dispensan y alteran los preceptos, no sólo del derecho humano, sino del natural y divino’ (i, 1126b).
In the time of the civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey, funds were collected from the provinces and the temples, and divine and human laws were mingled and confused together. Castillo regards this as legitimate, for on such occasions and with such extraordinary needs, ‘not to observe due order is itself due order [“el no guardar orden, es orden”]’ (i, 1127b).

The formula is an arresting one. In the context of this discussion it stands not merely as a comment on events long past but as the statement of a general and still valid truth. When necessity presses, it is legitimate for the secular ruler, in order to provide himself with funds, to disregard not only ecclesiastical immunities but also the established principles of human, natural, and even divine laws. The situation of which Castillo is speaking may be regarded as a distinctly hypothetical one. However, it is plainly a situation of considerable significance for him, and in speaking about it he seems clearly to reveal certain basic perspectives and values present in his thinking. Tomás y Valiente (1975, p. 195) notes Castillo’s disinclination in his treatise generally to embark on the discussion of problems relating to the natural law, or to arrive at the consideration of an issue of positive law by a process of deduction from first principles of a theological and philosophical kind. His approach, as well as his method, is thus profoundly different from that characteristic of the sixteenth-century Spanish scholastics who renewed Thomist thought in the sphere of legal and political philosophy. Castillo, it may be said, is more interested in the circumstances in which natural and divine law can be set aside for the purposes of government and the needs of society than in the subordination of government to their dictates.

The ruler’s justification for departing from established law and principle is to safeguard the public benefit and the common good—those very things for which, as Castillo observed in his opening chapter, people at large have little regard. The concepts of ‘bonum commune’ and ‘utilitas publica’ had, of course, deep roots in the intellectual traditions of Aristotelian political thought and the Roman Civil Law. As already suggested, it is difficult in this case not to allow a place of some importance also to Bodin among the elements contributing to the Castillo’s understanding of kingly position, power, and purpose. In any case, this understanding has a markedly secular emphasis and direction. The distinction between the temporal or secular order and the spiritual is central to his whole argument, and
overwhelmingly Castillo’s aim is to stress the claims of the former against the latter.25

In a work whose author clearly regards lawyers as being among the principal servants and instruments of the king, it is not at all surprising to find taken up once again the topic of the relative merits of the secular judge, on the one hand, and members of religious Orders on the other. So we find Castillo making the same comparison, in the same sense, as Costa had done, citing moreover, as Costa also had, Hostiensis and Chrysostom in support of his position:

The office of the good judge, according to Hostiensis, whom some Doctors follow, is of more merit than that of the preaching friar and that of the monk or hermit, because from the administering of justice (as St John Chrysostom holds) society receives more benefit.26

Castillo even quotes part of the passage from Chrysostom to which Costa had referred.27 However, Castillo’s own formulation states the benefit conferred by a ‘good judge’ in more explicitly social terms than either Costa or the authorities to which he refers had done.

It is, of course, tempting to conclude that Castillo was consciously following Costa at this point, although there is no reference to him here.28 Later, Castillo returns to the topic (ii, 458a–b), referring now to Camós’s words on the matter (see below, pp. 235–36). This time,

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25 As regards Castillo’s notion of ‘la utilidad pública’, it is relevant to recall that the revived study of Roman law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fostered the view that the authority of the ruler found its justification in the fact that it represented all the individuals who made up society and also provided for the needs of each citizen. The end that this authority pursued was the public good, which was what the general interest required. In pursuing this end it expressed the general will. Thus the authority of law and its servant, the ruler, was derived from the character and needs of earthly society. The satisfaction of these needs, the preservation of the salus publica or utilitas publica thus conceived, tended to be regarded by the Roman lawyers as the sole end of government and as something that could warrant the violation of moral principles. In so far as they held this view, they tended to separate legal and political thought from ethics and to make the notion of salus publica equivalent to that of raison d’état. See Lagarde, 1956, i, 146–49.

26 ‘El oficio del buen juez, según Hostiens, a quien siguen algunos Doctores, es de más merecimiento que el del frayle predicador, y que el del monje, o ermitaño, porque de administrarse justicia (según siente san Chrisóstomo) la República recibe más beneficio’ (i, 440a–b).

27 Castillo’s citation, in his marginal note, runs from ‘Volo enim maiori gloria [. . .]’ to ‘utilitatem caeteri consequuntur’ (see above, p. 142, n. 23).

28 In view of the multitude of references incrusting the text it would be rash to assert that Costa is nowhere mentioned in this work. However, if references to him are present, they have escaped the eye of this reader.
however, he omits his earlier supporting reference to Chrysostom, alluding only to Hostiensis; and this time one finds that the proposition derived from him has been blotted out by the censor.  

By good fortune, an Inquisition document survives that casts some light on what lay behind this deletion and on the way Castillo’s own attitudes could lead him to treat a source. This is an undated printed sheet headed ‘From the book entitled “Política para corregidores y señores de vassallos” [...] the following things must be removed [“Del libro intitulado Política para corregidores y señores de vassallos [...] se han de borrar las cosas siguientes”]’. In addition to specifying passages for deletion, it offers two MS annotations (apparently attributable to the examiner of the book himself) relating to passages to which objection had been taken. As regards the one with which we are now concerned, it is pointed out that the battery of authorities cited by Castillo in his marginal apparatus at this point is seriously misleading. Following up Castillo’s own indications, the annotator claims—rather inaccurately—that all these authorities have been taken over from Dr Marcos Salón de Paz’s Commentaries on the Laws of Toro. On the other hand, Salón de Paz, having cited these authorities, went on to dissent from them, and this fact Castillo had passed over in silence. In this assertion the annotator is correct.

Salón de Paz, though a lawyer himself, contends that the authorities which he had just cited had overstated the case in favour of the legal profession. For whereas lawyers are concerned with the ‘negótiaria saecularia’ of this world, Religious concern themselves with higher spiritual things and the pursuit of perfection. Renouncing the world, they take a vow of poverty, obedience, and chastity, and devote themselves to prayer and the contemplation of God. This contemplative life is in its essence better ("simpliciter melior") and of higher merit than the active life (Salón de Paz, 1568, fos.57v–58r). He adds, with some justification, that the interpretations placed on the words of Hostiensis by the writers to whom he refers here were

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29 The British Library copy provides evidence: see 1479.dd.5.
30 AHN, Inquisición, leg. 4444 (17).
31 Ad leges Taurinæ insignes commentarii (Valladolid, 1568). Among the authorities mentioned by Castillo but not by Salón de Paz are the treatises by Chasseneux and Tiraqueau against which Merola reacts so strongly. See below, p. 208.
ill-founded. Since the annotator—that is, as it appears, the examiner of Castillo’s work—indicates familiarity with these observations of Salón de Paz’s, the reasons lying behind this particular delendum are illuminated in some detail. One is left with a sharpened sense of the significance of the topic in Spain at this time. (It is strange, in view of all this, that the misleading marginal reference to Salón de Paz is allowed to stand.)

That is not to say that on occasion Castillo will not acknowledge that respect is due to the ecclesiastical order and its legal prerogatives (e.g. in the matter of offering sanctuary in churches: see Book II, chapter xiv). One even finds him accepting the proposition that, at least in one sense, God is represented in a higher manner in priests than in kings, and that any priest is higher in nobility than any layman (i, 902b–904a). Priests are in that sense the fathers and masters of kings. Against this, however, one has to set Castillo’s eulogy of kingship. The king, he declares, is called a prince ‘because he takes the first place and presides over all; and by all he is to be not only honoured but adored [. . .]’ (ii, 21b). Castillo is careful to add that the adoration due to the king is of course not the same as that due to God. For that reason it is not, he remarks, appropriate to describe a king as ‘God on earth’. Nevertheless, the title clearly has much appeal for him. He notes, with abundant supporting references, that many texts of the Civil Law do apply it to the king; indeed, he is called thus in ‘the civil, canon and royal law’; and as the Book of Exodus and the Apostles Peter and Paul and other places in Holy Scripture tell us, he who scor ns the king scor ns God (ii, 22a). Furthermore, if princes and governors are ‘ministers and lieutenants of God’, judges too are God’s ministers. They not only represent their earthly prince but are ‘the image and simulacrum of the Eternal Prince, from whom all power and lordship derive’ (ii, 5a).

The superiority that the clergy can nevertheless claim relates to

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32 ‘[. . .] los sacerdotes, en los cuales Dios es representado por más subida manera que en los Reyes, cuanto a las almas y dones espirituales de Dios en que directamente se meten los sacerdotes por el ministerio de su dignidad, y son de más estima y valor que los cuerpos y cosas temporales sobre que tienen los Reyes potestad [. . .]’ (i, 904a).

33 Castillo has already observed that, on account of their obligation to uphold justice, it is commonly said that laws are ‘promulgated divinely’ through the mouths of princes, while their ordinances and decrees are called ‘divine and heavenly oracles’. Kings and princes themselves are called ‘most sacred’ (i, 401a–b).
their spiritual character, not their temporal one; and Castillo’s treatise as a whole conveys the impression that, with this conceded, he is inclined to set things spiritual on one side and minimize or even ignore the peculiar eminence of those especially concerned with them. On a number of occasions Castillo’s treatment of the position of the ecclesiastical order in relation to the royal power and its officers recalls the determination of Marsilius of Padua, in his Defensor pacis, of the early fourteenth century, to remove pope and clergy from coercive jurisdiction in civil affairs and to present a unitary conception of the State in which the secular power is supreme (see Parker, 1955, pp. 134–35; CHMPT, 1988, pp. 415–20).34

We may now look somewhat more fully at the response of the Inquisition to this work once it had been published. The document mentioned earlier is not the only evidence of its kind to survive. There is also a copy of a carta acordada issued at Valladolid on 12 November 1604 to regional officials of the Inquisition for action.35 This lists thirteen delenda. One of these, as in the other document, is Castillo’s second passage on the comparative merits of secular judges and members of religious Orders. Again, the first of these passages goes unscathed, presumably because the mention there (but not in the second passage) of Chrysostom, and the marginal quotation from him, served as a talisman. Other remarks to which objection is taken assert that a secular judge may sometimes be superior in jurisdiction to an ecclesiastical one, that secular judges have power to compel ecclesiastics to comply in such matters as contributing

34 Another work deserving mention in this regard is the anonymous tract known as the Disputatio inter clericum et militem, one of the most forthright declarations of kingly power to emerge during the struggle between Philip the Fair, of France, and Pope Boniface VIII at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and, like the Defensor pacis, directed against Boniface’s Unam sanctam. Here too it is argued that the clergy benefit from peace just as the rest of society does and so should contribute to the cost of winning and preserving it; therefore kings have a right to use the wealth of the Church to this end. Of this work Jean Rivière (1926, p. 261) has written: ‘[…] si l’auteur combat l’absolutisme du pouvoir ecclésiastique, c’est pour lui substituer celui du pouvoir civil. Non content d’affirmer l’indépendance de l’Etat et les obligations patriotiques de l’Eglise—thèses qu’on pourrait croire très modernes—ce qu’il réclame au fond, c’est l’assujettissement de l’Eglise à l’Etat. […] La fin dernière est ici l’intérêt public et national […]’.

35 AHN, Inquisición, Lib. 1233, fos.33r–34r. The contents of this document correspond to the delenda set out in the Expurgatorial Indexes of 1632 and thereafter. It is of interest that, although this document did not get incorporated into the Expurgatorial Index of 1612, the deletions that it required were in fact made in the Barcelona editions of the Política brought out in 1616 and 1624.
material resources to the needs of the king, that in matters of jurisdiction ecclesiastics commit 'excesses' against lay people, that the secular order outweighs ('prepondera') the ecclesiastical one. (In the corresponding document the annotator observes that here too Castillo has misrepresented the authorities he cites.) Taken together, these passages have a clear general drift and express an outlook to be expected in a lawyer and established corregidor.\textsuperscript{36}

On the other hand, these documents require no deletion of borrowings from, or references to, Bodin. This, seen from one angle, is unsurprising; for while his \textit{Methodus ad faciлем historiarum cognitionem} had already been included in the Index of 1583, his treatise \textit{De republica} did not join it until it appeared in the list of forbidden books published in the Index of 1612. Once it had, Bodin's name disappears from the \textit{Política}.\textsuperscript{37} It seems in any case to have been mentioned only in Castillo's discursive opening chapter. The edition of Barcelona, 1616, carefully removes the name from eight marginal notes as well as its two mentions in the main text. In the first edition, Bodin's definition of the 'republic' was introduced with the phrase 'or, according to Bodin ['"o según Bodino"]': this is now replaced by 'or, in my opinion ['"o a mi parecer"]'. In this instance the actual quotation from Bodin is itself modified. Originally, Castillo had rendered the conclusion of Bodin's definition with the words 'con suprema autoridad'; this is now attenuated to 'con superior autoridad'. For the rest, the text remains unchanged.

We thus find ourselves with a situation where a writer's ideas are present even after his name has vanished. It is a similar situation to what one finds to be the case with Martín González de Cellorigo's \textit{Memorial de la política necessaria, y útil restauración a la República de España} of 1600—a work admired by modern historians for its treatment of the problems of the Spanish economy of the time. Albuquerque (1978, pp. 163–64) has pointed out that its author took over the essence of Bodin’s conception (and not only his definition) of soci-

\textsuperscript{36} Protests regarding abuses of power on the part of ecclesiastical courts against the laity and the secular courts repeatedly occur in the petitions to the Crown presented at assemblies of the Cortes spanning the century.

\textsuperscript{37} Bodin’s \textit{De republica} had, however, been banned (together with his \textit{Démonomanie des sorciers}) by the Papal Index of Clement VIII, of 1596, where particular attention is drawn to the fact. The \textit{Methodus} was to be banned until expurgated. See Reusch, 1886, pp. 537, 559.
ety as an association of families existing under a common supreme authority; but, again, the name of Bodin receives not the least mention in the passage in question. González de Cellorigo would have been a colleague of Castillo de Bobadilla’s, being an abogado in the royal cancellería of Valladolid. In his capacity as a lawyer he also, it seems, served that city’s tribunal of the Inquisition. Some years later, as Maravall (1955, p. 90) has observed, when Fray Juan de Santa María wrote his Tratado de república y policía christiana (Madrid, 1615), he began with a definition of society derived from Aristotle and Bodin. One finds him supplying the passage from the Politics from which he borrows, but, again, of Bodin there is no mention, even though he reproduces his words almost textually. Thus we find the same response in two writers of whom one was a lawyer and the other a friar, the former writing before Bodin’s treatise was banned in Spain, and the other afterwards.

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38 González de Cellorigo may well have familiar with the attack on Bodin by Ribadeneyra, in the mid-1590s, which will be considered later.

39 Maravall (1955, p. 90) notes that, in Castillo’s treatise, the concluding definition of society in his first chapter is taken from Bodin even though the latter’s name is not mentioned. However, since Maravall is working here from the Barcelona 1624 edition, he does not observe that the name had originally been given.

40 After the second edition of Castillo’s work appeared at Medina del Campo in 1608, the next two were brought out at Barcelona (as already noted) in 1616 and 1624. The work was not published again in Castile (or elsewhere) until 1649, and after that not again in Spain until 1759. The work enjoyed some success in the eighteenth century, with two editions at Antwerp (1704, 1750) and two at Madrid (1759, 1775).
PART FOUR
WRITERS IN THE CROWN OF ARAGON

Introduction

The next three treatises to be considered—all composed in the territories of the Crown of Aragon—differ from those studied so far in a fundamental respect. They are concerned not—or by no means primarily—with the ruler himself or the lesser figures who governed in his name, but rather with society as a whole. Their concern is with the structure and relationships by virtue of which a society is what it is—with its various constituent elements and different aspects. The interest which this undertaking held for these authors derives in part from the intellectual pleasure which they found in contemplating and expounding patterns of order in which multiplicity and unity are combined. These patterns are set out in terms of the ‘Great Chain of Being’, the corresponding planes of the whole created order, and the ‘organic analogy’ of the human body. These models were not only structures in which constituent elements were organized into coherent wholes but also, and still more importantly, structures of value and meaning. They offered terms in which, or a background against which, a writer could discuss the relationships, values, and purposes of man’s social existence, whether as Christian or as citizen. It is on these issues as set out in the three treatises now to be considered that this chapter will be focused.

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All three works were composed and published within the boundaries of Catalonia and Valencia in the 1580s and 1590s. Their authors were men of widely differing backgrounds and experience: Tomás Cerdán de Tallada, a lawyer of noble birth and member of the Royal Council of Valencia; Jerónimo Merola, Doctor of Philosophy and Medicine; and Marco Antonio de Camós y Requeséns, born into a distinguished Barcelona family with aristocratic connexions, Governor of Sardinia after a career in the army, and, by the time he wrote his treatise, an Augustinian friar.

Details of Tomás Cerdán de Tallada’s life and career have mostly
to be gleaned from his own works. From these it appears that he was born in 1532/33 into the branch of the Cerdán family established at Jáviva, near Valencia, and that he had qualified as a lawyer by 1556. In 1568, now a Doctor of Civil and Canon Law, he published his first book—Commentaries on the laws of inheritance—and was appointed by the King to be prisoners’ advocate (‘abogado de los presos’) for the prison at Valencia. This experience resulted in his second work—Visita de la cárcel y de los presos [A Visitation of Prison and Prisoners] (Valencia, 1574)—a kind of prisoners’ guide to the law as well as a guide for judges and those running prisons. He still held this post when composing the work with which we shall be concerned: Verdadero gobierno desta monarchia, tomando por su propio subiecto la conservación de la paz [The True Government of this Monarchy, taking as its Own Proper Subject the Preservation of Peace] (Valencia, 1581). The title-page announces him as now ‘abogado fiscal’ and a member of His Majesty’s Council in the Kingdom of Valencia. He had, it seems, been appointed to that Council the previous year.¹

Jeronimo Merola was a close contemporary of Cerdán de Tallada’s. In his introductory remarks to his República original sacada del cuerpo humano [The Common-wealth’s Original, derived out of the Human Body] (Barcelona, 1587), he describes himself as being of fifty years of age and, although married, childless; he had written no other book and was anxious to leave something behind him (sig.B5r). The title-page tells us that he came from Balaguer, near Lérida, in Catalonia. His own reference to Guillaume Rondelet—Regius Professor of Medicine at Montpellier from 1545 onwards—as ‘my master’ (fo.52r) indicates where his medical studies took place.² It is from the preliminaries to his treatise that we learn that he was not only a ‘Doctor of Philosophy and Medicine’ but also professor of medicine at the university of Barcelona.³

¹ See Visita de la cárcel, fo.*2r; Verdadero gobierno, fos.2v,68r; Veriloquium en reglas de estado (Valencia, 1604), sig.A6r, p. 28; Ximeno, 1747, i,232a–b; Fuster, 1827, i,212b–13a.

² Merola’s name does not appear in the Montpellier matriculation lists. However, as their editor points out, each year perhaps a dozen students failed to inscribe their names, generally because, at matriculation time, they were still awaiting funds for their expenses and intended to enter their names later (Gouron, 1957, p. 1). Guillaume Rondelet is named as a teacher of medicine in these lists from 1538 to 1566.

³ Kristeller (1961, p. 45) points out that at this time medicine and philosophy continued to be regarded as parts of the same study and career. The point is reit-
Much more information is available concerning Marco Antonio de Camós y Requeséns. Born, it seems, in 1543, he came from a family which, on his father’s side, had been prominent in the urban government of Barcelona over several generations. On his mother’s side he was related to the higher nobility. Through the literary persona that he adopts in his *Microcosmia y gobierno universal del hombre cristiano, para todos los estados y qualquiera de ellos [Microcosmia or The Universal Government of the Christian Man, for Each and Every Order of Society]* (Barcelona, 1592), he looks back to the time when he spent part of his childhood at the house of Doña Estefanía de Requeséns and her husband, Don Juan de Zúñiga (tutor to Philip II in his early years), at Molins de Rei, near Barcelona. He recalls being with three of their children, all older than himself: Don Luis de Requeséns y Zúñiga, the future Governor of the Netherlands; Don Juan de Zúñiga y Requeséns, who would become a Counsellor of State, ambassador in Rome, Viceroy of Naples, and tutor to the future Philip III; and Don Diego, who became a Franciscan and died young. It appears that Camós at first had thoughts of becoming a lawyer and made a start on legal study, but in his sixteenth year, as he records in his *Fuente desseada [The Longed—for Fountain]*, he left Catalonia and began on travels that would soon take him across the Mediterranean as far as Crete and the Aegean. After marriage (apparently near Cagliari, in Sardinia) he seems to have spent three years back in Spain in the service of Philip II. According to Santiago Vela, Camós became a cavalry captain and, about 1581, Governor of Sardinia. Soon after this his wife and children died and Camós, at the age of thirty-eight, joined the Order of Augustinian Friars, making his profession at Rome in 1583. After study at Padua, and after an absence from Catalonia (though not from Spain) of nearly thirty years, he returned to Barcelona, where he was ordained and in 1588 graduated as a Doctor of Divinity. The following year he became Provincial Master of his Order. It was during his time as Prior of its house at Barcelona that he wrote his *Microcosmia.*

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erated by Wallace (1988, p. 205) who observes that ‘physicians in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance saw themselves as both *philosophi* and *medici,* with their university degrees qualifying them in this way’. This is relevant to the character of Merola’s treatise.

4 Subsequently he became Provincial Visitor of Catalonia and finally, through the good offices of the Count of Benavente (viceroy of Naples and husband of the grand-daughter of Doña Estefanía de Requeséns) was nominated by Philip III to
the archbishopric of Trani in the Kingdom of Naples. Camós died at Naples on his way to Rome to be confirmed in the post, in March 1606 or 1607. See Ossinger, 1765, pp. 187–88; Santiago Vela, 1913, i, 551–56; Garcia Carraffa, 1919, xix, 200; Aldea Vaquero, 1972, i, 325b; Camós, 1592, Pt.I, 135a, Pt.III, p. 10a–b; 1598, fos.*3v–4v, pp. 166–68. (For various reasons it seems probable that the date of his death as given on his tomb—'5 Nonas Martii 1606'—should be read according to the calculus florentinus.)
CHAPTER IX

TOMÁS CERDÁN DE TALLADA

This was a lawyer impelled to write by his sense of the inadequacies of the law in his own day—by his sense that the law not only failed to foster, but in fact worked against, what he believed to be most necessary to the well-being of society: its peace and concord. Of that peace and concord he had a rich and complex sense, and it lies at the heart of his treatise, as its title indicates. In his Epistle Dedicatory to Philip II, he remarks that the central conviction underlying this work had come to him after twenty-four years as a lawyer and much experience of practical affairs (fo.3v). The title-page bears a quotation from Psalm 85: ‘Righteousness and peace have kissed each other’ ([Vg.]Psalm 84: ‘Justitia et pax osculatae sunt’), while, on the reverse, a wood-cut of the Annunciation is supported by words from [Vg.]Psalm 121: ‘Fiat pax in virtute tua’.

The book as we have it embodies only a part of the full scheme that he had in mind. Since his aim was to give an account of the various principal kinds of conflict in which peace and concord were lost, he proposed to devote an entire section of the work to discussing the issue of the provision of food at a just price and arguing against monopolies. He would also examine the causes of civil wars and propose ways of ending and preventing them. A further section would demonstrate how peace was compromised both by the fighting of wars without just cause and also by failing to undertake wars when necessary (fo.8r–v). However, in the Verdadero gobierno desta monarchia he does not get beyond the operation of the law and the almost universal litigiousness—as he claims—which it promoted. It is only in his much later Veriloquium en reglas de estado [A True Discourse on Rules of State], of 1604, that he goes into the structures and functioning of government, drawing on his fellow Valencian Furió Ceriol (among others) for his views concerning desirable royal councils and the selection of counsellors.

This may seem rather surprising in view of the fact that Cerdán begins his present treatise by reflecting on public administration at large. He sees it as consisting of three parts: the ‘government’
[‘gobierno’] of his title, together with justice and the dispensation of rewards [‘gracia’] (fos.11v–12r). These three he regards as being concerned respectively with the future, the present, and the past. About justice and ‘gracia’ many laws and books have been produced, he says, but among ‘our professors’ he does not find any who have given attention to ‘gobierno’ in particular, even though, in his judgement, it is the most necessary and beneficial of all. For this, preeminently, is the sphere where prudence operates, and prudence, drawing on the experience of things past and present, foresees and provides for things to come in the future (fo.13r–v). Cerdán is another who recalls Giles of Rome—in this instance the passage where Giles, expounding the eight parts of prudence, dwells on the prince’s need to have ‘memoriam praeteritorum et providentiam futurorum’ (De reg. prin., I,ii,8). However Cerdán lays more stress than Giles on the need to discern the true causes of things from afar and prevent an undesirable outcome thereby (fo.18r).

As regards the qualifications requisite in those engaged in ‘gobierno’ in this particular sense, Cerdán takes the view, with a perhaps surprising touch of hesitation, that it is not enough for a man to be intelligent, well-read in history, and learned in moral philosophy; still less is it acceptable to allow the unlettered to rule, guided only by natural reason and experience: a formal training in jurisprudence, and practice in its application, are essential. Best of all is to have a ‘letrado’ thus trained who is also fully versed in moral philosophy (fos.18v–27r). So far as the other two sides of public administration—justice and ‘gracia’—are concerned, the necessity of legal training cannot, of course, even be questioned.

Despite what Cerdán says about the lack of available books on ‘gobierno’ and the abundance of them on justice, that part of his own treatise which is concerned with practicalities—which is by far the greater part—is devoted not to ‘gobierno’ but to the law. However, that discussion is itself preceded by three preliminary chapters where Cerdán gives an eloquent and, clearly, a deeply felt statement of the primary convictions and attitudes that prompted him to write, not in the first place as a lawyer but as a Christian. For what Cerdán wishes first to establish is that the bond of peace in society is, most fundamentally, a matter not of law but of Christian love; and his insistence on this matter gives his book a particular interest in the longer perspective of sixteenth-century Spanish religious and social values.
Cerdán’s vision of the harmony he aspires to see in society is essentially Christian and emphatically biblical in character. Quotations from and references to the Bible, especially the New Testament epistles, abound on this theme and, in the course of nearly twenty folios, convey a powerful sense of how much they meant to Cerdán himself. He begins with Christ the reconciler of God and man through the Incarnation and Crucifixion (fos.28r, 30r), the Prince of Peace foretold by Isaiah, the author of peace and lover of concord; with him who said ‘Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you’. Cerdán multiplies his references to Christ’s injunctions to his followers to live in peace together on the basis of the Second Great Commandment, that they should love their neighbours as themselves. He repeatedly refers to ‘el dicho precepto de la dilección y amor del próximo’; the phrase ‘dilección y amor del próximo’ recurs still more frequently. He quotes (fo.35r–v) from the Vulgate, and then paraphrases, the opening verses of St Paul’s hymn to charity in I Corinthians 13, reinforcing these with references to the Johannine Gospel and Epistles.1 Another of his main debts is to Ephesians; and it is in terms closely derived from this Epistle that he brings this part of his treatise to a conclusion, seeing Christ as the very peace of his followers, as him who brought together Jew and Gentile in a single faith and who unites his followers in a single Body, bestowing on them peace, joy and all manner of contentment (‘paz, gozo, y todo contento’ (fo.46v).2

Cerdán’s feeling for his theme throughout this part of his work is clearly rooted in the dispositions and attitudes already expressed in

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1 A little later, with a marginal reference to Romans 13 [v.8: ‘Owe no man anything, save to love one another: for he that loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the law’], he writes: ‘[…] y así no ay de qué maravillarse, que para el buen gobierno desta Monarquía tomemos, y nos valgamos de lugares de la sagrada escritura del viejo y nuevo testamento, y principalmente del dicho precepto y amor del próximo, pues es averiguado, según doctrina del Apóstol san Pablo (como está dicho) que guardando el dicho precepto, se guardarán los demás que tienen respecto a lo de acá del mundo […]’ (fo.41r–v).

2 ‘[…] y según san Pablo, Cristo es la misma paz que unió los pueblos Iudayco, y Gentil, en una misma fe, y […] desta manera, biviendo como dize sant Pablo en charidad, y amor con su próximo, correspondiéndose los unos a los otros, con una conformidad en el alma atada con la paz del espiritu, unidos y hechos un cuerpo y una voluntad en el servicio de Dios, terníamos paz, gozo, y todo contento, que es el fruto que sacan los que biven debaxo del amor de Dios: […]’ (fos.45v, 46r–v). The marginal references are to Ephesians 2 [vv.13–17] and 4 [vv.1–8, 15–16].
his earlier *Visita de la cárcel*, where he writes in terms of Christian compassion of the sufferings of those held in the prison of Valencia (pp. 8–9 especially). But of broader interest is the similarity, both in the matter of Christian values and in attitude and tone, between what we have just been considering in Cerdán and Erasmus’s *Enchiridion militis christiani*, especially in the Archdeacon of Alcor’s Spanish version of the mid-1520s. The similarity is most marked as regards that part of the very important ‘Rule VI’ where Erasmus writes of the love which Christians as such should have for their neighbours, particularly those in need, seeing them as fellow members of the Body of Christ, of him who is very charity. Erasmus, like Cerdán later, echoes the Pauline words on how Jew and Gentile, bondmen and free, have been made one in the same Spirit, and protests against the readiness of Christians in his own time to raise barriers among themselves and resort to litigation (Erasmus, 1932, pp. 326–32).

Another obvious similarity is with Alfonso de Valdés’s *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón* (nearly contemporary with the Spanish *Enquiridión*) and especially with the section where, as we have already seen, the spirit of King Polidoro tells of his conversion to true Christianity and the moral reformation he effected in his kingdoms. He recalls how, as he promoted true Christianity among his peoples, the judges found themselves with little to do, the law-courts were often empty, and everywhere his subjects lived together in Christian joy, love, and charity (‘plazer, amor y caridad’) (Alfonso de Valdés, 1954, p. 173).

We saw earlier that there is much in common between this part of *Mercurio y Carón* and Felipe de la Torre’s *Institución de un rey cristiano*. Here the ideal of the love and charity that should exist between Christians as fellow members of the Body of Christ, the tone of the discussion, and the range of New Testament sources, are all closely similar to what one finds in Cerdán. De la Torre’s plea to Philip II

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3 The relevant passages are too extensive to quote, but the following lines illustrate the similarities of approach and tone: ‘Item escribe [sant Pablo] a los efesios en otra parte: Con el conocimiento de la verdadera doctrina, que es la de Christo, procuremos de tener también charidad con el próximo, de tal manera que así crezcamos en lo uno y en lo otro, que siempre nos conformemos más proporcionados y convenientes con nuestra cabeza, que es el mismo Christo, summa verdad y la misma charidad, de cuya virtud inmensa y vida verdadera desciende como de propia cabeza en todos nosotros, que somos los miembros, toda la vida y espíritu que se nos comunica. Y para esto es menester que estemos tan unidos y travados unos con otros con los nervios y coyunturas de la charidad cristiana, que tenga lugar el espíritu de Dios de animarnos y vivificarnos a todos, procediendo y derivándose de unos en otros […]’ (Erasmus, 1932, p. 329).
is that his reign should be a time of peace, a time of love for ‘el Dios de paz y dilición’ (fo.105r/p. 72). The resemblance between the two is all the more striking in view of their contrasting positions in certain other respects, as we shall see. Nevertheless, in the perspective of this succession of works it seems beyond doubt that in Cerdán’s treatise we have a document indicating the persistence of one of the most significant aspects of Erasmian Christianity—that of a particular kind of Christian utopianism—into the later decades of the sixteenth century in Spain.

The predecessors of Cerdán mentioned here all criticize unworthy clergy and, with varying emphasis, urge the secular ruler to reform and renew the Church. Occasional remarks indicate that Cerdán himself had clear views regarding the clergy. In his Visita de la cárcel of 1574 he looks to the bishops to concern themselves with those who were both prisoners and poor, and observes that clergy who ‘only exercise themselves in contemplation’ should not be made bishops (p. 49). In the Verdadero gobierno he comments that good preachers, like Christ himself, teach more by deed and example than by word (fo.100r–v). Having observed that unworthy men were made priests and even bishops in Spain in earlier times (fo.66v), he sees it as a prince’s duty to take great care over the appointment of prelates now (fo.101v). He counts it among Justinian’s achievements that he limited the number of the clergy (fo.107r–v); in his Veriloquium he speaks of the excessive number of the clergy in contemporary Spain and remarks critically on the excessive ‘liberty’ which some of them allow themselves and on the ‘greed and ambition’ which they display (p. 103).

In view of all that has been said so far about the religious tenor of his remarks, it is striking that he should, nevertheless, on occasion, adopt a strongly anti-Protestant tone. The discord and dissension that have come about in Germany, France, and the Low Countries he puts down to their

not having kept God’s commandments, separating themselves from obedience to the Holy Roman Catholic Church, allowing entry to new and depraved doctrines against the commandments of God, against the sacraments of the Church, and the articles of our faith and the Christian religion [...].

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4 ‘Pero bolvamos un poco atrás la memoria, por lo que ha pasado por Alemania, Francia, y Flandes, por no haver guardado los mandamientos de Dios, apartándo-se de la obediencia de la sancta yglesia Cathólica Romana, admitiendo nuevas
He notes with satisfaction that the Council of Trent has ordered bishops not to allow any ‘novelty’ in the celebration of Mass or in other ceremonics and prayers (fo.57v). Beyond that, he praises the Spanish Inquisition for its zeal and success in pursuing heresy. He reflects that, without that institution, Spain might well have suffered the religious conflicts of Northern Europe. It is, he remarks, a matter for praise and gratitude that Philip II has supported and strengthened the Inquisition and its authority in the way he has, thus discharging his duty as a Christian prince and upholding religion, on which the peace and tranquillity of Spain chiefly depend (fo.58r–v).

Cerdán makes this latter point again years later in his *Veriloquium* (p. 79), when he recalls in particular the cases of the *alumbrado* leader Hernando Álvarez, and [Agustín] Cazalla, formerly chaplain to Charles V. Cazalla was burnt in the first great Valladolid *auto de fe* of 1559; Álvarez, at the Llerena *auto* of 1579, was sentenced to the galleys. Cerdán trusts that there are no longer any people like these going about in disguise, and he sees Philip II’s presence at such *autos* as an example for his son to follow. Taken in conjunction with his religious outlook as noted above, these remarks represent a significant combination or mutation of attitudes.

While Cerdán’s belief in the importance of religion for its role in fostering the unity of society and a respect for law is in itself a commonplace, it is of interest to find him, early in the *Verdadero goyierno*, alluding in this regard not only to the religious troubles of Northern Europe but also to Machiavelli’s *Discorsi*. He refers (fo.7v) in particular to Book I, chapter xii, where Machiavelli stresses how important it is to the ruler to uphold respect for religion, thereby keeping the state united and preserving it from decline and ruin. All Cerdán’s major writings show that he fully shared this conviction.

In the course of his account of the relationship of love that ought to exist between Christians, he stresses that it has a this-worldly as well as an other-worldly reference, that it is relevant not only to salvation and man’s final end of blessedness but also to the things of this world (‘lo de acá del mundo’), to ‘the preservation and increase of this monarchy’ (fo.36r–v, 41v). Cerdán says this in the conviction...
that, if everyone had peace in his heart, his home and his república, ‘there would be nothing more to desire for good government’ (fo.7v). He acknowledges that, in view of all the discord to which the multiplicity of laws has given rise, the vision of peace and concord to which he aspires will seem sheer foolishness or an impossibility (fo.34v). Nevertheless, he insists that, if people loved the God of love by loving their neighbours as they ought, God, who is the God of peace, would preserve them in peace with each other without their needing to weary the mind with a search for human means for preserving ‘this Monarchy’. He continues: ‘it is quite certain that it would be preserved solely by love of God, which includes love of one’s neighbour, without need of other means’. It is consonant with this belief that Cerdán interprets ‘politics’ or ‘la política de la ciudad’ as ‘peace through obedience’ and includes it, along with peace within the individual soul and peace within the household, in his category of ‘paz intrínseca’, which is itself preserved by love of God (fos.49v–50v). In all this we are far from the Aristotelian conception of political society as part of the natural order. The affiliations of Cerdán’s view of things lie rather in the direction of Augustine. The extent of his debt there can be gauged from his reference in this passage to the De civitate Dei, Bk.XIX, ch.xiii, where Augustine pictures the peace and order that properly exist within man, between human beings, and between man and God.

It fits with all this that Cerdán sees the moral precepts as rooted in love of one’s neighbour, which in turn is rooted in love of God: ‘la charidad comprende todos los preceptos morales’ (fos.7r, 36r). Justice itself, in all its parts, he insists, recalling Lactantius and Augustine, is love of God expressed in terms of practical service (fos.48v–49r). Its role is to prevent the peace of society from being ‘impeded’ by those who live apart from the love of God (fo.47r–v). These reflexions link the first part of Cerdán’s discussion with the second, where, in the remaining two-thirds of his treatise, he examines

5 ‘[...] y demás desto, porque siendo como es el verdadero Dios de amor, si le correspondiésemos con las obras de la dilectión, y amor que devemos a nuestro próximó, que son las que suelen conservar a los que bien se quieren en una voluntad [...] bien es cierto, que el eterno Padre, como Dios de la paz, nos conservaría en ella sin que tuviésemos necesidad de cansar el juzyio en buscar medios humanos, para la conservación desta Monarchía, porque es bien cierto, que con solo el amor de Dios, debaxo del qual está comprendiido el amor del próximó, se conservaría sin tener necesidad de otros medios’ (fos.46v–47r).
the various ‘impediments to peace’ that seem to him to be of particular importance.

The first of these is failure to observe God’s commandments. With a variety of Old Testament references this failure is shown to incur divine wrath, whether in the form of pestilence or the Turk or the religious turmoil of Northern Europe (fos.52v–57r). On the earthly plane, Cerdán next considers the failure to punish those who have committed crimes (fos.59v–71v). His long experience as ‘prisoners’ advocate’ has shown him the extent to which criminals are emboldened by confidence that their deeds will remain undiscovered (fo.68v), and he praises the success of the Santa Hermandad in Castile in ensuring that no serious criminal fails to be brought to book, with the result that Castile sees much less crime than France does (fo.70v). Cerdán’s theme in this chapter is the application of punitive justice for the sake of the tranquility of society. Despite having said that justice is the application of Christian love, he now endorses views which he attributes to Augustine and Jerome on the need to punish and even kill wrongdoers for the peace and well-being of society. With this criterion in mind, he argues in two directions. As regards ‘particular cases’, where a precise penalty is prescribed by divine or human law, a judge must not show mercy and reduce the punishment; but in cases having a wider significance (‘tocantes a lo universal’) it is right and even necessary to show mercy and temper the rigour of the written law for the sake of the peace of the commonwealth (fos.64r–67v). In taking this position, Cerdán invokes the authority of the Roman Law.

He now moves on to discuss what for him is the central issue: the enormous number of law-suits being taken through the courts in his own day, with all the dissension and discord that this implies. He thinks it probable that, in Valencia at least, not a single inhabitant is not involved in litigation of some kind (fo.84r). He gives the impression that the situation had got quite out of control. The efforts made in the past by jurisconsults, kings, emperors, and popes had only produced measures for abbreviating legal actions once they had started, not for preventing them in the first place. However, it was just such prevention that was required, and it was the responsibility of rulers to bring this about. They would have to do it by means different from those employed in the past (fos.85r–86r).

Cerdán here reverts to the terms he used at the start of his treatise in speaking of the importance of prudence, foresight, and pre-
vention in government (fos.86v–87r), and in a series of chapters identifies the main causes of the situation that is crying out for a remedy: bad laws, devious and dishonest judges, the excessive number of laws, which have multiplied over the centuries to the point where now, for every determination of an issue, a contrary opinion can be found (fo.108r–v). Certain more specific sources of litigation are picked out: disputes over town and village boundaries, long-standing contract bonds, entailed property. Subsequent chapters comment on the unsatisfactory conduct of the law-courts, where people have little regard for their oath to tell the truth and there is such a lack of good order in the despatch of business.

Cerdán is insistent on the need to deal drastically with the causes producing so much litigation, and makes three basic suggestions. First, the laws themselves, in addition to being in conformity with the law of God, the Christian religion, and the law of nature, must be suited to the time and place where they are to be applied. They must be necessary, useful in promoting the common good, and wholly free from obscurity, so that they cannot be subjected to perverse interpretations (fos.89v–90v). Judges will be carefully chosen from among those who possess good minds, sound learning, and good characters. They must further be 'good Christians', their bodily senses being mortified and the powers of their mind enlivened by a Christian intention (fos.99v–104r). As for the multitude of conflicting laws, Cerdán looks for a reduction of the kind achieved by Justinian a millenium earlier and a curtailment of the liberty of lawyers to follow any legal opinion they fancy (fos.107v–10v). As for the telling of lies in court, Cerdán can only compare the endless protraction of cases that this causes with the speed and brevity with which issues are resolved in the confessional, where people tell the truth (fos.143v–44r).

We have seen that Cerdán's convictions on this issue were rooted in something deeper than the professional preoccupations of a lawyer. They derived much of their strength from his personal attachment to the ideal of peace and concord among men, and this commitment was itself rooted in a consciously maintained Christian outlook. It needs to be added, however, that Cerdán felt a powerful attachment—simultaneously intellectual, imaginative, moral, and religious—to the notion of order and harmony running through the whole scheme of things, both heavenly and earthly. He alludes to this at the outset of his work (fos.6v–7r); his extended treatment of
the topic as he nears his conclusion (fos.147v–50r) deserves to be counted among the more notable sixteenth-century statements of this World Picture. There is order in the choirs of angels and in the movement of the heavens and planets; there is order in the structure of bodies formed by nature and in the moral sphere; there is order in society, where those of noble rank are distinguished (‘as they should be’) from the ‘plebeians’ and where each of these two sections of society is further organized into several ranks; similarly there is order manifest in the many ranks of the clergy, from the pope downwards, and order in the family, where wives obey their husbands, children their parents, slaves their masters, and all obey the regidores and those who have charge of the administration of justice. This whole scheme of order was established by God. Where that order is lacking, experience shows that there is nothing but confusion, war, dissension in societies, sickness in the body, sin in the soul. It is the same vision of things as that expressed by Ulysses in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, and it provides the context and larger perspectives for Cerdán’s aspiration, both as a Christian and as a lawyer, to see peace prevailing in the society about which, and for which, he was writing. It is a vision that perhaps also offers a common source and a measure of explanation for the varying and sometimes apparently conflicting arguments and attitudes that he expresses.

Peace was his aspiration for society, but it was not to be his own lot. Soon after the publication of his Verdadero gobierno he was removed (apparently before the end of 1581) from his post on the Royal Council of Valencia by the new Viceroy, Don Francisco de Moncada, second Count of Aytona, for reasons that are not clear. (At some stage, it appears, Cerdán defended the fueros of Valencia in a case involving the King and the Inquisition, and, although he won, he was kept for seventeen months under arrest). His restoration to his post on the Council of Valencia by the King at the Cortes of Monzón in 1585 did not end his troubles. In the preliminaries to his Veriloquium, completed by the Spring of 1603, he writes of the ‘cuydados,

6 Cerdán here refers to Genesis i and I Cor.xiv [1578:7: ‘Tamen quae sine anima sunt vocem dantia, sive tibia, sive cithara, nisi distinctionem sonituum dederint, quomodo scietur id quod canitur, aut quod citharizatur?’]. This recalls St Augustine’s much quoted musical analogy by which he expresses the order and harmony to be desired in society. See above, p. 142.
pesadumbres, y persecuciones’ suffered by himself and two of his sons, refers to an exchange of numerous letters between himself and Philip II about the matters (unspecified) at issue, and begs his fellow Valencian, the Duke of Lerma, the new king’s chief minister, to intercede on his behalf with Philip III so that he may receive from that source the favour that his past services and unjust treatment deserve. This plea seems to have been without effect, for in his still later *Memorial*, of 1607, he speaks of having been suspended ‘pendiente lite’ from his post of *Oidor* a full fifteen years earlier, with the loss to him of more than 1000 ducats annually (Fuster, 1827, pp. 212b–13a). The matter had still not been legally resolved. There were, then, increasing personal reasons why Cerdán should continue to address himself, as he did in these later works, to the issue so prominent in his *Verdadero gobierno*: the harmfulness of the litigation of his time.

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7 Sig.A4r–6r. The other information given here regarding Cerdán’s personal situation is derived from this same source (pp. 10–19, 48).
CHAPTER TEN

JERÓNIMO MEROLA

Merola’s treatise falls into two parts. The first is focused on, but by no means wholly taken up with, an exposition of human society in terms of the analogy of the human body indicated by his title. Merola’s declared aim here is to show why certain ‘estates’ or components of society are, or ought to be, paid more honour than others (fo.1r–v). The second part is centred on the consideration of a particular aspect of this: the long-debated question whether the medical or the legal profession is superior to the other. In the course of his discussion, especially in the second part, Merola develops a number of views regarding social and religious values that are of considerable interest in the larger context with which we are concerned. The work was reprinted at Barcelona in 1595 and 1611.1

Merola acknowledges Plato’s Republic as the source of the central idea of his work: ‘Civitas bene instituta similis est fabric[a]e corporis humani’ (fo.7r).2 He nowhere mentions that other obvious source for the idea, John of Salisbury’s Policraticus. Nevertheless, Merola’s notion of human society owes a large and obvious debt to medieval conceptions which still constituted a substantial part of the sixteenth-century ‘world picture’ of which Tillyard and others have written.3

The human body, Merola tells us, is a copy and summary of the world at large (fo.2v); human nature joins earth and heaven in that it combines material elements inferior to man with a rationality that finds its full realization only in the angelic orders of creation above him (fo.4r). Merola sees man in an all-inclusive scheme of related ends: the larger world (or macrocosm) is by its nature directed towards ‘the little world that is man’, while God is the aim or goal of both (fo.2v). Man’s own aim is to complete a circular process (‘hazer una circulación’) and return to the God from whom he derives his origin

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1 All references will be to the 1611 edition, whose foliation is identical to that of 1587.
2 See Republic, V,462–64.
3 See Tillyard (1943); Winny (1957); Elton (1971).
(fo.20v). At the level of human existence, Merola declares, the body was created for the soul while the material things bestowed by fortune were given for the sake of the body: thus was created ‘a three-stranded cord not easily broken’ (fo.22v), or, as he also puts it, a ‘golden chain’ made of three kinds of links (fos.22v–23r). This three-fold scheme as further expounded in Chapter 5, covering the ‘goods’ (‘bienes’) of the soul (the theological and moral virtues), the goods of the body (health, an attractive appearance and good physical bearing), and the goods of fortune (lineage, social position, wealth and the like), is central to the argument running through both books of Merola’s treatise.

In terms of human existence, man’s task of completing the circular process from God and back to God means, to a great extent, service of one’s fellow men in social relationships, ‘because the good of the soul largely consists in action useful to one’s neighbour’ (fo.21r). In his opening pages Merola argues, with Plato, that the life of pure contemplation brings happiness to the individual but not to society at large, which requires action (fo.7r–v). Not that there is no place for contemplation: in a Christian society the contemplative and active lives must go together, for it is thus that the biblical injunction to love God and to love one’s neighbour is fulfilled (fo.8r–v). Nevertheless, Merola at once adds, in terms that recall Costa, that the life of action is ‘of more merit’ than the other since it results in ‘the good of many’. When Merola later returns to this point, urging that men have a duty to serve the república, sacrificing their honour, lives, and homes to it if necessary (‘since the good of many is greater and more important than the good of one’), he refers, as Costa had also done, to Cicero’s famous words in the Somnium Scipionis, where he looks to the heavenly reward awaiting those who have served their country (fo.177r–v). This is of particular interest in Merola’s case since, in Book II of his treatise, as we shall see, he takes a markedly different approach to civic society and its values.

Merola’s division of ‘bienes’ into three kinds—those of the soul, of the body, and ‘of fortune’—is complemented by a parallel three-fold division of the professions or ‘facultades’ corresponding to each kind of ‘good’. Of the first kind, the teólogo has charge (this term, as used by Merola, signifying not so much a theologian as one whose concern is with spiritual things); of the second, the médico has charge; of the third, the letrados or juristas, referred to collectively as ‘la facultad civil’. This three-fold scheme is as central to Merola’s entire argument
as the triple scheme of 'goods', for these three 'artes [or 'sciencias']
architectónicas' together perform the directive function in society
over the whole range of its concerns and goals.

In Book I, chapter ix, Merola emphasizes that each of the three
'sciencias' is, within its own domain, its own master. It is true that
the teólogo is concerned with the ultimate goal ('el último fin, y más
architectónico y perfecto'), that is, the good of the soul, to which all
other ends refer, so that, in this sense, the médico and the letrado are
subordinate to him (fo.50r–v). However, in their own areas, they are
all 'architectos y principales artífices', like three kings, each on his
own throne (fo.47v). Merola writes here at some length of how
they can profitably collaborate with each other (fos.51r–54v). Never-
theless, for the rest of the work, he is chiefly concerned with defend-
ing the position of the medical profession and arguing its superiority
to that of the law. He does so in response to the poor view taken
of medical practitioners by his contemporaries. He remarks that there
is no conversation or social gathering at which people do not attack
them. The like does not happen, he notes, in the case of the Civil
Law—or Theology, 'which has the Holy Office to protect it' (fo.55r–v).
Both Kagan and Kamen have commented on how medical study in
the universities of sixteenth-century Spain suffered from its lack of
In Merola’s own time, as recently as 1580, the seriousness of the
situation at Salamanca had been acknowledged by the Vice-Rector
of the University. One finds him addressing his colleagues on the
dearth of teachers and students of medicine apparent there over a
number of years and expressing the fear that the time would come
when it would be impossible to find a doctor, unless steps were taken
at once to encourage the subject (Beltrán de Heredia, 1970, iv, 339).\

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4 Merola's phrases 'artes architectónicas', 'fin architectónico', etc. derive, via the
Latin versions and commentaries, from the terminology of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,
where, at the outset, Aristotle distinguishes between 'master arts' and 'subordinate
skills'. See below, p. 211.

5 Kagan and Kamen remark that the position of medicine suffered from its asso-
ciation with those of Jewish origins—a point to which Merola was not indifferent:
see below, p. 216. The Vice-Rector observed that those studying medicine were
mostly of modest means and, while the course was longer than that of other sub-
jects, financial aid was not available for medical students as it was for canonists
and theologians (*loc.cit.*).
Merola first argues for the necessity and honour of medicine in a series of chapters where he draws on a variety of ‘authorities’: the Old and New Testaments, the ‘prophane authors’ of Classical Antiquity, and Roman history in classical times (chs.11–14). Later he stresses the importance of its role in promoting the virtue of temperance (chs.18–20). In between, he finds space for a stinging attack on many of the caballeros of his time and their pursuit of what they regard as honra.

Like Costa, whose strictures on the nobility Merola’s strongly recall, he rests his criticism on the familiar principle that the origins of noble birth, and so of social honra, are located in the exceptional virtue displayed by a man’s forebears, whose successors’ duty it is to emulate them in that virtue (fo.88r). True honra, Merola says, consists in coming to the aid of widows and orphans and the like (fo.87r), not in living lives, as all too many caballeros do, given over to gambling and ‘prophane love affairs’ or marked by murders, tyranny, and violence (fo.88r). He writes of the devices employed for acquiring nobility and honra: purchasing them or coming by them by princely favour, or by false documents, or by making friends with family chroniclers (fos.85v–86r). Earlier, Merola had remarked that ‘honour as the world has fashioned it is the merest nothing’; now he goes on to speak, as Costa does, of the indifference of the caballeros towards any kind of learning. However poor they are, they do not want it said of them that they know Latin, or even that they can write well, but only that they are ‘cavalleros pueros’ (fo.91r). Such knights, Merola comments, have no more brains than the horses they ride.

It is with Chapter 21 that Merola settles to the task of expounding the character of society in terms of the analogy of the human body. This occupies the rest of Book I. First he applies the analogy as a whole; then he elaborates a series of more particular applications.

He begins with the analogy between the three ‘artes arhitectónicas’ and the three ‘principal parts’ of the body. These, in ascending order of dignity and excellence, are the kidneys, the heart and the brain, corresponding respectively to the professions of civil law, medicine, and ‘theology’ (fos.101r–03r). The way in which these

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physical organs work together brings Merola back to the subject of how the three professions should collaborate; he deplores in particular the fact that medical men and lawyers speak ill of each other (fos.103r–07v). The reciprocity and harmony of functioning which Merola looks for between them is now expounded in terms taken from ‘the great and divine’ St Paul in Romans xii, 4: we have many members in one body, but not all the members have the same office. The different offices or functions with which Merola concerns himself for the rest of Chapter 23 are, again, three in number: those who govern but are not themselves governed; those who are governed but do not themselves govern; and those in between, who command some people while obeying others. The first include ‘counsellors or consuls’; the second, the plebs; the third, men who assist in council those who have the government of the república in their hands (fos.111v–12v). To express the harmony that results when these work together as they should, Merola recalls, as Costa and Cerdán had done, the image which Augustine adopted from Cicero of musical concord as applied to the proper relationship of the highest, middle and lowest estates (De ciu. Dei, II, xxii). Merola warms to the subject of the ‘great and inviolable peace and reciprocal benefit’ that should exist between these different parts of society in a way that recalls Cerdán’s words on the subject, though Merola’s debt is to Galen: ‘oscula haerent osculis’: the different elements of society are to give each other the kiss of peace (fo.115r). For ‘idlers and vagabonds’, however, his tone is very different. These have no place in society and are of great harm to it. Merola reflects with satisfaction that for such people the república has prisons, galleys, dockyards and other means for ridding itself of them as seems best, for ‘nature suffers no part in the body or other object that is not of benefit for its maintenance’ (fo.114v). This general discussion of society concludes, in Chapter 24, with an extended account of how the wonderful constitution of the human body parallels and sums up in itself the structure and elements of the macrocosmic order in which man in placed, while beyond even that, the constitution of man’s soul corresponds to the nature of the Triune God himself (fos.115r–19v).

The view of society set out in this part of Merola’s treatise seems to be what J.A. Maravall had particularly in mind when he remarked of both Merola and Camós that their neo-Platonic view of the order running through the whole scheme of things committed them to the defence of a traditional society structured as so many ‘estamentos’
within a closed hierarchy (Maravall, 1966, p. 513). For them perfection belonged to the timeless essence of things; it was not a historical outcome. Therefore their vision of the ‘republica’ excluded as far as possible all reference to the circumstantial aspects of life as led in political society. The case of Camós will be considered next. However, as regards Merola, some qualification seems necessary in the light of his insistence, in Book II of his treatise, that ‘plebeian people’ are not to be found only in the lowest estate of society (Chapter 14). On the contrary, ‘plebeos’ (rather like Ortega y Gasset’s ‘hombres-masa’) exist among society’s most highly placed members: those who are base in their outlook and opinions even if they are kings, dukes, or holders of doctorates (fo.256r). On the other hand, those of humble origins who have taken trouble over their behaviour and opinions leave many princes and other highly placed persons behind them, for men should be measured by what is best and of highest worth in them, namely the things of the mind (‘ánimo’) and understanding, not the gifts of capricious fortune (fo.256r–v). From this Merola concludes (borrowing from the phrase from Huarte de San Juan’s Examen de ingenios) that there should be an examination of men’s wits for choosing rulers from among those on whom nature has bestowed special gifts of understanding, learning, and prudence (fo.257r). He is another of those who praise the republic of Venice for its care in this matter; at the same time he recalls Aristotle’s warning of how societies under an aristocratic form of rule can be undermined by displaying injustice in this regard (Politics, V, vii).

This is one issue among others where Merola’s views are not altogether consistent. In Book I, when working out his organic analogy of society, he stresses the unsuitability of men of low estate for the exercise of government. Because by definition they lack power and riches of their own, they are likely to use government office to obtain them (fo.129r–v). These remarks come in the course of a discussion grounded on the proposition, attributed to Plato, that power, knowledge, and goodness are necessary for government, and especially knowledge and goodness. This leads Merola on to comments regarding the qualities requisite in the ruler that bear an unexpected resemblance to those of Furió Ceriol on the same subject in his introductory chapter. Merola writes:

7 Merola reinforces his point by quoting in full Ausiàs March’s poem ‘Foll es aquell que lo bon home plany’ (‘Canto moral, XI’).
One who presides over the government of society may well possess goodness, but this does not suffice, just as it would not suffice, in order to be a good master [in some discipline] to be good [in oneself] [. . .] what I mean is that not so much the man as the master and the ruler of society has to be good; although here we desire that [the latter] should be good in himself and also a good ruler [. . .].

Merola soon adds that 'it is manifest that one cannot exercise command without knowing what kind of thing is being commanded, the how and when of the matter, whom, and for what end' (fo.131v). Such sentiments are very much at one with Furió's and one is bound to wonder whether some unacknowledged familiarity with his treatise lies in the background here. However, this line of thinking is not taken further.

These remarks occur in Book I, chapter xxvii, one of the ten in which, from Chapter 25 to the end of this book, Merola elaborates a series of particular analogies between the human body and aspects or elements of human society. In the body one finds a representation of royal government, for as a king rules his kingdom, so does nature rule the human body. But the body is also a 'vivid portrait' of rule by aristocracy, seen in the combined control of the bodily functions by brain, heart, and kidneys together. Beyond that, it gives us a picture of warfare and military discipline, for, as the king's army attacks an enemy, so the body 'attacks' a disease. But as regards disease, the body is also like a legal tribunal, in so far as nature 'judges between illness and its sufferer' (fo.152r). It must be stressed that these and the like are not passing figures of speech; each analogy is worked out in detail in a chapter to itself. Merola sometimes admits to having difficulty, as when he argues that the body is a cifra—both summary and representation—of the three 'arms' of society: the ecclesiastical, the military, and 'el braço Real', the latter signifying all that is included in public administration and services (Chapter 32). All three are 'arms' of society because they offer it strength and protection in the way that arms protect the body. It is an awkwardness considered in the next chapter that the human body has only two

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8 'Podría tener bondad el que preside al gobierno de la República, pero ésta no basta, como no bastaría para ser buen maestro ser bueno: porque la bondad en este caso más [h]a de ser atributo de la calidad que del supuesto, quiero dezir que no tanto el hombre [h]a ser bueno, como el maestro y republico. Aunque aqui queremos, que juntamente sea bueno, y buen republico [. . .]' (fo.129v). See above, pp. 90–91.
arms, not three; but meanwhile Merola presents the three ‘arms’ of society in terms of the three chief organs of the body, of which the brain corresponds to the ecclesiastical arm, the heart to the military (since the heart is the seat of anger), while the kidneys correspond to the ‘braço Real’ (fos.161r–62v). But this scheme confronts Merola with the troubling consequence that it puts learned doctors of medicine and law in the least dignified sector of society, alongside plebeian persons who are ignorant and lacking in counsel (fos.163r–64v). The answer which Merola eventually finds is that, in this scheme, the learned provide strength where it is most needed, as the body does; it is for that reason that the learned are grouped with low persons, not because they do not deserve a higher place in society (fo.164v). This solution, Merola tells us, came to him only after ‘most diligent inquiry and profound consideration’ of the matter (fo.163v).

It is unnecessary to add to this account of Merola’s analogies to show that, for the modern reader, the problem is to understand in what sense Merola thought he was making meaningful statements in employing this kind of discourse. Early in Book I he shows he is aware that such talk presents difficulties, observing that ‘if in any matter a man had reason to fear seizing the pen, it was in matters of analogies and similitudes’ (fos.12v–13r). What, nevertheless, gave him intellectual confidence was his belief, emphasized in his chapter on the three ‘arms’ of society and later, that ‘art imitates nature’—a principle, he notes, accepted in the Schools (fo.159v). So, as he says, artificial things imitate natural things. The first house built necessarily imitated some natural thing resembling a house. More broadly, those who devised royal government, human society, the army, and legal tribunals—these being artificial things—‘necessarily had to imitate some natural model and type’. But, Merola continues syllogistically, no natural thing so perfectly contains within itself the cifra or sum of artificial things as the human body does. Therefore it follows that ‘in imitation of the human body have all other artificial things been made.’ Merola adds that he has desired to establish this point lest anyone should think that these things of which he speaks are ‘imaginary’ and merely ingenious comparisons.

Merola later writes of the good ciudadano’s need to know the business of governing a city in the way that a medical man knows his own particular business (fo.178r–v). The latter acquires his knowledge by examining the human body in anatomical investigations. ‘In like fashion’ the ciudadano cannot govern well ‘unless he has a thorough
understanding of his subject and gives very careful consideration to
the anatomical examination which we are performing here [. . .].’
Clearly Merola saw no inconsistency of argument in this remark.

Turning, in Book II, to the question of the standing of the me-
dical profession vis-à-vis the lawyers, Merola was aware that he was
entering a long-continuing polemic. He had been prompted to do
so, as he explains (fo.186v), by two prominent French jurists argu-
ning the case for the advantage of their own profession earlier in the
century: Barthélemy de Chasseneux (Cassaneus) in his Catalogus glo-
riae mundi and André Tiraqueau (Tiraquellus) in his De nobilitate.9
Chasseneux had remarked with disobliger forthrightness that there
was no comparison between the two professions: the object of the
law was ‘a hundred times superior [‘dignior’] to that of medicine’
(fo.195v). Tiraqueau is less aggressive in tone but, as Merola notes,
raises medicine in order to praise the law still more.

Both writers deploy a massive apparatus of learned reference to
earlier discussions of their subject. Tiraqueau’s references show the
interest taken in it by jurists and professors of the Roman Law in
previous centuries, especially in Italy, and also by Italian humanists
and professors of medicine in the fifteenth century.10 Chasseneux
directs his arguments especially against Andrea Barbazza, who taught
law at Bologna over the middle decades of the fifteenth century but
in this debate chose to take the side of medicine, which he had stud-
ied first. Petrarch had perhaps introduced a new vigour into the
debate a century before that with his onslaughts of the 1350s on
medical men who had pretensions to invading the field of letters.
Garin especially has shown, with his publication of the relevant pri-
mary material, how the debate was conducted from the late four-
teenth century to the late fifteenth century in Italy by humanists
such as Salutati, Bruni, and Poggio Bracciolini, and by practitioners
and professors of medicine such as Giovanni Baldi da Faenza, Giovanni
d’Arezzo, Nicoletto Vernia, and Antonio de Ferraris, il Galateo.11

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9 See Chasseneux (1546), Pt.X, ‘Consideratio 25’ (fos.194v ff.), and Tiraqueau
(1549), Ch.31 (fos.98v ff.): ‘An ars medicinae nobilitati derogat’.
10 The debate on whether the medical or the legal profession was superior to
the other related especially to the distinctive character of the Italian universities,
where there were only two faculties: law and arts. In the faculty of arts medicine
(supported by logic and natural philosophy) was the most important subject of
instruction. (See Kristeller, 1961, p. 36.)
11 See Garin (1947a), (1947b); also Maffei (1956).
Subsequently, in sixteenth-century Italy, one finds the rival claims being argued by Ferdinando d’Adda (Abduensis) in his Contra iurisprudentiae vituperatores oratio (Venice, 1546) and then by Giovanni Baptista Pellegrini in his Adversus philosophiae et medicinae calumniatores apologia (Bologna, 1566), written in reply. In the early years of the seventeenth century, Ippolito Obizzi (Obicius), himself a medical doctor, joined the ranks of medicine’s defenders with his De nobilitate medi ci contra illius obrectatores dialogus (Venice, 1605). This debate forms the context for Part II of Merola’s own treatise and, on those grounds, requires some examination here, for while professional parti pris counted for much on both sides of the argument, larger and more significant issues were involved.

Claims for the superior ‘dignity’ or ‘nobility’ of the legal as distinct from the medical profession centred on the role of law within the moral function of civic society; that is, on its part in promoting the moral life of the individual within society and thus society’s good at large. On the other hand, assertions of the superior standing of medicine rested on the alleged superiority of systematic knowledge over action, the superiority of the speculative life over the ‘active life’, and, finally, on the superiority of the object of its concern (the human body) over that of the lawyers (namely, mere things).

The case for the legal profession is put with particular intellectual force by Coluccio Salutati in his De nobilitate legum et medicinae, completed in 1399 when its author had been Chancellor of Florence for nearly a quarter of a century. In an argument addressing itself with notable directness to the underlying issues, he insists that to pursue the moral good is to pursue a more ultimate good (‘ultimatus bonum’) than that which is merely true (Garin, 1947a, p. 32). The will is more noble than the intellect, and the active life is to be preferred to the speculative (ibid., p. 182). The law strives so that ‘man will become good, the state [‘civitas’] will be preserved, and so that the society and community of human kind will not be disturbed’ (p. 36). Medicine is concerned with the body, law with the soul, and thus with that which distinguishes man from all other creatures; medicine is concerned with the health of the individual, law with the common good (pp. 50, 94, 104). Therefore Salutati can confidently

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12 See Thorndike (1926), (1936), (1963). (I have, however, revised the dates he gives for the first editions of the works of d’Adda and Pellegrini.)
appropriate (p. 212) the definition of jurisprudence enshrined in the
*Corpus iuris civilis*: ‘Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and human
things [‘Iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum noti-
tia’]’ (*Institutes*, I.i).

Salutati tells his particular antagonist that the latter’s reasoning
entirely rests on his estimate of the dignity of speculation and the
prerogative of certainty (p. 26). Later apologists for medicine show
the justness of this remark. Thus, towards the end of the fifteenth
century, Vernia contends that God himself and the other heavenly
intelligences cannot be known without ‘natural knowledge’ (‘sine ipsa
naturali scientia’); but it is in such knowledge of God that man’s
true happiness lies. This happiness the jurists as such cannot arrive
at, because their goal is ‘a certain happiness’ relating to man’s shared
existence in human society and to just retribution within the sphere
of the contingent and the temporal. The happiness achieved by spec-
culative activity, on the other hand, is the contemplation of the truth,
for the object of the intellect is ‘veritas scibilis et aeterna’ (Garin,
1947b, pp. 113–14). Since the human body, like the heavenly bodies,
forms part of the object of ‘natural knowledge’, which Vernia declares
to be far superior to ‘scientia politica’, he sees the medical profes-
sion as superior to the legal one. For his part, Antonio de Ferrariis,
il Galateo, physician and man of letters who became Court Physician
at Naples in 1490, explicitly takes up a position against that of
Coluccio Salutati (p. 146). He too knows that it has been said that
Socrates brought philosophy down from the heavens for the every-
day purposes of life (p. 140). Nevertheless, he unhesitatingly places
‘those studies which concern themselves with the contemplation of
things’ far ahead of ‘those concerned with action’ (*ibid*.). Wisdom he
sees as that which is found by those who scrutinize ‘the nature of
the heavens, the stars, the elements, plants, animals, and the nature
of man himself’. It is such people, he claims, borrowing the same
phrase from Justinian’s *Institutes*, whose minds are wholly on ‘the
knowledge of things divine and human’ (p. 154). For that reason,
he, like Vernia, rates the medical far above the legal profession.

Both Chasseneux and Tiraqueau, in response to whom Merola
was writing, themselves wrote with an evident and detailed know-
ledge of the arguments adduced on each side of the debate. Chasseneux,
more extensively than Tiraqueau, presents the traditional case for
the medical profession in order to argue all the more vigorously
against it. His own central arguments for the superiority of the legal
profession are very much those which we have seen in Salutati. He too quotes the Justinian definition of jurisprudence in favour of the lawyers (fo.195v), and, for good measure, Cicero’s words in his Somnium Scipionis in praise of those who serve their patria (fo.196v).

Before we turn to Merola’s own treatment of the subject, it is relevant to note that Cicero and Aristotle are repeatedly recalled in this debate for their estimates of the value to be placed on the life of intellectual speculation or contemplation as compared with that of activity devoted to the promotion of the well-being of human society. So, for example, we find Niccoletto Vernia, committed as he was to arguing for the superiority of speculative knowledge, recalling the passage in Cicero’s De officiis (I,154–58) where it is argued that the claims of human society take precedence over the pursuit of speculative knowledge, and that it is justice in particular that maintains human society.13 Two passages especially of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are repeatedly alluded to. The first is Aristotle’s distinction between particular arts or skills (medicine among them) directed towards particular ends, and ‘master arts’ (among which the science of politics is pre- eminent) concerned with the pursuit of ends desired for their own sake (Ethics, I,i–ii). The second is his argument that the activity of the reason in contemplation is superior to the activity of the practical virtues in political or military affairs, and that it is in such contemplative activity that man is most like God (Ethics, X,vii–viii). Such passages were in the minds of contenders on both sides of the law-versus-medicine polemic and we shall see that Merola regarded it as necessary to address himself to these authorities at some length.

What immediately distinguishes Merola’s discussion as a whole in this field of debate is the prominence it gives to the role of ‘theologians’ in addition to the medical profession and lawyers. It is true that, in the early fifteenth century, Giovanni Baldi da Faenza had set out an ‘order of perfection’ in which theology came first, medicine second, and law third (Garin, 1947b, p. 4); but this was a scheme of five elements in all and in any case his remarks on theology

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13 It is in the course of this discussion (I,153), where Cicero is arguing for the superiority of the practice of social virtue over theoretical knowledge, that he uses the phrase that would be incorporated into the Justinian Institutes and become so prominent in the debate which we have been surveying: ‘rerum [. . .] divinarum et humanarum scientia’.
remain undeveloped. Most of the works we have been considering barely mention theology or the clergy. Chasseneux, who so irritated Merola, refers to the clergy in this discussion only to reiterate the ancient claim of the Roman lawyers to be 'priests of the law' and to cite the same passage from Hostiensis as Costa does to the effect that upright judges and faithful advocates lead a 'better life' than preaching friars and others of their kind (fo.197r: see above, pp. 141–43). The work where we find a view closely similar to Merola's is the latest of those mentioned above: the defence of the medical profession published by Ippolito Obizzi at Venice in 1605. Here (p. 62) we are given a three-fold scale of nobility in which the highest place is occupied by the 'theologi', who are guardians of the soul and free it from its sins. The second place is occupied by the medical profession, the third by the lawyers, whose concern is with inanimate things, the 'goods of fortune', which are far less 'noble' than the animate human body. Therefore more regard should be had for medical men than for lawyers. Obizzi acknowledges that this scheme is not of his own devising; he had taken it from the thirteenth-century Italian lawyer Alberto de Gandino, more specifically from his De maleficiis (repeatedly reprinted in the sixteenth century). Tiraqueau quotes the same passage as Obizzi,14 and it may be that here we have one of Merola's unacknowledged sources.15 The fact remains that, in his argument, 'theologians' have a place of a wholly different order of importance from that accorded to them elsewhere.16

For he not only, like others before him, places teólogos 'above' the lawyers; he also introduces an emphatic and far-reaching distinction of another kind between them. Beyond the fact that lawyers are concerned with matters of less importance than those with which

14 Tiraqueau, 1549, fo.175r; Obizzi, 1605, p. 62.
16 Aquinas's discussion of the relative standing of 'politica scientia' and 'scientia divina' in his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics does, however, offer a parallel. Here he declares the former to be 'principaliorum et architectonicam omnium aliarum' among the 'scientias practicas', inasmuch as it is concerned with the 'ultimum et perfectum bonum in rebus humanis' (Aquinas, 1964, p. 2). However, 'ultimum finem totius universi considerat scientia divina, quae est respectu omnium principalissima' (id., p. 8b). See also Virol, 1992, pp. 35–36.
‘theologians’ deal, they are concerned with things merely external to
man, and even then only with the outward aspect and convenient
social arrangement of things, whereas ‘theologians’ deal with mat-
ters profoundly internal to man and with the very reality and sub-
stance of things. ‘The jurist is concerned only with exterior matters
and with what can be seen [‘El jurista no cura sino de lo exterior
y de lo que se ve’]’ (fo.203r). In different ways both ‘theologian’
and lawyer are concerned with justice. But whereas the business of
the ‘theologian’ is with forming a truly just character and disposi-
tion within the individual in his relationship with God, the lawyer’s
interest is only in the due legal ordering of the ‘goods of fortune’
with regard to the purposes of peace in society, and ‘for this he does
not merit the name of just’ (fos.193v–94r). The ideas presented here
in Chapter 3 of this part of Merola’s treatise are developed a good
deal further as the work progresses.

Merola repeatedly stresses that the aim that the legal profession
has in view is the maintenance of peace in earthly society, and only
that. As their concern is restricted to this world, to the distribution
and exchange of its ‘bienes de fortuna’, Merola denies the familiar
claim of lawyers to possess and to be applying ‘a knowledge of divine
and human things’ (fo.206v). Moreover, within the ambit of earthly
society, Merola notes that, for the sake of its peaceful existence, the
law tolerates public vices, prostitutes, brothels, and gambling, which
it would not do if its aim was to form a virtuous society. Not virtue
but peace is the lawyer’s concern, and peace is itself not a virtue
but an ‘indifferent good’ which may be used well or ill (fo.299r–v).

However, a more theoretical and more basic criticism is brought
to bear on the lawyers’ pretensions. The justice that is their concern
is not true justice. It is indeed one of the cardinal virtues in the
scheme of moral philosophy developed in Classical pagan times, but
those are not true virtues. Merola quotes St Paul on the subject of
those who, professing themselves wise, became vain in their reason-
ings (Rom.i, 21–22), but his main argument is avowedly Augustinian
in character. He refers to and elaborates the passage in the De ciu-
itate Dei (Bk.XIX, ch.xxv) where the apparent virtues of Classical
Antiquity are judged to be vices rather than virtues because they
were not directed towards the true God (fos.296r–98r).17 Therefore,

17 See above p. 144.
says Merola, 'we emphatically deny that the moral virtues of those times were truly virtuous and meritorious in character' (fo.295v). He twice quotes Augustine’s dictum that there is no true justice save in that commonwealth whose founder and ruler is Christ (De civ. Dei, II, xxi) (fos.195v, 303v). On the second occasion he observes that, in all the moral teaching of the ancient philosophers, there is no mention of Christ or God; it is the teólogo who ‘professes’ the things pertaining to them; ‘therefore it is plain that it is the teólogo alone who deals with and considers true justice and true virtue’.18

When he first quotes Augustine’s dictum, Merola adds that the república founded and governed by Christ is, in its continuing existence, founded on ‘love and peace of the heart and will’ (fo.195v). This is a peace which the world’s laws cannot give; for the world establishes peace by ‘tying the hands with fear’ whereas the peace brought by God and his laws ‘ties the will with love’ (fo.196r). Merola insists on the contrast: the teólogo governs with love and mercy, because he is the minister of the God of mercy and the law of grace, whereas the jurista appears as the minister of the rigour of the old, written law (fos.196v–97r). There is a recognizable echoing here of the Pauline theme that Christians live not under the law of the Old Testament but under grace, and that love is the fulfilment of the law. But now there has been a radical re-application of the concepts and contrast of which St Paul speaks.

Merola does not himself elaborate this re-application in specific terms. He does, however, indicate that he sees a genuinely Christian society as living by values very different from those of the society he sees around him. Thus, in Chapter 24 he writes of false and true honra. He enumerates the different forms of self-importance and attachment to honour displayed by different social groups in contemporary society in order to argue that Christ overthrew all such notions. Judged by the values of this world, no one was more lacking in honour than Christ, his apostles and disciples (fos.300r–01v). Merola, as mentioned earlier, takes over the familiar idea that the basis of honour is virtue, but, for reasons already clear, he now sees

18 ‘Pues es cierto como con Augustino lo avemos provado [q]ue la verdadera justicia no se halla sino en aquella República cuyo fundador y governador es Christo. Y es cosa averiguada que en toda la moral de la manera que los antiguos Philósofos la trataron no se hace mención de Cristo, ni de Dios, cuyas cosas muy de veras professa el sagrado Theólogo, y así es cosa llena que el Theólogo solo es el que trata y considera la verdadera justicia, y la verdadera virtud: […]’ (fos.303v–04r).
such virtue in exclusively Christian terms. On this score again he contrasts the lawyers unfavourably with the teólogos. Since the latter alone are concerned with true virtue, they alone are concerned with the recognition of true honra, whereas the legal profession distributes honour according to criteria of birth or princely favour, and all for the sake of peace in society. Thus the honra with which they deal is a mere ‘outward illustration’, not the real thing (fos.302r–05r). This Augustinian rejection of pagan Classical moral philosophy and the consequent repudiation of the pretensions of the lawyers form an important part of three chapters (23–25) towards the end of this treatise devoted to rejecting the claim of both Cicero and Aristotle that, in Merola’s phrase, ‘la facultad Civil’ occupied a place of primacy among the principal professions. Once again we find cited, as in earlier writers, Cicero’s words in his Somnium Scipionis to the effect that there is nothing on earth more acceptable to the Supreme Deity than those councils and assemblies of men bound together by law which are called states. The passage of Aristotle attacked is the introduction to his Ethics. We have already seen that Merola’s earlier treatment of the Somnium Scipionis in Book I of his treatise was very different. So also was his attitude towards the whole issue of moral virtue as codified by Classical Antiquity, and towards the moral function and significance of political society (see above, p. 201). It seems impossible to reconcile the two approaches. The change from the one to the other appears to be a further indication of the radically though patchily subversive effect exerted by certain elements in the thought of Augustine on the response of those influenced by Italian humanism to the Classical moral tradition.

Since Merola remained within the limits of a rather narrow and often unspecific terminology, it is hard to see just how he envisaged that the essentially Christian values and attitudes which he associated distinctively with the teólogos would express themselves in terms of the relations of a whole Christian society, or what kind of relationship he held to exist between this and the de facto social order. When, in the course of writing about the teólogos, he (at least by implication) alludes to a society sustained by Christian love, not by fear or force, and with a scale of Christian values leaving no room for the usual worldly distinctions of power and place, one may well recall other, earlier, Spanish works where a similar ideal is held up. We have seen this in the earlier part of Cerdán’s Verdadero gobierno, in Felipe de la Torre, in Alfonso de Valdés’s portrait of the converted
King Polidoro. We may recall also passages in Erasmus's *Institutio principis christiani* where he exhorts the youthful Charles V to remember that he is a Christian prince, not a pagan one, and that words such as ‘dominus’, ‘imperium’, ‘regnum’, ‘majestas’ and ‘potentia’ are pagan terms, not Christian ones (Erasmus, 1703, iv, 567B, 577D). Christ alone is the perfect model for a Christian prince, and in imitation of him, as St Paul said, Christians should owe no man anything but to love each other (*Id. id.*, 578C–F). To rule by power and fear is legitimate for a pagan ruler, whereas the Christian prince and people will be bound together by ‘Christiana caritas’ (579A–C). In the cases of Alfonso de Valdés and Felipe de la Torre this ideal leads each writer to present princely rule and the relations of Christian society essentially in terms of Christian love. We have seen the extent to which this is again found in Cerdán. However, we also saw how Cerdán effects a somewhat unconvincing transition from the chapters where this ideal is expressed to those in which he devotes himself to discussion of the operation of justice in society as it actually exists. What is thus rather ineffectively linked in Cerdán’s treatise is emphatically separated and contrasted in Book II of Merola’s, while what had previously, in others, been predicated of the whole Christian community is now expressed in terms linking it always with the priestly order, this being set in strong contrast to the aims and values of the secular order as signified by the term ‘la facultad civil’. Just how Merola came by his views in this matter remains unclear; however, the contrast drawn by Augustine between the Two Cities, the Heavenly and the Earthly (*De civ. Dei*, XIV, xxviii; XV, iv; XIX, xvii) would seem to have counted for much.

It was, of course, a major part of the author’s purpose, in Book II of his treatise, not only to place lawyers below *teólogo* but to place *médicos* above lawyers. This leads him to discourse (as he had done in Book I, chapters ix & xi) on the antiquity of the medical profession and the eminence of those who had followed it. In both respects, he contends, medicine had the advantage over law. He also regards it as necessary to repudiate at some length (in Chapter 20) the argument advanced by Barthélemy de Chasseneux that the standing of medicine was diminished by the fact that so many of those who practised it were of Jewish origins. Merola’s concern over the issue comes as no surprise at a time when the notion of so-called ‘purity of blood’ had taken such a hold on the minds of his compatriots.
Moreover, it was a fact that many of those who practised medicine were *conversos*. It is less expected to find Merola here, having just echoed the terms of contemporary prejudice against them, declaring that he does not want to take this matter too far, for, as he expects, many of his readers will be *conversos*, who will be far from pleased by such comment; better therefore ‘to withdraw and make friends with them’ (fo.277v).¹⁹

It is a point of superiority over lawyers that medical men, like *teólogos*, are ministers of mercy rather than of justice (fo.205r). Moreover, being concerned with the body, they are concerned with the instrument which the soul employs for doing good works and acquiring merit with God (fo.209v). However, much more central to Merola’s argument is the claim that medicine is superior to law as an intellectual activity and method. He repeatedly insists that medical knowledge has a coherent, systematic, and unvarying character which jurisprudence lacks. Laws, he notes, vary from place to place and from time to time (fos.212v–13v). Legal thinking, since it gives so much weight to the principle of authority, is very much open to frequently conflicting legal opinions, whereas medical men, as Merola claims, set less store by ‘authorities’ than by reason (fos.271v–72r).²⁰ That to which they apply their reason is the perfect ordering of nature by God, which is nowhere seen so fully and wonderfully expressed as in the human body (fos.212r–14r).

It is not surprising that Merola devotes a chapter (Bk.II, ch.viii) to arguing that natural philosophy is superior to moral philosophy, on the grounds that the more universal the matter of enquiry ['subieocio'], and the more universal and ‘architectónico’ the aim or end of that enquiry, the more highly the latter is to be esteemed (fo.222r–v). Therefore metaphysics is queen of the sciences. Natural philosophy is more universal in its matter and aim than moral philosophy, and medicine is immediately subordinate to natural philosophy, whereas the law comes below moral philosophy. Natural

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¹⁹ At two points in particular in this passage there is a disjointedness unusual in the work at large. This may be due to cuts made in the text prior to printing.

²⁰ Merola does not fail to speak, in terms reminiscent of Cerdán, of the way litigants are financially exploited by lawyers, and of the ignorance of judges. In many of the numerous tribunals of Catalonia, he remarks, it seems that the aim is to hinder justice rather than to despatch it (fos.275r, 311r–12r).
philosophy is superior to moral philosophy in the way it relates causes to effects and derives conclusions from basic principles (fos.222v–23v).

Merola’s line of argument on this issue is clearly very much in the tradition of the Italian fifteenth-century writers whom we earlier saw making the same claims for the superiority of medicine over law. However, in Merola’s case, this line of argument is considerably strengthened by quotations from and references to the Hermetic works. The enthusiasm expressed by Joan Costa for these writings a decade earlier was noted in a previous chapter. Merola refers to, or quotes from, the Asclepius (chapters 3, 4, & 8) and the Pimander (chapters 5 & 10),21 and the influence of these works is detectable in both books of his treatise. In his longest quotation (Bk.II, ch.x), he reproduces nearly a half of Chapter 5 of the Pimander, giving first Ficino’s Latin version and then his own Spanish rendering, the whole being a powerful evocation of the wonderful order of the created scheme of things, through which the invisible Deity is to be discerned, especially in the harmonious movement of the planets and stars and in the structure of the human body (fos.229v–31v).22 Because the order to be found in nature derives from God, it is proper to investigate that order, with its interplay of natural causes, so that it will become a ‘Jacob’s ladder’ by which man may ascend to God (fos.289r–90v). Here, in Chapter 22, Merola argues that it is no offence to God to attribute such importance to natural causes and devote such interest to their investigation. Indeed, to talk only in terms of the First Cause would be ‘to shut the door on all sound philosophical discourse’ (fo.290r). Merola’s remarks here recall a passage in Book I where he vigorously argues that illnesses normally require to be treated with ‘natural remedies’ and that to ignore these in favour of attaching relics, girdles, and the like to one’s person in order to secure the direct intervention of God or the saints is mere superstition (fos.154v–56v).23 The point is made at some length and with considerable emphasis; the note of dismissive scepticism as to popular religious nostrums, together with the measure of empiricism implied in the desire to see the remedies of nature applied to the

21 See fos.49r, 98r–v, 211v, 229v–31v, 242v–43r, 286r–v.
23 For a more detailed examination of this point in the context of Merola’s predominantly analogical mode of argument, see Truman (1994).
needs of nature, relates this part of Merola’s discussion to wider intellectual trends in sixteenth-century medical philosophy. However, his inclination towards empiricism must not be overstressed. If, on the one hand, he writes that ‘all sciencias have their origin in experience, which takes as its matter things perceived by the senses’, he also insists that, given the complex character of the human body and the difficulty of medical learning, the art of medicine cannot be worthily practised by a merely empirical physician: practical experience must be supplemented by a larger intellectual understanding. The exercise of that understanding upon the works of nature as seen in the human body—that ‘mappamundi’, as Merola calls it—brings not only knowledge of every branch of learning but also a perception of the power of God as it operates within the order of nature (fos.313r–14r). It is on these grounds that he attributes a higher dignity to the medical profession than to lawyers.

We have seen that Cerdán de Tallada responded powerfully to the idea of order and harmony encompassing the whole scheme of things, both heavenly and earthly. Merola’s work makes still more of this and, in terms of this scheme, of the related notion of a circular movement of descent and ascent, derivation and return—more than any other of the sixteenth-century Spanish treatises with which we are concerned. For that reason it deserves recognition as a work of some significance in the neo-Platonic literature of the Siglo de Oro and in the literature of ‘the Great Chain of Being’ studied in Lovejoy’s celebrated work (Lovejoy, 1936). However, it also shows how even a work giving such prominence to that world-view could nevertheless develop different perspectives in the course of its argument and reveal significant conflicts of value. We have seen how Merola’s ideal

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24 There is a close similarity between Merola’s position on this issue and that of Huarte de San Juan where he stresses that God works more through the operation of natural causes in the created order than by direct intervention or miracles: see his Examen de ingenios para las ciencias (1989), ch.2. We have noted Merola’s familiarity with this work. For the broader issue of scepticism and medicine in this period see Pition (1987).

25 ‘[...] todas las sciencias an tenido origen de la espiriencia, la cual tiene por subjecto las cosas sensibles [...]’; nevertheless, ‘[...] cómo es possible que pueda ni ose exercitar esta arte [de medicina] un empirico, con una sola espiriencia, vana, y de ningún valor, aunque pudiese tenerla de mil años[?]’. Merola quotes from Galen’s De sanitate tuenda and translates: ‘La exercitación y espiriencia[,] por más que larga y de muchos años sea, sin razón y arte no puede inventar algún remedio’ (fos.314r, 316r–v).
of cooperation between the three ‘facultades’ is outweighed by his professional antagonism towards the lawyers. We have also seen that his positive attitude in Book I towards civic values and the role of the law in upholding these is largely cancelled in Book II in consequence of a basically Augustinian line of reasoning concerning the natural virtues. More broadly, this Augustinian approach is a good deal at variance with the view that sees the ‘goods of fortune’ as positively contributing to the welfare of man’s physical being and the latter as serving the purposes and progress of his spiritual nature in an inter-linked and continuous process. Finally, the work shows how the concept of all-embracing cosmic order could lead a writer to employ language that sometimes appears to have a distinctly empiricist and ‘modern’ character while also fostering (to a much greater extent) aprioristic and analogical modes of discourse that, for the modern reader, give this work, among all these sixteenth-century Spanish treatises, a character that is especially but intriguingly alien.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

MARCO ANTONIO DE CAMÓS Y REQUESÉNS

In the last two treatises two themes have come increasingly to the fore. First, there is the ideal of order and concord. The order posited of earthly society is seen as part of a larger pattern of structures and purposes extending through the whole created universe, deriving from, reflecting, returning to, its source. At the level of earthly society, this order is expressed in terms of the organic analogy: the structure and operation of that society is likened to that of the human body, or, still more significantly, in Pauline terms, to the Body of Christ. This brings us to the second theme, which is at bottom that of the respective claims of the order of nature and the order of grace. We have seen discussion centring on the question of the view to be taken of civic society and its role in the promotion of the moral life; the values of civic, secular society as contrasted with and weighed against those of the ‘religious’ life—the one exemplified by lawyers, the other by members of the religious Orders or the ministerial priesthood; the one associated with the ‘active’ life, the other with the ‘contemplative’ or ‘speculative’; the one forming the context of, typically, the married life, the other giving significance to the celibate existence. A fundamental question posed by both Cerdán de Tallada and Merola, in markedly different ways, is how far the civic order of society can be expressed in essentially Christian terms—more specifically, those of the New Testament Epistles.

With the Microcosmia y gobierno universal del hombre cristiano of Marco Antonio de Camós y Requeséns, these issues are developed a good deal further. Again we find a strong attachment to the ideas of order and harmony embodied both in earthly society and in the cosmic order at large. Again we find an attachment to the presentation of the many elements and aspects of society in terms of the analogy of the human body—even more extensively in this work than in Merola’s. At the same time, Camós’s view of the specifically Christian relationships binding the members of that society together readily finds expression in terms of the Body of Christ. However, what gives his treatise especial interest in relation to the preceding ones is the value
he sets on the civic, secular order—the ‘natural’ order—while remaining attached to a view of the relations of Christians in society that has much in common with what we found in Cerdán de Tallada at those points where he is most under the influence of the New Testament Epistles. That first emphasis is the more noteworthy since Camós’s work—as we have already seen—is that of one who, by the time he wrote it, had turned from secular life in his late thirties to enter a religious Order. To an exceptional degree, the discussion contained in his work, and even its inconsistencies, in so far as these are present, are grounded in the writer’s own experience.

More specifically, Camós wrote this work—as he himself explains—in response to the wish of Don Antonio Folch de Cardona y Córdoba, fourth Duke of Sessa, to whom it is dedicated, that someone should write a work of Christian instruction relevant to the different orders of society, providing in particular a pattern of living for those involved in the world and its business. In a conversation between them at Madrid some years before, the Duke had explained that the work he desired to see written would not hold up for emulation the kind of perfection achieved by the canonized saints, nor on the other hand would it be indulgent to those of careless consciences; rather it would be such that anyone who followed its prescriptions, even if he could not call himself a saint in the narrower sense, could nevertheless legitimately call himself a Christian.¹

A dozen years after Camós’s treatise appeared—that is, in 1604—words of Sessa’s on this same point were to be recalled also by Don Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa, second Duke of Feria, in a letter to another Augustinian author of a treatise on government and subsequently included among its preliminaries: Fray Juan Márquez’s El governador christiano (Salamanca, 1612) (see sig.¶ 5v–6r). Don Lorenzo, who refers to Camós’s preliminaries to his own treatise, recalls how the Duke of Sessa had spoken to him (at Rome in the year in which

¹ ‘[…] en algunos ratos que me hizo V[ustra] Ex[celencia] particular merced en Madrid, años ha, mostró deseava se ocupase alguno en escribir de los estados para la institución Christiana de ellos: juzgando seria de mucha utilidad universalmente, y en particular dar una orden y método de vivir a los que andan metidos en el mundo y sus comercios. No en aquella perfección que vivieron los santos canonizados y celebrados como tales en la Yglesia cathólica, ni dexando lugar para que se siguan [sic] las libertades ilícitas de las descuydadas consciencias: mas por un medio tal que, aunque no sancto en el sentido que hablamos, pueda alomemos con honesto título llamarse Christiano el que en su estado siguiere la forma y manera de vivir que en esta obra se le da’ (sig.¶ 8r–v).
Camós's treatise was first published) of his desire for 'a book dealing with the duties of the [various] estates [of society]'. The Duke of Sessa had told Feria that he had first invited Luis de León to undertake such a work. The way in which—in the event—Camós addressed himself to the central issue of the Duke of Sessa's concern—that is, how to be a Christian 'in the world'—will provide the focus for the following discussion of his treatise.2

Printed first at the Augustinian house at Barcelona in 1592, it was republished at Madrid three years later. It consists of three parts and bears an obvious resemblance to medieval *specula* in which the different orders and aspects of society are reviewed. The theme of Part I is the secular order and its proper government. Here a series of chapters sets out the duties of the king, his servants, counsellors, legal officers and military men. The Second Part extends this discussion with a number of chapters on the unity and ordering of secular society at large and some discussion of the qualities desirable in those who give advice on public affairs. There follow several chapters on matrimonial and family life and then a discussion of yet other orders of society (*hidalgos*, peasants, skilled artisans, beggars) and occupations: doctors, traders, sailors. Part III is wholly devoted to the ecclesiastical order: the various ranks of the clergy, from pope to parish priest, together with the officers of church courts and theologians. Finally, several chapters discuss the religious Orders and the principles of the life they follow. Throughout the work Camós's argument is buttressed by a multitude of references to, and quotations from, Classical and Christian writers across the centuries, together with the Bible and other ecclesiastical and legal sources.

With Cerdán and Merola he shared a delight in contemplating and portraying the order and harmony of the universe as conceived according to the Ptolemaic model. His discussion of secular society is thus introduced with an extended account (I,12b–17a) of the Scale of Being and of man's place in it, that is, at the top of the ascending

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2 It should be added that the Duke of Sessa's interest in works of practical value to those involved in public affairs extended to the writings of Machiavelli. In 1584–85 he had twice written to the Council of the Inquisition asking that these, prohibited by the Index of 1583–84, should be permitted in Spain in a Spanish version, expurgated as necessary and issued under a name other than Machiavelli's. The lack of his works, he commented, was felt by many men of position, since they had valuable things to say about matters of state and government in time of peace and war. Though he offered to bear the cost the the undertaking, his plea was unsuccessful (Bertini, 1946, p. 26; Maravall, 1972b, p. 75).
levels of the material order and at the lowest position of the spiritual order, combining the two within himself. Later (I,99a–100b) he dwells on the ordered movement of the planets and the beauty of the world as the expression of Divine Providence. At the start of Part III (pp. 3b–7b) he shows how the unity and coherence of the universe derive from the unity of its divine source and how the monarchical principle, rooted in that source, finds expression at the various levels of the visible world. While this visible world in its entirety comes below the spiritual world, both find their place in an all-inclusive larger order. As for man, Camós here makes much again of his dual nature, because of which man represents a ‘horizon’ between the material and spiritual orders of being and thus comes to be a ‘little world’ in himself.

Camós here repeats a point much emphasized at the start of Part I: man was made in the image and likeness of God and has been placed in this world to worship and serve God on earth. To that end the other things of this world were created for man’s service and for man to rule over them. Man does indeed partly belong to the material order of being and in this life his soul is enclosed in an earthen vessel. Nevertheless, that vessel, the human body, is in itself a wonderfully ordered thing, and in any case there is an honour attaching to man which even the angels lack, since in the Incarnate Christ God took human nature upon himself. Therefore Camós concludes that man does himself wrong if he takes too low a view of his own condition. Self-knowledge in man should result in a certain self-reverence. For this assertion Camós claims Pythagoras as his authority. His indebtedness to the doctrine of man set out in Genesis will be obvious. Another significant debt is to the Hermetic writings. In this very section he quotes Hermes Trismegistus to the effect that man is ‘a great miracle and a wonderful animal, worthy of being adored and reverenced’ (I,13b). It is a response to Hermes akin to what we have already noted in Joan Costa and Merola. In his subsequent discussion Camós recalls that Hermes had described the whole created scheme of things, with its ordered variety and beauty, as ‘a book full of divinity and a mirror of divine things’ (III,5a).

It is not surprising, in view of what has been said, that Camós, like Merola, finds great satisfaction in expounding matters analogically. Thus it is in terms of the human body that, over an extensive range of chapters in Parts I and II of his treatise, he sets out his view of both the structure of secular society and the organs of
government. Repeatedly he acknowledges his own metaphorical mode of discourse.  

just as the human body would be imperfect if it lacked any of its members—being deprived thereby of the operation which is the business of that part of it—in the same way the mystical body of the commonwealth ['república'] would remain imperfect if it lacked any of the estates and offices that contribute to its perfection.

This conviction underlies both the comprehensive scope of this work and Camós’s pattern of exposition. In portraying secular society he works from the king (its ‘soul’) to—at the end of Part II—the poor and beggars (its ‘toe-nails’). In deciding to discuss the merchant class before peasants, he feels it necessary to excuse himself for thus dealing with society’s ‘legs’ before its ‘thighs’ (II,188b–89a).

Here we may return to Maravall’s remarks regarding the essentially static view of society which he finds in Merola and Camós. The similarity between the two in this respect is of course obvious, but again some qualification of Maravall’s comments seems necessary. Thus, like Merola and, indeed, Castilla y de Aguayo, Camós adopts the position that nobility and hidalguía are in essence a matter of virtue—Christian virtue—not of birth, so that on that basis it is open to those who were not born hidalgos to acquire that status and thus raise their descendants ‘in quality and dignity’ (II,174a).

Camós is another who retails a list of figures from Classical Antiquity who rose from humble origins to distinction of one kind or another, demonstrating that it is better to be ‘the virtuous and valorous son of poor and humble parents’ than the corrupt and cowardly son of rich and eminent ones (id.id.). Throughout this discussion (II,145a–47b, 171a–74b) Camós draws on authorities regularly cited in discussions of this topic. However, perhaps for reasons connected with his own

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3 ‘[. . .] para no salir de la metáfora y semejanza del cuerpo humano, con que vamos declarando nuestra república’ (I,142a); ‘Luego, por no salir de la comparación y metáfora [. . .]’ (II,27a); etc.

4 ‘[. . .] que de la manera que el cuerpo humano sería imperfecto, si le faltase alguno de los miembros, por caerse de la obra que es de la facultad de aquella parte: de la misma manera el cuerpo mixtico de la República quedaría imperfecto si le faltase alguno de los estados y oficios que la hazen perfecta.’ (II,186b).

5 See above, pp. 204–05.

6 For some discussion of these authorities, see Truman (1969).
social position, he lays less emphasis on the legitimacy of rising in society by virtue than on the blameworthiness of the well-born who in their conduct show themselves unworthy of their status in life. This is still more marked in Camós than in Castilla y de Aguayo. In particular, he criticizes those who have failed to give training in the ways of virtue and good breeding (‘virtud y criança’) to the young men sent them by their fathers to serve in their households as pages. Now fathers have learnt that to send their sons to the palaces of the great is like sending them to ‘a Salamanca of vice and sin’ (II,147b). The result is that nowadays those who serve in great households are mostly the basely born (‘gente allegadiza, gente baxa, y [. . .] villanos’) (II,148b).

Camós’s discussion of this topic stands apart from the main argument of his work, which is dominated by the analogy between society and the human body.7 Very evident here is his inclination to speak of secular society in terms of a ‘mystical body’. Thus it comes naturally to him to write of ‘peoples who jointly with their head, which is the prince, constitute the mystical body of the commonwealth [“república”] [. . .]’ (II,140b). The passage quoted a little earlier brings out more clearly the scope of meaning which the term had for him in this application. It emphasized that secular society, when it was properly itself, was a ‘societas perfecta’, characterized by unity, coordination and concord.

There is a clear parallel between how Camós writes of secular society and how he writes of what he calls ‘the spiritual republic’ of the Church. One of the most striking features of this work is the insistence with which Camós writes of the Church in the Pauline terminology of the Body of Christ. He had already used this terminology in a section of his first work, La fuente desesada, where he expresses himself with particular force (p. 288).8 Now he repeatedly refers to, quotes, or glosses the classic New Testament passages on this subject: Romans 12, I Corinthians 12, Ephesians 4. On occa-

7 Like Merola, Camós gives no attention to the question of how the ideal of rising in the world by the exercise of virtue fits in with the concept of a static, multi-layered society which he expounds at such length.

8 This work, composed in his thirties, before he entered Religion, is a lengthy didactic poem expounding a range of traditional intellectual, moral, and religious topics as its author makes his allegorical journey towards the long-desired Spring of Life: La fuente desesada, o institución de vida honesta y cristiana. En la qual moralmente se discurre por las edades y artes liberales y se enseña el camino de las virtudes (Barcelona, 1598).
sion (e.g. III.27b, 117b–18a) his purpose may be to argue that there is a variety of Christian ministries but the same Spirit; but the appeal of this analogy for him lay chiefly in its manner of portraying the association of Christian people with each other. Camós’s spokesman, Valdiglesia, says at one point:

This is what we seek after, namely, the bodily union of this [Catholic] Church among those of us who are parts and members of it by grace, united by a living faith shaped in charity in a mystical body (whose head is Our Lord Jesus Christ), and [further] the union of the mystical body, which is constituted out of its united members, with our head, [which is] Jesus Christ.9

This sums up the essentials of Camós’s understanding of the Church.10

The extent to which he envisages secular society and the specifically Christian society of the Church in similar terms is made particularly apparent in a passage of Part I, chapter iv, where he enlarges on the contention that ‘the commonwealth, in temporal matters, should be ordered in the same manner and (if it were possible) with as much concord as the spiritual commonwealth’ (I.37b). This at once leads on to a paraphrase of Romans 12 and I Corinthians 12. Having drawn the conclusion that in this spiritual commonwealth one finds expressed the unity and concord of that ‘mystical body whose head is Christ’, Camós immediately derives an application for secular society:

in the same way all those who have been born into a corporate society or have subsequently been joined to it (even though they are of different estates and follow different callings) must have regard for each other in the unity of a common civic body, united and governed by a single will and intention, which must be concern for the public good.11

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9 ‘Esto es lo que vamos buscando: es a saber: la corporal unión de esta Iglesia entre los que somos partes y miembros de ella por gracia, unidos por fe viva y formada en charidad en un cuerpo místico: (cuya cabeza es Jesuchristo señor nuestro) y la unión del cuerpo místico, que de los miembros unidos resulta, con nuestra cabeza Jesu Christo’ (III.41a). Camós has just spoken of ‘la unión según la carne y por naturaleza que tenemos, en la Iglesia Cathólica, con Jesu Christo, siendo miembros y parte de su cuerpo, de una misma carne y de unos mismos huesos’ (loc.cit.).

10 That Valdiglesia, the principal protagonist in the dialogue constituting the Microcosmia, is to be identified with Camós himself is emphasized by the fact that Valdiglesia is credited with having composed some years before a still unpublished work entitled ‘La fuente deseada’ (I.26b).

11 ‘[...] de la misma manera todos los que han nascido en una universidad, o
Or again: just as in the Christian society, its various parts properly cooperating together ‘make up a perfect body’, so, in secular society, where ‘not all can be dukes, counts, or knights’, ‘a perfect commonwealth’ results from a proper relationship and regard between those who command and those who obey (1,38b–39a).

The part played by organological concepts in Camós’s discussion places it in a long tradition of political and social thought. Lubac and Kantorowicz, especially, have shown how the term *corpus mysticum* came to be applied to human society in both its religious and its secular aspect, and how, in the process, it came to express subtle and complex shifts of view regarding these two aspects of society: the nature of each and the purposes and values inherent in each (Lubac, 1949, pp. 116–35; Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 193–232).

In Camós’s discussion, the use of the term *corpus mysticum* implies a high estimate of both the religious and secular aspects of society, and that, as we shall see, has a bearing on his insistence on the Christian value of the ‘active life’ led by Christians within the secular order. His extensive treatment of this issue in a Spanish work dating from the 1590s constitutes perhaps its most immediately interesting feature.

The opening discussion between Camós’s three interlocutors takes as its starting point the fact that one of them, Turritano, has with him Luis de León’s *De los nombres de Cristo*, first published in 1583. Luis de León belonged to the religious Order which Camós had joined in his middle years. Camós’s spokesman, Valdiglesia, makes it a special point of praise that the *Nombres de Cristo* is ‘all Scripture’, skillfully excerpted and presented in language of rare quality.12 Luis de León had declared of this work, in his Epistle Dedicatory, that

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12 '[...] a buen seguro que no se pierde el tiempo que se gasta en leerlos [i.e. *Los nombres de Cristo*]; todo ello es escritura, trayda con galano artificio a propósito: pues ¿qué lenguaje? debe de ser el mejor que se habla: bien paresce traslado de aquel acendrado entendimiento de su autor: no sé de los libros que han salido en nuestros tiempos en romance [que] aya sido alguno con tan justa razón tan bien recibido’ (I,2b). Luis de León’s name is not explicitly mentioned here (although a reference to his *La perfecta casada* occurs later (II,176a)). Nevertheless, Camós’s words put it beyond doubt that he is referring to Luis de León’s *Nombres* rather than to the much earlier *Consideraciones acerca de los nombres de Cristo* (Seville, 1544) of their fellow Augustinian Alonso de Orozco.
its aim was to provide something in place of the Scriptures (now banned in the vernacular) ‘for the common use of all’ and to meet ‘the common need of men’—that is, the need of the laity at large as well as others. Camós’s subsequent discussion strongly implies that Valdiglesia’s praise here is related to this fact.

The third interlocutor, Benavente, notes that, as regards the publication of vernacular works written ‘for the common benefit’, times have improved. Before, writing was all a matter of ‘propane things’: fables and books of chivalry; but since the appearance of Fray Luis de Granada’s first books on prayer and meditation, many spiritual works have appeared, written in imitation of him and of great profit inasmuch as ‘they dispose and help us to put ourselves right with God and to follow the way and path of Christian perfection’ (I,2b–3a). On this point Valdiglesia takes issue with his companion. Some, he points out, have held that these works, while highly profitable for those who have adopted the religious life in the formal sense of the word (‘para gente recogida y religiosa’), are ‘useless’ for those involved in the dealings and business of the world (I,3a–b). The religious life, in the narrow sense, is not for all; no more are the spiritual books written for those who have adopted that way of life. Such books are not ‘for the uneducated, the married man, the soldier, the trader [“negociante”]. People of this kind find that books like that make ‘the business of salvation’ something ‘difficult’, turning it into a method or skill (‘arte’) with precepts and observances which these people cannot possibly keep. The result is that many grow careless, reflecting that, since they cannot lead the religious life on those terms, it is better not to think about it at all (I,3b). All this supports the conclusion that there is a need for books of different kinds, capable of ‘teaching the Christian life’ to the various estates and conditions of men.

The theme of the argument is now developed in terms of the contrast between John the Baptist and Christ himself. Benavente, the admirer of Luis de Granada, himself recalls the view of ‘some saints’ that Christ did not come practising the austerities of John of Baptist, the reason being that, while the latter ‘represented only himself and a particular manner of life’, Christ came as law-giver to all men of whatever station or condition in life, and therefore followed that

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13 The reference here would seem to be to the revised versions of Luis de Granada’s spiritual treatises, which appeared in 1567. For comments on Luis de Granada’s works and their significance, see above, pp. 73–74.
‘middling’ manner of life necessary to all estates of society (‘Pero
Iesu Christo, que vino para dar leyes a todos de qualquier grado
fuesen, o condicion, vino con aquella mediocridad de vida necesa-
ria a todos los estados’ (I,4a)). His colleague Turritano demurs at
this: John the Baptist, with his hair-shirt, fasting, rigour, warnings
and insistence on penitence, inspired a healthy fear of God—a state
of mind, he notes, approved by the Council of Trent—and the cur-
rent books on the spiritual life, in stressing its demands, do likewise
(I,4a–b). To this Valdiglesia replies that, while John the Baptist did
enjoin penitence and works pleasing to God, he kept to general
terms. He did not tell people that, in order to be saved, they must
offer great sacrifices or perform rigorous fasts or mortifications
of the flesh, but rather that they should perform works of charity. The
rule which he laid down for people at large was: ‘Do no more than
that which is appointed to you’, or, as Valdiglesia glosses this:
‘Let every man, in order to be saved, do what he is obliged to do
according to the state of life in which he finds himself’ (I,4b–5a).
Not everyone, he adds, can find time every day to withdraw, as
Turritano’s books of spirituality prescribe, for the purposes of prayer,
contemplation, or meditation; men’s occupations make this almost
impossible.

This apologia for lay Christianity is of interest as regards the
writer, who had himself entered a religious Order in his middle
years; but it is of all the more interest with regard to the period to
which it belongs, that being a period more generally seen as one
when works on the religious life characteristically stressed the close
connexion held to exist between the Christian life and both the sacra-
mental dispensations and the authority of the institutional Church.
Camós’s apologia, on the other hand, has a good deal in common
with the Christian ideal which we have found in Cerdán de Tallada’s
Verdadero govierno; and like that work, Camós’s directs our attention
back again to the Christian ideals, but also the polemic, associated
with the name of Erasmus.

Marcel Bataillon remarks on the stress which Erasmus, in his Enchi-
ridion, placed on the Law of the Spirit as expounded by St Paul, and
on the fruits of Charity, the authentic expression of that Spirit, com-

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14 ‘[...] haga cada qual para salvarse lo que está obligado hazer, según el estado
en que se halla’. In this passage Camós appears to be alluding to Luke 3, 10–13
in particular.
pared with which external observances count for nothing (Bataillon, 1966, p. 201). He further remarks on the importance, throughout that work and especially in its Spanish version, of the Pauline metaphor of the Body of Christ, in terms of which Erasmus and his translator set out their understanding of the Christian society within which the Law of the Spirit—Charity—properly holds sway (Bataillon, 1966, p. 206). This Christian society includes laity as well as clergy. The point was crystallized in the most remembered single phrase of the work: ‘monachatus non est pietas’: to be a monk was not the same as being a Christian. It is, of course, true that Camós does not contrast here, as Erasmus does, outward forms and inner realities, the letter and the spirit; nor does he discuss or evaluate religious ceremonies and observances in general terms, save to say that fasting and self-mortification and the like belong to the narrower way of Christian perfection. His spokesman, Valdiglesia, does however stress that, compared with the basic business of seeking salvation as it applies to Christians at large, to enter Religion (in the technical sense of the phrase) and seek perfection thereby is a work of supererogation (I,7a), and the basic thrust of his argument, emphasizing the reality and value of the lay Christian life lived out in the conditions of the world, presents an obvious and important resemblance to the Erasmian position.15

Early in this discussion Camós invokes, citing Cajetan, the broad theological principle that ‘the Author of grace did not come to destroy natural reason or the civic dimension of human nature [“la humanidad civil”] but to perfect them’ (I,4a). However, Camós leaves this clearly Thomist principle undeveloped, enlarging instead on the fact that grace and glory are offered to Christians by God free (I,5a). Grace is not something that has to be earned by merit. Camós’s insistence on this is clearly connected with his concern with the value of the lay Christian life: grace does not have to be earned by the observances and practices of the specifically ‘religious’ mode of existence; rather, all are invited to receive it—the poor, the rich, the learned, the unlearned, children and the lowly (I,5a–b). Concluding a series

15 An echo of Erasmus’s ‘monachatus non est pietas’ as rendered by his Spanish translator (‘lo principal de la religión verdadera […] no consiste en meterte frayle, pues sabes que el hábito, como dizien, no haze al monje’ (Erasmus, 1932, pp. 410–11) is perhaps heard in Camós’s comment that the preacher will exhort ‘al religioso que lo sea de veras, y no sólo en el hábito’ (I,7b). However, the phrase, as Erasmus’s translator indicates, was current as a proverb.
of biblical references, Camós quotes Revelation 21,6: ‘I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely’. Camós emphasizes the ‘gratis’ of the Vulgate version: ‘Yo daré al sediento agua de vida de balde y sin algún precio’ (I,5b). It is true, on the other hand, that those to whom grace is to be given must show themselves to be athirst for it: they must bring desire (‘querer’) for grace, accompanied by ‘such works as we may be capable of’ (I,6a). In the case of those unable to give more, the mere will to give what one can ‘serves as currency’; for the will is what God takes for himself, while ‘works’ are ‘for ourselves and our Christian instruction [“institución”]’ (I,6b). The difference between Camós’s approach to this matter and that of Castilla y de Aguayo is very marked.

Camós’s treatment of this question seems to fall within the limits of the Augustinian position as regards grace and merit. Augustine himself, following St Paul, regarded salvation as the free work of God through grace alone; and in speaking of this saving grace, placed his emphasis on the divine imparting rather than on human attaining (Reardon, 1981, p. 55). Camós quotes from Augustine’s De Trinitate (Bk.XIII, ch.x) a passage where he stresses that the Incarnation was God’s wholly unmerited gift to man (I,7a). However, Camós’s own concern with the point is of particular interest in the intellectual and religious context of late sixteenth-century Spain, all the more so since his treatment of the issue occurs in the course of a discussion placing so much heavier a stress on the character and centrality of the lay Christian life than on the status and claims of the specifically ‘religious’ life.

Historical context again gives particular interest to the fact that he also writes of the Redemption in the terms he does. In the passage where he speaks of the disposition requisite in man if he is to receive grace—desire for it and the offering of the will—he speaks of that will as the ‘silver’ we are to offer, while faith is ‘gold’:

believing firmly that, although all that we are and all we can do are as nothing when set beside our supreme good and glory, the price which the Man who was God paid for us on the Cross is sufficient. As the Apostle Paul said, writing to Timothy, ‘Jesus Christ gave himself a ransom for all’.

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16 ‘Esta es la plata que avemos de ofrecer de nuestra parte: y la fe es el oro: creyendo firmemente que, aunque todo lo que somos, y lo que podemos es nada en equivalencia de nuestro summo bien y gloria, es precio bastante el que pagó el
In relation to the whole passage from which these lines come it is relevant to recall that the fundamental charge brought against Dr Constantino Ponce de la Fuente’s *Doctrina christiana* (Seville, 1548) by its theological examiner, reporting to the Inquisition, was that, throughout, its author ‘puts too much confidence in the Passion of Christ’.

It was a kind of confidence, in the judgement of this examiner, characteristic of ‘the heretics’. He specifically criticizes Dr Constantino for speaking of ‘works’ as signs of gratitude rather than as meritorious acts. That treatise, together with others by Dr Constantino, was banned in the Index of 1559 and survives in only a very few copies; Constantino was posthumously burnt in effigy in the Seville *auto de fe* of December 1560. However this passage of Camós is arresting evidence that some of the central Christian convictions and attitudes most dear to Constantino and to others in Spain in the first half of the sixteenth century, and most alien to the characteristic emphases of Tridentine Catholicism, survived among Spaniards into the later decades of the century—though it remains unclear to what extent or in what circles.

This apologia for lay Christianity is extended in the chapters immediately following. The stress in Chapter 2 on the dignity of man as made in the Divine Image prepares the way for Camós’s forceful arguments, in Chapter 3, in favour of the life of moral activity, of *bien obrar*. This in turn leads on to the discussion of the respective merits of the active and contemplative lives in Chapter 4, where, when one interlocutor has argued for the superiority of the contemplative life as led by saints and hermits, Valdiglesia argues at length the other side of the case: Christ’s own injunctions to works of spiritual and corporal mercy presuppose life in society; the monastic life followed by those who have withdrawn from the world is itself not solitary, and those who do in fact adopt the solitary, eremitic, existence are exposed to spiritual and mental dangers. By contrast, in well governed cities, one finds virtue, the cultivation of letters,
and those various arts and skills, functions and benefits ‘which perfect the world’ (I,32b). But society cannot be well governed if men wholly, or for a long period, ignore its various needs in order to pursue the life of contemplation (I,33a–b). Camós’s belief is that each individual should make time, in his own scheme of existence, for both the contemplative and active lives, devoting himself to the former especially in Sunday worship but giving the other six days chiefly to the ordinary occupations of life (I,33b–34a). It is a view that seems close to the position of Joan Costa.

When distinguishing, in Chapter 3, between the active and the contemplative lives and expounding the character and conditions of the life of virtuous activity, Camós not surprisingly makes reference to Aristotle’s Ethics. There is a clearly Aristotelian aspect to his remarks presenting the moral life—the life led according to the dictates of reason and the virtues—as proper to man as such (I,20a–b). Man, he continues in Chapter 4, is a social animal; society arose out the perceived need of men for mutual help (I,36a). However, whereas one might have expected that in such a discussion a distinction would be made between the natural and theological virtues or, more broadly, between the ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ orders of being, Camós explicitly rejects such a distinction. The life of virtuous activity, of bien obrar, he has said earlier, should not be attributed by men to themselves as something naturally theirs (‘como cosa nuestra y natural’); rather, it is something ‘supernatural’, a particular mercy from the hand of God, to whose liberality man must respond by practising the virtues, which, when allied to grace, make ‘works’ agreeable to God (I,20b). Now, having cited Aristotle to the effect that society has achieved its end and felicity when it is firmly engaged in the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues and in the enjoyment of the contemplation of natural and divine things, he continues: ‘we can say, without dissenting from the Philosopher, that the end of the well governed commonwealth is to live—peacefully, quietly, and without offence from anyone—the Christian life, life of a social and politically organized character’. Camós displays a marked disinclination to address himself to the theoretical issues involved in this kind of argument. Instead, his thinking is focused

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18 ‘[...] podemos sin discordar del philósopho dezir ser el fin de la bien gover-

nada república vivir en paz y sosiego sin injuria de nadie vida Christiana, vida

sociable y política (I,37a)’.
on the ideal of concord, on cooperation of a reciprocally beneficial and enriching kind between individuals in the context of social relationships, and moves in a fashion which is itself unargued from one field of discourse to another. This mental attitude clearly counts for much in the conviction underlying Camós’s apologia for lay Christianity; it also has much to do with his inclination to place emphasis, in the way we have seen, on the comparability of the mystical body of secular society and the mystical body of the Christian society.

It seems significant that when, in Chapter 4, he reinforces his remarks on the concord desirable in society with an extended reference (I,37a) to Augustine’s treatment of the topic in De civitate Dei, II,xxi, he does not take over Augustine’s celebrated comment here that true justice is to be found only in that commonwealth whose founder and ruler is Christ. In this he differs from Merola, for reasons that are easily seen. Merola quoted Augustine’s remark as a means of stressing the distinction between the spiritual, Christian society represented in his discussion by the ‘teólogo’ and, on the other hand, the ‘facultad civil’. The aim of Camós, however, is to stress the closeness and even identity of the secular and Christian societies as fellowships of ‘amistad’ and ‘amor’. In this respect he takes up a position generally akin to that of Cerdán de Tallada.

His conviction regarding the value of secular society underlies his treatment of the ‘Arms and Letters’ topic later in Book I (I,131b–35b). It is found again in his treatment (in Book I, chapter xvii) of the now familiar topic of the relative merits of lawyers and members of religious Orders. Lawyers who plead in court are among those whose professional skills, when rightly used, are necessary and beneficial to society. It is true that Camós comments at some length on unworthy and unscrupulous barristers who exploit the complexities and procedures of the law for the profit of wealthy clients and still more for themselves. His account of how they thus bring discord where there ought to be concord (I,208b–09a) resembles Cerdán’s remarks on the same issue. Nevertheless, when barristers are scrupulous and worthy, they perform an office of great merit in the sight of God. Elaborating on this point, Camós joins the number of those whom we have already found quoting Hostiensis on the subject. Thus Valdiglesia recalls that, according to Hostiensis, ‘the life of good [i.e. virtuous] barristers is better and of greater merit than that of Dominican friars or of other orders of Religious ["la vida de los
buenos avogados es mejor y de más merescimiento que la de los frayles de sancto Domingo, o de otra orden de religiosos’”) (I,210b). Asked whether this assertion is true, Valdiglesia defers a full answer but remarks meanwhile that he does not doubt that there must be many lawyers (‘letrados’) so upright, so charitable of disposition, such good friends of the poor [.] that they would outshine many of those who spend all their lives within the narrow limits of Religion.19

Book II begins with four chapters on the unity and ordering of society where reciprocal ‘friendship’ ['amicicia'] and love of one’s neighbour according to the second of the Two Great Commandments are seen as the basis of social cohesion. The ‘perfect república’ must be aflame with charidad and love of one’s neighbour; for it is charidad that makes equal the great and the lowly, the rich and the poor, and establishes harmony between them—even though, as Camós briefly adds, in the maintenance of that harmony ‘the severity of correction’ on the part of the prince also has its place (II,5a–b). The prince must be obeyed and respected: by the clergy as well as the laity, as the Old Testament shows. And although it is not appropriate for kings to be involved in the election of popes—in the way that Moses appointed Aron high priest—they are nevertheless entitled to play a consultative role as regards candidates for the papacy as well as to present individuals for prelacies. Camós’s basic point here remains that ‘the harmony and concord of the perfect república consists in the king’s knowing how to command and in his subjects’ obeying; and that which forms this harmony is love’ (II,7a–b). As with Felipe de la Torre on the same point, one seems here to catch an echo of De civitate Dei, Bk.XIV, ch.xxviii (see above p. 86, n. 20).

The issue of the unity and organization of society is approached in somewhat different terms in Chapter 11 ('On lords [señores] and bearers of titles'). As we have already noted, ‘peoples jointly with their head, which is the prince, constitute the mystical body of the república’ (II,140b). Titles and lordship over others do not pertain to men ‘by nature’. Like the possession of goods, they derive from human positive law, not from natural or divine law. The latter in fact give men equally ‘common possession and common liberty, in

19 ‘[...] no dudo yo de que deve de aver muchos letrados tan rectos, tan charitativos, tan amigos de los pobres y de consolarles y avogarles de balde: y en suma tan por el cabo buenos y perfectos en su oficio, que ganaran la raya a muchos de los que están toda la vida en estrecha religión’ (I,210b).
which we were born as sons of one father, Adam, and in that respect equal’ (here Camós refers to Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies) (II,142b). Notions of ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ arose—as we have already read in Castillo de Bobadilla—‘through iniquity’, as did claims to lordship along with ranks and titles (II,143a). Nevertheless, the resultant ordering of society on the basis of dominio and señorío can be seen as having been permitted and provided by God as a remedy for human wickedness, so that men might live together in society in conditions of material prosperity, justice and peace—that peace from which result ‘union and caridad and happiness’ (II,143b). For this reason Aristotle had argued in his Politics—as, again, Castillo de Bobadilla would also note—that things should not be possessed in common. Adopting a different kind of discourse, Camós goes on to argue that the resultant ordering of society on the principle of señorío has produced a pattern that corresponds to the ordering and pattern of the whole created scheme of things in its ‘concatenation and correspondences’ (II,144a–b).

Camós at an earlier point stresses how important it is that wise and prudent men should confer the benefit of their counsel on the community rather than distance themselves from it (II,20a). On this he echoes Cicero’s De officiis (Book I) and calls in aid, successively, El Tostado: no man can call himself a citizen who does not render his city the service which he is able to give; the pseudo-Platonic Letter to Archytas: no one was born to himself alone but for the benefit of his neighbour; and Seneca: the man who is not of benefit to others is not of benefit even to himself (II,17b, 20a–b). Characteristically, Camós concludes this passage with an extended reference to and gloss on Romans 14 on the same subject: none of us liveth to himself but to God and, adds Camós, his neighbour.

In Chapter 3 this duty to contribute to the good of society is presented in terms of the Public Treasury. Wealth in private hands that remains unused for that larger purpose has harmful effects. It represents unrealized potential and stimulates envy, from which arise discord, civil wars, and the ruin of society (II,25a). Wealth that should properly go into the Public Treasury should be spent first on the poor and needy. To that end some funds should go to churches and monasteries, to those in prison, and to hospitals or refuges. They should be used to provide bread in time of famine and doctors and medicines in time of contagious diseases. Treasury funds will also be employed to promote trade, to foster learning and banish ignorance.
In the political sphere of relations between different powers they will remove the need to seize what belongs to one’s neighbour but, on the other hand, support fleets and armies when required (II,27a).

In this discussion the example of the Roman Republic and Empire comes repeatedly to Camós’s mind. Following Cicero and Sallust he notes that the Republic most flourished when citizens shared the conviction that their wealth was not for themselves alone but for society at large. Rome fell when she fell prey to corrupt self-indulgence and the softness that came from prolonged peace (II, 11a,23a). Here Camós follows Sallust, Juvenal, and, chiefly, Augustine (De civ. Dei, I, xxix–xxx). He does not draw an explicit moral for Spain in particular; but recalling Cicero’s dictum that the stability of society is preserved not by walls but by mores, he laments ‘how changed the world is now’ and how people care for possessions and not for virtue (II,9b).

His high estimate of life led in secular society, together with his inclination to see a shared caritas as that which binds society together, underlies Camós’s long eulogistic account of the married state and his commendation of its purposes and values (Book II, chapters vi & vii).

The basic purpose of marriage is a shared existence—what Camós sums up as ‘union through love’ (‘la unión por amor’) (II,71b). Its essential perfection consists not in sexual relations ‘but in faithfulness, in the sacrament, and in the union and love [“charidad”] that follow from it’ (II,71a). And while wives should recognize superiority in their husbands, husbands must show courtesy and respect towards their wives and not treat them as slaves, for harmony between them largely depends on mutual respect (II,83b–84b). Since Camós (at a later point) quotes from Luis de León’s La perfecta casada [chapter 3] the comment that a virtuous woman will not even consider the possibility of not being virtuous, we may note a larger difference of emphasis between the two in presenting their ideal of the Christian wife. One does not find in Camós’s discussion Luis de León’s stress on the ‘weakness’ of women as compared with men and the consequent need for the wife to be subordinate to her husband. Camós stresses rather the unity of husband and wife within a reciprocal relationship of love and regard.

Between the children of a marriage too there should be ‘loving peace and brotherly friendship’ (‘paz charitativa and fraternal amistad’) (II,99a–b). Their training (which will be chiefly directed to-
wards virtue and Christian piety, with instruction in the Scriptures, as St John Chrysostom urges) will inevitably involve discipline and punishment. However, the latter must be imposed in a moderate and prudent fashion, with due regard for the age, character, and circumstances of the children concerned (II,91b). Camós does not go into detail as to the education to be provided for the sons in a family. However, he holds that study is of value to *caballeros* as well as to those who will later earn their living from letters. Furthermore, fathers should set their sons to the kind of thing to which they are most inclined. They should not, therefore, insist on involving eldest sons in practical affairs relevant to their future inheritance (even when they are unsuited to such things), or compel second sons to study at the university, whence they are likely to return (if unsuited to study) without any visible benefit (II,109b–10a). Camós commends the study of foreign languages (and travel abroad to further that study), and commends in particular the reading of history as a means of acquiring prudence (II,110b–11a). As to daughters, they too should be taught to read and write—to read, that is, works of a holy and devout character and not *cancioneros* or other ‘prophane’ books (II,123b). Early in his chapter on the education of daughters Camós alludes to the opening of Vives’s *Institutio feminae christianae* (II,119a). It would appear that his indebtedness to that work in this chapter goes far beyond what he indicates.

Before we proceed to Camós’s consideration, in Book III, of the ecclesiastical order of society and the values it represents, we should note that, in his first two Books, his discussion extends to some aspects of government and its purposes.

First, despite what has been said about Camós’s religious outlook, his language regarding the ‘heretics’ of his time is strongly hostile. He has an acute sense of the danger to the stability of kingdoms represented by the ‘new sects’. These, he says, must be extirpated as quickly as possible. He praises Charles V ‘for not allowing heretics to enter Spain’, and Philip II for removing those who nevertheless had slipped in ‘like wolves in sheep’s clothing’, before they could multiply and infect his kingdoms (I,91a–b). Here Camós’s reaction recalls that of Cerdán.

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20 ‘Que como dijo Catón, los ayuntamientos y conventículas solapadas y secretas, que en sus principios son tenidas en poco, por ser débiles y sin fuerzas, vienen después a ser de muy grande poder, creciendo de cada día. Esto se ve por...
The upholding of the cause of religion is part of a ruler’s larger duty and function: to maintain unity and concord in society. In arguing (Book I, chapter v) in favour of monarchy as against the other forms of government enumerated by Plato and Aristotle, it is Camós’s essential consideration that monarchical rule achieves that end better than any other. He returns to his organic analogy: society must have that harmony which is found in a healthy human body, where every part contributes to the well-being of the whole. The ruler thus becomes like a doctor, promoting the health of society (I,49a–b). This line of reasoning is more decisive with Camós than are the practical considerations telling against monarchy of which he nevertheless shows himself aware.

Since justice is of the essence of a kingdom (Camós recalls Augustine’s familiar words on the point) the ruler will take the greatest care to uphold it—though tempering it with mercy, since, in the words of the legal tag, ‘summum ius est summa iniuria’ (I,67a–69a). He is aware of the Roman lawyers’ concept of the prince as one not bound by the laws he makes (‘legibus solutus’) and himself a living law (‘lex animata’). However, he does not enter into constitutional questions or legal theory but contents himself with a statement of the Thomist position, seeing the ruler as subject to the law of God and the Natural Law.21

In view of Camós’s earlier career it is not surprising to find him offering a lengthy chapter (Book I, chapter viii) on the conduct of war. He acknowledges the destruction and suffering that war causes, and gives a vivid account of the conditions of service endured by the ordinary Spanish soldier (I,89b). Nevertheless, he firmly believes that war is legitimate and necessary in certain circumstances and to achieve certain ends. His chief guide here is, of course, St Augustine; in particular his Contra Faustum, though the related discussion of Aquinas (S.T., IIA 2ae, qu.40) is also cited. It is rather on his own

experiencia principalmente en las cosas de la religión: que es el fundamento y estabilidad de los Reynos. Que si al principio cuando nuevas sectas se introduzen, no se acude con diligencia a extirparlas, es tan grande el fuego que de pocas pajuelas se enciende, que con dificultad se puede después de encendido matar’ (fo.91b). See also III,39a, 96a.

21 ‘Adviertan los Reyes que aunque tengan autoridad de hacer leyes y mandar las guardar en su república, y que son esentos de la ley que ellos hazen, no lo son de la ley de Dios y de naturaleza: antes son los que más estrechamente que sus suyditos están obligados a estas leyes’ (I,75b). See Aquinas, S.T., Ia IIae, qu.96, art.3, ad 3.
account, however, that he stresses the Christian duty of princes to protect the Roman Catholic Church ("sole mother and mistress of peoples") by taking up arms against those who seek to disturb her peace (I,87a–b; II,205b).

He takes a strongly providentialist view of human affairs as they relate to war and peace. God alone bestows victory (I,84a). Therefore it is highly praiseworthy that Philip II should put more trust in the prayers offered to God at his behest by prelates and Religious than in the valour of his soldiers and the force of arms (I,85a). The recent events of 1588 receive only a brief and unspecific reference: God is not to be blamed if fleets ("armadas") formed with the intention of avenging the affronts done to him are lost. The reason for these things is to be found in the sinfulness of men (I,93a–b).

It is highly important that the prince should be truthful in his dealings and keep his word (I,96a–b). Here Camós recalls Isocrates's Ad Nicoclem and the passage in Patrizi's De regno where the other virtues are said to receive their radiance from good faith as the moon and stars receive theirs from the sun (see above, p. 27). The telling of lies, unworthy in any man, is especially so in the prince. This, it seems, is true in time of war as well as of peace.

Camós's providentialist approach to questions of war does not exclude a more empirical assessment of the conditions necessary for its successful conduct. Thus, when a prince has, after due consideration, decided on war, he must assure his position as regards three things—"time, people, and money"—lest he find himself obliged to sue for peace when he would do better to continue fighting (I,85a). By "time", Camós means a suitable time and set of circumstances ("buena sazón y cojuntura"); by "people", those capable of command and skilled in arms. "Money" includes not only gold and silver for the soldiers' pay but the victualling and munitions which have to be purchased.

Camós has relatively little to say about the role of royal councils in the business of government. He does devote one chapter to "Counsellors and the Council of State" (Book I, chapter xiii) and here accepts that royal councils have an important part to play in compensating for the shortcomings of princes or countering their weaknesses (I, '169' [= 165] a–b). However, he gives more space to reflecting on the danger to the counsellor of giving honest but unwelcome advice than to setting out the Council of State's duties and functions.
This is despite the fact that he has earlier (I,130b) referred to Furió Ceriol’s seven-fold scheme of councils described in his El consejo y consejeros del príncipe. That Camós had some direct knowledge of this work is suggested by the fact that his list of qualities requisite in counsellors serving on the Council of State bears some resemblance, both in substance and expression, to the desiderata set out by Furió:

It is necessary [. . .] to select persons for the council of which we are speaking who, in addition to being faithful and wise, must be people of experience. And as, in the Council of State, matters dealt with are not of a single character but are many and various, it is necessary that counsellors serving on this supreme council should have experience of different sorts of business: that they should have knowledge of history, the ways of nations, the strength of their prince and even that of his friends and allies, and the reliance that can be placed on these in case of need; nor should they be ignorant of the strength of his enemies—not only of those who are enemies now but of those who could become enemies.\(^22\)

However, Camós soon adopts a position very different from Furió’s in arguing that, although the first task of the Council of State is to preserve the State by establishing peace, not even the greatest monarch has authority to make peace contrary to justice or prejudicial to the honour of God and the salvation of souls (I,164a). Neither peace nor alliances nor truces are to be made with infidels, heretics, or tyrants. The difference between Camós and Furió is again seen in his adoption of the Ciceronian position that, in matters of deliberation, the honestum must not be sacrificed to the utile (II,49a–50a). Counsellors must be men who deal straightforwardly with the truth, uninfluenced by greed or fear. Camós is himself fearful of fluent and devious talkers (‘[la] gente rhetórica’) in this role. The greatest heretics, he observes, have been of this kind. Luther, though not learned, was ‘facundo y rhetórico’ (II,47a–48b).

Camós begins Book III with an account of the universe at large

\(^{22}\) [. . .] se deve [. . .] elegir personas para el consejo de que tratamos que, sobre ser fieles y sabios, es necesario ser experimentados: y como en el consejo de estado no ay negocio de una sola calidad, sino de muchas y muy diferentes, es necesario que los consejeros deste supremo consejo tengan experiencia de negocios diferentes: que sepan las historias, las costumbres de las naciones, las fuerzas de su príncipe y aun las de sus amigos y aliados y la seguridad que dellos se puede tener para el menester: y que no ignores a quanto llegan las de sus enemigos, no solamente de aquellos que lo son mas de los que lo podrian ser’ (I,161a). See above, pp. 93–94.
and of human nature, in which the spiritual order transcends the material one. As in man there are thus two natures, so man needs two kinds of government, the one temporal and the other spiritual, and two kinds of commonwealth (‘dos repúblicas’) to belong to, ‘the one concerned with exterior activity [‘obras’], the other with interior’ (III,9a). The ‘spiritual commonwealth’, he later explains (III,44a–b), is a kingdom of grace, or, in Peter’s words, a holy nation, a royal priesthood, a chosen people (I Peter, 2.9). This sense of the vocation of the whole Christian community underlies much of what he says later, as we shall see, regarding the special vocation of ‘perfection’ claimed by the religious Orders. Meanwhile, early in Book III, Camós renews the emphases already noted in Book I concerning the redemptive work of Christ, minimizing the merit of works and stressing instead divine grace freely offered (III,14b–15a; see also III,47a,53a).

Before he begins on a consideration of the different ecclesiastical orders—pope, prelates, parish clergy, judges in ecclesiastical courts, theologians, and Religious—he considers the priestly order at large. He gives sympathetic attention to biblical and patristic descriptions of Christians in general as being ‘priests’ by virtue of their baptism; they are, as he puts it, members of Christ the supreme king and priest, and thereby exercise ‘an intrinsic and spiritual priesthood’ (III,29a). However, there is also what he calls an ‘extrinsic and exterior priesthood’ (III,29a–b) within the Church, constituting a specifically ordained order whose task is to offer sacrifices for sin, to intercede before God for his people, to consecrate the host, to remit sins (III,30a,44b–45a,48a). The pastoral role of pope and prelates is a matter on which he lays great stress, grounding his remarks especially on I Peter 5, where, in a passage which Camós translates (III,58b), elders are exhorted to care conscientiously for the flock of the Chief Shepherd. Repeatedly he urges that the government of the Church by popes and prelates should be quite distinct from the kind of dominion exercised in the secular order between lord and vassal. It will be characterized not by severity and violence but by kindness, gentleness, and patience, as between a father and his sons, for that ‘gentle government’ which was lost under the law of nature with the fall of Adam is recovered under the law of grace (III, 59b–61a). Both substance and tone recall Felipe de la Torre. Camós later exhorts bishops to be generous to the poor, to care for widows and orphans, to interest themselves in hospitals, to take alms
to prisoners—and support poor students (III, 83a). As also in the selection of men for ordination (III, 101a), Camós is inclined to see some improvement here in the affairs of the Church since the Council of Trent: bishops no longer actually fight with each other in their desire to extract more wealth from the Church for themselves (III,’28′ [= 82]a).

Chapters devoted specifically to the religious Orders are found only quite late in Book III; however, in an early chapter (III,vii) one finds an important discussion of the basic issue of how the ‘religious life’ should be viewed in comparison with that of Christians at large. Here Camós addresses himself to what had been, over the centuries, the declared aim of the religious Orders in their specific patterns and values of life: the pursuit of ‘perfection’ (Newton Flew, 1934, pp. 158ff.). Camós takes his stand on the principle that, as caritas is the goal of the spiritual life, so it is by the measuring-rod of caritas that the ‘perfection’ of the different ways of Christian living is to be measured, ‘for without charity all is nothing’, as Camós comments, alluding to I Corinthians 13.

He refers to that part of Aquinas’s Summa theologica (IIa IIae, qq. 183,184) where the same matters are dealt with: the different ‘officia’ and ‘status’ of men in general and what is required for ‘perfection’ in them. Here too one finds it laid down that Christian perfection is essentially a matter of caritas (qu.184, art.1). However, most of Aquinas’s discussion is centred on a consideration of various ‘states of perfection’ (‘status perfectionis’) in a narrower and more formal sense. Members of religious Orders and bishops belong, as such, to these ‘states of perfection’, in the sense that, by their very way of life, they ‘tend towards perfection’, though not because they actually possess it as individuals (qu.184, art.5; see also qu.186, art.1). Indeed, it is entirely possible, since Christian perfection is essentially a matter of caritas, for some who belong to a ‘status perfectionis’ not to be perfect and, on the other hand, for some who do not belong to a ‘status perfectionis’ to be ‘perfect’ (qu.184, art.4). It seems that this would, in principle, apply to laymen. However, Aquinas does not put the matter so specifically or speak of laymen as such in this application. He stresses that the Church must contain a variety of ‘officia seu status’, and that these are properly bound together by Christian love. However, as the lay state is not itself seen as a ‘status perfectionis’, it apparently follows that it is less ‘perfect’ than, notably, that of Religious.
The fact that Camós refers to this discussion makes the different emphasis of his own treatment of these issues all the more marked. Out of the principle that perfection is essentially a matter of caritas Camós develops the argument that many outside the 'state of perfection' are in fact more perfect than many within it (III,64[2]b). He stresses the distinction to be made between the inner disposition of a man and the outward aspect of a man’s life. Though men judge the inward by the outward, the former can truly be known only to God and judged solely by him; whereas the Church can judge only by what is outwardly apparent. So on Judgement Day it will be a matter of no surprise to find many whom we now judge to be ‘less perfect’ ('because we see them outside the “state of perfection”, occupied in the business of the world’) in a far higher place and degree of glory than others whom we see in this present life in the higher ‘state of perfection’—people, that is, who made a solemn commitment to a particular way of life but failed to fulfil it. For what finally counts is not solemn undertakings but the actual performance of good works (III,64[2]b–65a).23

Nevertheless, when Camós gets to the point where he devotes a series of chapters to the life of ‘religion’ in the narrower sense, his emphasis changes markedly. It is true that, at various points Camós has already, despite his evident regard for the status of the married life of lay Christians, remarked on the superiority of the life of virginity adopted with a religious aim. That point of view is now developed. In the first of this group of late chapters (III,xii), Valdiglesia accepts that the prize of eternal glory is promised especially to ‘religiosos’ in return for the self-denial and renunciation of earthly things which they have practised in this life out of love for God (III,128a–b). Camós recalls the ‘superior degree of perfection’ accorded by Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite to monks in his Ecclesiastical History (III,130a). Furthermore, following Bellarmine’s account of the origins of the monastic way of life, Camós recalls Christ’s description of John the Baptist as greatest of the prophets, and the Early Fathers’ description of him as ‘prince and captain of Religious’. Christ himself was ‘prince and founder of Religion and the perfect life’

23 ‘De la misma manera, no […] será [maravilla] en el día del juicio ver a muchos de los que por el exterior juzgamos ahora menos perfectos (por verlos fuera del estado de perfección, en comercios del mundo ocupados) mejorados en lugar y asiento, y en grados de gloria, mucho más que otros que en la vida presente vemos mejorados en estado de perfección: […]’ (III,65a).
(III,132b). Having heard Valdiglesia discoursing at length on this matter, Benavente reminds him of what he had said at the outset of their discussion (i.e. at the start of Book I): that God does not ask impossible things of us or wish men to go to extremes in their way of life, but rather that those who seek eternal life and heavenly bliss should keep the commandments (that is, in following their ordinary way of life) (III,134a–b). Valdiglesia’s reply is two-fold: first, he recalls that, beyond the dominical precept, there was the counsel to sell all that one has, distribute to the poor, and follow him; secondly, he observes that it was not surprising if men adopted extreme ways of life in order to attain salvation when the end sought was so desirable. He does not, however, make any attempt, in response to Benavente’s question, to reconcile his present emphasis with the character of his remarks at the opening of the work.

Subsequent chapters praise in turn the three Counsels of Perfection: poverty, celibate chastity, and obedience. Thus we are told that ‘nothing can be more excellent or of greater merit with God than to be poor, as Christ was, and to renounce the world for love of him (III,140b). Again, if married life is suited to human nature, the life of celibate chastity ‘exceeds’ that nature (III,152b); on account of their vow of chastity ‘the perfect’ achieve special merit with God (III,154a). Subsequently, the virginity of nuns receives its own particular praise: as angels exceed men, so virginity exceeds the married state; only virginity represents in this present life the glory and immortality which we hope for in the life to come (III,175b). As for obedience, this, when willingly undertaken, is ‘the highest and most heroic deed’, the greatest ‘work’ and most acceptable sacrifice that men can offer to God (III,157a).

Clearly, the problem presented by these concluding chapters—how to reconcile the position adopted by Camós there with the markedly different and even contrary emphases so prominent in earlier parts of his work—is a considerable one. His own career suggests that this is a problem to be seen as much in terms of personal attitudes and lived experience as in terms of intellectual consistency or inconsistency. In this regard one may speculate whether the value he nevertheless sets by the lay Christian life in much of his treatise after several years in Religion was connected with the fact, that, when he entered a religious Order, he joined that of the Augustinian Friars.

Accounts of the spirituality of that Order draw attention to two
especially characteristic emphases. First, there is a central concern with caritas, love of God and of one’s neighbour. A contemporary Augustinian scholar has written that the real goal of the monastic life as envisaged by Augustine himself and by his Rule, which so deeply marked the spirituality of the Order, was ‘the actualization of a community of love founded in God . . . ’ (Zumkeller, 1987, p. 63). This ideal was frequently articulated in terms of the Mystical Body of Christ. Secondly, there is an insistence that the Christian life is to be seen as a response by fallen man to the free gift of renewing grace, a corollary of this being considerable caution in speaking of human ‘merit’ (Zumkeller, 1987, pp. 65–66; Gutiérrez, 1961, cols.1005–06).

This might well foster the view that progress towards perfection in the Christian life was more a matter of receiving grace than of engaging in an active pursuit involving human effort; and that could in turn lead to reluctance to set great store by the practices and demands of the specifically ‘religious’ life. Zumkeller notes that the Rule of St Augustine shows a strong tendency towards the spiritualization and interiorization of the monastic life, and that Augustinian writers often warn against false self-righteousness based on notions of works and merit (Zumkeller, 1987, pp. 64, 66). It is unnecessary to stress how much in Camós’s Microcosmia corresponds to these preoccupations and priorities.

Nevertheless, there remains the question of what Camós’s debt may have been to Erasmus. In addition to his apologia for lay Christianity, there is one further aspect of his treatise that deserves comment in this regard: his attitude towards profitable and unprofitable learning.

Early in Part I, just after Luis de León’s De los nombres de Cristo has been praised, Turritana observes that all the logic to which St Augustine once applied himself so zealously failed to show him ‘the true road of blessedness’ and that this he discovered in the Epistles of St Paul and the prophecies of Isaiah.24 In a fashion that recalls Joan Costa, Valdiglesia repeatedly voices impatience with

24 ‘[…] pues vemos que toda la Lógica que sant Augustín aprendió no fue bastante a enseñarle, por más que trabajase y se quemasse las cejas, el verdadero camino de la bienaventuranza: antes quíca fue causa que cayó en el error de los Manicheos, y que insistiese en ella tanto: hasta que las Epístolas de sant Pablo, y las Evangélicas prophecias del Propheta Esayas le quitaron las cataratas de los ojos de su agudo entendimiento’ (I,3a).
'metaphysical quœstiones which are things for the Schools' (I,34b). Camós's fullest treatment of this issue comes in Book III, chapter xi, on the subject of the Doctors and Masters who teach in the Church. A philosopher, he says, is one who 'attains and loves the knowledge ["sciencia"] of things human and divine, and trains himself to live virtuously' (III,117a). However, he goes on to compare human and divine learning at some length (III,117a–26b), starting from the proposition that 'true philosophy consists in rejecting human learning and devoting oneself to the divine sort, for to live virtuously according to what the latter teaches is to be truly a philosopher'. It is implicit throughout that the human learning rejected here is that of the Scholastics. Man's final end is far above human nature; his tendency to seek that end comes not from his nature but from the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity; therefore that final end and these theological virtues are to be known not by natural reason but by divine revelation. They lie beyond the reach of 'philosophers' and 'natural learning' ('la sciencia natural') and require instead 'supernatural learning' ('[la] sciencia sobrenatural'), namely theology (III,117b). Those who provide the Church with such learning, says Valdiglesia, turning once again to I Corinthians 12, are like ministers of a single grace of God bestowed in many fashions on the Mystical Body of Christ which is the Church (III,118a). It is on this basis that he attacks those teachers in the Church who, instead of cultivating humility, make their learning a matter of pride and arrogance:

for although to the proud man it seems that he has knowledge, the reality is that he is attracted to nibble at the outward rind of things and does not get as far as tasting the softness and sweetness of that which is good within; so that those who are puffed up show themselves to be acute as regards the surface aspect of things, but as regards what is essential and intrinsic, they are blind.25

This recalls Erasmus's words, early in the Enchiridion, on the 'new theologians' (i.e. the Scholastics) who devote more time and energy to elaborating subtle arguments regarding the letter of Scripture than to bringing to light 'the profitable mysteries within' (Erasmus, 1932,

25 '[...] que aunque le paresce al sobervio que sabe, es que se pase y ceva de la corteza, y no llega a gustar de la suavidad y dulçura de lo bueno que está encerrado en lo interior: por manera que, en lo superficial, muestran los entumecidos ser agudos, pero en lo essencial y intrinseco son ciegos' (III,122a).
pp. 137–38). He speaks of the contrast between the ‘shells’ of the words of Scripture and the ‘pith’ or ‘marrow’ inside. In the Spanish version, the outward verbal form of Scripture is likened to the ‘rind’ of something, its ‘corteza’ (Erasmus, 1932, p. 140)—the word used by Camós here in the same application and to make the same point. This whole section of Erasmus’s work is dominated by the contrast between the Christian wisdom that is of God, found in the Scriptures and within the reach of learned and unlearned alike, and the worldly wisdom and learning of men, the practitioners of which hold themselves to be wise but in fact are blind. This, of course, is a theme to which Erasmus was to return in his Paraclesis.

It is true that Camós does not, in his discussion, use the term ‘Christian philosophy’, as Erasmus does there, or insist that this philosophy is to be found in the Scriptures. The Christian ‘wisdom’ to which Camós is so much attached is to be learned ‘in the Church’ and derived from what has the Church’s approval. It is chiefly expressed in the articles of faith, in the precepts and commandments of God and his Church, and in the keeping of them (III,124b–25a). The fact remains that, in this chapter as a whole, Camós insists on the distinction between human learning and Christian wisdom, which is essentially a matter of the theological virtues; insists that true learning (‘la verdadera scienza’) ‘draws the affections and does not raise an arrogant spirit’; stresses that the ‘true philosopher’ is one who is seriously concerned with living virtuously; that learning is not for purposes of emulation, contention, and vainglory, but for the instruction and benefit of oneself and one’s neighbour. As for the interpretation of the Scriptures, neither the student nor the master will trust in his sharpness of wit, in finely drawn out and subtle distinctions, or his own efforts; rather he will trust in the goodness of God, who will fill the mind of one who is willing with the spirit of understanding. The wisdom of God is withheld from the proud and revealed to the humble (III,126a). In all this there is, of course, no mention of Erasmus. His name seems not to appear anywhere in Camós’s treatise. At this point Camós cites instead, and sometimes at length, Hugo of St Victor, St Bernard, and St Augustine, in addition to the Old and New Testaments and a variety of patristic and Classical authorities. Nevertheless, Erasmus’s unacknowledged presence seems unmistakable here, all the more so when one recalls what seems to be his contribution elsewhere to Camós’s advocacy of lay Christianity.

For reasons that will now be evident, the task of distinguishing
that presence in this work is partly a matter of distinguishing it from what Camós had absorbed of the characteristic traits of the spirituality, outlook, and values of the Order which he had eventually joined. Because this is also very much an issue presented by Luis de León's *Nombres de Cristo*, one cannot regard Camós's enthusiasm for that work as itself being of unambiguous significance in this respect, despite the suggestively 'Erasmian' features of it pointed out by Bataillon (Bataillon, 1966, pp. 760–66). Nevertheless, it seems wholly possible that Camós, during his many years as a layman, read and responded to Erasmus, that Erasmus marked his outlook in ways that continued into the second period of his life, and that, among the numerous, diverse and sometimes divergent elements that make up this work, the Erasmian one is by no means the least important. He himself implicitly acknowledged that his *Microcosmia* was the work of one whose formal study of philosophy and theology—so far as it went—did not begin until he was approaching forty.27 There seem grounds for contending, therefore, that this treatise, together with those of Joan Costa and Cerdán de Tallada, provides valuable evidence for the tracing of the continuing though unacknowledged presence of Erasmus in the Spain of Philip II and thus for mapping out that 'almost unexplored domain' of which Bataillon, as late as 1972, spoke.

26 The debate, prompted by him, concerning the influence of Erasmus in later sixteenth-century Spain has tended to focus on the issue of how far an attachment to the idea of the Mystical Body of Christ, as applied to the Christian society, is to be regarded as an Erasmian trait. The issue has been reviewed, with some astringency, by Fr Alvaro Huerga (1986, pp. 345–46 especially). On the broader aspects of the matter, see still Asensio (1952).

27 'Porque después de cumplidos los treynta y ocho años de mi edad, oydo la Philosophia, y lo poco que sé y alcanço de Theología. Por manera que, aunque he quedado corto en ambas cosas, todavía podrá animarse cualquiera que esto entienda: [. . .]' (*La fuente deseada*, fo.4r).
PART FIVE
JESUIT WRITERS

Introduction

The three Jesuit treatises to which we finally come all aspired to be of service in the education of the future Philip III, who was to succeed his father at the age of twenty in 1598. Juan de Torres’s *Philosophia moral de principes* is dedicated to the prince’s ‘ayo y mayordomo’, Don Gómez Dávila y de Toledo, Marqués de Velada. Pedro de Ribadeneyra, while dedicating his own treatise to the prince himself, refers in complimentary terms to both Gómez Dávila and Don García de Loaísa Girón, describing the first of them as the prince’s ‘ayo’, or tutor, and the second as his ‘maestro’, or teacher. It was at the insistent request of García de Loaísa, who had been a canon of Toledo and friend of Mariana’s, that the latter wrote his *De rege*, as he himself recalls in his Prologue, to help Loaísa discharge his task.

Torres’s treatise was, it seems, the first to be begun and completed, though it appeared the year after Ribadeneyra’s, in 1596. Its earlier part perhaps dates from the previous decade\(^1\) and the necessary authorizations from his Order for publication had been obtained in 1594. When it first went on sale, its author was just short of fifty. Ribadeneyra was nearly seventy when his treatise appeared. He had, however, written much of Book I by 1589: he refers to the assassination of Duke Henry of Guise and his brother the Cardinal on the orders of Henry III of France as an event of the previous year (Book I, chapter xv: p. 89/p. 479a).\(^2\) These same events are recalled by Mariana, who, as he tells us, began and nearly completed his treatise in 1590, when in his mid-fifties.\(^3\) The work did not emerge in print for a further nine years. It was, nevertheless, apparently serving

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\(^1\) In Book II, chapter vii, Torres refers—unfortunately with ambiguity—to Philip II’s visit to Valencia ‘el año passado de mil y quinientos y ochenta y cinco’ (see edition of Burgos, 1602, p. 107a).

\(^2\) Page references will be given both to the first edition (Madrid, 1595) and to that of *BAE*, vol.60 (Madrid, 1868); repr. Madrid, 1952.

\(^3\) See Bk.III, ch.xi: pp. 360–63/pp. 557b–58a. References will be given to both the first edition (Toledo, 1599) and to that of *BAE*, vol.2 (Madrid, 1834).
the specific purpose for which it was written some time before that. In 1594 the papal nuncio in Madrid reported that Loaisa was then reading to his princely pupil a treatise ‘de institutione principis’ (Cirot, 1908, pp. 95–96). While the term is itself merely generic, Mariana used it to refer to his own treatise both in the text and in writing to Loaisa;\(^4\) and in view of the latter’s anxiety to persuade Mariana to write such a treatise, it is reasonable to conclude that Mariana’s was the work in question. The necessary steps preparatory for its publication began very shortly after Philip III had succeeded his father and progressed with speed. The whole procedure was completed during the few months that Loaisa was archbishop of Toledo.\(^5\)

Information about Juan de Torres is scarce (Polgár has no entry on him in his Bibliographie (1981)). According to Sommervogel ((1890) viii, 126), he was born at Medina del Campo in 1547 (thus in the same place and the same year as Castillo de Bobadilla), joined the Society of Jesus as a novice in 1562 and taught Latin grammar in a Jesuit college. In 1575 he played an important part in a Mercedarian expedition to Algiers for the ransoming of Christian captives (Aldea Vaquero, 1972, v, 636–37). He died in the city of his birth only a few days before Mariana wrote to Loaisa announcing his intention of publishing his De rege.

Ribadeneyra was a generation older, having been born in 1526. Soon after going to Rome in 1539 as a page with Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, he came into contact with Ignatius Loyola and was received by him into the new Society of Jesus the following year. Soon sent, like a number of other young Jesuits, to study at the University of Paris, he moved on briefly to Louvain before returning to Rome in 1543. Thereafter Italy remained almost continuously his home until 1574 (though he was given the task of obtaining royal recognition for the Jesuit Order in the Low Countries and was in London with

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\(^4\) Mariana writes in his text of this ‘inchoatam in secessu aestivorum tempore de institutione principis disputationem [. . .]’ ([loc.cit.]); while, in a letter of 16 November 1598 to García de Loaisa he wrote: ‘[. . .] y yo estoy resuelto con licencia de V.S.I. de imprimir lo de institutione principis [. . .]’ (B.L. MSS. Egerton 1875, fo.38r).

\(^5\) A ‘facultas imprimendi’ was issued by Estéban Hojeda, the Jesuit Visitor for the Province of Toledo, on 2 December 1598; an ‘aprobación’ was provided by Pedro de Oña, Mercedarian Provincial of Castile, examining the work on behalf of the Crown, on 30 December; and the ‘privilegio’ was granted on 15 January. García de Loaisa Girón was archbishop of Toledo from July 1598 to his death in February 1599. See also Cirot, 1905, pp. 32–41.
the Conde de Feria at the time of the death of Mary Tudor). Then, shortly after the appointment of Mercurian as General of the Jesuits, he returned to Spain. For the previous twenty years he had held a series of responsible administrative posts in the Order: rector, provincial, commissary, 'assistant for Spain'. Back in the Peninsula, he was free to devote himself to literary composition. Until 1583 he resided at Toledo; thereafter at Madrid, where his treatise on the prince was written.

Mariana, born at the mid-point between the other two, also went to Italy. A student at the Jesuit college at Alcalá, he was chosen, when only in his middle twenties, as one of a small group of men to be sent to teach either at the Jesuit Collegium Romanum or in Germany. This took place in 1561, on the instructions of the General of the Order, though to the irritation of the Spanish Inquisition. During his thirteen years abroad—at Rome, Loreto, Messina, and Paris—his life was that of a teacher of Scripture and scholastic theology (Asensio, 1953, pp. 588, 610, 629–30). He was in Paris from late 1569 until the spring of 1574 and thus in the city at the time of the Massacre of St Bartholomew. From an early point in these years abroad he suffered ill-health (Ribadeneyra wrote, in 1566, of his 'melancholia') and this apparently obliged him to give up a teaching career in his Order in which he had achieved high regard (Asensio, 1953, pp. 599, 605, 639). Returning to Spain from Paris, he established himself at Toledo, only a few months before Ribadeneyra arrived from Italy, and made the city his home for the remainder of what turned out to be an exceptionally long life.

Torres's *Philosophia moral de principes [Moral Philosophy for Princes]* was his only published work. The first edition of Burgos, 1596, was followed by others (with additions) at Barcelona in 1598, at Burgos again in 1602, and at Lisbon in this same year. Ribadeneyra first went into print with what was the first Life of Ignatius Loyola (Naples, 1572). It was a work that, from the mid-1580s until the end of the century, went through many editions in Latin (published widely over Western Europe) and in Spanish (with other editions in Italian,

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7 It was contended by the Inquisition that the sending of these men was a breach of the Royal Pragmatic of November 1559 forbidding Spaniards to go abroad to study (save to a few specified institutions). See Tellechea, 1965, 79–85, and above, p. 4.
French, German, and Polish), ‘Lives’ of the next two Generals of
the Jesuits, Lainez and Borja, followed in the early 1590s. Ribadeneyra’s
other works published before his treatise on the prince were his
*Historia eclesiástica del scisma del reyno de Inglaterra* [An Ecclesiastical History
of the Schism of the Kingdom of England], which first appeared in
the year of the Armada, and his *Tratado de la tribulación* [A Treatise on
Tribulation], published the following year and written, as he says,
when woes and afflictions were coming thick and fast upon Spain
and its people. Here, it is clear, he had in mind not only the dis-
aster of 1588 but the turmoil of the religious conflict of the last
seventy years or so, since ‘the diabolical sect of Martin Luther’ had
arisen. The writing of his *Tratado de la religión y virtudes que deve tener
el príncipe christiano para governar y conservar sus estados, contra lo que Nicolás
Machiavelo y los políticos deste tiempo enseñan* [A Treatise on the Religion and
Virtues that the Christian Prince must possess to govern and preserve his Realms
and Territories, against what Niccolò Machiavelli and the ‘Polítiques’ of this
time Teach] must, as already noted, have been begun soon afterwards.
Its first edition, at Madrid in 1595, was followed by another at
Antwerp in 1597 and by two more at Madrid, in 1601 and 1604
(this last in an edition of Ribadeneyra’s Collected Works). Spain saw
no further edition until the late eighteenth century. However, in the
years from 1598 to 1664 there were half-a-dozen editions in Italian
or Latin, the latter published at Antwerp, Cologne, and Mainz. A
French edition appeared at Douai in 1610.

Pious biographies or works of religious reflexion were not Mariana’s
style. The tract which he composed on the subject of his own Order
was a highly critical one and for many years remained unpublished:
*Discurso de las enfermedades de la Compañía de Jesús* [A Discourse on the
Maladies of the Society of Jesus], probably finished before 1606 (Soons,
1982, p. 10). In Italy or France he had composed a compendium
of ecclesiastical history running almost down to the present day,
to which he referred in 1572 (Asensio, 1953, p. 632). An early task,
after his return to Spain, was to prepare for the Inquisitor General
in 1577 a report [‘censura’] on the Polyglot Bible published by Plan-
tin at Antwerp in 1572 under the direction of Arias Montano.8 Two
years later he was making recommendations for the revision of the

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8 Rey, 1957, p. 534; Clair, 1960, pp. 78–80. The report was called for after crit-
icisms of Plantin’s edition by León de Castro (more famed as an antagonist of Luis
de León), and Arias Montano’s replies.
Spanish *Index librorum prohibitorum* of 1559. The first of his published works to be completed was his massive *Historiae de rebus Hispaniae*, which, though ready for printing in 1586, was published only in 1592 (and then not in full), at Toledo. By 1598 he had got his Spanish version of this work ready for the press: it came out in 1601 (Soons, 1982, pp. 25–26). His *De ponderibus et mensuris*—an attempt to give an account of the weights and measures mentioned in the Bible and in Classical authors in terms of his own time—he had ready for dedication to García Loaísa at the start of his archiepiscopate. The Toledo 1599 edition of his *De rege regisque institutione libri III* was the only one to appear in Spain until modern times, when it was brought out in translation. There was an edition in 1605 at Mainz, and two further editions appeared in German territories in 1611 and 1640.

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10 It was a wearing time for him. In his letter of 16 November 1598 to García de Loaísa he commented: ‘Yo ando rebuelto en impressiones, y nunca acabo con officiales que son tan remendones como tranposos [...]’ (see above, note 4).
CHAPTER TWELVE

JUAN DE TORRES

Torres’s treatise is explicitly concerned with the Christian prince. That does not stop him from describing his aim, in somewhat problematic terms, as being to portray a Christian prince ‘as perfect as Xenophon’s King Cyrus, or the Philosopher portrayed by ancient sages, or the Orator described by rhetoricians, each model so complete that it lacked nothing [. . .]’. However, whereas Ribadeneyra’s central concern, similarly focused on the Christian prince, is with Machiavelli and the *politiques*, Torres seems not to mention them anywhere and to be little interested in the issues connected with them. Nor does he discuss the broad issues of government—matters such as public administration, finance, the conduct of war—that were of such interest to Fox Morcillo and Furió Ceriol. His work is centred on the prince seen as an individual man playing a public role. Its concern is with the virtues he must possess and with the attitudes and dispositions he must display.

His book is one of the longest with which we are concerned. The 1602 edition is a folio volume consisting of twenty-five books, 235 chapters, and 995 pages of text. After an introductory Book I on the Dignity and Office of the Royal Tutor, three Books follow on the religious dispositions to be fostered in the latter’s royal charge. Two Books on the prince’s education are followed by a further eighteen in which Torres works his way through the cardinal virtues. Beyond the fact that he gives separate Books to Liberality and Affability (traditionally treated as parts of Justice and Temperance respectively), the distribution of space between the cardinal virtues here is markedly different from what one finds in Ribadeneyra. Thus, Torres gives one Book each to Justice, Prudence, and Fortitude, and no less than twelve to Temperance. Throughout, the text consists overwhelmingly of learned references and lengthy citations and paraphrases. Nevertheless, in the course of these a number of significant attitudes and preoccupations on the part of the author emerge.

1 See edition of Burgos, 1602, sig.[P] 1v. (All further references will be to this edition unless indicated otherwise.)
Taking the prince’s religion as his first topic, Torres begins with the conventional but, clearly, strongly held view that the foundation of a Christian prince’s rule lies in his reverence, fear and love of God. This is what the prince learns from the specific virtue of ‘religion’ (which forms part of the cardinal virtue of justice). ‘Religion’ also teaches him to flee whatever borders on ‘auguries, sorcery, and superstition’. To this Torres devotes a whole chapter (Bk.II, ch.iv). Later we shall see that he writes at length on the related matter of astrology.

As to the religious dispositions that he seeks in the prince, he urges reverence for the clergy, for holy places and sacred objects, lays much emphasis on devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary (here, it seems, following a trend of recent years in his Order), the Cross, and the Mass, and stresses the prince’s duty to assist the liberation of souls from Purgatory by performing the observances and good works prescribed by the Church (Bk.II, ch.v–Bk.III, ch.xiii). At the same time, Torres insists that these things are not in themselves enough:

I indeed say that devotion to Our Lady is excellent, respect for sacred things of great importance, [. . .] reverence for the Cross most holy, compassion for souls in Purgatory admirable. But if [the Prince] does not turn away from sin, which earns him God’s displeasure, He will say to him what Isaiah said to the Hebrews: What do I care for your acts of devotion and piety when the principal thing is missing? 'Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; new moon and sabbath, the calling of assemblies, I cannot endure [. . .]' .

Torres enlarges on the point. Those who take part in religious processions, make long prayers, are generous with alms-giving and active in deeds of charity—such people do what a Christian should; but if they do not also turn from vice and mortal sin, they will hear to their consternation the words: ‘This people with their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart far from me’ (p. 205a).

When one places these passages alongside ‘Rule V’ of Erasmus’s

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2 ‘[. . .] digo que es muy buena la devoción de nuestra Señora: grande el respecto a las cosas sagradas, [. . .] santísima la reverencia de la Cruz: y admirable la compasión con las ánimas de Purgatorio: pero si no se aparta de peccados que le desgracian con Dios, dirále el mismo lo que dixo a los Hebreos Esayas: [2]qué se me da a mí de vuestras devociones y piedades, faltando la principal? Né offeratis ultra sacrificium frustra, incensam abominatio est mihi, Neomeniam & Sabbatum, & festivitates alias non feram [Isa.1.13] (p. 204b).
Enchiridion—the ‘marrow’ of that work, as Bataillon calls it—their resemblance on this issue is plain. Time and again Erasmus insists that, while religious ceremonies and pious observances have a certain claim to respect, they must not be treated as if they were the whole of religion. Much more important than the external, visible, material expressions of Christian practice is an authentically Christian disposition and sense of values. For Erasmus that means giving primacy to the internal, invisible life of the Christian—to the life led in the Divine Spirit of love and concord as known within the Christian society of the Body of Christ. He underlines the point by quoting (though at greater length) the same words from Isaiah 1 as Torres does (Erasmus, 1932, p. 279).

Unlike Erasmus, Torres has nothing to say in terms of the contrast between the Letter and the Spirit, outward form and inner substance. He uses few formulations of his own at all to convey his point, relying instead on biblical quotation and paraphrase. He nevertheless clearly conveys his sense of the distinction to be made between external observances and the essential inner dispositions that validate them. It is, of course, not to be suggested that he was any kind of crypto-Erasmian. His position in the passage noted here accords with the relevant ‘Rules for thinking with the Church’ set out in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises and should no doubt be seen as an expression of the Jesuits’ fundamental concern with the promotion of authentically Christian living and practice, or ‘Christianitas’, as they conceived those things to be (see O’Malley, 1993, s.v. ‘Christianitas’). Nevertheless, on the issue of the importance to be attributed to outward religious practices and particular forms of devotion as compared with essential Christian dispositions, the similarity between the positions of Torres and Erasmus draws attention to itself. As to whether Torres may have owed some debt—be it direct or indirect—to Erasmus for his convictions on this issue, much caution is plainly necessary. In view of what Bataillon has written of the close relation between significant aspects of Luis de Granada’s Libro de la oración and Guía de pecadores and Erasmus’s Enchiridion, it may be relevant to recall that Luis de Granada was a friend and admirer of the Jesuits and to note that Torres speaks of Luis de Granada in strongly admiring terms.3

3 Torres writes of ‘el padre fray Luys de Granada, luz y espejo de nuestros tiempos, cuyas obras no sólo valen para las personas espirituales y dadas al servicio de
Book IV sets out the respect that young Christian princes must show to their natural parents and also to their spiritual fathers. Such respect is indeed due to ‘all ecclesiastical persons’, since God made them superior in standing (‘dignidad’) to all monarchs on earth (p. 252b). In the next two books, Torres addresses the question of the education to be given to the prince.

In a preliminary discussion he argues that the young prince should be educated along with other children of noble birth, since this promotes emulation in the ways of virtue. The moral character of his associates thereby becomes a matter of much importance. Great harm can be done by bad company. Furthermore, while steadfastly faithful friends may grow out of such early associations, it is wrong for the adult prince to adopt particular friends as favourites (‘privados’) (Book V, chapters vi–vii).

Torres is responsive to the intellectual appeal of Plato’s philosopher-king. However, he does not want scholar-kings. Alfonso the Wise’s concern with philosophy made him careless of other important matters, while Henry VIII of England’s interest in theology led to his ruin. The fact remains that ‘natural prudence’ needs to be augmented by acquired knowledge and wisdom (‘sciencia y sabiduría’) (p. 285a). Therefore Torres looks to the prince to be a patron of scholars. Like Fox Morcillo, he stresses what past kings of Spain and other great men have done in this matter by founding Colleges, Chairs, audiencias, and ‘other offices for letrados’ (p. 296a).

He dismisses the view that the prince should seek to master all branches of learning, and accordingly concentrates on some basic necessities. Let the prince, as soon as he is old enough, learn to read and write and do it well. Here Torres joins those other writers whom we have found lamenting the ‘barbarism newly current among lords and caballeros’, who read badly and write worse, as though to do these things with some skill were demeaning (p. 297a). Then the prince must be taught languages—Italian, French, and Latin—both because many profitable works are written in them and because they will assist him in his dealings with foreigners. In terms somewhat

Dios, pero también son maravillosas para los muy sumidos en el Océano del mundo: por cuyos escritos grandíssima cantidad de almas se han reducido al conocimiento de la verdad y salido del miserable abismo de pecados donde estavan sepultadas’ (p. 125b; see also p. 892b). Torres praises, in particular, Luis de Granada’s Memorial de la vida cristiana, of 1566. See above, pp. 73–74. Torres thus appears more convinced than Camós of the usefulness of Luis de Granada’s spiritual writings to those involved in the business of the world.
reminiscent of Furió’s on the matter, Torres reflects that a foreigner is much more open to persuasion when one speaks to him in his own tongue. It is important to master languages thoroughly, with the aim of acquiring ‘eloquence, elegance, and abundance of speech’ and, with these things, the power of persuading his subjects as he will (p. 300a).

Embarking now on the subject of the ‘liberal arts’, Torres reproduces the traditional scheme of the trivium and quadrivium, save that in the latter he speaks of ‘astrology’ rather than ‘astronomy’. His immediate concern, however, is to insist that ‘not all these branches of learning are for everyone’; still less so for princes (p. 302a). He appeals to the authority of Quintilian for the view that courses of study must be adapted to the particular gifts of an individual.

Turning to individual subjects of study, Torres begins (in Book VI, chapter vi) with ‘astrology’, which for him covers both the study of the movements of the heavens as a subject in itself—astronomy—and the attempt to read the future from these movements. His comment on the comic absurdity of those who spend much time measuring the heavens when they are blind to what is in front of their noses (p. 305a) echoes Diogenes the Cynic as recorded by Erasmus in the Apophthegmata. However, on the subject of those who seek to read the future, his tone is sombre. He recalls Isaiah’s words on ‘the Lord that stretcheth forth the heavens alone [. . .], that maketh diviners mad [. . .] and [. . .] [wise men’s] knowledge foolish’, and refers approvingly to ecclesiastical condemnations of judicial astrology (pp. 304b–06a). Even what he calls ‘natural astrology’ draws rulers away from their daily duties and has a baneful power to absorb their whole being (pp. 307b–08a). These remarks are of the more interest in view of the evidence that Philip II himself took a serious interest in astrological predictions. As Geoffrey Parker has pointed out, Philip possessed, by the time of his death, at least 200 books on ‘magic’—hermetic, astrological, and cabalistic. Moreover, while, according to Baltasar Porreño, his biographer and a priest, the King on occasion made demonstrative display of disbelief in astrology, it is nevertheless known that he had five horoscopes cast for him and all his life kept by his bedside the prognosticon made for him in 1550 by the German magus Matthew Haco (Parker, 1979, pp. 14, 49–51). In this respect Philip shared a preoccupation evident among his subjects.4

4 Castilla y de Aguayo writes of ‘[.. .] los muchos [pronósticos] que estos años
The comparable power of music to exert fascination over human beings makes Torres wary of it, particularly as regards princes (Book VI, chapter vii). He follows Plato and St Ambrose in urging that it be enjoyed only in so far as it serves to order and strengthen the inner dispositions of human nature, but not so as to gratify a taste for voluptuous pleasure (pp. 309b–14a).

Torres has little interest in seeing his prince skilled in mathematics, though he looks rather more kindly on geometry (pp. 308a–09a). What has interest of a wholly different order for him is the question—now familiar to us—of how far the prince should cultivate natural and moral philosophy, of which ‘the one is pursued with the understanding, the other with the will, the one being concerned with knowing, the other with doing’ (p. 314b). The value of natural philosophy lies in the fact that it teaches us to see the order and harmony of the whole created scheme of things, so that we are moved to wonderment at the Eternal Wisdom governing and directing it. From this rulers can learn how to establish good government in their own kingdoms (pp. 314b–15a). Torres’s authorities here run from Plato to Cicero and Seneca and on to St Bonaventure. Nevertheless, he is soon declaring moral philosophy to be a far superior and more worthwhile subject for study. In a way that recalls Joan Costa and Francisco de Monzón, Torres speaks of the reputation gained in the time of Classical Antiquity by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch through their teaching of moral rather than of natural philosophy (pp. 317b–18a). He goes so far as to declare that the distance between natural philosophy and moral philosophy is the distance between things of no seriousness and those that are ‘very true and necessary’ (‘[lo que va] de cosas de burlas a las que son muy verdaderas y necesarias’) (p. 318a). Torres recalls the opening chapter of the Imitation of Christ: ‘Of what use is it to discourse learnedly on the Trinity, if you lack humility and therefore displease the Trinity? Lofty words do not make a man just or holy; but a good life makes him dear to God’. He enlarges on the topic of

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se han soltado por el mundo, que cierto deve de correr el era de astrólogos judiciarios, porque no ay sacristán que alcance a tener un reportorio que no se pique de echar juzios y de amenazarnos con hambre, pestilencia, muerte, y guerras' (El perfecto regidor, fos.66v–67r). Noting that ‘los que saben mucho desta scienca han acertado más estos años de lo que quisiéramos y menos de lo que temíamos’, he is content to express scepticism for his own part.

5 The translation is that of Leo Sherley-Price (Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth,
the foolishness of those philosophers who made great show of their learning and powers of intellect but failed to practise what they taught, being as empty of ‘true philosophy’ as they were full of self-importance, vanity, and arrogance (p. 318b). The terms he borrows here from St Augustine make it still clearer that his own target is the tradition of scholastic theology.6 This whole section of his discussion represents a further significant contribution to the treatment of a topic which we have now seen to be of interest to a series of sixteenth-century Spanish writers. In this matter, Torres stands much closer to Costa—and Camós—than he does to Merola.

He is now at the point where he can begin upon the main task of his work: the exposition of the cardinal virtues. On these depend not only the good governance of the prince’s soul but the greater part of kingship.7 He begins with justice. The successive chapters of this Book present this virtue in familiar terms and show Torres at his most traditional in outlook. It befits kings to administer justice; they must do so not for their own advantage but for that of their ‘vassals’, among whom they will have particular regard for the weak and those without anyone to help them. Conversely, kings must be on their guard against privados, men of power, evil counsellors, and the temptation to make exceptions for friends. In the administration of justice they must be ready to show clemency and watch against anger and the temptation to take personal revenge. The king’s duty to rule for the benefit of his subjects rather than himself is, once more, stressed by echoing the Letter to Archytas on the duty of men not to live for themselves alone but to serve the patria (p. 325b).

1952, p. 27). Torres refers on several occasions to works by, or attributed to, Thomas à Kempis (that ‘gran Religioso varón’, as he calls him (p. 318a)). The Jesuit enthusiasm for the Imitation of Christ is analysed by O’Malley, 1993, pp. 264–66.

6 He cites words from Tractatus 45 of Augustine's In Ioannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV: ‘Fuerunt quidam philosophi de virtutibus & [vitijis] subtilia multa tractantes, dividentes, diffinientes, ratiocinantes, acutissime concludentes, libros implentes, suam sapientiam buccis concrepantibus ventilantes’, adding: ‘Pero como no entravan por la puerta de la virtud a la casa real de Dios, quedaronse fuera en descampado, y ansi, en cargando la noche de la tentación, se los comieron bestias’ (p. 318b). See Migne, P.L., vol.XXXV, col.1720. (In this extract Torres has changed the basic sense of Augustine’s argument to suit his own purposes.) He at once quotes with approval a sentence from St Nilus the Ascetic: ‘Philosophia enim est morum correctio cum vera certae cognitionis gloria coniuncta’. Nilus’s ideal of the spiritual life was a ‘Christian philosophy’ (see ODCC, p. 1156b).

7 ‘[...] no sólo [...] el buen gobierno de su alma sino la mayor parte del estado polístico de los Reyes, y de las cosas que por razón del officio cuelgan de su Imperio’ (p. 320b).
Again the long duration of the Roman Empire is ascribed to the Romans’ care for justice (p. 327a–b). The practice of justice is, indeed, the ruler’s only path to power and riches. If he puts his confidence in his own strength, in his knowledge and experience of government, without regard to justice, he will fail (p. 328a).

Torres’s account of prudence conveys a very different impression of the ruler’s situation. In the course of the fourteen chapters of this Book three principal preoccupations emerge: the ruler’s need for good advice; the relation between prudence and action; and the irresistible force of necessity. As to the first, matters of importance require long deliberation and careful assessment, not only by the prince himself but also by his councillors, who must be men of years, experience, and good character (Book VIII, chapters iv–vii). Torres writes at length and with emphasis of how important it is that councillors should really know what they are talking about. He remarks on the harm done when affairs are entrusted to those who have gained for themselves a reputation for prudence or religion but in fact know nothing of the matters in question (p. 407b).

When an issue has been carefully considered and a conclusion arrived at, action should follow quickly (Chapters 8–14). Carefully matured advice is to no purpose if it gets lost in piles of paper (p. 416a). This is especially true as regards the conduct of war. If then things go wrong, the advice on which action was based is not simply on that account to be judged bad. For the future is often very uncertain, and God in his hidden wisdom often takes a hand in human affairs in a way that passes man’s understanding; ‘for the thoughts of mortals are timorous, and our devices are prone to fail’ [Wisdom, 9,14]. A man of judgement (‘el hombre discreto’) may therefore be required only to have due regard to how things may reasonably be expected to turn out (‘conjugando lo que puede suceder conforme al estilo que moralmente suelen tener las cosas’ (p. 423a)). Nevertheless, the prince must learn from past experience and past mistakes how to address himself to the future. To do this is to show oneself ‘discreto’. More broadly, it is a matter of prudence rather than of blameworthy inconstancy of purpose to have regard for changing circumstances, to be willing to draw back and rethink one’s position (Chapters xi–xiii).

This brings Torres to the subject of the power of Necessity, which, as the title of Chapter 14 puts it, ‘sets good advice at nought’, so that ‘it is great prudence to know how to accommodate oneself to it’ (p. 433a). ‘Necessity is lawless’, and one may have to dispense
with law in one's response to it. Torres gives an account of a series of untruths spoken, or forbidden things done, by Old Testament figures 'constrained by necessity of place and time' (p. 433b). This leads him on to forceful formulations of his own:

With necessity everything becomes permissible, nothing stands in her way; neither due regard for persons, nor the authority of the social order, nor the Law of Nature, nor sacred immunities are observed; she alone prevails, she alone commands, she alone governs and, herself ungoverned, does whatever she pleases in town and country alike; and what she does not cure, no one will remedy [. . .].

Or again:

[. . .] let the Prince understand that necessity is a step-mother who ill-treats good sons, a Dead Sea where ships may not sail, a sickness that consumes the robust, a sudden death that cuts the thread on which finest counsel hangs. Against her tyranny the laws of prudence and caution are of no avail [. . .].

'Necessity is the last and greatest weapon'. Torres quotes the phrase from Livy: 'Ultimum ac maximum telum est necessitas' (History, IV, xxviii). Ribadeneyra echoes it in his own treatise on the Christian Prince (Book II, chapter xxxii): 'necessity is so strong and powerful a weapon that it cannot be resisted, and excuses that which, in its absence, could not be excused'. Torres's conclusion is the same: 'when a man is forced by necessity, he is entitled to do many things which he could not do on another occasion, and thereby emerge [from his difficulties].

Thus, on this point, Torres, like Ribadeneyra, expresses himself

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8 On 'the immoralities of the patriarchs' see Bainton (1930).
9 'Con la necesidad todo se hace lícito, ninguna cosa pone empacho, ni se guarda decoro de personas, ni autoridad de estados, ni ley de naturaleza, ni privilegios sagrados; sola ella prevalece, sola manda, sola govierna, y sin gobierno hace cuanto quiere, en poblado y en el campo, y lo que ella no curare, nadie lo remediará [. . .] (p. 435a–b).
10 '[. . .] entienda [el Príncipe] ser la necesidad madrastra que trata mal los buenos hijos, mar muerto que no admite navegación, enfermedad consumidera de vidas muy sanas, y muerte repentina que corta el hilo a consejos maravillosos. Contra su tyrannia no valen leyes de Prudencia, ni aviso [. . .]' (p. 436b). This passage has been considerably expanded in the 1602 edition; compare that of 1598 (p. 325a).
11 '[. . .] y la necesidad es un arma tan fuerte, que no se le puede resistir, y que excusa lo que sin ella no se podría excusar' (p. 460/p. 565a–b). See below, pp. 297, 306–07.
12 '[. . .] pues en siendo un hombre necessitado, tiene privilegio para hacer muchas cosas y salir con ellas que no pudiera en otra ocasión' (p. 436b).
in terms closely similar to those which we have already found employed by a writer so different from them in most respects as Castillo de Bobadilla (see above, pp. 175–76). The vigour with which Torres treats the topic is very striking. His whole chapter on this subject, amidst so much in this work that may seem merely received and second-hand in character, conveys a strong sense that here he is putting into words a deeply felt perception of the actual workings of life.\footnote{Dunbabin (1988, pp. 487–88) notes that the doctrine of necessitas—necessity knows no law—had its origins ‘in canon law and in an extension of epikeia’, the latter being the Aristotelian virtue offering a correction of law where it is defective (because inequitable) owing to the universality of its terms (see Nicomachian Ethics, V, x). The doctrine provided kings with a means for justifying exceptional taxes and the like, and in the later Middle Ages (in Dunbabin’s words) ‘was to have a long and distinguished future. But its medieval exponents, unlike Machiavelli, always maintained the extraordinary character of emergency powers: abuse was both irrational and sinful’. It will be seen that the emphasis of Torres’s remarks, especially, like those of Castillo de Bobadilla, is significantly different.}

On the other hand—unlike Ribadeneyra—he does not examine the implications of this view of things as regards the prince’s duty to tell the truth. Although he devotes the whole of Book XXIV to truthfulness in the prince, he does not discuss the political situations in which rulers may feel the need to dissimulate. His own position is categorical: the Christian prince not only must not tell lies, even of a trivial kind, but must not even wish to tell a lie (p. 931a). Further, to use words in a double sense is unworthy of him (Chapter 10). Torres quotes, and endorses without qualification, Cicero’s judgement (De officis, I, 41) that, in the conduct of human affairs, the cunning of the fox is even more hateful than the force of the lion (p. 939b). There is no reference here either to Machiavelli or to Azpilcueta’s subtle reflexions on dissimulation, which, as we shall see, attracted Ribadeneyra’s appreciative attention.

In Book IX, Torres comes to his third cardinal virtue: fortitude. While, as usual, he draws here on a series of canonical definitions and descriptions, the overall effect is, again, far from being that of the routine treatment of a routine topic. On the contrary—and for reasons not unconnected with his treatment of Necessity—Torres writes here with particular force, stressing two aspects of fortitude especially: self-mastery, and steadfastness in the face of adversity.

It is true that he does not see fortitude as only a passive virtue: for it is the mark of a man possessing inner strength to set his hand
to great undertakings—in a way that is particularly appropriate in
kings (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, Torres’s chief emphasis falls on the
contention that it is the mark of the strong to bear any blow of
Fortune with a steady heart and imperturbability of spirit (Chapter 2).
Thus:

in the end we discover on our own account that to conquer oneself is
an act of greater fortitude than to subjugate the world: [...] this is valour, this is what it means to be resolute, these are the men wor-
thy to be celebrated in history.14

Or again:

I am not speaking of an untamed or reckless spirit [...] but of that
[strength] which does not bow to adversity, which is not broken by
opposition, which does not grow weary with temptation. I speak rather
of that which makes a man master of his earthly passions [...] All
that you valiantly tread underfoot will belong to you, even though it
be what counts for much and holds sway in the world.15

Thus the practice of fortitude, as presented by this Jesuit, becomes
part of a heroic ideal of conduct that owes a clear debt to the ethos
of his Order and the emphases of Ignatius Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises,
which take as their ‘beginning and foundation’ the principle of re-
solutely pursuing man’s Final End in a spirit of willed detachment
from one’s circumstances, be they favourable or unfavourable.

This disposition Ignatius describes as ‘making ourselves indifferent
to all created things’.16 Whatever the case may be with Ignatius him-
self, one cannot but be acutely aware of Torres’s debt here to the
Stoic ideal and in particular to Seneca and his insistence on the

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14 ‘Hallamos al fin por nuestra cuenta que el vencerse a sí es acto de mayor for-
taleza que sojuzgar el mundo: [...] Este es valor, esto es ser esforzado, éstos son
los dignos de ser celebrados en historia’ (p. 447b).
15 ‘No hablo de la ferocidad y osadía [...] sino de aquella que no se amilana
con la adversidad, no quiebra con la contradición, ni desfallece con las tentaciones:
hablo de aquella que hace al hombre señor de sus passiones terrenas: [...] Todo
lo que valerosamente pusiéredes debajo de los pies será de vuestra posesión:
aunque sea lo que en el mundo vale y reyna’ (p. 448a).
16 ‘Por lo qual es menester hacernos indiferentes a todas las cosas criadas, en
todo lo que es concedido a la libertad de nuestro libre albedrío y no le está pro-
hibido; en tal manera que no queramos de nuestra parte más salud que enfer-
medad, riqueza que pobreza, honor que deshonor, vida larga que corta, y por
consiguiente en todo lo demás; solamente deseando y eligiendo lo que más nos con-
duce para el fin que somos criados’ [from the ‘Principio y fundamento’] (see Loyola,
importance of duly ordering one's inner life and controlling one's responses to one's situation by the exercise of reason. In the opening chapter of this Book, Torres quotes from Seneca's characterization of fortitude as 'the impregnable fortress for our mortal weakness' (Epistulae Morales, CXIII). Seneca adds that, 'when a man has surrounded himself therewith, he can hold out free from anxiety during life's siege; for he is using his own strength and his own weapons'.

This briefly states much of what Torres is most concerned to say about this virtue.

He now sets about his 400 pages on the virtue of temperance. By far the greater part of this discussion, in twelve Books, is devoted to describing and encouraging self-control in the prince's personal conduct. Torres does, however, give some attention to the bearing of this virtue on the conduct of the prince as such. This is, indeed, the primary theme of the final Book [= XXI] of this part of his treatise, where he exhorts the ruler to practise temperance in the matter of riches and personal possessions. Here, in terms reminiscent of Felipe de la Torre's, Torres urges the ruler to care for his people as a father does his children or a shepherd his sheep. Then all will be concord and friendship between ruler and ruled (Chapters 3, 6).

While this is commended in markedly utopian terms drawn in part from the Old Testament, a more political perception of the advantages of concord is also present. In particular, Torres warns that it is the universal testimony of histories ancient and modern, sacred and profane, that risings among the people have always been provoked by rulers' greed (p. 867a). It is quite largely on similar grounds that Torres commends, in separate Books, the virtues of liberality and affability.

In Book XXV, which brings the treatise as a whole to a close, Torres deals with the subject of the prince's reading—what is of benefit and what is harmful—applying predominantly religious and moral criteria. He first speaks of the profit to be derived from religious reading, recalling how Augustine was converted by reading Romans 13, and Ignatius Loyola by reading spiritual works in place of Romances of Chivalry—here he draws on Ribadeneyra's 'Life'

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17 'Quid est fortitudo? Munimentum humanae imbecillitatis inexpugnabile, quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac vitae obsidione perdurat; utitur enim suis viribus, suis telis'. Torres glosses: 'Un confortativo del coraçon, para que esté muy en sí, no se desvaneciendo con lo próspero, ni dexándose caer en lo adverso y dificultoso que le viniere' (p. 439b).
(p. 973b). Torres quotes St Paul: ‘Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness’, and alludes (p. 974b), as Felipe de la Torre had done, to how King Josiah had been moved to effect reform in the Temple after reading the Book of the Law (see above pp. 71–72). His emphasis on the value of reading the Scriptures is reinforced by quotations from Gregory the Great’s Moralía, from Thomas à Kempis’s De disciplina claustralium, and from various Eastern Fathers (p. 976a–b). The Scriptures, it emerges clearly, should be the prince’s primary reading.

After them, the prince may read ‘histories of the Ancients’, which offer entertainment worthy of such a reader as well as moral exemplars to follow (p. 978a). The particular value of such works is that they do not weary ‘the speculative intellect’ but offer benefit of a practical kind. Torres’s list of admired historians is lengthy: Xenophon, Thucydides, Herodotus, Theopompus, Justinus, Diogenes Laertius, Suetonius, Plutarch, Livy, Sallust, Julius Caesar ‘and the like’ (p. 978a).\(^\text{18}\) He notes that there are many modern histories written in Italian and French worthy of the prince’s attention; also an abundance of chronicles and histories written in Castilian. He does not, however, name any—for fear of giving offence, as he says, by mentioning some and ignoring others (p. 979a).

Turning now to undesirable books, he notes that these are especially harmful to the young and include both ‘historians’ and ‘poets’—all of whom, when they compose reprehensible works, ‘adorn lies’ in a pleasant garb that attracts attention in the way that prostitutes do. Fine language, whether in verse or prose, makes such works the more tempting and dangerous—and they are brought out daily (p. 980a–b). The Emperor Augustus did well in exiling Ovid after he wrote his Ars amandi, as did Plato in banning all poets and books of poetry from his Republic. If there were an emperor like Augustus now, presses would not be so busy producing such nonsense (‘devaneos’), nor would palaces be so full of the madness they turn out (p. 981a). Torres wishes that the same controls were applied to works offending against chastity as to those offending against the Faith (p. 984a–b). Again, however, he does not identify any particular authors or books (though he does pick out works of judicial astrology as a category for particular criticism).

\(^\text{18}\) A substantial number of these are recommended in the Jesuit Ratio studiorum.
His final chapter is not entirely austere, since he finds it legitimate for the prince to read some works of poetry or other kinds of composition written simply to provide entertainment and recreation rather than profit. Nevertheless, these must not be too many, nor must they be read too frequently—even in order to show off the breadth of one’s reading (pp. 985b–86b).

In his treatment of this topic Torres combines, in a number of respects, the emphases which we found earlier in Felipe de la Torre and Costa. His stress on the value to the prince of reading the Bible (of which he makes much more than he does of the reading of other kinds of religious writing) recalls de la Torre, despite the marked differences between their religious outlooks and their conceptions of the place of Bible-reading in the life of the Christian taken as a whole. As regards secular writing, Torres’s position is very much that of Joan Costa (especially as stated in the third and final version of his treatise). It is true that Torres’s treatment of the matter is less specific and analytical in character than Costa’s, but the two men reveal the same appreciation of the moral exemplarity afforded by the works of Classical historians and, still more, the same fear of the power of imaginative fiction—especially the work of ‘the poets’—to undermine morals. They speak in similar terms of the unsatisfactory situation existing in this regard in the Spain of their own time.

It remains to add that, in the course of Torres’s account of the virtue of liberality, in Book XXII, there arises with particular clarity an issue which we have met in a number of the works considered earlier and which appears at various points in this present treatise: namely, the nature of the virtue displayed by the pagans of Classical Antiquity and how Christians should regard it.

Torres writes at some length of two outstanding exemplars of liberality: Cimon, the Athenian statesman and soldier of the fifth century B.C., and Gillias of Agrigentum. For the first he follows chiefly the eulogistic accounts given by Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch; for the second, that of Valerius Maximus. Of both figures Torres remarks that the things told of them seem to relate to ‘some good Christian’ rather than to ‘unbelieving pagans’ (p. 880a). Moreover, both men, in their works of mercy and charity, set an example to

Christians which the latter, for the most part, fail to equal. This is the more remarkable and, as regards Christians, the more scandalous because these pagans were guided in their conduct by nothing but the light of Natural Reason and were not motivated by any promise or prospect of eternal life. Christians, on the other hand, enjoy supernatural aid and the promise of heaven. Even so, they are not moved to care for the poor in their need as these pagans did. Explicitly, Torres points the moral that Christians should be shamed by such pagans into amending their ways. Implicitly, the tone of his writing suggests regret that such virtuous pagans as these could not receive the reward of eternal life. Generous and compassionate as they were, their good deeds profited them only to the extent that their names remained written in the cold marble of men’s memory (p. 882b).

Torres’s approach to these two figures is akin to his approach to the philosophers of Classical Antiquity, for here too one finds a marked disposition on his part to receive appreciatively what they have to teach. This is evident throughout the treatise. He acknowledges, for example, that the vanity of the superstitions of the Ancient World was condemned by pagan philosophers such as Cicero as well as by the Bible (p. 85a). The words of Plato on how rulers can learn the principles of governing their subjects from the way in which God orders and sustains the universe, as also those of Cicero on philosophy as the ‘mother of the arts’, and Seneca’s on ‘liberal studies’, strike him as ‘not only philosophical but very Christian’ (p. 314b). When he stresses the superiority of moral over natural philosophy, he observes that it was the teaching of the Ancients in this branch of philosophy that rightly earned them the highest renown. Of Cicero in particular he remarks that he wrote books of moral philosophy ‘as full of good advice as any Christian philosopher could do’. Cicero’s De officiis and Tusculan Disputations should bring him eternal fame (317b–18a). Picking out, in the latter work, advice offered for the cultivation of chastity, Torres notes that here Cicero, ‘aided by nothing more than Right Reason, counsels what a very good Christian, illuminated by the Faith, might well prescribe’ (p. 822a). It is, however, for Socrates that he keeps his highest praise. He recalls the chapter in the De civitate Dei (Book VIII, chapter iii) where Augustine speaks of the significance which Socrates acquired by being the first to redirect philosophy away from the study of the natural order to that of moral conduct. For his own part, Torres likes to think that the ‘same Spirit guided the tongue of Socrates as spoke through
those of the holy Apostles’ (p. 86a). He recalls that, according to some writers, Socrates found salvation (in the Christian sense) through the Natural Law—by which Torres means the moral law taught by reason. He plainly hopes that those who have made this claim are right. ‘Socrates had much reason in his appreciation of things, great justice in what he taught, and no less courage and good fortune in dying for it’.20

In dealing with this issue Torres makes numerous references to Plato’s Vita Socratis and Xenophon’s De factis et dictis Socratis. However, one is bound also to recall the similar sentiments of Erasmus—most notably in his ‘Sileni Alcibiadis’ (Adagia, III,iii,1) and, among his Colloquia, in the ‘Convivium religiosum’.21 There is also a marked similarity between Torres’s position on this issue and, again, that of Joan Costa, even though the Jesuit does not equal him in length or forthrightness on the topic. On the other hand, he is more evidently anxious than Costa to justify his practice—as he puts it—of sometimes wrapping Holy Scripture in the maxims of the philosophers, and at other times confirming the sayings and deeds of pagans by recourse to Holy Writ (sig.++] 2v). In his Prologue to the Reader he calls in aid a catena of authorities including, as is to be expected, Augustine, Jerome, and Basil.22 However, that being done, he shows himself less troubled by the issue than we shall find Ribadeneyra to be—less eager to deny that the Ancients possessed real virtue (see below pp. 293–94).

For Torres the matter is perhaps rendered less pressing by his extensive reference to, and citation of, medieval writers whose work predates, or in its most significant aspects stands apart from, Aristotle as recovered and exploited in the thirteenth century. In his general introduction to his account of the cardinal virtues, the writers of the Western Church on whom he draws run from Jerome and Augustine to the massive biblical commentaries of El Tostado and include

20 ‘[. . .] y él tuvo gran razón en lo que sintió, mucha justicia en lo que predicó, y no menos ánimo y ventura en morir por ello’ (p. 86a).
21 In the latter work, one of the interlocutors, Nephalius, remarks (in the Spanish version by Alonso Ruiz de Virués) that ‘con dificultad me aliento de no creer determinadamente que Sócrates esté en el número de los santos que en ley de natura sirvieron a dios’. (I quote from Donnelly (1979), ii, 520. See also NBAE, xxi (1915), 192.
22 Augustine, De doctrina christiana (II,xl); Jerome, ‘Epistola ad magnum oratorem’; Basil, ‘De legendis libris Gentilium’.
Gregory the Great, Bede, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Bonaventure. Throughout his treatise these last two are prominent among his 'authorities'.23 References to Aristotle and Aquinas are not lacking but are relatively infrequent (those to Aristotle especially). He thus shows himself in general to be drawn to writers who did not make a sharp and emphatic distinction between the spheres of reason and revelation, between natural knowledge and faith, between philosophy and theology, the natural and the supernatural, in the way that, with Aquinas, became characteristic of medieval scholasticism. In his discussion of St Bonaventure, Aquinas's Franciscan contemporary, Dom David Knowles wrote:

He was [...] the last and one of the most eminent of a long series of thinkers, from the fourth to the thirteenth century, who regarded all forms of knowledge and learning as subservient to theology and useful solely in that ancillary function, and who also regarded the progress from letters to philosophy and from philosophy to the Bible as stages in the growth of Christian Wisdom, which was also Christian virtue (Knowles, 1962, p. 247).

This seems to state what the appeal of the medieval writers whom Torres mentions most often consisted in for him.24

Torres is of an unpolemical disposition and in that respect very different from Ribadeneyra. Contemporary controversy, whether as regards religious conflict or the ethics of political power, appears to find no place in his work. Thus his treatise, despite its size, expresses a narrower scope of intellectual concern and argument than Ribadeneyra’s, while in mood it is calmer and less intense. Nevertheless,

23 Among the Eastern Fathers, Origen and Basil are frequently cited.
24 Knowles quotes a passage from Gilson's study of Bonaventure where he summarizes the essential differences between the Franciscan’s position and that of Aquinas: "[...] The Thomist intellect forms intelligibles [= intelligibilia] out of sense-impressions and creates the first principles, which in their turn are the instruments by which it builds the entire edifice of knowledge. The Bonaventuran intellect finds within itself the intelligible, which it has not framed out of sense-perceptions, but has received from One within it who is more “within” than its own interior life. The Thomist will acquire “natural” virtues which owe their development, qua natural, to exercise and habit; the Bonaventuran will waits for grace to descend upon these virtues, qua natural, in order that it may complete them" (Knowles, 1962, p. 246; see Gilson, 1924, p. 412). Knowles remarks of Bonaventure's outlook that 'in theology [it] is that of Augustine, and in philosophy is in large part that of Christian Neoplatonism'. (Torres makes several references to works by Ficino, though they do not contribute substantially to his arguments.)
within its own range and set of emphases, it reveals much of interest as regards the character of Spanish intellectual and religious life at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the complex interplay of elements and responses that is to be discerned within it.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

PEDRO DE RIBADENEYRA

Ribadeneyra’s ‘Prologue to the Pious Christian Reader’ makes his purpose in writing abundantly clear: it is to take a stand against the pernicious doctrines of Machiavelli and the principle of raison d’état which his writings have done so much to foster in the minds of men. The fundamental aim, he observes, which Machiavelli’s prince sets before him is the preservation of his State. To achieve that aim, he will employ any means, whether good or evil. For Machiavelli the Christian religion is just one of those means, to be exploited simply as best serves the prince’s political purposes. Lamentably, the doctrines of this ‘minister of Satan’ have spread across many countries of Europe, for the politiques of his day Ribadeneyra sees as Machiavelli’s ‘disciples’. These politiques are even worse than the heretics of the age (a very remarkable concession, in this work, to the ‘heretics’) for while the latter ‘take away part of religion, the politiques take away all of it’. Ribadeneyra names ‘the springs from which the politiques of our time drink’. Earliest among them is Tacitus, whose Annals people treat as oracles on questions of government. Then comes Machiavelli. The remaining three are ‘all French’: first, François de la Noue, the Huguenot author of the Discours politiques et militaires, of 1587; then his fellow Huguenot Duplessis-Mornay; and then there is Bodin.

What [shall I say] of the works of Jean Bodin, which we find in the hands of statesmen, being read with much curiosity and praised as the writings of a man of learning, experience and prudence, a distinguished master in the subject of all good Reason of State? For it is overlooked that they are scattered with so many false opinions and errors that, however much those who have translated them from French into Italian and Castilian have endeavoured to purge and emend them, they have not been able to do this so thoroughly that many more things for purging and emending do not yet remain.¹

¹ ¿Qué [diré] de las obras de Iuan Bodino, que andan en manos de los hombres de Estado y son leídas con mucha curiosidad, y alabadas como escritas de un
It is likely that here Ribadeneyra had particularly in mind Añastro Ysunza's Spanish version of Bodin's treatise—Los seis libros de la república de Iuan Bodino [. . .] emendados catholicalemente—to which we referred earlier in relation to Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla (see above pp. 168–69). As we have seen, the Council of the Inquisition in August 1594 ordered not the banning of Los seis libros . . . but its further expurgation. Ribadeneyra's remarks suggest that this instruction by no means put a stop to circulation of the work.

In setting Bodin alongside Duplessis-Mornay and De la Noue, Ribadeneyra was doing what his Italian fellow-Jesuit, Antonio Possevino, had already done in his Judicium de Nuae militiae Galli, Ioannis Bodini, Philippi Mornaei, & Nicolai Machiavelli quibusdam scriptis, of 1592, written at the urging of the Venetian Inquisitor (Donnelly, 1987, pp. 31–32). Possevino had been in France during the troubled years 1560–72. If his tract—on which Ribadeneyra draws—played some part in prompting the Spaniard to undertake the writing of his own treatise, the latter brought abundant conviction of his own to the task.2

Of the sixteenth-century writers who came to be referred to as ‘politiques’ T.M. Parker has written that

varón docto, experimentado y prudente, y gran maestro de toda buena razón de Estado? no mirando que están sembradas de tantas opiniones falsas y errores, que por mucho que los que las han traducido de la lengua Francesa en la Italiana y en la Castellana las han procurado purgar y emendar, no lo han podido hacer tan enteramente, que no queden muchas más cosas que purgar y que emendar" (fos.†5v–6; p. 456).

2 The work of Duplessis-Mornay's that Possevino attacks here is his De la vérité de la religion christienne, of 1581 (see Possevino, 1593, pp. 122–27). This is an apologetic work of Christian apologetic that looks beyond the Christian fold and is little concerned with the religious and social conflicts of the Reformation and, according to Patry (1933, pp. 299–300), 'obtint l'assentiment et les éloges de maints catholiques'. Even Possevino finds relatively little to criticize in it. Ribadeneyra does not indicate any particular work of Duplessis-Mornay's that he had in mind when including him in his trio of Frenchmen. Perhaps the inclusion of De la vérité... among Possevino's targets was enough. On the other hand, in a series of tracts published anonymously in the 1570s, and perhaps most notably in his Remonstrance aux estats de Blois pour la paix, of 1576, Duplessis contended that there was only one Christian religion, which embraced both Catholics and Huguenots, and that, far from leading to political disorder, toleration which had been extended to religious differences had, in the case of Germany, Poland, and elsewhere, facilitated the re-establishment of peace. He therefore argued, in the interests of the well-being of society as well as of Christian charity, against policies of religious coercion. (See Garnett, 1994, p. lxii.) Thus, whether or not Ribadeneyra knew any of these tracts, or credited Duplessis with their composition, their author was committed to the position that Ribadeneyra wished to attack.
concerned by the religious fanaticism which was tearing apart
states by religious war, [they] regarded religion as a secondary con-
sideration for the State. Therefore they preached the absolute rights
of secular sovereignty and the necessity of subordinating religious issues
to national solidarity. This last principle, however, in the circumstances
of the time, involved in practice religious toleration. It necessitated the
idea of a State which would be neutral, or at least accommodating,
in matters of religion; which would accept the idea, so abhorrent to
many sixteenth-century minds, of a nation of mixed faith . . . [when] . . . it
was by many taken as axiomatic that religious divisions weakened the
State in the face of outside enemies and promoted internal [dis]order
(Parker, 1955, p. 168).

D.R. Kelley (1970, p. 551) has written that ‘it was during the 1560s
. . . that politique was used [in France] as a highly charged, often
derogatory way of characterizing anyone who placed public utility
above religious principle’. The association of the term there with
Machiavelli was particularly a feature of the years following the
Massacre of St Bartholomew in 1572 and above all of the late 1580s
and the 1590s. As Edmond Beame has remarked: ‘a new surge of
anti-Machiavellism was brought on by the final series of crises of the
Wars of Religion’: ‘[Machiavelli’s] intimacy now was with the poli-
tiques, “those who prefer the peace of the kingdom . . . to the salva-
tion of their souls”, . . . with irreligious princes and oppressors of
the Church’; so that the phrase ‘Politiques et Machiavellistes’, or
some variation of it, came to be frequently used in the pamphlets
of the League (Beame, 1982, pp. 45–47, 50, n. 56). The charge that
‘the Politiques were Machiavellian converts whose object was nothing
less than the secularization of the French state’, and that they saw
religion as nothing more than an instrumentum regni, was brought
against them in two works in particular, closely contemporary with
Ribadeneyra’s own: the Dialogue d’entre Le Malheustre et le Manant, of
1593 (incorporated into the Satyre Menippée), and François de Gravelle’s
Politiques royales, of 1596. It is against this background, vividly pre-
mitted by Kelley and Beame, that Ribadeneyra’s own work—with
its fierce rejection of Machiavellian and politique Reason of State—
eeds to be seen, although written in the very different circumstances
obtaining in Spain.

Ribadeneyra made it his fundamental aim to establish a distinc-
tion between—as he put it—two kinds of raison d’état, the false and
the true, of which ‘the one makes a religion of the State, the other
makes a State out of religion’ (fo.††7r; p. 456). The former is taught
by Machiavelli and the *politiques* and rests on ‘vain prudence and merely human, worthless means’; the other, taught by God, ‘rests on God himself and the means which he, as Lord of all States, reveals in his fatherly providence to princes, strengthening them to make good use of such means’.3

This treatise consists of two books. The first sets out ‘what princes must do concerning religion as guardians, defenders, and sons of the Church’. The second expounds ‘what they must do for the political and temporal government of their kingdoms’, together with ‘the true and perfect virtues with which they must be radiantely adorned if they are to rule them well and preserve them’.

* * *

The essential argument of Book I is compactly summarized in Chapter 8:

Let the first and last of [the prince’s] cares be to observe the commandments of God and to revere and serve his most holy religion; for with this they will have God on their side—him who alone bestows kingdoms and rules kings, and enlightens them and gives them counsel so that they may know what they must undertake, and courage to undertake it, and strength and resolution to carry it through, and a happy outcome to business taken in hand in his service. He it is who provides them with riches and treasure in times of greatest need; he who uncovers and punishes the intrigues that are secretly devised and woven against princes; he who diverts and removes occasions for expenditure and wars, and puts fear into enemies and gives victory over them; and finally, it is he who, as sovereign King and sole Monarch of the universe, makes glorious all kings, their servants and ministers, who reign on his behalf (pp. 42–43/pp. 467b–48a).

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3 Although Ribadeneyra was familiar with Giovanni Botero’s *Della ragion di stato*, which first appeared in 1589, he seems to make very little use of it in his task of revaluing the notion of ‘reason of state’. Viroli (1992, pp. 252–53) writes that ‘through his work, Botero severed the notion of reason of state and the language of the art of the state from the negative moral connotations that had so far accompanied them. […] By purifying it from Machiavellian and Tacitan connotations, Botero gave the art of the state a new, more acceptable meaning’. See how the close examination of the question by Paolini (1998). Ribadeneyra’s one allusion (in Book II, chapter xx) to Botero’s treatise comes where he draws on Botero’s chapter ‘Della liberalità’ [= Bk.I, ch.xx] in order to commend princely liberality towards the poor. By such means, writes Ribadeneyra, the prince ‘steals the hearts of his subjects and binds them to himself with chains of love and perpetual obligation’. For ‘the triumph of reason of state’ in the language of politics, see Burke, 1991, pp. 479–90; Viroli, 1992, chapter 6; Tuck, 1993, chapter 2.
By far the greater part of this Book I is devoted to elaborating this argument and deploying it against ‘the politiques of these times’, with their ‘false Reason of State’. Ribadeneyra’s purpose is to attack and discredit both them and it.

It is in no cool, intellectual fashion that he sets about this. He writes in an often violently polemical spirit which deeply marks the character of this work as a whole. The very phrases ‘the politiques of these times’ and ‘false Reason of State’ are many times repeated and become sticks with which to beat his enemy. The opprobrious idiom employed shows Ribadeneyra’s deep personal engagement in the subject that he is treating.

There was another, more literary, reason for his polemical stance. At one point (p. 166/p. 497a) he envisages (in a way that was by no means uncommon in the sixteenth century) that his treatise will have not only readers but hearers: that is, he envisages it as being both read and also read aloud to others. This illuminates his deployment of the rhetoric of vituperation.

As to the intellectual character of Ribadeneyra’s approach to his subject, it is, throughout, overwhelmingly historical and illustrative rather than conceptualizing and analytical. The successive chapters at large display the same basic procedure: a quite small number of propositions (which sustain and advance the basic argument) are stated and set in a context of supporting citations from works taken as authoritative, and of illustrative examples derived from the whole sweep of the centuries running from Old Testament times down to Ribadeneyra’s own.

Much use, of course, is made of the Bible, especially the historical books of the Old Testament, but time and again Ribadeneyra also draws on the historians of the earlier centuries of the Church: notably Eusebius and those who continued his Ecclesiastical History—Socrates of Constantinople, Sozomen and Theodoret... on through the twelfth-century Byzantine historian Zonaras and down to Ribadeneyra’s contemporary, the Oratorian Cesare Baronio, author of the Annales ecclesiastici (1588–1607), to which Ribadeneyra turns with great frequency. Another contemporary Italian historian whom he mentions no less often is Carlo Sigonio, author of the Historia de occidentali imperio (on the dissolution of the Roman Empire and the genesis of the Kingdom of Italy) and the De regno Italiae, described by Cochrane as ‘one of the greatest masterpieces of Renaissance historiography’ (Cochrane, 1981, p. 309). Ribadeneyra takes an interest
in histories of Central Europe, and makes flattering reference to the sixteenth-century Polish historian and bishop Martin Cromer for the ‘diligence and elegance’ of his *Polonia, sive de origine et rebus Polonorum libri XXX*, published at Basel in 1558 and 1568. Among histories of Spain he draws on Garibay’s *Los XL libros del compendio historial de las crónicas y universal historia de todos los reynos de España* (Antwerp, 1571), and Zurita’s recent *Analecta de la Corona de Aragón*. Osório da Fonseca’s *De rebus Emmanuelis* receives occasional mention.

Along with these histories and chronicles one must place the compilations of edicts of Ecumenical Councils and other ecclesiastical assemblies to which Ribadeneyra readily refers—among them the edition of the *Collectio conciliorum Hispaniae*, of 1593, compiled by García de Loaísa. There are occasional references to the compilations of the Canon Law and also to the Justinian compilations of the Roman Law. Alfonso el Sabio’s *Siete Partidas* is quite often quoted. Ribadeneyra also turns to the massive *Variarum ex iure pontificio, regis & caesareo resolutionum libri IV* of Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva, President of the Council of Castile and ‘the Spanish Bartolus’. Beyond all this there is a multitude of citations from the Early Church Fathers, many also from popes, and some from liturgical texts relating to coronation rites.

By contrast there are few references to political and theological treatises and there is little exploration of their arguments. Aquinas’s *De regno* is briefly recalled on three or four occasions, and the same *quaestio* of the *Summa theologica* (on the infidelity of heretics being worse than that of Jews and Gentiles, and whether Jews or Gentiles should be compelled to accept the Christian Faith or their rites be tolerated) three times. The two references to Giles of Rome’s *De regimine principum* support those to Aquinas’s *De regno* as regards the kind of rewards that the Christian king should seek and may hope to receive from God for his labours. Bodin’s *Six Livres de la République*, although so central to Ribadeneyra’s preoccupations in this whole treatise, receives only four references in Part I. One relates to Bodin’s comment that even atheists have recognized the importance of respect for religion as the basis of social order and rulers’ authority [Book IV,vii]; another to where he notes the salutary effect of ecclesiastical censure on kings [Book VI,i]. The remaining two references are of more substantial importance, forming part of Ribadeneyra’s argument in favour of religious compulsion, where (as we shall see) he takes Bodin as his principal antagonist. There is no larger direct
engagement, in Book I, with Bodin's text and arguments.

The intellectual world of reference that Ribadeneyra thus creates here reveals a fundamentally polarizing cast of mind. Whatever recognition of ambiguities of character, motivation or situation, or of complexities of causation, there may be in his sources, his is a black-and-white world where, on the one hand, there are the good, the truthful, the devout, those reverent towards and obedient to God and Church, while, on the other, there are the wicked and disobedient and false and unscrupulous, enemies of God, his Church and his people alike. It is rare indeed for Ribadeneyra to acknowledge any inconsistencies of character or behaviour among those on the right side of the line.

It is time to consider in more detail his notion of the good Christian prince and his consequent onslaught on the teaching of the polities; and here at the outset it is relevant to note his particular interest in recalling the examples of the Christian Roman emperors, from Constantine onwards, who (as he portrays them) were unflaggingly zealous in establishing and maintaining the Christian religion among their subjects. This, as he makes clear to his readers, involved their upholding orthodox doctrine against the various heresies that arose in those times. The appeal of this for Ribadeneyra in the context of his own times is readily understood.

The world in which he sees rulers placed is one governed by God's providence and omnipotence.\(^4\) God has particular care for 'good and just men', and among these he especially rewards good princes. Ribadeneyra stresses divine providence thus in order (as he says) to show that it 'is the foundation on which the government and confidence of the pious prince must rest':

[... ] the Christian prince who is persuaded of the immense majesty of the Lord, and of the service and reverence owed to Him, and of the providence with which He rules and governs empires and preserves kingdoms and domains, adopting just and licit means on His behalf and dependent on the providence of the Lord, entrusts himself to His promises and rests beneath His protection, because he knows that all kingdoms [estados] are His, and that He bestows them and upholds them, and that no human wisdom or power can uphold them without Him; [... ] (p. 55/p. 470b).

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\(^4\) For Ribadeneyra's most detailed statement of his view of Christian kingship see Book I, chapters ix–xiii.
It is therefore incumbent on the Prince to defend the Catholic Faith, protect the Church and honour the clergy. Indeed, the Prince’s kingdom [*imperio*] is better governed and further extended when he shows care for the Ecclesiastical Estate than when he wages war (p. 61/ p. 472a). Ribadeneyra repeats the point: ‘Kings are obliged, as kings, to love and fear God above all things and to have more regard for the worship and reverence owed to God than for anything else’ (p. 70/p. 474a–b). It is hardly surprising, in such a context, to find quoted once more the whole of Augustine’s chapter on the felicity of Christian emperors in his *De civitate Dei*, (Bk.V, ch.xxiv) (pp. 56–58/ p. 471a–b).

So far Ribadeneyra has argued his point, as he comments, on the basis of ‘the use observed by all societies and nations of the world’ and, with that, the Scriptures, ‘the purity and excellence of our holy religion’, the testimony of the saints and the oaths of kings. (p. 69/ p. 474a) Now he will establish it by ‘natural reason’. What he goes on to offer is argument operating in a context of religious presuppositions.

Men generally must love God as the *summum bonum*; but that means having regard for the religion that teaches people to love the Supreme Good. Natural reason makes this evident to all men, but it is also evident that kings, whose possession of their office shows them to be especially favoured and honoured by God, are particularly under obligation to honour him in return and to do so with notable service. This is a matter of justice, and what prince (asks Ribadeneyra, recalling *De civitate Dei*, IV, iv) can be a true king rather than a tyrant if he does not observe justice? If this is the virtue that gives to each what is due to each—to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s—how can the prince do justly who deprives God of what is his? Furthermore, kings are God’s ‘viceroys and lieutenants’, and ‘all right reason teaches us that the viceroy must govern a kingdom as his king orders him to do’ (pp. 71, 75/pp. 474b, 475b). Again, ‘no king is an absolute, independent king governing what belongs to himself, but a vice-gerent and minister of God, by whom kings reign and through whom any power has being and stability’ (p. 74/p. 475b).

When writing earlier of God’s providence, Ribadeneyra remarked that he emphasized the matter in order to

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5 Ribadeneyra is translating here a passage from the Synod of Mainz in AD 888.
undo the entanglements devised by the *politiques*, who teach men to
govern states in such fashion as though the Lord did not cast his pro-
vidence over them and as if the world were governed by chance or
solely by human roguery and cunning (p. 54/p. 470b).

This, in his view, is the moral universe of those who practise *raison
d'État*, and they are to be found as far back as kings Jeroboam and
Asa in the Old Testament, who sought to preserve their position
and kingdoms through schemes and stratagems rather than by putting
their trust in the care and power of God (pp. 79–82/pp. 476b–77a).
When Ribadeneyra moves on to similar illustrations from secular
history, he reaches back as far as Visigothic Spain but concentrates
his attention on figures from much more recent times: Charles the
Bold, duke of Burgundy; Lodovico Sforza, duke of Milan; Johann
Friederich, Elector of Saxony; and three kings of France: Francis I,
Henry II, and the recently assassinated Henry III, who, says Ribade-
neyra, followed the advice of *politiques* and Machiavellians—advice
not governed by the law of the Lord', and so 'by God's just judge-
ment came to die' (p. 90/p. 479a). 'Has the world seen an exam-
ple like this one, so recent and so remarkable, the like of which was
never heard by any man born?'.

Each of these had employed *raison d'État* (or 'la razón falsa de
estado', or 'la engañosa razón de estado') for purposes of political
self-interest or self-preservation, and in so doing—under God's judge-
ment—brought misfortunes upon himself. With these warning exam-
pies Ribadeneyra places Mary Queen of Scots, since, although she
went on to become a glorious martyr, she had contributed to her
troubles earlier by listening to those who, motivated by considera-
tions of *raison d'État*, persuaded her to show tolerance to heretics,
arguing that it was 'better to employ gentleness than to lose every-
thing' (pp. 90–91/p. 479a).

This points ahead to a series of nine chapters (17–18, 23–29)
where Ribadeneyra sets about attacking the *politiques*' contention that
temporal kings and princes should concern themselves not with the
faith and beliefs held by their peoples but with preserving them in jus-
tice and peace and governing society in such a fashion that each may
follow the religion that he wishes, so long as he is obedient to the civil
laws and does not disturb the peace of that same society [. . .].\(^6\)

\(^6\) '[. . .] enseñan que los reyes y príncipes temporales no deven atender a la fe
y creencia que sus pueblos tienen, sino a conservarlos en justicia y paz, y governar
This, says Ribadeneyra, is the doctrine of 'ministers of Satan'; or, more fully:

this is the liberty of conscience taught by the politiques of our time; this is what the Lutheran heretics in Germany have embraced; this is what has been sought by some who are rebels against God and against their natural lord in the States of Flanders.\(^7\)

His response is as direct and explicit as could be: his aim, in the face of such doctrines, is

to show that the Christian prince must not allow heretics and men belonging to various and contrary sects in his territories if he wishes to fulfil properly the office and obligation of a Catholic prince; and [further to show] that it is impossible for the Catholic and the heretic to associate on good terms in one and the same society, just as it is for great disturbance and commotion—which are the ruin and destruction of kingdoms and societies—not to follow from intermingling of this sort.\(^8\)

Ribadeneyra’s manner of treating this issue quickly reverts to his usual one of quoting from auctoritates (among these, in Chapter 18, prominence is given to Augustine’s ‘Quae est peior mors animae quam libertas erroris?’) and citing exempla. Chapters 23 and 24 are notable cases of this. The single idea running through both is that ‘Catholics and heretics’ cannot associate together, either in principle or in practice, either within the Christian community or in civil society. In Chapter 23, on top of a series of references to, or quotations from, the Bible (mainly the Old Testament) there are over twenty references to, or direct quotations from, such authorities, whether individual writers, or works—letters, treatises, histories—or compila-
tions (legal ones of the late Roman Empire, or edicts of ecclesiastical
 councils). In the following chapter there are over thirty, with a strong
 preponderance of references to, and quotations from, the Early
 Fathers, historians of the Early Church, and, again, legal edicts from
 the late Roman Empire. Nevertheless, Fray Alonso de Castro’s De
 iusta haereticorum punitione, of 1547 (along with Bishop Diego de Siman-
cas’s Institutiones catholicae [. . . ad . . .] extirpandas haereses, of 1552) is
 brought in to establish the point that ‘the Catholic wife is not obliged
to pay the conjugal debt to the heretical husband’ (p. 160/p. 495b).

Both chapters are marked by an extreme and vehement polar-
ization in presenting the contrast and necessary conflict between
‘Catholics and heretics’. Thus, Catholicism is a queen and pure vir-
gin, whereas heresy is a filthy whore; there is not such natural enmity
between the wolf and the lamb as there must be between the Catholic
and the heretic. How can Catholics live in peace and quietness
in the same society as heretics, who are excluded from it by all laws
divine and human? ‘For it is hard to state adequately how much
the saints praise the hatred that the true Catholic must have for the
heretic, and the care and horror with which he must shun the other
[. . .]’ (p. 153/p. 493b). Because

heresy is the breath of Satan, and a fire from hell, and a corrupt and
pestilential air, and a cancer that grows and spreads without remedy,
and a disease so dangerous and acute that it penetrates the innermost
parts and corrupts and infects souls, and not only kills with its touch,
like the viper, or with its look, like the basilisk, or with its breath, like
the dragon, but in all these ways and many others destroys, ends, and
consumes everything (p. 160–61/p. 495b).

The heresies of the time ‘are so many and so great that there could
not be more of them’; and as for the heretics themselves:

these hellish monsters have not been content to embrace some of the
ravings that other heretics have taught but have gathered into a sin-
gle whole all the errors of all the heretics of the past and added other
new ones out of their own heads [. . .] (p. 165/p. 496b).

It is after this that Ribadeneyra addresses himself to the one substan-
tial point on this subject in Bodin’s treatise that he deals with
specifically: the contention that, while a prince should endeavour to
bring it about that all his subjects should share the same religion,
‘he must (in Ribadeneyra’s paraphrase) seek it by gentle means and
by his life and example, and not by means of fear and punishment’
Ribadeneyra concedes that those who have never been Christians, of whatever following, must not be compelled to accept the Faith. However, heretics and other baptized persons who accepted this Faith are obliged to keep it and thus fulfil their baptismal promises; and it is right to compel them to do so and to punish them severely when they do not. Among many other Church Fathers—Augustine prominent among them—Ribadeneyra recalls from Jerome words regularly cited on this topic: when the spark appears, it must be extinguished, rotten flesh must be cut away, the scabby sheep driven from the flock (p. 169/p. 497b). At one point Ribadeneyra recognizes (wholly exceptionally in this discussion) that in this matter the prince needs to proceed with prudence, having regard to the number of heretics among his subjects, lest he do more harm than good by too much zeal. If heretics are numerous, let him proceed gradually, seeking to enlighten the ignorant and win over those who have gone astray; but ‘if the kingdom is Catholic and the heretics who disturb it are few, his duty is to endeavour by all means to prevent the cancer from growing and extending to the healthy parts, with the loss of the whole of that society’ (p. 176/p. 499a–b).

Therefore, again, Ribadeneyra rejects Bodin’s contention stated earlier. In support of his own position he invokes the authority of his fellow Jesuits Antonio Possevino and Robert Bellarmine and, again, the Franciscan fray Alonso de Castro (for whose De iusta haereticorum punitione Possevino has warm praise).

At one point Ribadeneyra shows some concern lest it should be argued that, as the Church ‘in some provinces and cities’ tolerates Jews living among Christians, so it should tolerate ‘heretics’. His answer is three-fold: these Jews never accepted the Christian faith; their own religion was instituted by God ‘for a certain limited time’ as a prefiguration of the Christian faith, while the Old Testament foretells Christ; in any case, ‘the Jews now are reduced and humbled and do not pervert Christians as the heretics do’ (p. 184/p. 501a–b).

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9 See Bodin, Six Livres . . ., Bk.IV, ch.vii (1576, p. 510; 1586, p. 483 [= Knolles, p. 537]).

10 There is a marked similarity between the substance and expression of Ribadeneyra’s argument here (as also in ch.17) and Bellarmine’s in his Liber de laiciis sive secularibus, ch.18 (in his Disputationes de controversiis christianaee fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos (3 vols, Ingolstadt, 1586–93), i, cols.1749–52). See also chs.19 (‘Non posse conciliari catholicos cum haereticis’) and 21 (‘Posse haereticos ab Ecclesia damnatos temporalibus poetis, & etiam morte mulctari’).
As regards the case of Spain, Ribadeneyra makes his position entirely clear at an earlier point (Chapter 16) where he argues that rulers who, in determining their policy, show more concern with God and his holy religion than with other interests and aims are rewarded by God with success in their undertakings. An outstanding example of this was furnished by Ferdinand and Isabella in their determination to expel 'Moors and Jews' from Spain (p. 99/p. 481a). In ordering this they displayed more concern with 'preserving and increasing [...] the purity of our holy religion than with false raison d'etat or royal revenues, which with the Jews' departure would necessarily decrease'.

But this service which these glorious monarchs so piously and so disinterestedly did to God was richly rewarded by him, cleansing these kingdoms of all the ugliness and filth of false sects and preserving them down to the present in the unimpaired purity of the Catholic faith, and in justice and peace, and giving them [= Ferdinand and Isabella] further kingdoms, and revealing by his hand a New World, with so many and great treasures and riches that it is one of the greatest miracles that the world has seen. And that same Catholic King Ferdinand acknowledged and confessed that all his prosperity and victories had been born of the zeal that God had given him to preserve and amplify his holy religion by ejecting from Spain those outside the Faith and setting up within it the Holy Office of the Inquisition [...] (pp. 99–100/p. 481a).

The statement is all the more striking for coming from one whose own family background was converso in character.

We have now seen what is by far the chief business of Book I of this treatise. The remaining chapters are concerned with related issues of a more particular kind. Chapters 19–22 elaborate the point that secular rulers are guardians of God’s law but not its interpreters, ministers of the Church but not its legislators. Popes and bishops teach; princes are taught (p. 116/p. 485a–b). Again, for the most part he argues by citing acta and dicta drawn nearly all from the

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11 The same point would be made by Quevedo in his Exeércación contra los judíos of 1633. In the closing lines here, and in those immediately following, Ribadeneyra echoes passages from Zurita’s Historia del rey don Hernando el Católico (Bk.VIII, ch.xxxiv) and the Anales de la Corona de Aragón (Bk.XX, ch.xlix), of which it forms part, though contributing a characteristic vigour of its own.

12 See José Gómez-Menor (1976).

13 On this matter Ribadeneyra again refers his reader to Bellarmine’s Disputationes de controversiis: here to his De verbo Dei (Bk.III, chs.vi,vii,viii).
early Christian centuries; but when—briefly—he undertakes to supplement these by the conclusions of ‘natural reason’, he adopts the language of a more conceptualized political philosophy. Thus,

as all the causes [the term signifies also ‘purposes’) of government by secular princes are natural and human (because the efficient cause is election by the people, and the immediate final [purpose] is the temporal peace and tranquility of society), it follows that they [= secular princes] cannot extend their involvement to any matter that is supernatural and divine, because it exceeds their power which, as we said, depends on natural and human causes.14

God gives different kinds of illumination to secular princes and to the ‘shepherds’ of the Church: to the secular prince ‘prudence and human illumination’, to administer his kingdoms ‘in peace and temporal quietness, which is the target which government by him has in view’; to the shepherds of the Church ‘another higher and more excellent illumination’ (p. 137/p. 490a). Ribadeneyra recalls the Pauline metaphor of the body where all the members do not have the same office and do not receive the same gifts.15 That kingship essentially belongs to the order of nature rather than of grace is further emphasized when, almost parenthetically, he remarks—enlarging on the biblical injunction ‘Subjecti estote omni humanae creaturae’ [I Pet.2.13]:

we see that outside the Church there are true kings, non-Christians and Gentiles, because being king, qua king, is not something that is dependent on the Church or has a necessary connexion with it, ‘although’, he adds, ‘in the case of the Christian king it is so’.16 The principal point made here is clearly in line with what Skinner has

14 ‘[...] y como todas las causas del gobierno de los Principes seglares sean naturales y humanas (porque la causa eficiente es la elección del pueblo, y la inmediata final es la paz y tranquilidad temporal de la República), sigúese que no se pueden ellos estender a cosa que sea sobrenatural y divina, porque excede su potestad, la qual (como diximos) depende de causas naturales y humanas’[p. 136/p. 490a].
15 Here Ribadeneyra refers his reader to a much appreciated work by the renowned controversialist Thomas Stapleton: Principiorum fidei doctrinalium demonstratio methodica per controversias septem in libris duodecim tradita (Paris, 1578 and thereafter), Bk.V, Controversy 2. (Stapleton also receives favourable mention in the course of Possevino’s attack on De la Noue (Judicium . . . , p. 7).
16 ‘Y así vemos que fuera de la Iglesia ay verdaderos Reyes infieles y Gentiles, porque el ser Rey, en quanto Rey, no es cosa que tenga dependencia de la Iglesia ni connexion necessaria con ella, aunque si el ser Rey Cristiano’ (pp. 136–37/ p. 490a).
described as ‘the pivotal Thomist claim that there is an equal capacity in all men, whether or not they are Christian, to establish their own political societies’ (Skinner, 1978, ii,169). More broadly, Ribadeneyra’s paragraphs in this chapter are in harmony with the Thomist insistence that political authority essentially belongs to the order of nature rather than of grace.17

However, the conceptual language employed by Ribadeneyra in this chapter is not found elsewhere in this Book. On occasion he employs another kind of theoretical discourse, with its own roots deep in medieval political thought. So, in Chapter 18, he praises Christian rulers

who understood that they could not well fulfil the duties of their office save by preserving purity of religion; for the spiritual power and the temporal power are sisters and, as it were, members of a single body, or, to put it better, the spiritual power is like the soul and the temporal like the body. And thus, as the soul in man is the more excellent and superior part and that which gives life and being to the body, so the spiritual power greatly exceeds all earthly power.18

This passage, with what follows, closely corresponds to a section of the chapter in Bellarmine’s De laics on which we have already found Ribadeneyra drawing; but it also recalls much older sources, notably the analysis of Hugo of St Victor in his De sacramentis christianae fidei, of the earlier twelfth century, which, as J.A. Watt (1988, p. 368) has remarked, was to have great influence and achieve classic status with its inclusion in Boniface VIII’s Unam sanctam. Within the one corporate society of all Christians there are two orders, lay and clerical, ‘like two sides of a single body’. These represent two ways of life: one earthly and the other heavenly; one corporal, the other spiritual. And in the measure that the spiritual life is more worthy

17 ‘[...] the main polemical aim of the Thomists was to repudiate the heretical suggestion that the establishment of political society is directly ordained by God. They wished on the contrary to be able to claim that all secular commonwealths must originally have been set up by their own citizens as a means of fulfilling their purely mundane ends’ (Skinner, 1978, ii, 154 [see further, pp. 154–73]).
18 ‘[...] los cuales entendieron que no podían cumplir bien con la obligación de su oficio sino conservando la pureza de la religión. Porque la potestad espiritual y la potestad temporal son hermanas, y como miembros de un cuerpo, o por mejor decir la potest[ad] espiritual es como el alma, y la temporal como el cuerpo. Y así como el ánima en el hombre es la parte más excelente y superior, y la que da vida y ser al cuerpo, así la potestad espiritual excede en gran manera a toda la potestad de la tierra’ (p. 114/p. 484b).
than the earthly, so the spiritual power exceeds the earthly or secular power in honour and dignity (Watt, 1988, pp. 368–69). Ribadeneyra (like Bellarmine) invokes the authority of Gregory the Great here to the effect that ‘the earthly kingdom must serve the heavenly kingdom, and kings, who are God’s ministers and lieutenants, must not allow anything in their realms contrary to his holy law’. This expresses a central conviction of the work, and it is open to question how satisfactorily its paragraphs on kingship as validated by the natural law can be made to fit with that and with the larger tendency here, in Arquillièr’s phrase, ‘to absorb the natural order into the supernatural order’. Ribadeneyra does not spend time discussing primary and secondary origins and ends, and in general shows little interest in drawing out the implications of these larger views of human society conceptually for his own purpose of portraying the Christian prince, or in organizing his own account of such a prince in terms of them.

The concluding seven chapters of Book I are concerned with three related topics: princes—like other men—should submit themselves to the censure and correction of the Church when they have done a grave wrong, as the Emperor Theodosius did to St Ambrose; a fortiori, rulers must regard excommunication as a most grave matter; finally, they must display deep respect not only to the clergy but to the churches they serve, both by ensuring a proper reverence on the part of those attending churches and, still more, by unconditionally respecting the privileges and endowments attaching to them. Ribadeneyra expatiates on the reverence due to the clergy and recalls Pope Leo the Great: ‘as the radiance of the sun exceeds that of all the stars and planets, so the dignity and office of the Christian priest exceeds any temporal dignity and power’ (p. 230/p. 511b). He recalls also God’s words to Jeremiah: ‘I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms’ [Jer.1.10], noting that from this text

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19 ‘Por esso como dize san Gregorio, el Reyno de la tierra debe servir al Reyno del cielo, y los Reyes que son ministros de Dios, y lugartenientes suyos, no deven consentir en sus Reynos cosa que sea contraria a su santa ley’ (p. 114/p. 484b). The reference is to Pope Gregory’s letter to the Emperor Maurice of Byzantium in AD 593: ‘Ad hoc potestas super omnes homines pietati dominorum meorum [= the Emperor] coelitus data est, ut qui bona appetunt adjuventur, ut coelorum via largius pateat, ut terrestre regnum coelesti regno fumuletur’ [italics mine]; quoted by Arquillière, 1955, p. 130, n. 2 (longer extract in Carlyle, 1903, i, 155, n. 1). For Arquillière the importance of this statement lies in the fact that it sees the essential role of temporal power as consisting in the ‘directing of souls towards salvation’.
Pope Innocent III had ‘proved’ that ‘the spiritual power of the priest is greater than the temporal power of kings’ (p. 231/p. 512a).\textsuperscript{20} As to church privileges and immunities, Ribadeneyra retails a series of instances in which God severely punished princes and soldiers for violating churches and their possessions: ‘the preservation of kingdoms is in his hand, and they are not diminished or impoverished by however much is given to his churches and ministers’ (p. 254/p. 517b). The difference, on this point, between Ribadeneyra on the one hand and Castillo de Bobadilla and Mariana on the other is marked.

We now come to Book II of Ribadeneyra’s treatise. Having dealt in Book I with the ‘virtue of religion’, which is ‘the first and principal virtue and the foundation of the rest’, he will now give an account of the other ‘truly royal virtues’. In the opening four chapters he addresses two major preliminary issues, first arguing that only a \textit{Christian} prince can possess true virtue, and then repudiating Machiavelli’s argument that the prince needs to be able to feign virtue and also to abandon its principles when necessity requires this.

As regards the first of these issues, he begins by recalling Aquinas (\textit{S.T.}, Ila IIae, qu.23, art.7) as expounded by Cajetan, while behind both, of course, is Augustine, from whom six passages are recalled in this single chapter, three of them being passages from the \textit{De civitate Dei}, whose importance for the thinking of sixteenth-century writers on this matter has already been seen several times. Ribadeneyra quotes from Book V, chapter xix: ‘no one can have true virtue without true piety and true worship of the true God’ and recalls the no less crucial Book XIX, chapter xxv: those virtues that have the appearance of being genuine but do not refer beyond themselves to God and are desired only on their own account are in truth not virtues but vices. They are—in the words of Cajetan as presented by Ribadeneyra—the virtues of the pagan, who knows no human goal save that which the light of natural reason makes known to him (p. 260/p. 519a).\textsuperscript{21} Ribadeneyra soon moves his position, however,

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\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, the declarations of Pope Gelasius I on this subject in the fifth century—of momentous importance for the political theology of the Middle Ages—earns him no special attention here among the briefly enumerated Boniface I, Ignatius of Antioch, Gregory of Nazianzus, Chrysostom and Ambrose.

\textsuperscript{21} Ribadeneyra in fact establishes a sharper opposition between the natural and theological virtues, and devalues the former in respect of the latter more radically, than either Aquinas or Cajetan does. See Thomas a Vio Cajetanus, commentary
arguing now that the exemplars of virtue among the pagans of Classical Antiquity were flawed precisely because they did not love virtue for its own sake but esteemed it rather as a means for attaining ‘other base ends’. This criticism he extends generally to ‘the pagan philosophers and princes whom the histories hold up to us as models of virtue’—men whose virtues were in fact accompanied by as many vices, themselves incompatible with ‘true and perfect virtues’. Into the scope of this criticism Ribadeneyra brings Socrates, Plato, Diogenes, among the Greek philosophers, and among the Latins, the two Catos and Seneca ‘and [...] others with a reputation for being austere men of well regulated life’ (p. 265/p. 520a). The issue has an immediate bearing on his own style of argument since, as he says, if he cites the examples of some pagan princes in presenting the virtues requisite in the Christian ruler, it is not to be thought that the virtues of those rulers were perfect virtues or that he considers them to have been so. It is rather that he will seek to shame Christian rulers into greater effort to be what they should be, and will do so by citing the examples of ‘pagan princes who, being blind and without knowledge of the true God and the Supreme Good, strove so zealously in their deeds that these had the appearance of being true virtues of a very high order’ (p. 266/p. 520a). Subsequently, Ribadeneyra rather anxiously at times reminds his readers that this virtue or that as achieved by pagan rulers and others, though persuasive in appearance, was in fact no more than an appearance.22

As to the second issue—Machiavelli’s contention that princes must be able both to feign virtues and to depart from them when necessity requires it—Ribadeneyra begins (pp. 267–68/p. 520b) by translating a substantial passage from the notorious Chapter 18 of Il principe, where this proposition is set out.23 Ribadeneyra, for his part, declares this not only to be in conflict with Christianity but to be contrary to ‘all right reason and all good philosophy’. On this issue

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22 Thus: ‘En esta virtud [= justice] huvo entre los Gentiles algunos Príncipes, Governadores y juezes, que procuraron mucho esmerarse: y puesto caso que no alcançaron la virtud perfecta de la justicia (por las razones que diximos arriba), todavia tuvieron una sombra e imagen de justicia pintada con tales matizes, y tales colores, que parecia verdadera justicia, no siendo mas que justicia contrahecha y pintada’ (p. 296/p. 527a).

23 ‘Ad un principe adunque non è necessario avere tutte le soprascritte qualità [...] a sentire a pochi’ (Burd, 1891, pp. 304–06).
he appeals first to Cicero, citing four places where he condemns the practice of deception and the playing of the moral hypocrite. One of these passages is the now familiar one where Cicero presents fox-like cunning as being still more unworthy of man than is the force of a lion (De officiis, 1,41). This is reinforced by references to Seneca, Augustine and others to the effect that a man should desire to appear as he in truth is, and to be as he appears (p. 270/p. 521a). Feigned virtues are eventually found out and then the prince is hated for having sought to deceive. In broader terms, the preservation of the State ('la conservación del Estado') depends not primarily on the good or bad opinion that a ruler’s subjects form of him but on the will of God, who it is—as Ribadeneyra again tells us—that bestows and upholds States, or removes and transfers them; and in no way can the prince win the good will of God towards himself save by keeping his holy law and practising the true and holy virtues that he teaches (p. 272/p. 521b). Not that the virtues of good faith, charity and religion should be embraced chiefly with the aim of preserving the State; rather, the State should serve religion.

Continuing in Chapter 3 his attack on ‘Machiavelli and the other politiques who have ruined the world with this false Reason of State’, Ribadeneyra focuses his argument on the charge that they seek to make the prince ‘a consummate hypocrite’ (p. 273/522a). Indeed, they seek to make him ‘a monstrous being, composed of various forms’, so that he will appear as a sheep but be a wolf, with the face of a man and the heart of a fox; with more spots than a leopard, with laughter in his mouth and a knife in his hand, the voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau...and so on over a dense paragraph: ‘such (he concludes) is the cunning prince-hypocrite painted by Machiavelli [...]’ (pp. 273–74/p. 522a). Ribadeneyra harks back to the passage he has translated from Chapter 18 of Il principe and against it sets Sts Hippolytus and Hilary on the Antichrist as hypocrite and so proceeds to a closely woven set of biblical citations enjoining man to love and obey God with a true heart (pp. 277–79/pp. 522b–23a). Beyond that, he argues that hypocrisy and pretence give birth to perfidy, which in turn undermines the whole basis of good faith and trust on which the operations and stability of society rest. Such hypocrisy also undermines the virtues that a prince must practise, thus destroying his reputation for justice and truthfulness and indeed all the virtues essential to the preservation of States (pp. 280–81/p. 523a–b).
The concluding chapter of this opening section, while continuing the onslaught on Machiavelli, nevertheless addresses itself to a key argument found in Chapter 15 of *Il príncipe* (though the fact is not acknowledged here): that he who seeks in all respects to play the part of a good man will surely be destroyed among so many who are not good; or, in Ribadeneyra’s own words, ‘it is right that kings should consider how they will deal with other princes, when they are false friends and true enemies’ (p. 285/p. 524b).

He begins by recalling Louis XI of France’s dictum: ‘Nescit regnare qui nescit simulare’, and refers to similar utterances in Tacitus, Sallust, and Seneca’s *Thyestes*. For his own part he accepts that the Christian prince will need ‘to go armed’ among his enemies, so that among those who practise dissimulation he will need to employ some dissimulation himself; but Ribadeneyra’s immediate and continuing concern is that his prince shall be watchful how far this may lead him, lest he become a disciple of Machiavelli rather than of Christ and so do offence to God (pp. 283–85/p. 524b). He returns yet again to the advice in the same passage from *Il Príncipe* that the ruler should go against good faith, charity, humanity and religion in order to preserve his State; and again he counters this by saying that it is by practising these virtues genuinely that a prince comes to have God on his side—the God who is ‘Lord of all States’. Machiavelli’s words, he again reflects, amount to a denial that there is a God, or that he exercises his providence over kingdoms; thus God is excluded from the deliberations of government.

Pretence in matters of religion is very prejudicial both to the prince’s own conscience and also to his kingdom, since his conduct here infects the whole (p. 287/p. 525a). The same is true as regards the good faith and solemn oaths that he is obliged to observe. Nor must he tell lies, for his word ‘must be like a word of God, true, certain, constant and secure’, as Augustine, Aquinas, and the *Siete Partidas* all show. Nevertheless, Ribadeneyra reflects now, although quite briefly, on what does not constitute lying but is more properly seen as prudence.

Thus, it is not lying to remain silent about one’s deliberations and actions and keep them a close secret, even though this will cause others to be misled. Again, it is prudence rather than lying when the prince pretends not to see many things that he does see, even though (once more) this will mislead others. And it is not lying when the prince is in fact very cautious over what and whom he believes
although he lets it appear from his manner that he trusts everybody. Finally,

it is not lying (when necessity or great utility require it) to speak some words that are true in one sense even though the speaker recognizes that his hearer—because of the ambiguity of those words—may well take them in a different sense.\(^{24}\)

This is equally true of actions, since often (especially in time of war) these have to be performed with such cunning and contrivance that the enemy may well understand something other than, or even contrary to, the aim that is being sought. Again, this is not lying but prudent action in the public interest.

Here Ribadeneyra invokes the authority of ‘Dr Navarro’, that is, Martin de Azpilcueta, and his *Commentary on the Chapter 'Humanae Aures', XXII. qua.V, on the Truth of an Answer partly expressed in Speech and partly reserved in the Mind, and concerning the good and bad Art of Dissimulation*, published a decade earlier, in 1584.\(^{25}\) According to Azpilcueta, says Ribadeneyra,

there are two arts of simulation and dissimulation: the one practised by those who, without [legitimate] cause or profit lie and pretend that something is the case that is not so, or that something is not the case that is; the other is that practised by those who, without evil deceit or lying, prudently convey one thing in place of another, when necessity or utility require it.\(^{26}\)

This refers to Azpilcueta’s arguments justifying ‘mental reservation’. Central to these arguments, as Zagorin (1990, p. 170) points out, is the contention that an utterance should be judged true or false by

\(^{24}\) ‘Assí mismo no es mentira (quando la necesidad o utilidad grande lo pide) dezir algunas palabras verdaderas en un sentido, aunque crea el que las dize, que el que las oyé, por ser equivocas, las podrá tomar en diferente sentido’ (p. 289/ p. 525a).

\(^{25}\) The reference here is to Gratian’s *Decretum*, Secunda Pars, Causa XXII, Quaestio V (xi) where a distinction is made between how the ears of men (‘humanae aures’) interpret words spoken and how the judgements of God rest on understanding of the inner meaning of those words as intended by the speaker: ‘Humanae aures verba nostra talia iudicant qualia foris sonant. Divina autem iudicia talia ea audiunt qualia ex intimis proferuntur [. . .]’.

\(^{26}\) ‘Y como dize el Doctor Navarro, ay dos artes de simular y dissimular, la una de los que sin causa ni provecho mienten y fingen que ay lo que no ay, o que no ay lo que ay. La otra de los que, sin mal enano y sin mentira[,] dan a entender una cosa por otra con prudencia, quando lo pide la necesidad o utilidad’ (p. [290]/ p. 525b). See Azpilcueta, *Commentarius in cap. Humanae Aures, XXII, qua.V . . .* (Venice, 1588, vol.I, fol.223v); cited by Zagorin, 1990, p. 173.
consideration of all its parts, both those spoken and also those left unspoken, known only to the mind of the speaker—and to God. It followed from this—and from the fact that what was known to God was open to the judgement of God—that there could be legitimate as well as illegitimate simulation and dissimulation; and this, as already seen, is the position that Ribadeneyra adopts.\(^{27}\)

He does not, however, follow Azpilcueta into the complex analysis of this matter that the latter’s Commentary offers; nor does he acknowledge how difficult the arguments advanced on behalf of mental reservation could make it to distinguish the speaking of the truth from the telling of lies. Rather he leaves it that the prince must carefully guard against the danger of being led by the foregoing into accepting the substance of the ‘pestiferous doctrine of Machiavelli’, thus breaking God’s law and departing from his religion. His concluding practical injunction to his Christian Prince is that he should take ‘only a small dose’ of ‘simulation and contrived feigning’, prepared with the laws of Christianity and prudence and used only when necessity requires it. The focus and emphasis of Ribadeneyra’s moral concerns in this chapter are clear enough; but it remains open to question how satisfactorily at an intellectual level he has, in his own words, ‘disposed of this matter of pretence on the part of the prince’ and established an effective principle to guide a ruler in the pursuit of a morally good Reason of State. The question of how far, in particular, he has succeeded in setting limits to the justifying imperatives of ‘necessity’ and ‘utility’ is of all the more interest in view of their impact, already seen, on the thinking of Castillo de Bobadilla and Juan de Torres.

Although neither of Ribadeneyra’s two references to Justus Lipsius’s Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex (first published at Leiden in 1589) occurs in this part of his discussion, it is relevant to note that the same questions arise in relation to that widely esteemed work also and in particular to its treatment of the issue of ‘mixed prudence’ (Book IV, chapters xiii and xiv). Lipsius’s emphasis, in approaching this topic, is different from Ribadeneyra’s in that—in terms similar

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\(^{27}\) J.A. Fernández-Santamaria, in an illuminating study, brings out the importance of this distinction, and of the larger issue of how to relate political practice to moral and religious principle, for Spanish writers on statecraft in the period 1595–1640. His study is mostly concerned with writers after Ribadeneyra and Mariana. See Fernández-Santamaria, 1980, pp. 355–79.
to those which we have met in Fox Morcillo and others—he writes with some scorn of those who pronounce on matters of government ‘as though they found themselves in Plato’s Republic rather than in the dregs of that of Romulus’ and argue that man’s God-given reason should in no way be applied to practices of deception (Lipsius, 1589, p. 201). He asks how, in government, such a thing would be possible, for ‘among whom do we live but cunning rogues?’ These include princes, who behind their display of lion-like ferocity hide the cunning of a fox. Among foxes the prince must employ the cunning of the fox; in a world where kingdoms are overthrown by deceit and guile the prince needs to practise deceit and guile. The question is: how, and how much? Lipsius goes on to urge that the prince should ‘mix the utile and the honestum’ (this being the ‘mixed prudence’ of which he speaks): he will never, he says, accept the arguments of those who hold that the second of these should be wholly separated from the first. In the following chapter he distinguishes between ‘slight deceit’, ‘moderate deceit’, and ‘great deceit’, commending the first, tolerating the second, and condemning the third. He endeavours to mark off the one from the other in moral terms, but, as Robert Bireley (1990, p. 85) has written, ‘here more than anywhere else [in this treatise] we sense the clash between the demands of the good and the useful’. Lipsius’s attempt to give due weight to the claims of the utile along with those of the honestum ‘brought him perilously close to Machiavellianism himself’ (p. 81). The paucity of Ribadeneyra’s references to the Politicorum . . . may well be due to recognition of this. He may also have felt that Lipsius’s mockery (‘ô puri, immo ô pueri!’) of those who ask rulers to have nothing at all to do with cunning, pretence, and deception came uncomfortably close to the bone. He would certainly not have welcomed Lipsius’s remark here that the now fashionable condemnation of Machiavelli [‘Maculonus Italus’] went too far; nor would he have relished Lipsius’s constant recourse to Tacitus—first, chronologically, among Ribadeneyra’s bêtes noires.28

28 Ribadeneyra may well have been aware, in any case, that Lipsius’s work had been placed on the Roman Index in 1590 ‘until corrected’. The revised edition appeared in the year after Ribadeneyra’s own treatise came out. His references to the Politicorum . . . (II.ix and I.ix) occur at II, xiv and II, xxxiii respectively, where Ribadeneyra is arguing that the ruler should keep his judges up to the mark and that he will derive moral and religious as well as practical benefit from reading ‘ancient histories’.
Leaving now, he tells us, ‘Machiavelli and his followers’, Ribadeneyra sets about his exposition of the cardinal virtues, which will provide the structure for the rest of this Book and treatise. He begins with sixteen chapters on justice, of which he sets out an interestingly varied series of aspects. First, however, he emphasizes how fundamental justice is to human society. Again, St Augustine’s words on how a kingdom without justice is like a large-scale gang of criminals are recalled (p. 293/p. 526b); Augustine, he observes, ‘proves with the authority of Cicero and Scipio Africanus that there cannot be a society where there is not justice’. His reference here is to De civitate Dei, Book II, chapter xxi, where Augustine cites two passages from Cicero’s De república, one of these in turn quoting Scipio. He then draws on Plutarch at some length. Even here, however, Ribadeneyra feels it necessary to point out—in a passage already noted—that the justice to which some pagan rulers devoted themselves was not in fact true justice, however convincing it appeared.29

Moving on to particular aspects of justice, he begins with the conferring of honours and rewards by the ruler on his subjects. This comes within the fundamental principle of ‘giving to each his due’. The honours and riches bestowed by the prince are not his to do as he likes with: they belong to society rather than to him, and ‘prince and society [=‘república’], king and kingdom, constitute one body’ (p. 299/p. 528a). Therefore honours and riches must be conferred ‘according to reason’, not caprice, and in return for services performed for prince and society.

In doing this the ruler will have regard not for wealth and lineage but for an individual’s own virtue and deeds (p. 300/p. 528a). Expanded into the larger issue of the nature of true nobility, this becomes the theme of Chapters 6 and 7. These may seem to offer only a reworking of a commonplace topic, but such a view would do less than justice to the energy with which Ribadeneyra handles it. Thus, in Chapter 7, having recalled Juvenal’s famous dictum on the matter (‘Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus’), he soon goes on to make an eloquent and extensive rendering of the greater part of Caius Marius’s speech, in Sallust’s Bellum Iugurthinum (lxxxv,14–42), setting out his own great achievements as a low-born homo novus in contrast to the socially unprofitable self-indulgence of the nobiles. It

29 See above, p. 294, n. 22.
is an indication of the appeal of the central idea to Ribadeneyra that Sallust’s own self-distancing attitude towards the episode is wholly lost from view in the process. Sallust’s testimony is reinforced by the Oratio in Sallustum Crispum (the historian’s adopted son) attributed to Cicero, and by Seneca’s most remembered letter on the subject (Epistulae morales, XLIV); it is further confirmed by Christian writers: John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nazianzus.

Ribadeneyra nevertheless emphatically disavows any intention to suggest that ‘there is not a difference between the knight and the citizen, the nobleman and the non-noble, the rich man and the poor [. . .]’ (p. 311/p. 528b). God’s will is that there should be different ranks in earthly society as in heaven, and that not all the saints should be equal in glory or the stars in radiance. It is a matter of ‘reason and justice’ that the prince should have proper regard for the social standing of his subjects; to do so is also in the interests of his own position and the tranquillity of society. On the other hand, Ribadeneyra is keenly aware of the social benefits that will follow when those who are poor and of lowly origins can have real hopes that the prince will reward virtue and service to the commonweal even in them, while the well-born will see that to have their ancestors’ blood in their veins, without those ancestors’ virtues, is no longer enough. What Ribadeneyra’s terms here stress is the importance of recognizing and rewarding virtue and service to the commonweal—that rather than the legitimacy of social mobility. Nevertheless, he does think it right that the poor and low-born should have ‘the hope of ennobling themselves and making progress in the world [‘la esperanza de ennoblecere y de ir adelante’]’, while he has severe words for the rich and well-born who, encouraged by their prince to further ambition and greed, bleed the poor white and corrupt society as a whole by fostering an insatiable appetite for riches (pp. 300–01/p. 528a).

This whole topic is rounded off in Chapter 8, where three points are made: men—as Tacitus noted—are less inclined to gratitude than to vengeance; princes should seek out, among the self-promoting, those who truly deserve reward; they must also let it be seen that it is they themselves who bestow favours and rewards, so that the gratitude of the recipients goes to them rather than to their ministers and privados (pp. 317–18/p. 532a).

Chapters 9–11 are concerned with the prince’s duty to respect and promote the material well-being of his subjects. Thus, he must
respect their property and must not oppress them with taxes. To that end he will avoid so far as possible borrowing money at interest, since that increases his indebtedness and financial needs; likewise he will try to prevent tax revenues from being swallowed up by rapacious officials in the process of collection. He will also strive to ensure that the tax burden is distributed equitably, with those paying most who are best able to do so. Ribadeneyra is especially concerned that the poor and needy should not be oppressed, 'as they commonly are', having no one to look after them. As to promoting the material prosperity of his realm, the prince must in the first place show favour to the peasants who till the land and 'are the foundation and nerve of the whole of society' (p. 342/p. 537b). He must similarly encourage agriculture as such—of which 'Cicero, Virgil, Horace and other grave authors speak such marvels'. All the land that can be cultivated should be. More briefly Ribadeneyra urges the prince to favour traders and merchants as well, since by their activities what is superfluous in a kingdom is removed and what is necessary is supplied and different nations communicate with each other. On this point he strikes a very different note from that characteristic of Book I:

By means of navigation it seems that the whole world becomes like a well-stocked town square and fair, and that all enjoy all the things in it, and new territories are discovered, and new ways of life and kingdoms, and [...] things wonderful and never before seen; and a man in his own kingdom is like an inhabitant and citizen of the whole world.30

He has already spoken briefly (pp. 338–39/p. 537a) of the value of the treasure fleets from the New World and the need to ensure their protection from the enemy. Now he warns the prince against permitting the entry into his kingdom of unnecessary and expensive things from abroad merely for the sake of pleasure. Such things make men soft and effeminate, undermine morals, and drain away the kingdom's wealth.

These chapters are also of interest in a different way, in that Bodin, who hitherto has been so heavily attacked as chief among

30 'Y por medio de la navegación parece que todo el mundo se haze como una plaça y feria abundantissima, y que gozan todos de quantas cosas ay en él: y se descuben nuevas provincias, y diversas costumbres de gentes, y Reynos, y [...] cosas admirables y nunca vistas, y estando un hombre en su Reyno, es como un morador y ciudadano del universo' (pp. 343–44/p. 538a).
the *politiques*, is here, without comment or explanation, drawn on as an important authority whose testimony gives weight to Ribadeneyra’s own arguments. Thus, in Chapter 9, on so important a matter as the distinction between a true king and a tyrant, the long rhetorical elaboration of the topic is a close rendering of Bodin’s text in Book II, chapter iv of his *Six Livres* . . . (the source in this case being indicated by no more than an initial marginal reference). Yet Ribadeneyra concludes the passage with words suggesting that the tyrant is the kind of ruler whom the *politiques* collectively advocate.  

In Chapter 10, and now with due acknowledgement, Ribadeneyra follows Bodin (Book VI, chapter ii) in his account of the harm done by armies of tax-gatherers and by the borrowing of large sums of money at interest.

This brings Ribadeneyra to justice as concerned with the punishment of malefactors. The prince’s particular duty in this is to select good and just judges and keep a vigilant eye on their performance in office. Good judges will be men of moral courage and integrity, neither fearing the rich and powerful nor accepting bribes, impartial as to both friend and enemy. However, where the application of the law is doubtful, judges should incline in favour of the poor and weak and lowly. In general they should tend to mercy rather than the rigour of the law . . . except where the crime is against the honour of God and the well-being of religion; for here, lest society be infected, exemplary punishment is called for. Since judges must apply laws to particular circumstances, they need to be men of great experience and judgement, with a proper respect for the sense of the law and the intention of the law-maker, both of which can be subverted by over-ingenious interpretation. Judges who twist the rod of justice must be severely punished.

A further three chapters stress, with many illustrations both pagan and Christian, that justice requires the prince to keep his word and that God will punish him if he does not. Machiavelli, as Ribadeneyra again recalls, teaches otherwise, and the *politiques* do as he teaches; but the Christian prince, having carefully considered first what he is to say and to promise and to swear, will keep his word steadfastly. In so doing, he will become all the more highly esteemed.

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31 'Esta es la diferencia del Rey y del tyrano, del justo y Christiano Principe, de quien nosotros hablamos, y del violento e injusto, de quien tratan los politicos' (pp. 322–23/p. 333a).
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

prosperous, feared and obeyed, and thus ‘preserve his state’ (pp. 362–63/p. 542b).

Like his judges, the prince must be inclined to temper justice with mercy, for without mercy justice becomes cruelty (Chapters 18–19). Ribadeneyra recalls the same verse from Psalm 85 [Vg.Ps.84] as Cerdán de Tallada took for his epigraph: ‘Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other’. The ruler who remembers this is loved by his people, whereas severe and rigorous princes arouse hatred and place themselves in peril. Here Ribadeneyra, following Battista Fregoso’s De dictis factisque memoria-bilibus collectanea and Jacques de Meyer’s Annales rerum flandricarum, recalls, as a notable example, how the city of Ghent was driven to revolt by Louis de Mâle in 1379.

Finally, according to the old schema, it belongs to justice to display liberality and magnificientia (Chapter 20). This must be done ‘according to the laws of reason and with regard to all the circumstances that must be considered for a deed to be virtuous’: what and how and to whom? (pp. 389–90/pp. 548b–49a). Liberality will most properly be displayed in relieving the needs of the poor and affording help in times of public calamity. In this way the prince shows himself to be the father of all his people.

Ribadeneyra devotes only two chapters (in contrast to Torres’s twelve Books) to the next of the cardinal virtues—temperance—but makes clear its importance not only to the prince’s rule but also for the well-being of society at large (Chapters 21–22). The reading of histories shows, as Ribadeneyra claims, that the fall of republics and great empires most often had its roots in self-indulgence and the softness that it fosters. He cites passages from Livy and Valerius Maximus on how the fighting quality of Hannibal’s army was undermined by the winter-quarters delights of Capua. In the present day, contact between nations means that the one easily catches the vices of the other. The prince must therefore be zealous in cutting back the various forms of self-indulgence and display that his subjects seek. The condition of contemporary society is so far gone in this direction that the example set by temperance in the prince becomes all the more valuable.

The eleven chapters now given to the virtue of prudence emphasize Ribadeneyra’s acceptance of the view that this is the ‘guide and mistress’ of all the virtues in the Christian prince (p. 405/p. 552b). It must therefore be diligently sought, primarily from God but also
by the cultivation of the virtues generally; it will be learnt from the moral sciences that teach a man how to govern himself, his family, and society, and from the study of history. But the most valuable source of prudence, after God, is to be found with wise, faithful and zealous counsellors, committed to the prince’s service and the public good (pp. 406–08/552b–53a). The prince needs advice both as an individual man and as a ‘public person’ with all the responsibilities of office. To be known to seek and follow advice adds to his own reputation as a ruler and gives authority and weight to his laws and mandates. Here Ribadeneyra recalls with approval the ‘Digna vox’ text from Justinian’s Code, stating that, although the emperor is the source of all law, he should nevertheless conduct his actions according to the prescriptions of the law (p. 415/p. 554b).

As to the qualities requisite in counsellors, Ribadeneyra especially favours the three-fold formulation of Gregory of Nazianzus: knowledge and experience of affairs; ‘charity’ towards the prince—that is, a genuine desire to serve him without regard to self-interest; and a tongue not silenced by either personal calculation or the prince’s unwillingness to listen (p. 419/p. 555b). As regards the kinds of matter for which knowledge and experience are needed, Ribadeneyra follows the same scheme as we have found in Furió Ceriol’s set of councils and traced back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (see above, p. 95).

Advice, however much pondered, will fail if God is not brought into it; advice given against God’s laws will return upon the counsellor’s head (p. 428/pp. 557b–58a). The wise counsellor will guard against excessive confidence in his own prudence or the favour he enjoys with the prince; for the wheel of fortune is always ready to turn, and ‘the only way to hold it still is to know it for what it is, not to entrust oneself to it, and to do what a man must before God’ (pp. 430–31/p. 558b). Here Ribadeneyra recalls the warning examples of Álvaro de Luna, Cardinal Wolsey, and Thomas Cromwell. On the other side of the relationship, the prince will guard against flatterers (whose antics Ribadeneyra vividly describes) and distinguish carefully between the true friend and the false. Here he recalls Patrizi’s De regno (IV,ii).

At the start of his discussion of this virtue, Ribadeneyra stresses that the prince’s prudence must be ‘true prudence and not that which only appears so; Christian and not that of the politiques; solid virtue and not the astuteness of deceit’ (p. 406/p. 552b). He returns to this in the two wide-ranging chapters that bring the substance of this
part of his treatise to a conclusion. The law of God must be the prince’s first and closest counsellor (pp. 446–47/p. 562a); and where it is not clear whether a given matter conforms or not to that law, prudence itself indicates that the prince should consult theologians and others in the Church before taking things further (p. 447/p. 562b). Prudence will also help him to distinguish genuine from merely apparent utility. Like others whom we have seen, Ribadeneyra recalls and adopts Cicero’s contention in the De officiis that true utility cannot lie in that which is contrary to virtue.

Nevertheless, these two chapters, more than any so far, encourage the prince to take account of the facts of politics and power. Thus, it is ‘a rule of prudence’ for him to make himself familiar with the characteristics, dispositions and situations (‘las propiedades, humores y condiciones’) of the different nations that he is to govern, so that he will know how best to treat each, whether with severity or mildness. Failure to do this will land him in difficulty and danger. It is also a matter of prudence for the prince to give contentment to his peoples, especially at the start of his reign, even in matters that are morally questionable or not in themselves reasonable, lest he earn his subjects’ hatred rather than their love (pp. 449–50/p. 562b). To act thus is to display a proper regard for ‘the circumstances of the time’: without this, things become difficult and even impossible which, with the advantage of circumstance, are easy and straightforward. Such sensitivity in this respect is appropriate in a world where ‘opportunity flies and flees’, where changeability characterizes all human affairs, and where ‘nothing can be regarded as certain and sure except what we hold in our hands’ (p. 451/p. 563a). A regard for circumstances and situations (‘la coyuntura y sazón’) will lead the prince to overlook certain matters for the present, however deserving of punishment, and leave them for action later, lest he cause ‘great noise and scandal’ (p. 452/p. 563b). It is important that he should foresee evils when still far off and remedy them before they arrive rather than afterwards. In governing, he will always aim at peace, but must do so in such a fashion as to avoid becoming slack or careless thereby; so here too he will exercise foresight, ensuring readiness for war in time of peace. Such foresight, says Ribadeneyra, is ‘the most excellent part of prudence’. This same virtue teaches him to measure his own strength against that of his enemy, and to calculate difficulties and dangers, before committing himself to an undertaking from which, according to the laws of prudence, he can-
not expect to emerge successfully (p. 454/p. 564a). Beyond that, when the prince finds himself in conflict with another ruler, prudence requires him to consider carefully the natural disposition of his opponent, along with his counsellors and ministers; for whereas consideration of the latter’s strength indicates what he is capable of doing, the taking of these other matters into account enables the prince to assess what his opponent is likely to do (p. 455/p. 564b).

Offering yet further prudential counsels in the following chapter, Ribadeneyra again warns the prince not to drive his subjects to desperation and possible revolt (p. 457/p. 564b). This emphasizes further what will already be obvious: the extent to which Ribadeneyra’s view of the circumstances in which a ruler governs, and of the political and military needs involved in those circumstances, has been marked by his reading of Machiavelli’s *Il principe*, despite his hostility towards this work. Its impact here is, of course, less radical than in the case of Furió Ceriol. Ribadeneyra is eager to insist on fundamental religious and moral principles which Furió programmatically excludes from his own discussion, and this sets firm conceptual limits to the scope of political empiricism. Nevertheless, the impress of Machiavelli’s reflexions on Ribadeneyra’s treatment of princely prudence remains strongly marked, and it perhaps helps to explain why he does not address himself to the question of how, or how far, in given cases his fundamental attachment to principle and his recognition of the circumstantial realities of political rule can be reconciled; nor does he reflect on the issue in general terms.

Finally, Ribadeneyra comes to the virtue of fortitude: ‘the seal and guard’ of all the virtues (p. 468/p. 567a). His first seven chapters here are an extended refutation of a passage (which he quotes) from Machiavelli’s *Discorsi* (Book II, chapter ii), where it is argued that the Christian religion has fostered a disposition to accept suffering rather than to perform valorous deeds. Thus it ‘has made the world weak and given it over as a prey to wicked men, who can safely handle it as they wish’. Ribadeneyra’s immediate response is that what Machiavelli calls fortitude is nothing but ‘a barbarous and inhuman ferocity’ (p. 471/p. 567b). He recalls Cicero’s contention [De

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32 ‘E se la religione nostra richiede che tu abbi in te forza, vuole che tu sia atto a patire più che a fare una cosa forte. Questo modo di vivere adunque pare che abbi renduto il mondo debole, e datolo in preda agli uomini sclerati, i quali sicuramente lo possono maneggiare [...]’ (Machiavelli, 1982, p. 252).
officiis, I, 62–63] that fortitude is inseparable from a concern with justice and the common good, and alongside him sets Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. To this he adds the argument—based on the Book of Job, the Psalms, and Jeremiah—that human fortitude rests on and derives from God’s own strength. For that reason the Christian must necessarily have more of fortitude than the pagan; indeed, no pagan could ever possess true fortitude. Here (as again later, at pp. 491–92/ p. 572b), Ribadeneyra refers back to his argument in the opening chapter of this Second Book. The Christian’s valour is all the greater for his knowing that its reward is to be found in eternal life and the God who bestows this virtue (pp. 478–79/p. 569a–b). As to the character of fortitude itself, Ribadeneyra follows Aristotle (Ethics, III,ix) and Aquinas (S.T., II, ii, qu.123, art.6) in seeing this as essentially two-fold—active and passive, initiating exploits and withstanding situations—and in judging its second mode to be superior to the first (p. 480/p. 569b). Later, in terms taken from Cicero’s De officiis [I, 66], he recognizes the performance of arduous and dangerous deeds as a characteristic aspect of this virtue (pp. 489–90/p. 572a); but it comes second here to indifference to outward circumstances, for both Cicero and Ribadeneyra. Proverbs 16.32 has already been recalled: he who is long-suffering is better than the mighty [‘Melior est patiens viro forti’] and he who rules his spirit better than he who takes a city. But, supremely, fortitude is displayed in the resoluteness with which a man conquers himself—as, for example, in forgiving an enemy. Ribadeneyra stresses this point with a lengthy (and heavily rewritten) passage from Cicero’s Pro Marcello [6–8]. We have already noted this same emphasis in Juan de Torres.

This does not stop Ribadeneyra from devoting a whole chapter (Chapter 38) to enumerating in triumphant tones soldiers and warriors across the centuries whose ‘courage and felicity’ were rooted in God. From recent times he cites the examples of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, ‘el Gran Capitán’; Charles V, victor over the Turk at Vienna; Christopher Columbus; Hernán Cortés, conqueror of Mexico; and Afonso de Albuquerque, founder of the Portuguese empire in the East.

We have seen how Ribadeneyra warns against the evils of self-indulgence when writing of temperance. This theme is taken up again now that he argues that the possession of fortitude is largely a matter of early training (Chapter 39). On this one issue, as he acknowledges, Machiavelli—amidst so much that is wrong in the same chapter
of the *Discorsi*—is right. ‘It was with sobriety and moderation’—writes Ribadeneyra—‘that all great monarchies and empires were founded and grew and were sustained, and it was through immoderation and self-indulgence that they were lost’.33 He recalls in particular the example of the Roman Empire, cites Horace and Quintilian on the subject, and remembers the pithy conclusion of Pliny the Elder reflecting on how the Romans had acquired the corrupt ways of those whom they had conquered: ‘Vincendo, victi sumus’. The Christian religion, he argues, is opposed to such softness, preaching ‘toughness, simplicity of living [pobreza’], temperance, labour, and the other virtues with which fortitude is engendered and grows and comes to perfection’ (p. 510/p. 576b). The prince who wishes ‘to preserve his state’ will pay heed to this.

There is a final suggestion in Machiavelli’s remarks on the effects of the Christian religion that Ribadeneyra picks out for attack: that the world which it hands over as prey to wicked men, to do with as they wish, is directed by chance and not by God’s providence (p. 512/p. 577a; also p. 521/p. 579a). This, says Ribadeneyra, is blasphemy. God bestows kingdoms on rulers and rulers on kingdoms. It is true that rulers are sometimes monstrously wicked men who ill-treat their subjects, like Attila the Hun and Tamberlaine the Great; but divine providence (Ribadeneyra recalls the *De civitate Dei*, V, xxii here) is to be seen in punishment as well as in blessing. Punishment is a necessary element of human society. In terms remote from the Christian utopianism of Felipe de la Torre and Cerdán de Tallada’s opening chapters but strikingly similar to Castillo de Bobadilla’s [see above, pp. 171], he writes that

in a well-governed city there have to be not only judges, governors, knights, citizens, and public officers, but also constables, executioners, hangmen, and torturers. Not only must there be temples, palaces, public squares and streets but also prisons, cells, dungeons, and chains; for without them, life in society would be impossible.34

33 ‘Todas las grandes Monarchías e Imperios se fundaron, y aumentaron, y conservaron con sobriedad y templanza, y se perdieron por la destemplanza y regalo’ (p. 506/p. 575b).

34 ‘En una ciudad bien governada no solamente ha de aver juezes, Governadores, Cavalleros, Ciudadanos, y oficiales, sino también Alguaziles, sayones, Verdugos y atormentadores; ni solamente ha de aver Templos, Palacios, plaças y calles públicas, sino también cárcellos, mazmorras, calaboces, y prisiones, sin las cuales no se podría bivir en la República’ (pp. 515–16/pp. 577b–78a).
God’s justice is seen no less in his punishment of the wicked in hell than it is in his mercy on those received into heaven; and his goodness is seen no less when he punishes men with cruel and wicked rulers than when he bestows on them rulers displaying virtue and moderation (p. 516/p. 578a).

This discussion of fortitude ends with three chapters (Chapters 41–43) on the subject of war—where, above all, the Christian prince displays this virtue. While he must aim at peace, and carefully consider the justness of his cause before going to war, the fact remains that ‘often a good peace cannot be achieved or preserved without a good war’ (p. 522/p. 579a). Furthermore, God’s providence is notably displayed in armies and battles and the victories that he grants (p. 523/p. 579b). Chapter 42 enumerates ‘miraculous’ victories taken from across the centuries, down to the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. God would have similarly granted Catholics miraculous victories over the heretics of Germany, France, and the Low Countries—‘had we but known how to take advantage of them’ (p. 535/p. 582a). It follows that the prince must have high regard for the art of war and bestow great favours on those who fight; for arms and good soldiers are society’s protectors, the nerves of kingdoms and the safety of kings (p. 537/p. 582a). Ribadeneyra recalls in particular the soldiers and sailors who ‘armed with fortitude and constancy’ have discovered and conquered the New World, and quotes in that regard from Cicero’s praise of the military art which had subjected nations to Rome and protected the arts of peace [Pro Murena, 22]. Praise of the military art is also found, Ribadeneyra tells us, in Plato, Aristotle, the Doctors of the Church and the Scriptures; he undertakes no theoretical justification of it himself. His concerns are of a more practical kind: soldiers must be kept under firm discipline; but such discipline, if it is to be successful, must be accompanied by good pay. Therefore the prince must deal severely with any minister who cheats soldiers of the funds provided for them. Beyond that, ‘knights, nobles and vassals’ must train for war in time of peace, as the Romans did when their republic flourished, and likewise the Spartans (pp. 544–45/p. 584a). It is of the greatest value if the prince himself sets an example in these things. Ribadeneyra refers in this passage to Jerome and Vegetius, but not to Machiavelli.

Summarizing now the argument of this whole work in his concluding chapter, Ribadeneyra speaks, in an ancient phrase, of having set out here a ‘royal highway’ (p. 556/p. 586b) for the prince
to follow; and he continues with a rendering of the same verses from Psalm 2 as Felipe de la Torre had translated and made the basis for his own concluding chapter. Thus they both close with a statement of the highly providentialist view of Christian kingship that they share. In other respects, however, the differences between them—differences of preoccupation, mood and tone—are much more marked than resemblances. Whereas de la Torre is largely content with a statement—a deeply felt one—of biblical Christian utopianism (with strongly reformist implications as regards the character of the Church of his time), Ribadeneyra confronts the world of secular government and power in the name of Roman Catholicism. More particularly, he writes in defence of the essential connexion that he holds properly to exist between the exercise of power by rulers and the received tradition of ethical thought deriving from both Judaeo-Christian and Classical sources (despite his theoretical difficulties over the validity of the latter). The powerful polemical thrust of his treatise results from his sense of the threat to this whole position represented, on the one hand, by the divisions and conflicts arising from the Reformation and, on the other, by the various writings of Machiavelli and the *politiques*.

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We noted earlier (see above, p. 280, n. 3) that Ribadeneyra seems to have made little specific use of Botero’s *Della ragion di stato* in seeking to rescue the notion of Reason of State from the *politiques* and Machiavelli, and that his one reference to the work comes where he quotes or adapts passages from Book I, chapter xx (‘Del liberare i bisognosi della miseria’, this being a function of ‘liberalità’). The fact that this is the sole reference to Botero in a work where source-references abound suggests *prima facie* that Ribadeneyra’s debt here was a very limited one. However, Robert Bireley, in the chapter devoted to Ribadeneyra’s treatise in his *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, sees it as something larger. In his view, the *Tratado del príncipe cristiano* is ‘a vehicle for restating ideas of Botero’ (p. 111) on economic matters; it thereby establishes Ribadeneyra’s claim to be regarded as the first of the Spanish *arbitristas*. This he picks out as one of two points in Ribadeneyra’s treatise deserving special mention (p. 134).

The interest of Ribadeneyra’s observations on economic matters is not in question, whether in the immediate context of this treatise
or as seen in larger perspectives—backwards to Fox Morcillo, Azpilcueta and Ortiz, and forwards to Mariana and González de Cellorigo, very soon, and thereafter to the seventeenth-century arbitristas at large. As regards Botero, if Ribadeneyra was a ‘channel’ (Bireley, p. 134) for his ideas, it was a very restricting one. The interest that Ribadeneyra brings to these things is not so much technical as moral, and his discussion of them is much briefer and more limited in scope than Botero’s. Thus he does not discuss, as Botero does, questions of public finance, the encouragement of industry, the increase of the wealth of a state, and the increase of its population as a means to that end. Ribadeneyra’s primary concern is with agriculture seen as the basis of society and with commerce seen as a means of connecting supply and need between different lands. In so far as he speaks of tax-ation policy and practice, his intellectual debt (acknowledged to some extent) is to Bodin, as we have seen, and claims on behalf of Botero here need to take that into account.

The second point picked out by Bireley as deserving special attention—in fact as the more important of the two—is Ribadeneyra’s ‘acceptance of religious toleration; here he was a reluctant pioneer led to his advance by his concern for utility’ (p. 134). In this matter Ribadeneyra ‘took a decisive new turn, to which he was led by his pragmatic approach. […] Civil peace with religious toleration was to be preferred to the unrest stirred up by further efforts to enforce religious unity’ (p. 121). Thus, Bireley claims, ‘without apparently realizing it, he had accepted essential elements of Bodin’s and Lipsius’s position’.35

This, I suggest, reverses Ribadeneyra’s own emphasis in the crucial chapter on this issue (Bk.I, ch.xxvi) from which Bireley quotes his key evidence. As we have already noted (see above, pp. 287–89), Ribadeneyra argues there in the most vigorous terms against toler-ation and in favour of the religious coercion of dissidents. He twice rejects Bodin’s argument that, while religious unity is a desideratum, a ruler should seek to bring his subjects to it by the persuasion of his own example and not by the punishing of heretics. Ribadeneyra sides rather with Alonso de Castro and his De iusta haereticorum puni-tione, to which he refers, contending that the employment of gentle

35 Bodin’s discussion of the issue has already been noted; for Lipsius’s, see Politicorum . . . libri sex, IV, iii–iv.
means in dealing with heretics usually acts only as a poison by which they are rendered more obdurate (p. 174/p. 498b).

It is true that, in the midst of this (as, again, we have already seen) Ribadeneyra argues that the prince should not proceed against heretics without having regard to his kingdom’s religious situation as a whole. When all or most of the kingdom consists of heretics, then ‘Christian prudence teaches one to pretend [‘simular’] in order not to do more harm than good’. Then the ruler should proceed little by little, seeking to win his subjects over (p. 176/p. 499a). But this is essentially a matter of prudential calculation relevant to a specific and limited situation. There is no larger recognition of the benefits of religious toleration as a settled policy—as Ribadeneyra’s renewed attack here on Bodin now emphasizes. It seems unwise, therefore, to pick out this very limited section of his argument at this point as one of the most noteworthy features of his treatise when so large a section of it argues so strongly in the opposite direction.

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Ribadeneyra’s declared aim in this treatise, as we have seen, was to describe and argue for ‘true’ Reason of State against the ‘false’ sort advocated by Machiavelli and the politiques. Our examination of his work suggests that his zeal in the enterprise was greater than the intellectual success that he achieved—greater than that with which he has on a number of occasions been credited.

Against the politiques’ arguments in favour of religious toleration his response had at least the strength of a coherently stated position that drew on centuries-old assumptions, principles and convictions. In replying to Machiavelli he was clearly in more intellectual difficulty, even though he was again reacting in the name of the traditional understanding of kingship: the tradition according to which the world is directed by God’s providence and subject to his judgement. In this setting the Christian ruler earns divine favour and protection by a trusting obedience to God and his law, by honouring and obeying his Church, and by practising genuine virtues. The urgency of Ribadeneyra’s desire to reassert this view is seen in the overall shape of his treatise, in its strongly affirmative tone, and in its polemical stance. It is also seen in the closeness of his engagement with Machiavelli. However, that engagement, while bearing its own witness to his sense of the importance of what Machiavelli had written
and reinforcing his eagerness to repudiate that, also deeply marked Ribadeneyra’s own view of princely rule in some respects—his view of the world of power and politics in which the ruler inescapably has to act.

This is, of course, seen most obviously in the way in which Ribadeneyra addresses himself to what is both conceptually and practically at the heart of the notion of ‘true’ Reason of State and the problems associated with it: that is, the point of contact where religious and moral principles and empirical fact become involved in each other. The difficulties that Ribadeneyra faced here are especially well indicated by the fact that, in a chapter devoted to repudiating Chapter 18 of Il principe (where Machiavelli argues that a ruler must be ready not to observe good faith in his dealings), he was glad to resort to Azpilcueta’s defence of the principle and practice of mental reservation—a defence that is itself highly problematical in moral terms.

The overall effect produced by this critically important chapter (and by much else in the treatise) is that, while Ribadeneyra was powerful in erudition, affirmation, and denunciation, he failed to develop an analytical argument of the scope, detail and cogency that would be needed to establish, in at least a persuasive fashion, the intellectual claims that he was anxious to make on behalf of ‘true’ Reason of State.

In broader terms, the problem that Ribadeneyra faced in writing this treatise was that of language: the language which it is appropriate to employ in discussing the purposes and operations of government and the aims and values of society at large. Especially because of its intensely engagé nature, this work leaves the reader acutely aware of a two-fold issue: first, the question of the conceptual appropriateness and practical usefulness of employing a discourse derived on the one hand from the Bible and on the other from the Graeco-Roman tradition of ethical thought; secondly, the question of how this Graeco-Roman tradition, centred on the four cardinal virtues, is to be related to, and validated in respect of, the biblical one and the specifically Christian paradigm of the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. These are issues that have repeatedly presented themselves from the outset of this study; but Ribadeneyra’s treatise, despite or because of its strongly assertive character, brings them—though he is little inclined to contemplate the fact—to a particularly urgent point of crisis.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

JUAN DE MARIANA

Mariana’s treatise *De rege* has a markedly different intellectual style from that of either Ribadeneyra or Juan de Torres. The argument is not structured on the paradigm of the four cardinal virtues (although certain of these are considered in Book III). Topics and themes tend to recur at different points in the work. Arguments and assertions are generally not bolstered with long sequences of quotations and illustrations; in fact Mariana gives relatively few names of writers whom he has followed or from whom he has borrowed, and for the most part is content to speak in his own name. In doing so he displays little of the religiously motivated animus that is so manifest in Ribadeneyra. He says little about the Protestants and, in alluding to those of Jewish origins in the Spain of his time, displays—as we shall see—a degree of understanding for their social situation wholly absent from his colleague’s remarks. Nor does his own treatise voice hostility towards Machiavelli or the *politiques*. What he owes to them will be considered later.

Mariana’s areas of interest, and the emphases of his treatise, are likewise distinct, in many respects, from those of his two fellow Jesuits. Thus, he says little about Divine Providence and its operation in the affairs of rulers; therefore he does not—as Ribadeneyra does—see it as the king’s first duty to base his conduct on trust in that Providence rather than on human calculation. Again, he says little about the religious attitudes at large requisite in the king, whether in terms of public ideology or personal dispositions. With Torres he shares an interest in the education of the prince that finds no place in Ribadeneyra’s treatise; on the other hand he displays a still greater interest than Ribadeneyra does in the administrative aspect of government, in economics, agriculture, and in ways in which the poor and needy can and should be helped. Beyond that, Mariana makes manifest at the outset an interest in issues of political theory that can be compared, among the treatises studied here, only with that found in Castillo de Bobadilla’s *Política para corregidores*.

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In Book I Mariana devotes chapters to topics that had featured over
the centuries in treatises *de regimine principum*; that monarchy is the
form of rule to be preferred over all others; that a king and a tyrant
are contrary to each other in a wide range of respects. Here, how-
ever, these topics are set in a larger discussion of issues of political
theory: the origins of political society and of kingly authority and
power; the limits that those origins set to the latter; rights of kingly
succession; the respective authority of rulers and subjects; the right
of subjects in certain situations to remove and replace their rulers,
even, *in extremis*, by an act of tyrannicide.

It is this aspect of the treatise—in particular Mariana’s defence of
tyrrannicide—that has received most attention from historians of poli-
tical thought, and readers of this present study are referred to these
for detailed consideration of the nature and context of the political
arguments set out in this First Book of Mariana’s *De rege*. However,
it is relevant to note here that, in this First Book, the people over
whom the king rules are seen in two contrasting ways. On the one
hand, Mariana repeatedly stresses that royal authority is something
derived from the people and, in consequence, is both limited by,
and conditional upon, that relationship. This is the basis of Mariana’s
celebrated assertion (in terms clearly recalled from Cicero’s *De officiis,*
III,32) that it can be legitimate (albeit as a last resort) even for an
individual man to remove a tyrant from human society by killing
him (p. 81/p. 484b). On the other hand, in tracing the emergence
of civil society through the establishment of laws, Mariana sees it as
a great step forward that now ‘the evil-intent of men was restrained
by the majesty [of the ruler], the arms of his attendants, the sever-
ity of laws and fear of legal tribunals, so that, fearing punishment,
individuals refrained the more readily from shameful deeds’ (p. 23/
p. 469a). Nothing is more excellent or admirable than man when
thus kept under discipline and control; but nothing is more mon-
strous and savage than he when the fear of laws and the courts is
removed (p. 22/p. 468b). Kingly majesty is the safeguard of peace
in society (p. 39/p. 473a). We are thus introduced at an early point
to a kind of discourse that becomes prominent later.

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1 The principal study of Mariana’s political thought remains that of Lewy (1960);
240–41, 272. A recent wide-ranging and stimulating study of Mariana, where the
*De rege* in various of its aspects receives extensive treatment, is that of Ferraro (1989).
In the course of arguing in favour of hereditary monarchy, Mariana seeks to strengthen his case by stressing the power of education to correct the character faults of princes: ‘with an appropriate education the moral blemishes of princes can be put right, especially in childhood; corrupt natures are often checked and turned right around by it’ (p. 43/p. 474a). In Book II he sets out in detail his thoughts on the education of the prince.

Here his range of topics is very much the one that we have found in Patrizi, Fox Morcillo and Costa, and belongs to the tradition of the humanist discussion of education. While making respectful use from time to time of Plato and Aristotle, as well as of Plutarch and Polybius among others, Mariana has special praise for Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (‘a work deserving never to be let out of princes’ hands, whether as regards its truth to history or its portrayal of the best kind of prince’). He also very frequently draws on Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria, especially its Preface and Book I.

Education plays a crucially important role in forming a child’s character for the rest of its life by exerting an influence additional to that of its natural propensities (pp. 126–31/pp. 496a–97a). Even if such education cannot entirely reform an individual’s character (Mariana is more measured now than earlier), it can at least effect some improvement (p. 133/p. 497a), and this is something not to be scorned, especially as the moral reformation of society can be achieved only through that of individuals. On contemporary Spanish society’s need to be thus reformed, Mariana writes with great vigour. Its morally corrupt ways have left it sick and prostrate. However, in terms resonant with humanist faith and reminiscent of Fox Morcillo, he places his hope for its restoration in sound learning derived from purified sources and conveyed by worthy teachers. To this end he urges that the representatives of the prince and his government should

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make careful examination of the morals and skills of those seeking to be teachers (p. 137/p. 498b), and deplores the public authorities' actual indifference to the matter. He further urges that public inspectors should have the right and duty—like the Censors of ancient times, as he argues—to remonstrate privately with parents careless of their sons' education and to punish, and even shut up, children who will not be taught. As Fox Morcillo had done, he speaks of the failure of the higher clergy to concern themselves with such issues and contrasts with this the admirable service performed by Benedictines of former times in making schools of their monasteries for the education of the young (p. 138/p. 499a).

Turning now to more detailed matters, he takes up the old topic of the importance of choosing wet-nurses with careful attention to their health and character and deplores the unwillingness of Spanish ladies of his own time to suckle their own children, so far gone are they in their pursuit of pleasure at the expense of duty. Mariana's criticism of the moral character of contemporary Spanish society extends over successive chapters. He reaches a particularly high pitch in Chapter 4, lamenting that more money was now spent on sweetmeats and sugar in a single city than was spent in the whole of Spain 'in the time of our forebears'; and as for garments made of silk, 'oh heavens!'. To such immoderation he attributes the change that Spain has undergone in her fortunes: from the peak of greatness she has fallen into a variety of great calamities; the valour and toughness of her sons who created a vast empire have been undermined (p. 155/p. 503b). It is what happened to the Romans. We have noted similar remarks in Ribadeneyra; we shall find more here in Mariana.

The moral dangers that threaten individuals in such a society are all the greater in princes' palaces. It is therefore all the more important that the young prince's teacher should be a person 'notable for his prudence and esteemed for his erudition and for the virtues by which his princely pupil will be shaped into a man of entire uprightness' (pp. 148–49/p. 502a). Much care must be taken over the moral atmosphere in which the young man is educated; in particular, he must not be spoilt by indulgence. Mariana writes in Chapter 5—very much in the manner of Patrizi and Fox Morcillo—of the importance of physical exercise and sporting activities, for the sake of bodily health, of course, but also for toughening character, for fostering an ambition for military glory and giving the youthful prince
standing among his fellows. Lest, however, such activities make him coarse and cruel, they must be balanced by the gentler effects of music, to which Mariana devotes a whole chapter. While concerned with its dangerous tendency to soften character, he nevertheless stresses its positive value—its capacity not only to afford relaxation from life’s burdensome tasks but also to foster a perception of order at large and the concord between different parts that should characterize human society (pp. 176–79/pp. 509a–10a). This again looks back to Augustine (drawing on Cicero), whom we have found others recalling on the same point; Mariana himself recalls Plato and Aristotle.

Discipline is necessary even in the education of a prince, but his teacher must remember that excessive severity can be self-defeating. The best teaching is done with gentle words and when it is adapted to the character of the individual pupil (pp. 151–52/pp. 502b–03a). Here, clearly, Quintilian (I,iii,6) is in the background. We have noted the same concern in Costa and Torres.

The young man’s studies will rest, first, on the basis of instruction in the elements of the Christian religion and morality. Even here, though, care should be taken not to try to pour more into the vessel than it is capable of receiving all at once—as, again, Quintilian had said. Mariana stresses the moral benefits that follow from the study of letters. Now we are told that the royal tutor must be learned and eloquent, ‘the equal of the greatest philosophers, for a teacher of high reputation for learning is requisite even for the instruction of a prince who will not himself go beyond a general education [“eruditionis mediocritatem”]’ (p. 169/p. 507a), and this is what Mariana seeks for his prince. As he says later, in Chapter 8, one who bears the weight of public affairs on his shoulders must not spend long hours in the leisurely shade of literary study or fashion himself after the sophists; he should rather range over the whole sweep of the different branches of learning—Mariana speaks of the ‘circle of studies’, that is the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία—picking out the main points of each and letting regard for public benefit set limits to his studies.3 On these grounds he criticizes Alfonso the Wise—in much the same way as Juan de Torres does—for being ‘puffed up

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3 ‘Sed si orbum istarum disciplinarum ita confecerit, ut in singulis praeter modum non immoretur, summa tantum rerum capita delibet, eximum aliquid & praeclarum proculdubio existet’ (p. 183/p. 511a).
with the fame of his own learning’ (p. 184/p. 511a). More broadly, he presents a view of the values and aims of a ruler’s education that again takes us back to Patrizi, Fox Morcillo, and Costa.4

Setting limits to the prince’s scholarly pursuits does not, however, undermine the principle that study (of a suitable kind) is appropriate in princes as in others. Mariana has earlier touched on the ‘Arms versus Letters’ topic, at the end of Chapter 6, where he acknowledges that ‘especially in Spain there have been great princes who in their early years have devoted themselves but little or not at all to the cultivation of letters’ (p. 175/p. 509a). One such, in recent times, has been Ferdinand the Catholic, who gained immortal praise by expelling the Moors from all Spain—as Mariana says—and subjecting many peoples to his rule. Nevertheless, ‘had he added study to his exceptional natural endowments, he would have been much greater and still more outstanding’ (p. 175/509a). An exemplary figure here is Ferdinand’s uncle, Alfonso the Magnanimous, king of Aragon and Naples and ‘perpetual honour and ornament of the Spanish people’, who, having heard that ‘a certain Spanish monarch’ had declared the study of letters to be unfitting in a prince, observed that these were the words of an ox rather than a man. Mariana recalls that this Alfonso, even though well advanced in years, put himself into the hands of scholars ‘to be reconstituted’, and was on friendly terms with Lorenzo Valla, Antonio Beccadelli ‘Il Panormita’, and George of Trebizond. He felt deeply the death of Bartolomeo Fazio, ‘whose commentaries on Alfonso’s reign still exist.’5

The young prince will set himself to acquire the skills of a ready reader, so equipping himself in adult life to read communications for himself and thus keep them secret (p. 171/p. 507b). He will also learn to write elegantly and expertly, unlike the majority of nobly born people. This, again, is a point made by Quintilian (I,i,28), but it also brings to mind the similar, if more extensive, remarks of Costa, Castillo y de Aguayo, and Torres on the same topic. More substantially, he will be set to learn the rudiments of grammar—clearly, Latin grammar. Here Mariana is anxious that the child’s

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4 For Costa’s remarks on the ‘circle of studies’, see above pp. 133–34.
5 Mariana’s encomiastic description of Alfonso the Magnanimous here (‘Hispanae gentis lumen decusque perpetuum’) is of interest as regards the eagerness of modern historians of Spanish culture ‘to appropriate the humanistic court of Alfonso the Magnanimous as part of the cultural history of fifteenth-century Spain’ (Russell, 1967, p. 52).
mind should not be overloaded with needless rules and complexities; on the other hand he urges strongly and repeatedly that the child should be taught to write and speak Latin, so that, with translation both ways, with composition of letters, speeches and verse, and with constant practice, Latin will become for him ‘almost a native language’ (p. 174/p. 508a–b). Repeating that he does not want the young prince to give too long to study, Mariana insists that the mastery of Latin which he desires for him can readily be achieved with the practice urged here, provided that the prince is put to study in the company of other boys; for then he will be spurred on by a determination to excel among his fellows.

Mariana’s words on this last point are a paraphrase of Quintilian (I, ii, 22) and further emphasize Mariana’s debt to Renaissance pedagogical belief and practice. They also express central educational aims and values strongly characteristic of the schools of Mariana’s own Order, as set out in the Jesuit Ratio studiorum, the definitive version of which first appeared in the same year as Mariana’s own treatise. The value placed on bringing students to a ready and active mastery of Latin, by translation into and from the vernacular and otherwise, is repeatedly evident in this Scheme of Studies; so too is the value set on competition and emulation, which are a regular feature of its prescribed procedures. P.F. Grendler (1989, p. 380) remarks that ‘whereas Renaissance pedagogy, with the endorsement of Quintilian and Erasmus, strongly approved of scholastic competition, the Jesuits wove it into the very fabric of the [Jesuit] college’. Mariana never refers specifically to Jesuit pedagogical practice or purposes; however, he returns to this point in his subsequent chapter ‘On Glory’ (II, xiii), where he envisages that competitions may be of a ‘military’ as well as a literary kind. In particular, the holding of debates carefully supervised by a teacher powerfully serves to strengthen memory, impart an understanding of virtue, and foster eloquence. It also stimulates a love of renown, and this is especially relevant to the prince, ‘whose actions must above all be directed towards acquiring fame and renown for his name’ (p. 249/p. 528b). This last is a topic to which we shall return.

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6 A trial version had been published in 1586 and could therefore have been known to Mariana.

7 See Ratio atque institutio studiorum Societatis Iesu (Rome, 1606), pp. 18, 102, 131–32, 136, 141.

8 Ed.cit., pp. 88, 94–97, 106, etc.
Mariana’s specific recommendations for the young prince’s studies (pp. 171–73/pp. 506a–09a) are concerned with equipping him with a stylistic as well as a linguistic mastery of Latin. So he should read, among the Roman historians, Caesar, Sallust and Livy; and later, when he has the necessary skill, Tacitus (‘horrida oratione atque spinosa’). Poets also should be read, especially Virgil and Horace; only those should be avoided who, though of high literary quality, corrupt morals. Then there is Cicero, father of Roman eloquence and source of wise counsel for those involved in government, above all in the first of his Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem. All this owes an obvious debt to what Grendler calls the ‘new curriculum consensus’ arrived at by teachers of the humanities in Italy after the triumph of the studia humanitatis in the mid-fifteenth century (Grendler, 1989, p. 205)—a consensus in which the Ratio studiorum largely joins. In this context what is exceptional, and in stark contrast to Ribadeneyra’s position, is Mariana’s enthusiasm for Tacitus, whose value for him lies especially in the account he gives of the scheming and deception practised at princes’ courts. Here ‘as we regard the dangers and misfortunes of others, we can contemplate as in a mirror the image of our own affairs’ (p. 172/p. 508a). Neither princes nor courtiers should ever let his works out of their hands. It is true that Leonardo Bruni had included Tacitus, along with Caesar, Livy, Sallust, and Quintus Curtius, in the reading-list of Classical historians provided in his De studiis et litteris liber of the 1420s. Patrizi, while commending Caesar, Sallust, Livy and Cicero, makes no mention of him; nor does the Jesuit Ratio studiorum of 1599, though in other respects it gives the same list as Bruni.9 Here we seem to find again that independence of judgement repeatedly evident in Mariana’s work.

He shares the humanist sense of the importance of studying history, its value being expressed here yet again in the words cited times without number from Cicero’s De oratore, II,36. Therefore the prince must ever be a reader of history and learn from its examples what to imitate and what to avoid (p. 192/p. 513a–b). Again, as is fitting in an admirer of an admirer of George of Trebizond,

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9 Ed.cit., p. 122 [= ‘Regulae professoris humanitatis’, sectio I]; compare Bruni, De studiis et litteris, ch.3, in Garin, 1958, p. 158. (The special esteem expressed by Mariana for Virgil and Horace corresponds to the preferences of the Ratio studiorum (loc.cit.).)
Mariana has high esteem for the study of rhetoric, seeing it as of great importance for the prince’s relationship with his subjects. For he must not command these as slaves but address them as free men, persuading them to be zealous in the service of the common good (pp. 185–86/pp. 511b–12a). Training in the techniques of dialectic also has its importance, in that (rather than teach the prince how to imitate the chattering of the sophists) it shows him how to argue cogently and, in any matter being considered, to distinguish the true from the false, whether in the processes of argument or in questions of value. Again with humanist emphasis, Mariana points out that ‘dialectic is the foundation of eloquence’, serving the arts of persuasion (pp. 187–88/p. 512a). Once more one finds a close affinity with Costa.

Mariana is more enthusiastic about mathematics—especially geometry and arithmetic—than Torres, chiefly on the grounds of their practical usefulness to the prince, whether in peace-time or in war (pp. 189–90/p. 512a–b). In commending the study of the heavens he again has a practical regard for its relevance to navigation and agriculture, but here makes more of its capacity to lift the mind to the contemplation of God and the Divine Wisdom that gives order to the universe (pp. 190–91/p. 512b–13a). Unlike Torres and others whom we have seen, he does not—at this point at least—warn against seeking to read the future from the stars.

Early in Book II, where Mariana is about to begin his prescriptions for the young prince’s education, he ascribes to the whole complex task a purpose that is social and implicitly political in character: the winning for himself of the ‘veneration of the citizens’ over whom he will rule. ‘The prince’, he writes, ‘is placed at the peak of society so that he may appear like a god, a hero descended from heaven, superior to mortal kind’ (p. 145/p. 501a). To enhance such ‘majesty’ and gain for him the awed reverence of his subjects, the prince is customarily surrounded by royal pomp and show, and Mariana gives explicit approval to this. However, to such pomp and show must be added the moral and intellectual training that he now sets out in the chapters that follow, as we have seen.

Both Giles of Rome and Patrizi speak on occasion of the prince as one who should be like a demi-god among his subjects. However, the prominence that this idea gains from successive appearances in Mariana’s text is of a quite different order. Its political significance
for Mariana emerges most clearly in Book III; in Book II it mostly functions as an image of magnificence. It also serves to give added force to Mariana’s account of how the prince should pursue ‘glory’.

After summarizing in characteristic fashion the arguments commonly employed both for and against such a pursuit, he sets out his own position. Glory is a legitimate aim so long as it is achieved by legitimate means; that is, by the exercise of virtue and outstanding service of the respublica (p. 242/p. 526b). Glory of the sort achieved by evil deeds is altogether hollow, spurious, and fickle. But even glory of the good sort is not to be pursued as an ultimate end or good in itself, for that is forbidden by divine laws. It must be sought rather ‘by illustrious deeds directed towards God as the author of all good, on whom we must make all our purposes in life depend’ (pp. 244–45/p. 527a). So long as that principle is observed, love of celebrity should be stirred up in the hearts of all men, including princes, as a constant spur to the performing of great and notable acts (p. 245/p. 527b). Then indeed the prince’s actions ‘must be directed above all to winning celebrity for himself’ (p. 249/p. 528b), but not so as to be led in this matter by the desires and opinions of the vulgar herd.

Aquinas, in his De regno (I, viii), had said that ‘the duty of a good man is to show contempt for glory and all such temporal “goods”’. Giles of Rome (De reg. prin., I,i,9), had similarly argued that ‘it is unfitting for the King’s Majesty to set his happiness in the attainment of glory or even of fame’ (as distinct from honour and praise). It was Petrarch and his disciples, drawing above all on Cicero, who established it as a primary goal of the ruler to achieve honour, glory and fame, and to do so by the practice of virtue. As Skinner (1988b, p. 414) has written, by the end of the fourteenth century this ‘had become firmly entrenched as the leading tenet—almost the defining characteristic—of humanist political thought’. Thus one finds Patrizi arguing that, while a king should set more store by the testimony of his conscience as to things done rightly than by praise of the multitude, nevertheless, ‘just as I do not regard a man who strives avidly after praise as one to be approved of, I do not commend the man who neglects his own glory’ (De regno, IX, xx, p. 595). Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda would argue to similar effect in his De appetenda gloria (Rome, 1523). It is in this humanist tradition of thought that Mariana stands here, though in that tradition—it seems likely—as to some extent reinforced and mediated by the Jesuits. (There is a clear
resemblance between Mariana’s views on glory as a goal for human effort in the service of society and those of Castilla y de Aguayo.)

Mariana’s concern here with the prince’s ‘image’ in the eyes of his subjects appears again in what he says in his following chapter (Book II, chapter xiv) about the ruler’s religious dispositions and behaviour. While wanting him to be religious, Mariana does not him to ‘defile his majesty’ by giving credence to old women’s superstitions, seeking to discover the future by divinatory arts, and resorting to amulets and magical verses for his safety and health (p. 250/ p. 528b). There is often deception in those who display exaggerated holiness of living, and the prince should avoid it himself. He should not spend day and night in prayer and anxiety of mind. Let him not greatly care about the future; let him place his hope of salvation only in the divine help and mercy; let him seek relief for his illnesses only from professional doctors (p. 251/p. 529a). Mariana returns to the point that the prince is born for labour, not for idleness. What these labours are is largely the theme of Book III, where, turning from the broad issue of the religious, moral and intellectual formation of the prince, he sets about considering questions of government.

Although he now offers chapters on justice and prudence, he does not—as already noted—endeavour to give his discussion a comprehensive pattern in terms of the four cardinal virtues; nor does he follow a scheme of his own presenting a clear progression of related topics. Individual chapters sometimes have an ad hoc circumstantial character, as when, in Chapter 9, Mariana’s reflexions on how towns can be made more attractive with fine buildings run on into an extended and admiring account of the recently completed Escorial, or in Chapter 11 (‘On Justice’), which begins with a lengthy account of the exceptionally bad weather of the autumn of 1590, when, as he says, he was trying to finish this treatise which he had begun that summer. With the bad weather had come illnesses which affected Mariana himself and, as he recalls, carried off one who had been a companion of his in his country retreat near Talavera that summer: Juan Calderón, canon of Toledo. More broadly, this Book begins with chapters advising the prince on the selection of those through whom he will rule; it then moves on to treat of military matters; from these it turns to questions of government finance, agriculture, urban embellishment, the administration of the law, and poor relief. The final three chapters consist of one on prudence (mainly on how
a ruler should handle the unruly multitude), another on the morally
corrupting effects of the theatre (where Mariana takes up again in
vehement terms the themes of his earlier treatise on the subject),
and one stressing, finally, the link between religious unity in a given
society and social cohesiveness.

Making a start on the business of princely rule, Mariana leaves
undiscussed the structures of government, whether the councils through
which the king will govern or lines of authority and responsibility.
He is concerned rather with the individuals who hold office, and
sees the prince as presiding over a situation where those whom he
appoints—he they palace officials, ministers or others—are most
likely to be self-seeking and in some measure incompetent, corrupt,
or both. Therefore the prince must take very great care over his ap-
pointments, determinedly seeking out those qualified by character
and experience and resisting the pleadings of friends as well as the
promptings of his own personal likes and dislikes (pp. 264–66/pp.
532b–33a).

He is anxious that no one individual should hold more than one
office, not only because that is as much as any one man can pro-
perly manage but also because, when the prince distributes offices
among many, many will love him (pp. 267–68/p. 533b). Mariana
is particularly concerned about the lamentably large number of
people who ‘gnaw away at society’ by drawing large salaries for dis-
charging ‘merely imaginary’ posts. As to whether the holders of
posts should removable or not, Mariana gives arguments against
(with Plato) and for (with Aristotle) but does not offer a conclusion
of his own. What he does urge (looking back, he says, to a law of
Charlemagne) is that, at stated intervals, bishops and other men of
the first rank specially chosen should tour the kingdom and care-
fully examine the character and conduct of those charged with the
administration of justice. If this practice were restored, excellent
results would follow (pp. 269–70/p. 534a). Mariana has little confidence
in the procedure whereby, in contemporary Spain, corregidores under-
went such inquiry at the end of their terms of office, since it was
all too likely that, while being severe in their treatment of others,
they would connive with each other over this.10

Among the prince’s most important appointments are those to

10 Mariana does not make specific mention of corregidores, but his terms make the
reference clear enough.
bishoprics. We have noted earlier the Spanish Crown’s role in this matter (see above, p. 75, n. 7). Here it is necessary to note also what Mariana has written earlier, at the end of Book I, about the role of bishops in society.

He first states the principle that the doctrines, laws and rites of the Church do not come within the authority of secular rulers. It is true that things were sometimes otherwise with the sacred institutions of Old Testament times and in Classical Antiquity; however, after Christ’s coming, religious and temporal power was separated: ‘to Peter and his successors [Christ] gave the care of sacred things; to kings and princes he left that power which they had received from their predecessors’ (p. 110/p. 491a–b). That being said, Mariana argues strongly for a close and cooperative association between the two powers. The stress that he lays on this follows primarily from his sense of political and social needs, though also from his appreciation of the interests of the Church.

The cooperation that he desires will be fostered if the honours and posts of both orders of society are accessible to members of both, for then the clergy will work for the well-being of society while princes and men of rank will labour to protect the received religion, both parties being animated in this by the hope of acquiring greater honours and wealth for themselves and their kinsmen (p. 110/p. 491b). The clergy will therefore be allowed to participate in matters of State; indeed, it is from them rather than laymen such as govern towns and cities (‘urbium procuratores’) that one may hope for some remedy for the moral corruption of the present time.

In the interests of the relationship with the ruler that Mariana has in mind for the clergy, and in support of their role in society, the prince will uphold their immunities and rights; he will not allow townships and fortresses previously bestowed on churches and bishops to be taken from them; for if the authority of the clergy is weakened, ‘who will blunt the efforts of wicked men who seek to overthrow society and who make a mockery of religion?’ It is prudent to think in tranquil times of the storm to come (p. 112/p. 492a). In this passage we find Mariana expressing what is with him a characteristic view of social realities and the needs that they imply: the threat of social disorder, the breakdown of structures of authority and control, and the need to uphold and reinforce these. This preoccupation is far more prominent in Mariana’s treatise than in Ribadeneyra’s, and it finds its most powerful expression towards the end of Book III.
Meanwhile, here at the end of Book I, he argues that the wealth of churches—whether in the form of vessels heavy with gold and silver or rents or land or tithes—chiefly serves the well-being of society; for while some moderation must be observed, such wealth does much to increase the majesty of religion, on which public well-being depends; it also helps to keep the clergy within the bounds of their duties (p. 114/p. 492b). It would indeed be very fine, Mariana concedes, if respect for religion and the clergy could be won solely by holiness of living and without external show; it would also be better if the clergy expended their resources with more restraint and more fruitfully; but in the world as it is, where the priesthood is poor, religion is scorned; indeed, the morals of the clergy themselves suffer. In any case, the extravagance of the clergy is as nothing compared with that of the lay nobility. Mariana remarks in particular on how religious houses devote their modest income to care of the poor (pp. 115–16/p. 493a). In this discussion he is clearly mindful of criticism being directed against the Church’s wealth (though he does not say by whom), and he concedes that more care should be taken to ensure that charitable bequests are devoted to the purposes originally intended.

The wealth of churches also serves as a kind of sacred deposit on which, in sufficiently urgent circumstances, the ruler may draw (pp. 116–17/p. 493a). This, however, must be a last resort, a possibility that becomes legitimate only when the prince has overridden the immunities of people at large and still finds himself in desperate straits. Furthermore, the pope should be consulted and the bishops’ consent obtained. On the other hand, the latter should not make too much difficulty over the matter, for in the face of a danger affecting all, why should they expect sacrifices to be made only by others? (pp. 118–20/p. 494a). This fundamental argument is one which we have found used by Castillo de Bobadilla (see above, pp. 175–76). However, whereas he, making much play of the concept of necessity, seeks to extend and generalize the secular ruler’s rights in this regard, Mariana emphasizes their exceptional and limited nature. So he further stresses that wealth thus obtained must be spent only for the specific purpose stated, that the status quo ante must be respected once the particular crisis has passed, and that new exactions must not be made every time that the country finds itself in difficulties (p. 120/p. 494a). Of this, however, as he makes clear, he has few expectations.
His discussion in Book III of the appointment of bishops by the prince repeats a number of the main points which we have now surveyed. While Christ separated ecclesiastical and secular authority, he did not wish the clergy to have no part in the government of the people. Indeed, at all times and in all peoples, there has been a manifest desire that ministers of religion and those exercising secular power should be closely associated with each other, 'like twin members of a single body' (pp. 274–75/p. 535b). This is in the interests of both orders of society. The Church fortifies religion, binds ruler and subjects together, and fosters respect for the laws under which society lives, so that, if religion declines, all the interests of society come to ruin (p. 273/p. 535a). Members of the clergy involved in secular government will work for the public good as well as protecting the Church's rights and freedoms (p. 276/p. 535b). In such times of instability as the present ('in tanta novandi libidine, tantaque temporum labe') it has been the endeavour of bishops to prevent all things from collapsing.

On these same grounds Mariana once more argues that prelates should be allowed to enjoy wealth and land. Those are deeply mistaken, therefore, who contend (remembering the first centuries of the Church) that it would be to the general good if prelates were obliged, after the model of the Apostles, to give up riches and social pre-eminence (p. 276/p. 536a). Mariana repeats that this would diminish the standing of the clergy and leave the mass of the people less under control. Even so, if losing their wealth would make the clergy more virtuous, then perhaps they should lose it; but in fact, men and the times being as they are, this would have the opposite effect.

Enlarging on a point made in the earlier chapter, and still in the interests of social stability, Mariana proposes that princes and secular officials—both they, their sons and their kinsmen—should have ecclesiastical honours and wealth conferred on them, for then they will be better disposed towards the clergy and more inclined to protect the rights and riches of the Church (p. 277/p. 536a). Again Mariana is clearly troubled by unspecified persons hostile to the Church's wealth, arguing—as he indicates here—that it was lying idle and would be better employed meeting the financial needs of a hard-pressed society and covering the expenses of war, especially now when public funds were so short and the people weighed down with taxes.

In Mariana's view it was foolish to argue as, he says, some eminent
theologians had done, that laymen who had held high public office should as a class be excluded from ordination and ecclesiastical honours, this being on the grounds that such people neither knew how to preach nor were versed in the rites and ceremonies of the Church. These, he holds, were difficulties easily got around, and he rejects in particular the view that lawyers ("iurisconsulti") should be excluded from ecclesiastical office (p. 278/p. 536a). He invokes the authority of the Council of Trent for the counter-view that not only theologians but those learned in the law ("iurisperiti") had been deemed fit as a class to be made bishops.11

This line of argument is consistent with what has gone before. What is harder to follow is how, having taken this position, Mariana can at once go on to argue strongly for the contrary view, stressing the ways in which a theologian is better qualified to be a bishop than is a man trained in the law.

The primary duty of a bishop is to teach his flock, and theologians are usually men of more piety and religious zeal than lawyers because they are constantly dealing with divine matters and never let the Scriptures out of their hands. This is all the more important at a time when heresy threatens from France, with Britain just beyond (pp. 279–80/pp. 536b–37a). As for the lawyers, few of them, says Mariana, get ordained unless drawn to it by the attraction of a richly endowed appointment promising a sumptuous style of living. The point is reinforced by a powerful quotation from Bernard of Clairvaux’s Epistle XLII (p. 283/p. 537b). More, however, is made of another argument. If theologians often lack practical and administrative skills, lawyers will be still less equipped to grasp the discipline and character of Christian living; for being so busy with litigation and the courts, they have spent their time remote from the Scriptures, where the precepts of the Christian life are to be sought (pp. 281–82; p. 537a). How, then, shall they pass straight from the law-court to a prelacy and become masters teaching doctrine which they never studied? Shall we entrust the Church to one who is wholly unversed in sacred matters, or hand over Christian instruction to one ignorant of Christian virtue and piety? How shall he teach what

11 See Session XXII, ‘Decretum de reformatione’, ch.ii (‘Quinam ad cathedrales ecclesias assumendi’), where it is laid down that those to be made bishop should be academically qualified ‘in sacra theologia vel iure canonico’. This latter term is, of course, narrower than the corresponding one on which Mariana builds his argument.
he has never properly learnt, or lead where he has never had the
time or inclination to go himself? (p. 282; p. 537a–b).

Mariana speaks of this issue as being a much debated topic in his
own time (pp. 271, 279/pp. 534b, 536b). In this regard Ignacio
Fernández Terricabras (1994, pp. 603–04) contrasts the approaches
of Domingo de Soto, Fray Miguel de Medina and Tomás de Vitoria,
on the one hand, and of Diego de Simancas, lawyer and bishop, on
the other. Simancas declares it to be the chief duty of a bishop to
protect his flock from ‘ravening wolves, that is, from the poisoned
doctrine of impious men and heretics’, and sees the achievement of
this in terms of juridical and institutional means. However, the
Dominican Domingo de Soto explicitly rejects this view of episco-
pal office, seeing the latter as consisting above all in the feeding of
the flock with Christian doctrine. The same positive point was made
with great emphasis by the Observant Franciscan Miguel de Medina;
both he and Soto desire a bishop to be learned ‘not in both bod-
ies of law [that is, the Civil and Canon Law] but in both Testaments’.12
This, according to Fernández Terricabras (loc. cit.) was the position
that predominated in sixteenth-century Spanish discussion of the
issue. It was a topic with a good deal of history behind it. J.A. Brun-
dage (1995, p. 186) remarks that, after canon lawyers had, by the
mid-thirteenth century, come to dominate a church ‘that was becom-
ing increasingly legalistic with every passing generation’,

critics cried out repeatedly that shallow legal opportunists, not wise
spiritual giants, complacently occupied the church’s thrones of author-
ity, that students preferred to learn lawyerly legerdemain rather than
sound theology in the schools, that legalistic sophistry had supplanted
fundamental Christian values in church government.

Mariana’s only specific indication of his own reading in the matter
comes where he mentions ‘Abbot Panormitano’, that is, the canon-
ist Niccolo de’ Tudeschi (d.1435), to whom he attributes the Solomonic
view that those best qualified to govern the church were those who,
in addition to knowledge of the law, were learned in theology, or
theologians who knew ecclesiastical law (p. 284/p. 537b).

The vigour of Mariana’s own attack on the appointment of jurists
as bishops cannot be explained by the practice followed in the Spain
of his time, since Philip II, over the course of his reign, nominated
a substantially higher number of theologians than jurists (while taking

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12 See Simancas, 1575, p. 181; Medina, 1564, fol.115r; Tellechea, 1963b, pp. 172–75.
care to nominate men from the one category or the other for good reasons in a given case) (Rawlings, 1987, pp. 56–57; Fernández Terricabras, 1994, pp. 602–03, 608–09). Mariana’s lively engagement in the debate seems to relate to his taste for an energetically argumentative presentation of issues, whether or not they were bound up with actual situations in contemporary Spain; it seems to relate also to a strong personal commitment on his part to a particular view of the religious role of bishops—a view involving a clear set of values and priorities. His insistence on the primacy of preaching among a bishop’s duties corresponds to explicit statements to that effect in the Tridentine Decrees. His concern with the matter may also reflect the priorities expressed in the Jesuit Formula of the Institute and Constitutions (see O’Malley, 1993, pp. 91–92). In any case, he nowhere expresses himself more sharply in this treatise than in his account of the religious inadequacies and material self-seeking of lawyers turned prelate; but nowhere, either, does he so forcefully commit himself to what appear to be flat contradictions of argument as here and on this particular point. These are contradictions arising, it seems, from a clash in his mind between two very different perceptions of the higher clergy, relating respectively to their social function and their religious role, both of which were of the highest importance to him. The intellectual balance and restraint of his formal position here—that, all things considered and caeteris paribus, he favours the appointment of theologians rather than of lawyers as bishops (pp. 271, 283/pp. 534b, 537b)—by no means correspond to the dynamics of his discussion.

Mariana now turns, in Chapter 3, to a wider question: what is morally requisite in those to be appointed to public office generally? Granted that no wicked men of infamous reputation can ever be called to administer society, what is the case with those whose faults are much less grave and also less known? Need they be wholly ruled out? Of course, only men of spotless reputation should be chosen for ecclesiastical office, but cannot military matters be entrusted to men of valour even if they are not of the highest integrity, and likewise the lesser kind of public office? Is not professional competence enough? In the present lamentable moral climate (‘ut res habent in tanta colluvie hominum perditorum’) the prince should not be expected to inquire into the hidden faults of men before deciding whether to appoint them (p. 288/p. 539a). Nevertheless, he should consult trusted advisers; he should also give much weight to the testimony of the
people at large, who are more honest in their views than their social superiors who have private interests to pursue (pp. 290–91/p. 539b).

Appointment to public office is among the chief ways in which a prince bestows honours and rewards, and to this latter topic as a whole (which we have found considered at length by Ribadeneyra also) Mariana now devotes a chapter. His position is like Ribadeneyra’s: the structure and operation of society largely depend on rewards and punishments; rewards, being so important, must therefore be granted by the prince with more regard for an individual’s merits than for any noble blood in his veins (pp. 292–93/p. 540a). Like Ribadeneyra (and also like Juan de Torres and Castillo y de Aguayo), Mariana has harsh words for those who rest their expectations in this matter solely on claims of birth, and is eager that honours and hopes of social advancement should be within the reach of the more humbly placed members of society. Characteristically, he is more overtly concerned than Ribadeneyra with the danger of social disorder that threatens when the poor and lowly placed feel themselves to be ignored in this respect (p. 294/p. 540b); he sees the danger arising from such people as more serious than that likely to come from the rich and powerful for similar reasons.

Care over this will foster harmony and unity in society; and that in turn will contribute to the extension of the prince’s power and territories. If this, again, is a point made by Ribadeneyra, Mariana’s development of it recalls Furió Ceriol more; for Mariana urges that princely favour and reward, even of the highest kind, should not be denied to any by reason of geographical origins, whether the deserving individual be Spanish, Italian, Sicilian, or from the Low Countries (p. 295/p. 540b). Again like Furió, Mariana warns the prince not to allow ambitious men to attain high office under a false guise of religion (p. 298/p. 541b).

In one more respect, too, Mariana’s views on this theme of rewards and honours recall Furió Ceriol: that is, in his attitude towards those of Jewish origins in the context of Christian society. At no point is Mariana’s position more strikingly different from Ribadeneyra’s.

We saw earlier (p. 99 above) Furió’s remarkable declaration that, in a world where the only significant distinction to be made is that between good men and bad, ‘all the good men, whether they be Jews, Moors, Gentiles, Christians, or of another religion, belong to the same land, the same household, and are of the same blood’; and we have seen how hostility towards Jews and conversos is one of the
most marked ideological and psychological features of Ribadeneyra’s treatise. Mariana, in terms not fully explicit but nevertheless clear in meaning, refers to the situation of those of Jewish origins in the Spain of his time and their treatment by the Inquisition. The prince should not, he argues, allow whole families to be exposed to public disgrace on the basis of unreliable hearsay; nor should the stain and discredit thus incurred last forever. A term should be set to the punishment visited upon earlier generations and likewise to deprivation of social standing. Thereafter, the ‘new’ (that is, ‘New Christian’) status of ancestors should not be atoned for by punishment and infamy suffered by their descendants (p. 298; p. 541b). The implicit reference here, of course, is to the requirement of the Inquisition that the sanbenitos or penitential garments of shame required to be worn by those on whom it imposed this punishment were afterwards to be hung up in the parish churches of those concerned as a perpetual memorial. Mariana enlarges on the point in terms that have Stoic, and perhaps particularly Senecan, echoes: personal merit should outweigh disadvantages of social origins; all the families of most distinguished lineage had humble beginnings; so that, if the door to aristocratic status had been closed to plebeians, we should now have no nobility (p. 299/p. 541b). Mariana’s interest in this issue, as so often, reveals an underlying preoccupation with the dangers that threaten social order. Implicitly recalling the statutes of limpieza de sangre (or ‘purity of blood’) that had multiplied since around the mid-century, he remarks that it would perhaps be safe to exclude from public honours (he means those of public office) people thus marked by ‘ignominy’ if the latter were few in number; ‘but today, when the blood of all classes of society is so intermingled, it would be a serious and dangerous matter to rear so great a number of enemies in the country [...]’ (p. 300/p. 542a).

Mariana’s critical attitude towards the social operation of the concept of limpieza de sangre was in accord with what had been—down to the time when he was writing—the predominant position of his own Order (and of its founder). His observations on the injustice of

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13 See Kamen, 1985, pp. 122–23: ‘The declared aim of displaying these sanbenitos was therefore to publish and perpetuate the infamy of condemned persons, so that from generation to generation whole families should be penalized for the sins of their ancestors’ (since old and decaying sanbenitos were to be replaced with new ones bearing the names of the offenders).
this notion, on its effect of impoverishing society by inhibiting talented people from contributing to it, and on the capacity of this notion to foment hostility, division and conflict between different elements of society, are also at one with the attacks that would be made on limpieza de sangre in the decades following the writing of his De rege, whether in treatises (most notably that of the Dominican Agustín Salucio, of 1599) or in discussion papers, reports, and official enactments (for the most part with little effect).\textsuperscript{14} Mariana, it seems, was one of the first to adopt this position in writing.

It is only some time later, in Chapters 10 and 11, that Mariana expressly addresses himself to the subject of justice and its administration. Here he works from the particular to the general, from what is requisite in judges and their judgements to the main divisions of law and the basic function and purpose of law in society. What Mariana asks of judges and their sentencing is conventional in substance but expressed with force. Sentences must be severe but just; they must also display consistency and impartiality. Judges must be honest, with independent minds, ready to stand up to the powerful, and free of the promptings of greed. In a tone more characteristic of Ribadeneyra, Mariana recalls King Jehosaphat’s warning to his newly appointed judges: they exercised the judgement not of men but of the Lord (II Chron.19.6); that is, he comments, judges, as the Lord’s deputies on earth, must forever have before them what equity requires and will be most pleasing to God (p. 353/p. 556a). Later he warns against undue severity and speed in passing sentence (p. 363/p. 558b), but stresses still more the seriousness of leaving wickedness unpunished. He finds illustrations of the divine punishment that this brings not only in the Old Testament and the history of Ancient Greece but also in very recent times: in the defeat of the Portuguese at Alcazar-Kebir in 1578 and the defeat of the Spanish Armada a decade later (pp. 358–59/p. 557b).

In a different vein he urges that the laws be applied with straightforwardness and simplicity. Judges should not employ subtle arguments to twist and distort their true sense; nor should laws be so

\textsuperscript{14} For a valuable survey of the whole matter see Kamen, 1985, chapter 7. A. Huerga (1959, pp. 39–40) points out that the printed version of Salucio’s treatise—Discurso [. . .] acerca de la justicia y buen gobierno de España en los Estatutos de limpieza de sangre: y si conviene o no alguna limitación en ellos—was brought out clandestinely. A royal order was given that copies were to be recovered; retention of MS copies was also forbidden. See also Pérez Villanueva (1984), pp. 1037–41.
numerous as to impede the purposes of justice or too difficult to
come within the reach of the average man’s understanding (p. 352/
p. 555b). These comments recall a passage in his chapter ‘On
Magistrates’ (Book III, chapter i), where he urges that means be
found to prevent law-suits from being dragged out *ad infinitum* (p. 270;
p. 534a). The very hope of doing something about this will, he
acknowledges, seem ‘laughable’ to some. Like Cerdán de Tallada,
he laments the endless tergiversations of lawyers and makes practi-
cal suggestions for achieving the end he desires. In particular, he
proposes that a limited term be set for the duration of cases, so that
matters cannot be drawn out by such devices as the calling of wit-
nesses from remote parts of the country.

Mariana’s division of justice into three main kinds—the ‘legal’ sort,
concerned with upholding obedience to the laws, and also the com-
mutative and the distributive—is what we have found treated at
length by Fox Morcillo. But whereas he brought into his account of
justice his thoughts on public finance and economics (as Ribadeneyra
also does, although much more briefly), Mariana makes these the
matter of separate chapters.

What he stresses, in his rather brief remarks on commutative and
distributive justice, is the contribution that each makes to sustaining
and giving structure to social existence. This finds its place in a
larger and powerfully expressed assertion of the necessity and func-
tion of law in human society. His aim is ‘to prove that, when justi-
tice is lacking, it is impossible for empires, cities, or any society to
exist for long among men’ (pp. 364–65/pp. 558b–59a). To do this
he first presents a position that he will then reject. What are even
the most flourishing empires but large-scale robbery, he asks, echo-
ing Augustine. It is not only that they owe their origins to force;
they are kept in being by laws devised solely for preserving people
in untroubled possession of that which was obtained by robbery and
force of arms, so that a mere simulacrum of justice serves as a shield
to iniquity and crime (p. 365/p. 559a). In any case, it is natural
with all animate creatures to pursue self-interest at the expense of
the well-being of others, and who—it may be asked—will seek to
change that save one who wishes to tear up the foundations of his
own and everyone else’s well-being?

Clearly, this is a view of human nature that takes us back to
Mariana’s opening chapter on the origins of civil society and the
institution of kingship. Now he sets out a counter-view of justice. It
is a bond uniting the upper, lower, and middle orders of society in harmony, while equity, translated into effective laws, is that which gives structure, order, and discipline to society. Take but degree away and hark what discord follows. Without justice, virtue cannot survive; and without virtue in its members, society itself cannot exist, and the social nature of man cannot be exercised. Indeed, one who seeks to do away with respect for justice among men will destroy the very foundations of nature (p. 367/p. 559b). It is true that 'many empires owe their origin to force, their increase to crime, their spread to plunder'; it is also true, however, that even such empires must collapse if they do not impose laws to hold their citizens in check and keep them within the bounds of their duties (p. 368/p. 559b). Mariana enlarges on this in his account of 'legal justice': what can be more barbarous or cruel than man when he has not laws to obey and law-courts to fear? For if a man controls his evil impulses, it is due either to the religion that has been instilled into him or to fear of punishment. Take those things away and all will be wantonness, banditry, slaughter, and violence (pp. 368–69/p. 560a).

We thus see that underlying both contrasting parts of Mariana's argument in this chapter is the same pessimistic view of human nature as something ruthlessly and destructively self-seeking unless controlled by public authority. It is a view of things that not only takes us back to Mariana's opening chapter but appears at various points in the course of the work subsequently; it finds particularly powerful statement in the chapter 'On Prudence' near the end.

It belongs to justice to keep good faith. This leads Mariana, in Chapter 12 ('De fide'), to enlarge on the prince's need to ensure that all who serve him in palace and administration are loyal and trustworthy as well as otherwise virtuous, and to investigate carefully which individuals he can properly take into his trust, and how far (pp. 373–80/pp. 561b–63b). Before this, however, he stresses that good faith means resolutely keeping one's word, being truthful, relying on honesty rather than astuteness and deception (pp. 374–75/ p. 561a–b); and here he refers his readers back to his chapters on the appointment of public functionaries and 'On Lying'.

In treating this latter topic (in Book II, chapter x) Mariana cites in general terms the view of 'men of high intellect and reputation for prudence' who hold that the prince needs to employ much dissimulation in governing the mass of the people, needs 'to adjust himself to persons, the times, the business in hand' (p. 203/p. 516b).
Let him in all things pursue the public good and the stability of his rule, employing truth and falsehood without distinction. Mariana recalls the dictum of Louis XI of France: ‘Qui nescit simulare nescit regnare’. We have found Ribadeneyra recalling this same dictum; both refer to Tiberius’s systematic practice of deceit as presented by Tacitus (Mariana, p. 205/p. 516b; Ribadeneyra, p. 283/p. 524a). Mariana does not identify those who advocate the practice of deceit in government. For Ribadeneyra it is Machiavelli and the *politiques*; Mariana clearly has the same people in mind.

He distinguishes between these and those others who ‘more modestly’ require the prince to practise justice and the other virtues but allow him to resort to lying and deception ‘when driven by necessity’ and when strict conformity to the dictates of justice would leave the ruler exposed to danger and society exposed to calamity (p. 205/p. 516b). Here Mariana refers to Lysander’s remark (recalled more appositely by Ribadeneyra—and also by Patrizi in his *De regno* and by Justus Lipsius) that ‘where the lion’s skin will not reach, it must be patched with the fox’s’ (Plutarch, *Lives*, ‘Lysander’, VII, 4). The writers that he has in mind are those concerned with the force of necessity in human affairs—writers among whom Ribadeneyra picks out Martin de Azpilcueta (see above, pp. 297–98). Such people, Mariana notes, recall—as Ribadeneyra does—the cases of lying and deceit practised by figures in the Bible without being condemned for it.

His own position is less qualified than Ribadeneyra’s. It is true that he briefly acknowledges that a prince must cultivate a caution of manner which is described as astuteness and deception by the crowd (p. 209/p. 518b). In his chapter ‘On Prudence’ he accepts that, while it is never licit for kings to tell lies, they will need to dissemble and keep their thoughts to themselves, either to administer society better or to win the good-will of their people. A ruler needs to learn to hide his counsel and make himself pleasant even to those who seek to do him harm (pp. 399–400/p. 568b). However, these concessions are of very limited weight as compared with Mariana’s insistence that, from his earliest years, the prince must be taught to hate lying, chiefly—as put here—because it is contrary to a ruler’s dignity as a man and moral being (‘homine alienissimum’, as Cicero had said in *De officiis*). This Mariana feels very strongly. Those who practise lying will, furthermore, find themselves caught in self-betrayal
and self-defeat (pp. 207–09/pp. 517a–18a). Thus Mariana is another
who insists on the inseparability of the 'honestum' and the 'utile'.

This conviction, as stated principally in Book II, does not com-
plicate Mariana's attitude to the waging of war as presented in Book
III. He is sure, and stresses, that it is very important for the prince
to possess powerful and efficient armed forces and to be ready to
use them. Even in time of peace, the prince will never forget the
business of war if he wishes to live secure against all kinds of attack:
'In pace de bello cogitare non desistat' (p. 302; p. 542b). It is the
same point as Fox Morcillo had picked up from Chapter 14 of
Machiavelli's Il principe (though we have found a similar proposition
in Vegetius).

Mariana does not spend time arguing questions of principle. It is
the practical aspects of war that he considers at greatest length in
the two chapters (5 and 6) devoted to it, and the issue on which
he spends most time in Chapter 5 is that of finance. It will be argued,
he says, that the resources of the Treasury are inadequate to the
expenses of war, that to burden peoples with further taxes for war
purposes is harmful and destructive, that it is pointless to strike fear
into foreigners at the cost of alienating one's own people and, with
the purpose of avenging injuries inflicted by external enemies, to cre-
ate many more of them within one's own kingdom (p. 302/p. 542b).
Mariana accepts that these are real dangers to be avoided. No one—
not even the ruler—is capable of financing war by himself, espe-
cially when all officialdom is so busy getting its eager hands on
Crown revenues (pp. 303, 310/pp. 542b, 544b). How else, then, is
war to be funded?

First, soldiers must be encouraged to provide for themselves in
the course of fighting, seizing rich booty, sacking the cities of other
peoples, especially 'impious ones' (p. 304/p. 543b). Thus enriched,
they will not demand high pay or indeed any other recompense,
having a sufficiency for the time when they finish their military ser-
vice and hang up their arms. In addition, the ruler must encourage
those of his subjects with sufficient means to maintain arms and
horses according to their wealth. Practical encouragement should be
given to citizens, as a matter of policy, to gain skill in the arts of
war (pp. 304–05/p. 543a). Beyond that, 'the nations and provinces
of Spain' should be encouraged to defend their coasts at their own
expense and to invade enemy shores whenever they wished. It would
then be easier to raise a powerful fleet for a major military undertaking when this was called for. This, says Mariana, is a view that he has long held and he would like it to find acceptance as the expression of a sincere heart and an eager desire to help his native land (p. 306/p. 543b).

There are other ways in which the cost of war could be reduced. Honours and rewards should be kept for those who have really earned them and not handed out to pampered courtiers who have never seen the enemy. Well-deserving military men now past combat age could be rewarded with undemanding civilian posts and, when appropriate, with ecclesiastical revenues. Such revenues, especially those of richly endowed churches, could also well be applied to the relief and support of the wives and children of soldiers killed in action (pp. 306–09/pp. 543b–44a). The most valiant soldiers should be selected for posts in the prince’s palace. This will stimulate others to display valour under arms; it will also foster military understanding and soldierly attitudes in the prince himself (p. 307/p. 544a). Here King David is Mariana’s most admired exemplar.

His larger point is that, by such means, all should be persuaded that, the more they exert themselves in war in the service of the república, the more they will be esteemed as ‘excellent citizens’, as indeed ‘noble’, and that neither ‘defects of birth nor the infamy of forebears’ (here again Mariana is thinking of those of Jewish origins) will block the way to the highest honours and positions (p. 309/p. 544b).

Chapter 6 emphasizes two further points: first, when war breaks out, the prince himself must gird his sword and take part in the action with his army; second, his armies must be made up predominantly of his own subjects and not of foreigners (though Mariana’s position on this question is more qualified than Machiavelli’s in Il principe (p. 311/p. 545a). In each respect important advantages follow. The prince who fights with his army enhances his ‘majesty’ in the eyes of his subjects and soldiers: men then ‘venerate him as a god, as a hero superior to the mortal condition’ (p. 312/p. 545b). He also stimulates a zeal for arms and the practice of military virtue among his subjects. This in turn prevents his people from going soft and saves his empire from sinking into decline. Furthermore, when the prince constitutes his armies from his own subjects rather than from alien troops, he guards against the undermining of his position by military uprisings and the disintegration of the lands that he governs.
Mariana has in mind here the warning examples of the Frankish kings before Pépin and of the Moorish rulers of Córdoba, who stayed within their pleasure palaces and left the conduct of war to their hajibs (p. 316/p. 546a); but above all he is thinking of the decline of the Roman Empire. His own comments on this are reinforced by two lengthy passages taken from the ‘Address on Kingship’ directed to the Emperor Arcadius by Synesius of Cyrene in AD 399, when, in Mariana’s words, ‘the Roman Empire was hastening to its ruin and finally collapsed altogether, chiefly through the lack of spirit of its princes, who handed over the conduct of war to their generals’ (p. 315/p. 546a). Gibbon, drawing on the same address, remarked that ‘the court of Arcadius indulged the zeal, applauded the eloquence, and neglected the advice of Synesius’ (Decline and Fall . . ., ch.30). That advice, with its exhortation (in Mariana’s rendering) to ‘recover the Roman spirit and learn to conquer for ourselves’, he regarded as highly pertinent to Spain and its dominions in his own time. His analysis of the reasons for the decline of the Roman Empire and his sense of their significance for his own age are very similar to what we have already found in Ribadeneyra’s treatise (and earlier here in Mariana). The treatment of the topic in both works belongs to that body of writing on Spain’s declinación produced over the first three decades of the seventeenth century which has been vividly presented by J.H. Elliott (1989, pp. 250ff.).

Since Mariana is not troubled by the question whether it is legitimate for a Christian prince to wage war, he spends little time discussing the basic issue. He does say, early in Chapter 5, that he is ‘not so destitute of reason as to prefer war to peace’ (p. 303/ p. 543a), and acknowledges that war can rightly be waged only when its object is peace. War should not be sought in peace-time but rather peace in time of war. This position, as will be clear, is at odds with much else that is said, at greater length and with more emphasis, in these two chapters. In this very section of Chapter 5 Mariana’s primary concern is with the prince’s need to ensure that his troops are never allowed to be idle (lest they turn against him). Let him, therefore, contrive to make one war follow upon another, since ‘legitimate causes are never lacking’ (p. 303/p. 542b); let him

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16 Elliott (1989, pp. 247 and 251, n. 31) refers to Mariana’s similar words on this topic in the concluding chapter of his De spectaculis.
encourage soldiers to go after rich booty, by land or sea, sweeping down on the frontiers of other peoples and laying waste their cities (p. 304/p. 543a). There is no attempt to bring intellectual or moral order into this section of the discussion. What predominates is Mariana’s interest in making the armed forces self-financing and his desire to see reborn the military temper of spirit that, he claims, has almost been lost (pp. 304, 310–11/pp. 543a, 545a).

The first purpose of effective armed forces mentioned here is not, however, to fight against alien powers and prevent invasion and injury by the prince’s enemies (Mariana puts this second); it is rather to maintain control over the prince’s own subjects:

[by such forces the ruler] will be able to curb the audacity and temerity of corrupt citizens, who unfortunately abound in all countries and regions and, if they are not restrained by fear, forever seek to overthrow government and make good their own lack of things with that which is plundered from others, and to have the wherewithal to satisfy their gluttonous appetites and love of gambling—those ungovernable masters of men [...] 17

This is a view of society that recurs throughout Book III of this work especially and finds particularly powerful statement near its close, as we shall see. Meanwhile, what remains to be considered in this part of Mariana’s treatise are his thoughts on agriculture, economics, and care for the poor.

Questions of economic activity, finance and taxation were to be of concern to Mariana over a number of years, and his views on these matters attracted attention in official circles, both favourable and unfavourable. 18 In a Memorial which, Cirot suggests, dates from not later than 1606, he disclaimed any special knowledge in this field. Nevertheless, that document sets out views regarding proposed new taxation which had been sought from Mariana by the Crown, apparently on the basis of what he had written in his De rege. In this Memorial he writes that ‘as regards the difficulty confronting [the Government], I confess that I understand very little and in that book [= the De rege] I put for the most part what I found in other books

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18 For further details see Lewy (1960), pp. 28–32.
or papers [. . .].

The text of the *De rege* gives a few indications of what certain of these other sources were. Thus he refers (p. 303/ p. 550b) to an edict issued by Charlemagne and his son Louis the Pious exempting peasants who rented the land they worked from price controls on the selling of wheat in time of shortage. This was, in fact, a provision of the Synod of Frankfurt in AD 794. In his later chapter on the relief of the poor, Mariana refers (pp. 386–87/ p. 564b–65a) to the edicts of two Councils of Tours urging each town to take steps to care for its own poor, and to legislation—which he takes to be that of Charlemagne—enumerating different kinds of home for the provision of care for the needy. The distinctive terms in which he does this echo legislation brought together under the name of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious. The Carolingian texts in question were printed at Paris and Basel in the sixteenth century.

As regards taxes, Mariana is eager that these should be kept moderate; he accordingly urges the ruler to hold government revenues and expenditure in balance. A reliance on borrowing brings a burden of interest payments that grows daily. Mariana warns still more against ‘the harmful practice, on all scores to be avoided, of selling [in advance] tax revenues for a given year at a price, assigning them to wealthy financiers’ (p. 322/p. 548a). He attacks both those who

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19 ‘En lo que toca a la dificultad que se ofrece, yo confieso que de cosas semeljantes entiendo muy poco y en este libro puse por la mayor parte lo que hallé en otros libros o papeles[,] de más que no se escribió a propósito de lo que en estos tiempos corre sino años ha tocando cosas universales y que me parecían podrían servir para todas naiciones y tiempos’ (Cirot, 1917, p. 10). Later in this document Mariana refers to his chapter ‘De vectigalibus’ in the *De rege*, mentioning ‘plana 327’. This corresponds to page 327 of the first edition of that work.

20 See ‘Karoli Magni Capitularia’, 28: ‘Synodus Franconofurtensis’, art.4, in *MGH*, Legum Sectio II: ‘Capitularia regum frantorum’, ed. A. Boretius (Hannover, 1883), i, 74. (I am grateful to my colleague, Mr Patrick Wormald, for his guidance here.) The point would have been of the more interest to Mariana since a similar price control on wheat (the ‘tas del trigo’) still, as he remarks, operated in Spain. Indeed, it ‘became a permanent feature of the Crown’s economic policy from 1539’ (Elliott, 1989, pp. 228–29).

21 See ‘Ansegisi Capitularium Collectio’, II,29 in *MGH* (as in note 20), i, 420–21. The source of this legislation (and so of the terminology adopted by Mariana) was in fact the *Epitome Iuliani* of Justinian’s *Novels*. The documents in question were published at Paris in 1548 and 1588, and at Basel in 1557.

22 He alludes here to the practice of taking loans from bankers against the security of repayment from the next treasure-fleet or from future Castilian revenues. The written contract governing this arrangement was known as the *asiento*. 
use their position as tax-gatherers to line their own pockets and also useless hangers-on at Court who make society their 'prey and play-
thing'—surveyors, historians, and royal chaplains (p. 324; p. 548b)—people who draw fat salaries to no good purpose and aggravate the fundamental problem facing the country: that expenditure is run-
ning far ahead of income. To get the two into balance must be 'our first and great concern'; otherwise, there will be a constant need to increase taxes, with the result that 'people will become deaf [to demands] and deeply angry' (p. 323; p. 548b). Again one finds a preoccupation with the danger that the oppressed members of soci-
ety will rise up. Mariana is clear that those who, citing the exam-

ples of France and Italy, are always urging that heavier taxes be imposed in Spain must be resisted (p. 330/p. 550a).

As to issues of policy, taxes imposed on basic commodities should be light; those on luxury and imported items should be heavy. Such items—among which Mariana includes scent, sugar, silk, quality wines, and game—are not only unnecessary to life but tend to make men's bodies soft and their characters corrupt (p. 327/p. 549a–b). If imported goods were heavily taxed, less money would leave the kingdom; the producers of such goods abroad would come to Spain in search of profit; and that in turn would increase the population, thereby further contributing to the wealth of the prince and the whole kingdom (p. 328; p. 549a–b).

This issue of taxation is made all the more urgent for Mariana by his concern with the consequences of Spain's harsh and arid cli-

cmate for the situation of a tax-burdened peasantry and all those who struggled to make a living from the land. They paid their Church tithes. If then they had to pay as much again to the landowner from whom they rented their land, what would be left to them for satis-

fying the demands of the royal treasury or for maintaining them-

selves? It would be more just to give support to those on whose toil and efforts the whole country rested (p. 329; p. 549b). We have noted a similar concern in Ribadeneyra's treatise; Mariana states it still more strongly.

In the following chapter he suggests ways in which the food-
supply for the population at large can be made more reliable and abundant. His plea now that trade between nations should be encour-
aged by low tariffs is somewhat at odds with his earlier remarks on the taxation of imported goods, but he writes here with the same enthusiasm as Ribadeneyra of the processes of trade by which the
surplus of one nation can make good the wants of another (p. 331; p. 550a). As regards the Spanish countryside he recommends afforestation and irrigation. He is eager to see a high level of land-cultivation and suggests ways—both carrot and stick—in which specially appointed officials can bring this about (pp. 331–32/p. 550b). Other officials, and the prince himself, must do their very best to ensure that the peasants and shepherds ‘on whose labours the whole kingdom’s sustenance and vigour depend’ are protected from being cheated and abused by the strong. This chapter in particular makes clear the difference of emphasis between Mariana’s analysis of Spain’s economic problems and that of Botero. While they agree that the ruler should encourage and promote agriculture, the Italian sees Spain’s problems much less in terms of climate and barren soil than of sparseness of population: ‘it is the numerical strength of a people that makes a land fertile and by labour and art gives a thousand different forms to the produce of nature, and hence power and wealth to their king’ (Botero, 1956, p. 153). Mariana had, perhaps, a less developed view of the mechanisms of economic prosperity, but he had the native’s knowledge of basic rural realities. That being so, it is surprising that he says nothing about the privileged position of sheep.\(^{23}\)

The discussion of economic and fiscal matters in this section of Mariana’s treatise takes on a strongly moral aspect, as is found in so much of the *arbitrista* writing setting out remedies for Spain’s ills in the reign of Philip III and later. Lamenting that the cultivation of wheat is giving way to that of the more profitable vine (which encourages a debilitating self-indulgence), Mariana writes that he would like to see reinstated that law which, as he believed, restricted vine-cultivation in favour of wheat in the time of the Romans until Domitian (p. 334/p. 551a).\(^{24}\) This would encourage Spain’s return to her ancient ways, to that simplicity of spirit and strength of body which, through commerce with other peoples and through indulgence in pleasures obtained from abroad or provided by ourselves, have

\(^{23}\) On the agrarian situation in Castile around the time that Mariana was writing see Elliott, 1989, pp. 228–31.

\(^{24}\) Mariana seems to be misremembering Suetonius’s ‘Life of Domitian’, VII, 2 and XIV, 2 (on Domitian’s Vine Edict). Maravall (1970, pp. 22–23) comments on the concern of Mariana and certain others of the time over this major development in Spanish agriculture. Maravall’s whole study provides a valuable context for Mariana’s discussion of agricultural and fiscal matters here.
greatly fallen away from the old ways and are daily being further cor-
rupted and destroyed.\textsuperscript{25}

Again it is the language of \textit{declinación} and \textit{restauración} which we found
Mariana using earlier.

However, another view of Spain’s situation also found expression
in these years, as Elliott points out: a view in which the Spanish eco-
nomic situation was seen in relation to, and in contrast with, that of
contemporary societies rather than as set against Rome and Spain’s
own past. The conclusion to which this led was not that Spain should
restore the past but should innovate, in imitation of more success-
ful rivals in the present. Elliott quotes Olivares’s words of 1624: ‘We
must bend our efforts to turning Spaniards into merchants’, but notes
that the situation remained a confused one: ‘Proponents of innova-
ting economic remedies also tended to think in terms of collective
guilt and moral regeneration (1989, pp. 257–58). Something of this
ambivalence is seen in Mariana and especially in his attitude to inter-
national trade. As we have seen, at one time he speaks enthusiasti-
cally of the benefits deriving from this and urges its encouragement
by government policy; at another, he sees it as a principal contri-
butor to the undermining of that virtuous simplicity of earlier times
to which he would like to see Spain return. We noted a similar oscil-
lation in Ribadeneyra. It is striking that Mariana begins his discus-
ion of agricultural issues by remarking how little man can do to
promote fertility of land and herds; godly prayers should therefore
be offered in difficult times and efforts be made to prevent the com-
mitting of any grave public crime of a kind likely to bring the pun-
ishment of dearth and general misfortune from on high (p. 330/
p. 550a). Again, when he asks, in concluding, whether Spain’s rivers
could be made navigable, he dwells on the prospect of failure rather
than the possibility of success. Other countries have indeed made
much progress in this respect and so are able to transport primary
necessities at little cost, but in Spain, with its harsh terrain, fast-
flowing rivers, and many water-mills, it may well be pointless to
innovate (‘novare’) in this way, moving men to laughter and merely

\textsuperscript{25} ‘[...] si aliquo temperamento lex illa instauraretur, optime rebus communibus
consultum iri putabam, patriae moribus antiquis, & simplicitati animorum & cor-
porum robori: quae commercio aliarum gentium & externis ac domesticis voluptatibus multum ab antiquo degenerarunt, magisque in dies corrumpuntur & pereunt’
(pp. 334–35/p. 551a).
raising memorials for future generations to man’s fruitless efforts. It is hard for anyone to do what the Romans failed to do in all the time they governed Spain (pp. 335–36; p. 551b). These are remarkably pessimistic comments from one who must himself have witnessed the engineering works undertaken in the 1580s to make the Tagus navigable from Toledo to Lisbon and who was writing before those works had finally shown their inadequacy.

Mariana’s discussion of these matters generally invites comparison with that of González de Cellorigo in his Memorial on the renewal of Spain, published at Valladolid the year after Mariana’s treatise appeared. This work has attracted particular interest by reason of its scope and its vigour of analysis and expression. It conveys a stronger sense of immediate crisis than Mariana’s does, and analyses that crisis, and proposes remedies for it, in more detail. It also argues with its own distinct emphasis that wealth is not being used productively in Spain, that it needs to be, and that prevailing social attitudes work against this. González de Cellorigo especially criticises the belief that money in itself constitutes wealth (whereas it is no more than a means of exchange) and the conviction that a man’s honra, or reputation, is incompatible with involvement in agriculture, finance, commerce, and any manufacture. So he comes to his celebrated reflection that ‘these kingdoms [of Spain] seem to have had the wish to reduce themselves to a society of beings under a spell, living outside the natural order of things’ (Memorial (1600), fo.25v). Thus, in a paradox of which he is fond, he argues that wealth (so largely deriving from the New World) has produced poverty. This goes deeper than Mariana does. However, both writers have a sense that the wealth of a country is bound up with prospering agriculture and trade; both are concerned with the critical state of affairs in the countryside, the burden of various taxes as they fall on the rural class, and the great gap in Spanish society between the poor and the rich. Mariana’s view of the contemporary condition of Spain has something in common with that of the many people who, according to González de Cellorigo, held that all earthly societies go through a process of growth followed by old age and decline.26 On

26 Ferraro (1989, p. 225) draws attention to a powerful statement of this view in Mariana’s Historia general de España (Bk.IV, ch.xxii), where he is writing of the reign of the Roman emperors Arcadius and Honorius: ‘[…] Pues en su tiempo la majestad del imperio romano, que de pequeños principios era llegada a la cumbre, y su
the other hand, even if he does not articulate as explicitly as the other the conviction that there is ‘a science of political government’, capable of preventing the fall of societies, Mariana plainly shares—in this work at least—the belief that there are practical things that a ruler can do to overcome present difficulties, serious as they are, and he is no less eager than González de Cellorigo to make specific proposals to that end here.

In view of Mariana’s interest in practical questions relating to the prosperity of Spain, and in view also of the fact that ‘the problem of the poor’ had prompted as much legislation and discussion in print as it had, it is perhaps surprising that he does not devote more space to this particular issue. He does not allude to that debate; his only specific references—as already noted—are to the edicts of two Councils of Tours and to legislation, which he takes to be that of Charlemagne, on the provision of care for the needy. Nevertheless, in the context of contemporary discussion there is a work that offers striking points of similarity and comparison (even though it is not certain that Mariana was directly indebted to it); that is, Vives’s celebrated De subventione pauperum, dedicated to the city authorities of Bruges in 1526.

Both writers speak of Nature’s abundance and her gifts to men, and contrast these with the poverty and need that followed when what had been given to men as a common possession was greedily divided up by them into ‘mine and thine’ (p. 381; p. 563a). Denouncing the covetousness and self-indulgence of the rich, Mariana, like Vives, sets the practice of the Early Church, when bishops and lay people alike were zealous in caring for the needy brethren, in contrast to the subsequent greed of the clergy, who increasingly took for themselves what was rightly the patrimony of the poor. The latter’s needs—Vives and Mariana both believe—could wholly or largely be met from the unspent riches of the clergy. Mariana writes of

misma grandeza con su peso la trabajaba, comenzó a despeñarse, sin volver más en sí, que fue clara muestra de la flaqueza humana. Y es cosa averiguada que ninguna cosa hay debajo del cielo que el tiempo con sus mudanzas no lo consuma y deshaga; [. . .] Ningún imperio puede permanecer largo tiempo; si le falta enemigo de fuera, dentro de su casa le nace [. . .]’ (B4E, xxx, 115 a–b). See above, p. 341.

27 On this subject see Martz, 1983, pp. 7–44. Mariana’s discussion of the issue is not referred to here.

28 See Vives, De subventione pauperum, I.ix; and for subsequent references: II, ii, iii, vi.
churches ‘collapsing no less under the weight of riches than under their age and massive structure’ (p. 384; p. 564a), and he asks why the ancient practice of devoting the income of churches to the care of the needy should not be restored. As earlier, he denies wishing that the clergy should be forcibly deprived of wealth bequeathed by earlier generations; but he does wish that they would themselves shape their behaviour more closely after that of Christians of old. In any case, the prince should see to it that the superfluous wealth of churches in the chief cities of Spain went to help the poor (p. 385; p. 564b). Mariana does not refer to the substantial taxation—the subsidio and the excusado—levied by the Crown on the income and property of the Church, or to the annual charge (amounting to something between a third and a quarter) made on episcopal revenues by the Crown—though not for the benefit of the poor.29

Both writers envisage a role for civic authorities in the care of the latter, though Mariana’s account of this is much briefer than Vives’s. He wishes each city to endeavour to feed its own poor, and so to limit the stay of beggars from other places to three days ‘unless they are willing to devote themselves to some trade or useful occupation’ (p. 386/p. 564b). The sheer number of those going from town to town begging is a major problem. If their number in any one place could be reduced, it would be easier to help them. Even so, daily alms are not likely to suffice. Mariana would like funds to be set aside on an annual basis and to see it established where at least part of the expenditure envisaged was to come from (p. 387/pp. 564b–65a). Finally, he recommends that the poor should be divided into different categories according to their needs, and cared for in different kinds of home. It is here that he draws on the Carolingian legislation mentioned earlier. Vives had himself urged the civic authorities to accept responsibility for the various sorts of ‘hospital’ providing the shelter and care required: that is, for the sick, for boys and girls in need of education, for foundlings, the insane and the blind. However, his insistence on the duty of civic authorities to provide appropriate kinds of supervised labour for the needy in their charge

29 Helen Rawlings notes that ‘Philip [II] disposed of around 250,000 ducats per year on the gross incomes of Castilian sees’, and that this sum ‘was comparable to the excusado tax yield’. In broader terms, ‘at least one-third of the annual income of the Castilian Church was being appropriated by the Crown in the late sixteenth century’. See Rawlings, 1987, pp. 55, n. 9, 57, 69.
and to educate them in the ways of virtue does not find a parallel in Mariana’s discussion.

To look after the poor, the weak, and orphans is, says Mariana, the first and principal responsibility of the prince (p. 381/p. 563a). Characteristically, he sees this as a matter not only of Christian duty but of political prudence. One section of society must not be allowed, by its excessive growth in wealth and power, to leave others reduced to uttermost penury. ‘It is inevitable that in society there will be as many enemies as there are poor, especially if they are deprived of the hope of emerging from that condition’ (p. 382/p. 563b). Therefore a certain measure and mean must be established. Vives begins Book II of his De subventione pauperum by speaking of the threat to the order and peace of society arising from the resentment of the poor against the rich. This is a much more prominent preoccupation in Mariana’s work, and nowhere more so than in his next chapter, ‘On Prudence’, which brings us close to the end of the treatise.

Even for private individuals, let alone princes, it is very difficult to avoid error at every step, so various are the events of life and so impenetrable the designs of men. Princely prudence is the outcome of three things together: character of mind, experience, and the precepts of learning. It is again stressed that the prince must be a serious reader, above all of history (pp. 390–91/p. 565b).

Although, as Mariana claims, his whole treatise so far will foster prudence in the prince, he has more to add regarding three issues in particular. First, the prince must seek the advice of others, even though he is not bound to follow it. He should not stand too much on his dignity here; but neither should he allow any one counsellor by this means to obtain ascendancy over him (pp. 391–92/p. 566a).

Mariana’s second topic is more substantial and he devotes most of the rest of the chapter to it: the need of a prince to proceed with prudence and caution in handling the mass of his subjects. Mariana enlarges on the wild, destructive, torrent-like strength of the multitude; the prince should seek to break its onrush more by calculation than by a display of force. It may of course be wise, once a tumult has been calmed, to punish those chiefly responsible for it; but preferably they should be dealt with one by one, since this is a highly effective way of undermining the shared resolution of the crowd (p. 392/p. 566a). The latter must be handled with care and calculation in more general ways. Thus, it is a mistake to be in too much haste to root out the faults of the people at large, especially
if these have gone deep, for people are attached to that to which they are accustomed, even when it is to their discredit. Indeed, the prince must to a large extent follow his subjects’ inclinations, whether in declaring war, imposing taxes, or punishing trouble-makers. He must also have regard for the different outlooks and responses of different parts of his dominions. Each has its own way of judging things; and since the prince cannot change this, he will do well to remember it, lest people become alienated and the peace be disturbed (p. 393; p. 566b). Perhaps some judgement on Spanish policy towards the Netherlands is implied here.

Fear may well have a part to play in the handling of such a mass of ill-disposed people as surround the ruler. That being so, it will be wise always to mete out punishment with a degree of restraint, so that his subjects will be left fearing still worse to come (p. 394; pp. 566b–67a). Nevertheless, ‘Oderint dum metuant’ is the maxim of a tyrant, and the punishing of criminals becomes tyrannical unless the due processes of law are observed. The ruler must control his own anger. He will also be well advised, if some particular severity of punishment is called for, to hand the matter over to others, so that he can then call them to account on the grounds of their exceeding the powers given to them and thus preserve the goodwill of his subjects for himself. He should always be mindful of the general truth that nothing moves either kings or private individuals so much as self-interest (‘utilitas’). Therefore it is better for him to proceed by exploiting hopes of further favours than by manipulating his subjects by fear (pp. 395–96; p. 567a–b).

Lastly, Mariana considers prudence in relation to war and diplomacy. ‘Nothing is more alien to the principles of princely conduct than to entrust the well-being of society to chance and the caprice of fortune’ (p. 401; p. 568b). This observation does not lead on to reflexions on prayer and Providence, as in Ribadeneyra. We get instead a precept of a very different kind: a ruler should never regard his hold on power as other than precarious (p. 401; p. 569a); then he will be the safest and best of princes. This applies to his dealings both with the mass of his own people and with foreign rulers. Therefore—Mariana returns here to his earlier theme—in time of peace the prince must think of war. Let him equip himself with arms and horses, build fortresses, fit out garrisons, conclude alliances both far and near. Let him so embrace peace that he will never abandon military preparations. The more care he shows over this, the
safer he will be, and his power will be eternal (p. 402; p. 569a). Such preparations serve a useful purpose even if the prince does not in fact intend to wage war. They stir up the efforts of his own people, cause anxiety to neighbouring princes, and weaken them by driving them to new expenditure on defence (p. 400/p. 568b). Finally, the prince should avoid face-to-face diplomacy with foreign counterparts. To illustrate the point Mariana renders into Latin a lengthy extract from Philippe de Commynes on the meeting at Fuenterrabia between Louis XI of France and Henry IV of Castile in 1463.

Mariana’s stress here on the prince’s need to prepare for war in time of peace conveys a particularly strong sense of what his view of the ruler’s situation has in common with Machiavelli’s. However, this resemblance goes much wider. It extends to his view of the political relations between the ruling prince and the mass of his subjects; the inconstant nature of the people; the prince’s need to win their goodwill; his need, therefore, to show political sensitivity to their feelings and interests; his need also to employ force and fraud, punishments and rewards, fear as well as love, as calculated means directed towards the end of preserving his position on the basis of that which lies within his own control rather than in the hands of chance.30

Much of this, however, is also found in Bodin’s Les Six Livres de la République. For although Machiavelli is sharply criticized in this work and its Preface, it still reveals the Italian’s impact on Bodin’s view of political realities and needs. As G. Cardascia put it, Bodin is categorical on the principle of not separating politics from ethics, but one has to see how he applies that principle; and then one finds that, for Bodin as for Machiavelli, ‘the good of the State justifies assaults on the Good [...]’ (an assessment in which Ribadeneyra would have concurred). This is expressed not in explicit formulations but implicitly, in the solutions proposed for particular situations and needs (Cardascia, 1943, pp. 152–53).31 It is in this fashion

30 On the extent of the impact of Machiavelli on Mariana see also Ferraro, 1989, pp. 212–16.
31 ‘L’intention antimachiavelique de Bodin est certaine; [...] mais il est sur aussi qu’elle est demeurée en grande partie une intention. [...] Bodin, antimachiaveliste d’intention, est un machiaveliste qui s’ignore’ (Cardascia, 1943, pp. 151–52; see also Beame, 1982, pp. 39–40). (On the other hand, ‘in general Bodin worked in a much richer—and more inhibiting—context of legal, historical, and philosophical erudition [than Machiavelli], and he was by training and nature, if not by nationality,
that *Les Six Livres* . . . of 1576 ‘marks the high tide of Bodin’s leaning towards Machiavellian political realism’ (McRae, 1973, p. 336). There is also, however, a convergence between Bodin’s treatise and Mariana’s on other topics which are much less prominent in, or even absent from, Machiavelli. In view of Ribadeneyra’s acknowledgement of the interest that Bodin was arousing in Spain, and his reaction against this, it is worth examining this convergence further.  

One finds it in the views expressed by both Mariana and Bodin regarding such matters as the imposition of taxes and customs dues, the difficulties involved in collecting revenues, the dangers of large-scale princely or public borrowing at interest, and the objects on which public revenues can properly and advantageously be spent (see Bodin, *Les Six Livres* . . . , Book VI, chapters i–iii). Like Mariana, Bodin wants the necessaries of life to be wholly or largely exempted from taxes; these should fall instead on ‘all kinds of merchandise that serve no good purpose or are shameful or superfluous in character’, of which half at least serve only ‘to corrupt the simplicity of the subject’ (Bodin, 1576, p. 641 = Knolles, 1606, p. 671). He repeatedly refers to the corrupting effects of the love of luxury and self-indulgence that overtook the ancient Romans and undermined their hold on empire. Like Mariana again, he is concerned with the extent to which royal revenues are swallowed up in the process of their collection by dishonest officials, and warns rulers against landing themselves with heavy burdens of interest on borrowed capital. As to the proper objects of princely or public expenditure, there is a strong resemblance between the two writers’ recommendations regarding public building projects for purposes of utility and social amenity.

Repeatedly Bodin links the issue of taxation with that of public order and the tranquillity of society. His recurrent fear is that excessively burdensome taxes imposed upon the poor will drive them to rebel. He and Mariana share an acute sense of the potential threat presented to the prince by ‘the tumultuous people’ and of the difficulty involved in handling them. In Book IV, chapter vii, especially, he reflects at length on the need for the prince to employ both severity and indulgence in ‘staying the angry peoples rage and furie’:

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unable to separate politics from its legal and social environment’ (Kelley, 1973, p. 145)).

Albuquerque (1978) discusses the presence of Bodin in González de Cellorigo’s treatise (see pp. 162–65) but does not find it in Mariana’s.
True it is, that for the prince or magistrates thus to temper maiestie with clemency towards an unruly and headstrong people without judgement and reason, is a most hard and difficult matter: yet there is nothing more necessarie [. . .] (Knolles, 1606, p. 532 = Bodin, 1576, p. 507).

And so the ‘wise governour’ will follow in part

the affections and desires of the troubled people, so much the more easily afterwards to attain unto the full of his designes. And albeit that a prince had the power by force to represse and reform a mutinous and rebellious people, yet ought he not so to doe, if otherwise he may appease them (ibid.).

We noted earlier, in relation to Castillo de Bobadilla, Bodin’s firmly stated conviction that human beings have small regard for things possessed in common, each individual really caring only for that which belongs to him in particular (see above, pp. 166, 171). Mariana’s dictum about self-interest being a fundamental trait of human nature corresponds to this. Both writers also show a marked interest in the contention that the origins of society are to be found in the clash of self-interest and conflicting efforts at self-preservation. Again in relation to Castillo de Bobadilla, we have noted Bodin’s assertion that ‘Reason, and the verie light of nature, leadeth us to beleive very force and violence to have given course and beginning unto Commonweals’ (see above, p. 170). Mariana, for his part, writes on several occasions (whether or not in his own name) on this same topic, presenting at some length the view that those origins lay in the attempt of the weaker to seek protection against the violence and robbery they suffered at the hands of the stronger (see pp. 20–21/468a–b; 240/526a; 365/559a). He explicitly acknowledges (as we have seen) that ‘many empires owe their origin to force, their increase to crime, their spread to robbery’ (p. 367; p. 559b). Violence remains a latent reality among the people at large, and society’s existence rests in no small measure on force of arms and the instilling of fear (p. 301; p. 542a) (see pp. 316, 336–37 above).

Bodin, like Mariana, sees here an important role for religion. ‘There is’, writes Bodin ‘in the reverend feare of religion a great power for the staying of the tumultuous people’ (Knolles, 1606, p. 534 [= Bk.IV, ch.vii]).33 We have already noted Mariana’s comment that

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33 ‘Est etiam in religionis metu magna vis ad plebem coercendam’ (Bodin, 1586, p. 480). [This sentence is added to the 1576 French text.]
‘if men control themselves and master their evil impulses, it is due to the religion that has been instilled into them or to fear of punishment’ (pp. 368–69/p. 560a). Royal ‘majesty’ has a similar value. As we saw earlier (see p. 323), Mariana views the purpose of princely display and magnificence as being ‘to increase majesty’ and ‘to dazzle the eyes of the people so as to keep them within the bounds of their social duties’ (p. 146/p. 501a). On this he lays still more stress than Bodin, who writes rather of the power of ‘the majesty of virtue’ (‘virtutis singulare decus ac maiestatem’) to calm civil commotion more effectively than laws, arms and edicts (1586: p. 480).

There is, then, much in Mariana’s chapter on princely prudence that recalls both Machiavelli’s *Il principe* and Bodin’s treatise, and a good deal in Mariana’s work more widely that seems to echo Bodin—despite the obvious and profound difference between them in matters of political theory regarding royal sovereignty and the respective authority of king and people. While there is no explicit reference in Mariana’s text to either writer, it seems reasonable to conclude that the outlook of Mariana had, in a number of important respects, been marked by the two writers whose eager reception in Spain Ribadeneyra most deplored.34

As with Books I and II, Mariana concludes Book III with a chapter on the religious aspect of his subject, arguing here—chiefly in the interests of social peace—that in a given society only one form of religion should be permitted by the ruler. In the two corresponding earlier chapters (and elsewhere, as in that on Prudence, as we have seen) Mariana has argued that the peace and orderliness of society require the authority of religion to uphold them. This is especially stressed in the closing pages of Book II, where Mariana writes all the more urgently because of his low view of human nature: ‘if religion were removed, what could be worse than man, what more savage and monstrous?’ (p. 254/p. 529b). It is scarcely likely that men could dwell together in society without laws, or that laws could

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34 For reasons already given (see above, pp. 253 and 280, n. 3), it seems that Mariana would have had little time in which to make himself familiar with Botero’s *Della Ragion di Stato* before composing his own treatise. Similarities between their works appear to owe something to a shared indebtedness to both Bodin (according to Waley (Botero, 1956, p. x) ‘probably the most important single influence on Botero’s thought’ and Machiavelli—even though Botero was writing explicitly in reaction against the latter. ‘The problem for Botero, as for later writers in the genre, was that, much as they might dislike Machiavelli’s recommendations, they could not do without his ideas’ (Burke, 1991, p. 483).
hold firm without religion. Legislators have therefore been wise to promulgate laws with the forms of high religious solemnity so as to persuade the people that crimes are always eventually punished and that laws have been received by divine inspiration rather than devised by human judgement. ‘To remove religion from human affairs would be to deprive the world of the sun’ (pp. 254–55/pp. 529b–30a). As Mariana acknowledges, his chief concern here is to argue that ‘nothing more strengthens rule and authority (‘imperia’) than religious worship (p. 256/p. 530a). It does this also by securing the favour of God, who, while being the eternal avenger of men’s impious endeavours, no less shows himself well disposed towards those who implore his aid with sincere worship and pure prayer. Religion also fosters the devotion of the people to their prince. Thus, surrounded and sustained by the support of God and men, he is beyond the play of chance and will overcome every kind of difficulty (p. 258/p. 531a).

Already here Mariana draws the conclusion that the prince must neither slip into forms of religious worship coming from abroad nor allow the citizenry to do so; because nothing is more deceptive in appearance than bad religion, nothing more likely to undermine society than the practice of new rather than inherited religious rites (p. 259/p. 531a–b). This is the point that Mariana develops in his last chapter of all.

Nothing, he says here, is so opposed to peace within a given society as the existence within it of ‘several religions’ (p. 420/p. 570a). For while religion is in itself a powerful social bond, what social intercourse can there be between those who do not worship the same God or worship him in the same way? Rather will the adherents of one kind of religion reject those of another, believing that they merit well with their own God by doing violence to those from whom they differ. Mariana enlarges on this point with considerable psychological force before addressing a more specific issue: where, in a given society, the adherents of two opposed religions are of approximately equal numbers, what shall the prince do? If he favours the one, he will alienate the other; if he seeks to favour both, he will incur the suspicion of both. Seeking illustrative cases in history, Mariana writes at some length of the religious policy of the Roman Emperors from Constantine onwards (p. 429/p. 572b). He is clearly uncomfortable with the evidence he encounters there of some toleration of religious differences, and claims to find it confirmed by long experience that ‘new religion’ was never allowed entry into a
city without great calamity resulting from it (p. 433/p. 573b). Here he cites the cases of the French Albigensians, the Bohemian Hussites, and the ‘new plague’ afflictng France and Germany. This brings him back to his preoccupation with the importance of religion for exercising control over the innate violence and destructiveness of the mass of men and for preserving thereby the order and fabric of society. At this point, however, he shows particular concern with the situation where the people at large, greatly burdened with taxes and other hardships, are moved to rise up and seize the rich revenues of the clergy and the treasures of churches. This is what happens when authority is weakened by religious discord. The flame thus kindled gradually reaches up to the highest levels of society. Mariana recalls the German Peasants’ Revolt of the 1520s. But diversity in religion produces yet more ills. It weakens society in the face of foreign powers, who exploit it for their own advantage; it makes impossible the holding of public assemblies by which government is carried on; and it brings discord even into individual families (p. 439/ p. 575a).

Mariana is aware that others (whom he leaves unnamed) take a different view and argue in favour of toleration, citing the instances of the Turkish Empire, Bohemia, the Swiss and the Germans. He counters that to take the Turkish Empire as the measure for Christian societies is an insult to Christian princes.35 Nevertheless, he is led, at this point, to concede in a single sentence that if the ‘followers of the new heresies’ were willing to accept for themselves in Christian societies the burdens of non-Mohammedans living in the lands of the Turkish Empire, perhaps they could, on such terms, be allowed the freedom of conscience which they so much desire (p. 442/pp. 575b–76a). In reality, however, those who depart from the religion of their fathers are seen to make very great demands and to seek the primary places of authority. As for the cases of Bohemia and the German states, Mariana sidesteps the issue by drawing attention to the situation of Catholics in Geneva and England. His concession regarding the possibility of toleration is thus a very limited one and by no means matches the main thrust of his argument in this

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35 De la Noue cites the instances of the Swiss and the Germans, Duplessis-Mornay those of the Germans and the Poles. The prominence that Mariana gives to the case of the Turks may be due to Bodin’s treatment of this instance in Les Six Livres . . ., Bk.IV, ch.vii (Bodin, 1576, p. 510 = Knolles, pp. 337–38).
chapter. To those who have overthrown impiety and maintain the old forms of religion intact, the greatest gratitude is due. Conversely, the ‘inventors of the new sects’ are no less deserving of condemnation and of posterity’s hatred.

Mariana is not inclined to consider the issue of how far his basic argument for religious unity and continuity in the interests of social and political order might be transferrable to societies that were not Roman Catholic or even Christian in character. Instead, in familiar metaphorical terms Mariana urges the prince to extinguish quickly the flame of the dangerous new religious teachings of his time, even at the risk of his own life, lest the contagion spread further and remedy be sought too late (pp. 443–44/p. 576a). So he ends his discussion of kingship on a note where he seems most strongly to share the outlook of his country and time and to be close in a way that is rare with him to Ribadeneyra, even though the considerations that have brought him to this point of convergence with his fellow Jesuit differ from the other’s in emphasis and scope. For Mariana remains much more concerned with the importance of religious unity for social and political unity than with adopting a particular ecclesiastical cause, and in opposing arguments for religious toleration, he writes more in terms of religious diversity and discord than of heresy.

Domenico Ferraro finds Mariana’s De rege to be ‘a fragmentary and contradictory work’, one that ‘develops on different planes that are juxtaposed rather than brought into harmony with each other, so that it presents itself as a progressive and at times confused series of layers’ (1989, pp. 207, 225).36 The account of Mariana’s treatise given here in this chapter largely accords with that view, taken in its descriptive sense. The characteristics to which Ferraro alludes result in part from the fact that, while maintaining a link with the tradition of treatises de regimine principum as regards the topics discussed and schemes of presentation adopted, Mariana handles that tradition with considerable freedom and flexibility. This in turn results from the wide range of topics that it was his desire to treat, and to treat with specificity and to practical effect. An interest in things viewed in their concrete reality underlies much of his writing taken

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36 Mesnard (1952, p. 565) similarly writes of this work: ‘nous regardons Mariana comme le point de convergence d’influences très différentes et qui se compénèrent plutôt qu’elles ne s’harmonisent’. He is insistent, however, that one of these influences was that of Erasmus. For reasons that will be clear, I judge that to be a wholly untenable position.
as a whole, and it is a characteristic and primary concern of this work to bring book-learning to bear on perceived practical needs, whether those relating to the prince or to society and its operations at large. The sources of the book-learning on which Mariana draws themselves range widely both in character and date. Some contribute particular guidance for particular issues, such as exemption from the wheat tax, or poor relief, or the supervision of royal officials, or the appointment of bishops; others of a more deliberative character offer advice for the education of the prince in a context of intellectual and cultural values of a recognizably humanist kind; others leave their mark on Mariana’s way of thinking about the fundamental realities of power, political control, success, and survival, that largely constitute the situation in which the ruler has to act. The very range—and also the strength—of Mariana’s interests and larger preoccupations detract both from structural cohesion and, at times, from coherence of argument and moral stance. His discussion of practical, technical issues (such as finance, agriculture, and social provision) is likely to leave the modern reader with a sense of a writer who was taking on more than he knew how to cope with—a judgement from which (it seems likely) Mariana himself would not have altogether dissented. On the other hand, the very fact that he addressed himself to so wide a range of topics, and did so in the way that we find, conveys a sense that in Mariana we are dealing with a writer who was seriously engaged intellectually with the issues he treated—with one who was seriously committed to proposing useful action on the part of the ruler concerning the needs and problems—both social and political—and, indeed, the crisis of his time as his observation and his reading together had led him to see them.

Any assessment of the intellectual character of Mariana’s treatise in any case needs to have regard to his comments at the very close of the work. Here he acknowledges that not everyone will find his views on kingship and kingly education to his liking. Let those follow him who will; let others hold to their own opinions if they find them to rest on better arguments: for

as regards all that I have said in these Books, I will never assert that my opinion is truer than that of the next man. For not only can I take one view and other people another, but even I myself can see things differently at different times.37

37 ‘De quibus rebus tantopere asseveravi in his libris, eas nunquam veriores quam
It is an expression of self-distancing from his own discussion, of open-mindedness, that seems seriously meant. If it comes unexpectedly at the end of a treatise notable for the force with which points are put, it fits with the independence and energy of mind with which Mariana has recast the tradition of treatises on kingship. For anything comparable among these sixteenth-century Spanish treatises one has to go back to Fox Morcillo in one respect, and to Furió Ceriol in another. Mariana’s final invitation to his readers is that each should follow his own view rather than the writer’s, but at least should read him without prejudice, ‘since [such prejudice] is detrimental to the vision of the mind’. This coda implies a good deal regarding Mariana’s conception of the nature of his own discussion and of the intellectual enterprise more broadly.

alienam sententiam affirmabo. Potest enim non solum mihi aliud, aliud alijs videri, sed & mihi ipsi alio tempore’ (pp. 445–46/p. 576b).

38 ‘Suam quisque sententiam per me sequatur, neque nostrae subscribat; tantum exoratum cupimus eum qui nostra leget, ut praecidicium amoveat, quoniam mentis oculis officit [. . .]’ (pp. 445–46/p. 576b).
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

CONCLUSION

These treatises address us as a series of distinct voices. We may now, in conclusion, review the character of that variety and consider what significance it possesses as regards Spanish intellectual life in the time of Philip II.

We have seen that the authors of these treatises differ from each other as regards their purposes in writing, the presuppositions and preoccupations that they bring to the task, their cast of mind, the schemes of values to which they are attached, and the sets of purposes that they seek to commend. The treatises themselves give expression to various areas and ranges of interest as between each work and each group of works studied here.

On the one hand, this variety reflects the different times, places, and situations—personal, professional, religious—in which these writers were composing their works. On the other hand, it finds an intellectual focus in the question raised by Fox Morcillo at the start of the first of them: in what terms can questions of kingly government be suitably and significantly treated? Recast and extended in various ways, it is an issue with which a number of these writers explicitly show themselves to be concerned; it is in any case one that presents itself in all the works that we have been examining.

(i) The problematic language of the virtues.

Both Fox Morcillo and Castilla y de Aguayo voice a mocking impatience with what they declare to be useless theoretical learning, whether as this bears on the particular issue of giving instruction in government or as seen more broadly. Such learning is associated in the one case with the world of the universities and with Plato (whose theoretical and idealist approach is rejected also by Castillo de Bobadilla and in more general terms by Costa); in the other case it is linked with the tradition of Classical moralists and historians at large. Both Fox Morcillo and Castilla y de Aguayo indicate, on the other hand, a corresponding sense of the importance to a king or
regidor of practical experience—practical experience of a kind relevant to the conduct of affairs in the conditions of the time in which he finds himself. The issue is addressed more extensively in Fox Morcillo’s treatise than in any of the others and is focused there on the question of basic categories: whether the role and duties of the ruler can usefully be expressed and discussed in terms of the four cardinal virtues. Do not such terms rule themselves out of serious consideration by reason of their theoretical, a priori, character—their failure to engage with the facts of the world and of the ruler’s situation as they really are?

Although a preoccupation with this issue runs right through Fox Morcillo’s treatise, he fails to adopt a decisive and unproblematical position regarding it. Despite his declared desire to make a break with irrelevant theorizing, he shows himself unwilling or otherwise unable to turn his back on the traditional scheme of the cardinal virtues, even though he extends their application far into the area of practical issues of government, whether administrative, political, or military, with particular regard for the circumstances and needs of his day.

In contrasting ways both Felipe de la Torre and Furió Ceriol adopt a more decisively defined position. The former brings a predominantly biblical approach to the task of portraying an ideal and specifically Christian king. The values that animate this portrait are centred on the principle and disposition of Christian love as presented in the New Testament. The cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance are not treated in their own right; they neither set the terms of the discussion nor give structure to the argument. For entirely different reasons the same is true of Furió Ceriol’s treatise. Here the author, more radically than any other of these writers, repudiates (and in practice largely turns his back on) traditional religious and moral modes of discourse, giving us instead a picture of the prince such as, in Furió’s clear-sighted view, he needs to be in the real world of power, conflict and calculation. This picture brings us closer than any other of these treatises to Machiavelli’s Il principe, of which (like Fox Morcillo, though with more far-reaching consequences) he was identifiably a reader.

We thus see that, while the cardinal virtues had held—and in these treatises, taken together, continued to hold—so central a place in moral and political discourse, they were open to criticism and even rejection on two principal grounds: first, they represented an
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inappropriate conceptual scheme for the articulation of the essential values of the Christian religion; secondly, they constituted a mode of discourse irrelevant to the consideration of matters of government. While no other of these treatises was to adopt so clear-cut a position in the matter as those of Felipe de la Torre and Furió Ceriol, a concern with the issue repeatedly reveals itself in these works and underlies much of the most significant discussion that they contain. The two points picked out here therefore merit more detailed consideration.

The four cardinal virtues, whose treatment is frequently extended into the numerous subordinate virtues traditionally derived from them, were the ‘natural’ virtues as distinct from the three ‘theological’ virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and precisely in this distinction lay a further difficulty, whether in fact it was addressed or not. The codification and analysis of the cardinal virtues formed part of the inheritance that came down from pagan Classical Antiquity, with all the authority of—pre-eminently—Aristotle and Cicero. However, did the pagans possess knowledge of true virtue? If not, what value could be set by Christians on the teaching of the Classical moralists? These questions recur in a number of the works which we have been considering, and it has been evident how the reflexions of St Augustine (chiefly as found in his De civitate Dei) weighed upon the minds of our writers as they considered the issue, though more with the effect of rendering them uncomfortably aware of the problem posed than of enabling them to resolve it. None of these writers displays more discomfort over the issue than the Jesuit Pedro de Ribadeneyra, who still organizes Part II of his treatise on the basis of the scheme of the cardinal virtues while anxiously insisting that he did not believe these to be, in the last analysis, authentic virtues (at least as conceived and practised by the pagans). The larger issue involved here was, of course, that of the relation between the orders of nature and grace. This comes through most clearly in Merola’s treatise, where he contrasts the roles of lawyers and those whom he terms ‘teólogos’. What these treatises do not convey is a sense of their authors being in secure intellectual possession of an answer to the question of what that relation was.

1 It is, of course, hardly to be expected that they would. As to the particular question of the reality of pagan virtue, this was denied by the scholastics on the one side and, much more reluctantly, by such figures as Petrarch and Erasmus on
As to the issue of how far matters of practical government could be profitably discussed within the framework of the cardinal virtues, we have seen that Fox Morcillo's treatise as a whole reveals his preoccupation with the question in a variety of ways. He clearly found this framework constricting as regards the discussion of such aspects of government as public finance and administration, taxation, and the fostering of agriculture and trade. This is evident from the way in which, repeatedly, after speaking in a highly specific manner about one or another of these issues, he feels it necessary to apologize for having 'wandered from [his] subject'. Nevertheless, his interest in such things is matched, among these treatises, only by that of Mariana, who mostly deals with such matters in separate chapters specifically devoted to them. Neither writer brought professional expertise to these questions but both were prompted to consider them by the alert interest which they took in the economic and financial conditions of their own time. In Mariana's case at least, it seems that his own discussion of these things owed something substantial to their previous treatment by other writers—among them, Bodin.

Both Fox Morcillo and Mariana are concerned with public works and utilities, with how to ensure an adequate food-supply for the population at large, with the export and import trade, with taxation policy and its implications for the peace and harmony of society. There are, however, differences of emphasis between them. Mariana, in his De rege, says less than Fox Morcillo about maintaining the value of currency and the bearing of this on international trade, reserving his discussion of these questions for a separate treatise. On the other hand, he takes (on the whole) a more positive view of international trade than Fox Morcillo and places still more weight than he does on the threat to the peace and good order of society arising from grossly unjust taxation. Fox Morcillo makes some significant remarks about aspects of the Spanish economy in parti-

the other, despite the admiration that these latter felt for the Ancients. 'The scholastics were well aware that the ancient pagans had been capable of the highest moral achievement, but by definition, they did not have "faith" in the sense of Christian belief. Since grace was always dependent on faith, they could not therefore have had grace, been justified or been saved' (A.H.T. Levi, 1971, p. 25). For Petrarch and Erasmus, "true" virtue could not be attributed to any pagan, since his actions were obviously not done in the love of Christ. Valla went beyond such generality to suggest that pagan virtue was vitiated by its concern for glory [...] (Bouwsma, 1990, p. 51).
cular—commenting, for example, on how little of the wealth from the New World had remained in Spain. However, he was writing as one who in his early adult years had gone to reside in the Low Countries, whereas Mariana was writing many years after his return to Spain and as one who, whatever his reading on these topics may have been, was reflecting on current conditions there in a period of mounting economic difficulties. His treatment of the issue is more extensive and detailed than Fox Morcillo’s.

There are also certain larger differences of approach between them. Although Fox Morcillo shows a marked inclination to view the functioning of society in practical terms, his intellectual perception of society at large is still essentially that of a static ordered structure of a hierarchical kind; this replicates and finds its place in the larger context of a universe whose comprehensive order and structure reflect its origin in God. Mariana, for his part, makes little or nothing of this mental scheme and his religious view of society is expressed more in terms of divine favour and punishment. With this goes a clear sense of the moral basis of a healthy and prospering society. That moral basis is represented by him in terms of a virtuous simplicity of living such as was promoted in Spain by the Romans of Classical Antiquity, as he believed. By comparison with that era and even the more recent past, contemporary Spain presented a picture of grave moral decline.

It will be clear that, in their treatment of these issues, each of these two writers employs different kinds of discourse within the same work. It was pointed out earlier in what respects Fox Morcillo’s treatise resembles in this regard the ‘Commonwealth’ literature of Early Tudor England as presented by A.B. Ferguson (see above, pp. 67–68). Likewise, one can readily apply to Mariana what J.H. Elliott has written of the early seventeenth-century arbitristas generally: that in their works the contrasting approaches of traditionalists and innovators were in general closely intermingled: ‘proponents of innovative economic remedies also tended to think in terms of collective guilt and moral regeneration’ (Elliott, 1989, p. 258).

Another aspect of Fox Morcillo’s concern with the relevance or otherwise of the cardinal virtues to the discussion of kingship relates to the question of moral principle and its applicability to rulers. We have seen that Fox was the first of these writers (and, it appears, the first Spanish writer at all) to quote from Machiavelli’s Il principe—at the point where Machiavelli urges the prince to prepare himself
in time of peace for the successful conduct of war. Fox also adopts various of Machiavelli’s injunctions relating to how the prince should establish and defend his position vis-à-vis newly acquired territories, particularly as regards sedition. However, he repudiates Machiavelli’s contention that a prince need not keep good faith when it suits him not to do so. His position here is rather that the *honestum* and the *utile* fundamentally coincide. Subsequently, this Ciceronian position is explicitly adopted by Costa and several other of these writers.

Furió Ceriol, on the other hand, rejects it and does so in a thorough-going fashion, showing himself to have been more deeply affected in his outlook by Machiavelli than any of the rest would be. Decades later, Ribadeneyra was to present his own treatise as primarily an attack on Machiavelli and on the concept of Reason of State that had come to be associated with his name. The Christian prince was to base his personal conduct and his rule on Roman Catholicism and the canonical virtues. However, that same work reveals that even Ribadeneyra’s perception of the prince’s needs in the position which he occupied had been significantly marked by the writer whom he was chiefly attacking.

Ribadeneyra had also read Martín de Azpilcueta’s subtle reflexions on mental reservation—on the conditions in which a statement that, by intention and careful calculation, conveyed less than the whole of the speaker’s mind or meaning and so misled the hearer, could nevertheless be held to be truthful rather than mendacious. The effect of his own adoption of Azpilcueta’s arguments is to blur the definition of the moral position which he states it as his aim to establish. It also reinforces the impression that Ribadeneyra sees the prince as one performing his role in a complex of circumstances that—in fact—make an unproblematic application of the virtues impossible. His limited and reluctant recognition of this is expressed in terms of the notion of ‘necessity’, seen as something that, in situations of sufficient urgency, suspends the normal principles of law and morality. His fellow Jesuit, Juan de Torres, though in general little inclined to consider the more tangled moral issues facing those in public office, gives a memorably powerful statement of a similar view of that all-powerful fact of life. Castillo de Bobadilla restates the same view with no less force though with the practical elaboration of a lawyer. Among our writers the issue becomes much more prominent in the
final decade or so of the sixteenth century than it had been before.

An important part of the difficult world with which the ruler and his representatives have to deal is the unruly mass of the people, always threatening to overthrow its rulers and the established order. Both Castillo de Bobadilla and Mariana are especially preoccupied with this issue and show themselves less interested in contemplating the harmonious pattern of the social structure in the larger scheme of things than in studying the devices of effective political and social control. (We have seen in what vigorous terms Castillo de Bobadilla writes of the need of prisons and punishments to uphold law in society and how Ribadeneyra writes no less forcefully on the same topic.) Furthermore, whereas Fox Morcillo found the origins of human society in the desire of rational human beings for association and cooperation to their mutual advantage, Castillo de Bobadilla and Mariana trace those origins to the human propensity to violence in pursuit of self-interest and to the need of the weaker to defend themselves against the stronger.

(ii) Education, the ruler, and society.

Our treatises are often severely critical of contemporary Spanish society. This is especially on the grounds of its values and attitudes. Writers of varied backgrounds, both laymen and clergy, whose outlooks differ markedly in other respects, agree in criticizing those of their fellows in possession of wealth and social position for their extravagant display and self-indulgence, their concern with material possessions, their self-importance (which they are inclined to present in terms of 'honra'), their social arrogance, their lack of concern with virtuous and truly Christian living. Costa speaks of their indifference to the needs of the poor; Castilla y de Aguayo of their laxity in moral behaviour and religious observance. Mariana, characteristically specific, attacks idlers at Court, useless or corrupt Crown officials, wealth-loving prelates, and (in cautious terms) comments critically on prevalent attitudes towards the *conversos* and on their treatment by the Inquisition. There is a perception among these writers that the moral character of Spanish society had recently deteriorated and wide-spread agreement that it was now so bad as to be nearly beyond hope of improvement. Camós, Ribadeneyra, and, most emphatically of the three, Mariana recall how corrupt self-indulgence
led to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. Their remarks on the subject belong with the literature of declinación of earlier seventeenth-century Spain.

An aspect of contemporary Spanish society especially picked out for criticism is its allegedly widespread indifference to the values and purposes of education. Consideration of this point will bring us to another set of issues whose discussion is prominent in these works and represents one of their most interesting features.

The indifference to learning displayed by caballeros of the time is commented upon by various of our writers—Castilla y de Aguayo, Merola, Torres and Mariana among them. That indifference, it is claimed, extended even to such elementary matters as being able to read and write in a competent fashion. Torres sees this as ‘a new barbarism’; Merola links it to attitudes of social rank; Castilla laments in particular the failure of fathers to have their sons properly educated—away from home—so as to make them more capable of maintaining their social position and in particular to equip them for the pursuit of careers in public office under the Crown.

Taken generally, the writers studied here have a good deal to say about the importance of education—whether as regards the ruler himself, or those who govern by his authority, or caballeros and citizens at large. For Mariana, well-based and effective moral education is ‘the only remedy that can be applied to our sick and enfeebled society’ (p. 135/p. 498a). While their observations on the topic often have a larger reach, they are focused on the ruler or regidor and his particular practical needs. In consequence of that, Fox Morcillo explicitly rejects as irrelevant Plato’s ideal of the philosopher-king, declaring it to be his aim, instead, to portray, as we have seen, a ruler possessed of moderate rather than great learning, such as will be an adornment and pleasure to him and of profit to those over whom he rules. Similarly, Torres rejects the aim of portraying a scholar-prince and makes it clear that not all the traditional subjects included in the trivium and quadrivium are to be studied by all, still less by the prince. For Mariana, Alfonso the Wise, made vain by all his learning, is an example to be carefully avoided, not followed (p. 184/p. 511a). Costa had already rejected the encyclopaedic ideal of knowledge as inappropriate for his regidor and Castilla y de Aguayo (though less explicitly) had adopted the same position. The grounds for this approach included—to a different extent in different writers—a concern with the ruler’s (or public official’s) need to receive
preparation for the practical tasks of government in the world as it is—that same concern which underlay unease with or rejection of the scheme of the four cardinal virtues in this regard—and also dis-
taste for some kinds of learning and intellectual expertise. In the lat-
ter case we have noted a widespread lack of sympathy with the
methodological subtleties of scholasticism, especially as associated with
natural philosophy.

That is not to say that the ancient scheme of the *trivium* and *quadr-
ivium*, making up the ‘seven liberal arts’, is wholly ignored or rejected.
It lies behind Fox Morcillo’s recommendation that the king be taught,
*inter alia*, eloquence, geometry, cosmography (closely allied to the tra-
ditional conception of ‘geometry’), and ‘astrology’. Costa urges the
value of training in rhetoric and dialectic for the future *regidor*, and,
in the case of the bright child, recommends study of the full tradi-
tional range of subjects. Torres acknowledges that same scheme of
study as a general ideal of education. However, he at once heavily
qualifies its value and appropriateness for the prince and by no
means sees it as providing the essential basis and structure of his
intellectual formation. The prince, he says, will not devote more care
and time to the study of these liberal arts than will serve him ‘as
an innocent exercise and a relaxation from weightier matters’ (p. 302a).
We have seen his cautious approach to ‘astrology’ and music. He
has less enthusiasm than Mariana for the study of arithmetic by
princes (‘since they have no occasion for buying and selling’), despite
its usefulness in war, and not much more for geometry, even though
this is a subject fit for gentlemen. It is the study of moral philoso-
phy that he recommends here above all else—though with the warn-
ing that in this case study counts for less than practice.² Mariana
would like to see the future king instructed—if time and his natural
talents permit—in the full cycle of the *artes liberalles*, or at least in
those of them that ‘most befit the dignity and nobility of kings’ and
equip them to be ‘a kind of deity’ to their subjects. However, one
cast for burdensome public office must not spend too much time ‘in
the shade and leisure of literary studies’. It would therefore be best
if he covered this cycle of subjects without spending too much time
on any one of them, mastering only the chief points of each. In any
case, this learning must rest on a firm foundation of instruction in

² See pp. 308a–b, 317b–19b.
religion and virtue (Book II, chapter vi). This was generally agreed. For Fox Morcillo the education of the king in virtue is more important than anything else except religion. Costa likewise prescribes the study of ethics as the place where the future regidor’s education should begin (and as the whole substance of it, along with religion, for the less apt pupil).

(iii) (a) The educational and civic values of Italian humanism adopted or rejected;

(b) the Jesuit position regarding these.

Giles of Rome had already made the same point, subordinating the study of the seven liberal arts to that of the ‘moral sciences’ on the grounds that the latter are of more immediate profit to those who have to rule (see above, p. 25). However, the manner in which our sixteenth-century Spanish tratadistas treat the issue takes us back rather to Francesco Patrizi’s De regno et regis institutione and the humanist treatises on education that preceded it—most notably Vergerio’s De ingenuis moribus ac liberalibus studiis adulescentiae (see above, pp. 26, 139–40). It is true, as Grendler (1989, p. 263) has remarked, that ‘Renaissance pedagogues neither taught a separate subject called moral philosophy nor read specific texts for that purpose. Instead they extracted moral lessons from curricular texts’. However, a concern that their pupils should draw such lessons from the texts of the Latin authors whom they studied was a characteristic element of these teachers’ approach to, and evaluation of, those authors. The latter might be prose-writers (Cicero being pre-eminent among them) explicitly engaged in pursuing a moral and social purpose; they might be poets; they might be historians. Again as Grendler (1989, p. 255) observes, ‘the Renaissance’s most original curricular innovation was teaching history’. The value of its study as a source of moral or practical guidance and encouragement, whether to the ruler or princely adviser or civic official, is pointed out by a whole series of our Spanish writers: Fox Morcillo, Furió Ceriol, Castiño de Bobadilla, Camós y Requeséns, Torres and Mariana among them. This takes us back to the Italian humanists’ commitment to the principle of transmitting morally and socially relevant knowledge and values—to the principle of ‘expertise in letters united with the knowledge of things’, as Bruni put it in the 1420s—‘things’ here meaning both ‘the moral facts and principles that should govern men’s lives’ and also ‘prac-
tical experience in the world, which might be acquired through history as well’ (Grendler, 1989, pp. 229–30). This already serves to indicate the extent of the debt owed by the Spanish writers examined here to the tradition and values of the Italian humanists.

The third subject for study which Vergerio groups with moral philosophy and history is, as we have seen, eloquence, by which, as he puts it, ‘one learns to speak gracefully, with gravity, in order to win over the hearts of the multitude’ (cited by Grendler, 1989, p. 118). One finds the value of rhetoric and eloquence to rulers stated in terms very similar to Vergerio’s by Costa, Torres and Mariana, while Furió places ‘the arts of speaking well’ second in his list of fifteen qualities to be sought in a prince’s counsellor.3

The study of all three subjects is commended by Vergerio on the grounds that they are parts of what he calls ‘civlis scientia’ and prepare men for participation in the civic life of the society to which they belong. This brings us to one of the major themes of Italian Renaissance humanism, and it is therefore of particular interest that essentially the same sense of the value of civic activity—of active participation in the life and service of the secular community in pursuit of the good, both individual and corporate, that specifically belongs to it—is prominently present in several of the Spanish treatises with which we have been concerned. It may find expression either in a direct treatment of the central topic or in discussion of closely related issues.

Fox Morcillo, Costa, Camós and (in a less developed fashion) Torres all see service of one’s respublica or patria as one of life’s main values. The terms in which they write of it are closely akin to those employed by Patrizi when treating the same subject, and, like him, they quote Plato (whether in the Crito or in the ‘Letter to Archytas’ attributed to him) and, above all, Cicero—especially his De officiis

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3 Costa, fo.9r–v; Torres, p. 300a; Mariana, pp. 185–87/pp. 511b–12a; Furió, fos.18v–20r/pp. 124–25. Furió and Mariana recall the ancient definition of man as a creature possessing the power of understanding and language; Costa and Mariana see skill in rhetoric and the practice of eloquence as bestowing a pre-eminent lustre and radiance on the ruler and as enhancing thereby his authority over those whom he governs. One can readily apply to a number of these Spanish writers the words of Hanna H. Gray some years ago when writing of the Italian humanists: ‘[…] the[ir] humanist conviction [was] that knowledge should serve practical ends, that human learning ought to have utility for human life, that education should instruct both will and intellect, and that in persuasion and eloquent discussion lie the effective means of conveying truth’ (Gray, 1963, p. 505).
and his Somnium Scipionis. So they are led to place service of the society to which one belongs before even duty to parents. In such discourse this service on the part of the ruler tends to be assimilated to that of any citizen, as we saw in Fox Morcillo and in Costa, who here echoes Patrizi’s De institutione reipublicae at a point where he in turn elaborates on the pseudo-Platonic ‘Letter’. A strong sense of the values attaching to an active civic role underlies, of course, the whole of Castilla y de Aguayo’s treatise on the perfect regidor.

The value of cultivating and practising the moral virtues in a social and civic context is quite often asserted in terms of contrast or opposition: whether between the relative claims of moral and natural philosophy as subjects for study or between the ‘active life’ and the ‘contemplative life’ as alternative modes of existence. This latter contrast leads into a series of further related topics.

The prior claims of moral over natural philosophy are stated with particular emphasis by Costa and Torres. Both echo Cicero’s argument in Book I of his De officiis where he places the performance of social duties above the pursuit of speculative knowledge, and both are led, explicitly or implicitly, to belittle the intellectual procedures of scholasticism. The closeness of their positions on this issue is all the more striking in view of their differences in other respects. As to the relative merits of the ‘active life’ and the ‘contemplative life’, both Merola and Camós, treating the matter in general terms, see the contemplative life as a pursuit of individual good which contrasts with the contribution to the good of society at large that constitutes the raison d’être of the active life. Camós is eager to stress the value of the latter on those grounds; Merola (at this point of his argument) explicitly states its superiority. Essentially the same conviction underlies the repeated assertions which we have encountered in Costa, Castillo de Bobadilla and (in this instance less emphatically) Camós, that those who minister justice in society acquire greater ‘merit’ thereby than those who adopt the ‘religious life’ as followed in one or another of the religious Orders. This sense of the value of society in its secular aspect comes into what both Costa and Camós have to say in commendation of the married state as compared with the celibate life devoted to religion and, more broadly, on behalf of the lay Christian life. A conviction of the value of the latter again underlies the whole of Castilla y de Aguayo’s treatment of the role of the regidor.

The fact that this nexus of values had the appeal that we have
seen for our writers does not mean that it always constituted a predominant point of view or an unproblematic element in a particular work. This is especially evident in the cases of Merola and Camós. Thus Merola, having written near the start of his work of the values of secular society and the contribution made by the legal profession to its well-being, goes on, at a much later point, to subvert the very basis of this position. Now we are told that the values and concerns of lawyers relate to things merely external and that the function of law in society is a merely utilitarian maintenance of peace. More radically, Merola now denies that the justice with which the lawyers are concerned is true justice, claiming rather that this is exclusively the business of his ‘teólogos’, while, more broadly, a truly virtuous society can rest only on the specifically Christian virtues. Thus, whereas he had earlier recalled with approval Cicero’s praise, in the Somnium Scipionis, for those who had given their lives to the service of their respublica and thereby earned a heavenly reward for themselves, he now repudiates it. As we saw, this change of position seems to owe much to a new sensitivity as this work progresses to views of pagan society and pagan virtue associated principally with Augustine’s De cievitate Dei.

As for Camós, although, when he comes to discuss the ecclesiastical order of society, he gives an account of the ‘states of perfection’ that denies any necessary superiority to those who have ‘entered religion’ over those who have not, and thus apparently reinforces the position that he so strongly establishes at the start of his treatise, he still later adopts a position that seems irredicably at variance with the earlier one (as, to some extent, Camós himself seems to recognize). For now the way of life of professed Religious is presented as intrinsically of a higher Christian order than that of the laity. Camós’s ambiguous position on the issue is perhaps, as we have seen, partly to be explained by the course of his own life. However, the dichotomy of attitudes and evaluations which we find in his treatise corresponds in certain basic respects to that which we have found in Merola, and this resemblance emphasizes its larger intellectual significance, arising as it does in large measure from the interaction—which both of these works especially display—of different traditions of thought relating to fundamental values.

It is a central feature of the account which Castilla y de Aguayo gives of his ideal regidor that civic and religious values are kept close together in the performance of that functionary’s public role. We
have seen on what grounds Castilla’s conception of that public role and the values attaching to it may be regarded as expressing the particular position of the Jesuits on these matters. Jesuit values seem to be detectably present again, though in a more limited fashion, in Mariana’s treatise and particularly in his chapters on the education of the young prince (Book II, chapters vi and viii especially). Two things especially attract attention here: the reiterated stress which Mariana places on the importance of acquiring a complete mastery of Latin, spoken as well as written, and the value which he sets on competition among pupils as a spur to intellectual achievement. In both these respects his prescriptions are reminiscent of the Jesuit Ratio studiorum and the pedagogical values and practice which it made its own.

The substance of Jesuit education, as followed over the successive years of Latin grammar, humanities and rhetoric, was, of course, that of the humanist studia humanitatis, though these were now taught in a more systematic fashion and set in a distinctive context of religious values and practice with a view to preparing pupils for their future role in society. Mariana’s chapters on the education of the prince draw heavily on the Institutio oratoria of Quintilian, who, over the century and a half following the recovery of the full text of this work early in the fifteenth century, ‘became the revered authority behind every humanistic pedagogical treatise’ (Grendler, 1989, p. 120). Costa and Torres recall his words on the importance of adapting teaching to the aptitudes and dispositions of the individual pupil; Costa echoes his concern with the character and dispositions requisite in the teacher. Some of the criticisms which other Spanish writers voice of their contemporaries’ attitudes towards learning seem to owe something to Quintilian’s prompting as well as their own observation. In any case it is clear that the debt of these Spanish treatises to Italian humanist pedagogical thinking is a substantial one.

(iv) The contemporary context and intellectual traditions.

A more detailed examination of the debt of these works to the larger intellectual tradition of Renaissance Italy would also have to take into account the interest which some of them reveal in neo-Platonism, the Hermetic writings, the debate over the rival claims to pre-eminence of the faculties of medicine and law and the intellectual styles that these respectively represented. Merola’s treatise in parti-
cular shows how complex and even inconsistent a position a writer could be led to adopt as he drew on one element and another of the Italian tradition. There is, in any case, Machiavelli also, whose varied and often disturbing presence in several of these works, even when he remains unacknowledged or is mostly named only to be attacked, has been considered in some detail. It is clear that the Spanish treatises produced in Spain after the crisis of the late 1550s, like the ones produced in the Low Countries just before or during it, belong to, and insistently direct our attention towards, the larger European intellectual context of which Italy was so pre-eminent a part.

So far as France is concerned, the most striking debt found among our writers—even if in only two of them and in the last years of the century—is to Bodin’s Les Six Livres de la République. That work appears to have deeply marked the outlook both of Castillo de Bobadilla (whose familiarity with Bodin’s work is explicitly acknowledged in the first edition of his own treatise) and of Mariana in a number of respects: their view that human beings are animated by self-interest rather than by a concern for the common well-being; that society arose out of conflict and the need to control this; their sense of the always latent threat of destructive violence in the mass of the people; the consequent belief that this violence must be held in check by the ruler and the order of society maintained—by careful calculation and the adjustment of policy (especially as regards taxation), by the employment of the authority of religion, and by coercive force in so far as that is necessary. In these various ways princely rule is seen as the exercise of power. Ribadeneyra’s frequently remembered hostility to Bodin as chief and worst of the politiques, in the introduction to his own treatise, must not, therefore, be taken as unquestionably typical of Spanish attitudes of the time towards him.

We have noted evidence suggesting a link somewhat earlier between Costa’s occasional tendency towards philosophical scepticism and intellectual trends at Paris around the mid-century. As regards Merola, who had studied medicine at Montpellier, the immediate stimulus that moved him to write his treatise came from the massive compilations of the French lawyers Barthélemy de Chasseneux and André Tiraqueau: their Catalogus gloriae mundi and De nobilitate respectively, in which, amongst much else, the standing of the medical profession vis-à-vis the legal one was challenged.
It seems clear from the references found in a number of our Spanish treatises to these two French works that they were widely known in intellectual circles in the Spain of Philip II and served as vehicles for a broad and multi-faceted tradition of learning and debate—a tradition that derived predominantly from Italy. An important element in this tradition is that of the Roman Civil Law. In a number of respects our works serve to remind us of the importance of legal culture and its values in the intellectual life of Spain in the period with which we have been concerned. One thinks here especially of Castillo de Bobadilla, the context of learning to which he abundantly refers, and his attachment to the prerogatives of the Crown vis-à-vis the ecclesiastical estate; but also of the evident sympathy displayed by a number of these writers towards the claim that those secular officials who upheld justice in society were more ‘meritorious’ than those people who devoted themselves to the ‘religious life’ in the technical sense. This topic, of course, leads back to the question of the relation between the values and outlook of the Roman Civil Law as expressed in the work of its theorists, teachers and practitioners, and, on the other hand, those characteristic of Italian Renaissance humanism in its social bearing. This is an issue that deserves further investigation as regards Golden Age Spain.

It is characteristic of these works generally (Furió and Mariana being the only exceptions) to buttress their assertions and arguments with references to, and citations from, authors running from the Ancient World (whether Classical writers or the Bible or the Early Fathers) through the Middle Ages and down to the Renaissance period. These references all too often testify oppressively to the diligence of these authors in availing themselves of florilegia or to their prodigious memories for their first-hand reading. However, these references also serve to place discussions on the larger intellectual map of Europe over the centuries. At the start of our enquiry we noted that an important and much discussed issue as regards sixteenth-century Spain is that of how far, after the crisis years of the later 1550s, the intellectual life of Spain went on behind a cordon sanitaire and experienced a significant change of character as a result. The works examined here make it clear that, in considering this question, it is important to take fully into account the extent to which the larger and longer European tradition of thought—both religious and secular—continued to be available and to be drawn upon in Spain during the period with which we are concerned.
(v) Erasmianism after Erasmus.

When we turn to the question of significant continuities within Spain itself, in particular those between the reign of Philip II and the preceding one of Charles V, we are confronted by the issue of ‘Erasmianism’. We noted at the outset Bataillon’s view that religious and intellectual attitudes characteristic of, and fostered by, Erasmus survived in Spain, even after the crisis of the 1550s, in a discreet and unavowed fashion, and that further exploration of literary production in the reign of Philip II was likely to reveal more evidence of this. A number of the treatises considered here appear to offer such evidence. It relates to two themes: social values and intellectual values.

As to social values, we have found a strong convergence of priorities between Felipe de la Torre and Cerdán de Tallada, despite the different contexts in which they were writing and the different focuses of their works. It is central to the whole of de la Torre’s argument that the Christian ruler of his title must be Christian in no merely formal sense but in fact and essence, animated in the discharge of his office by his Christian dispositions and discipleship and united with his subjects in peaceable rule and Christian love: as we noted earlier, ‘the king must govern with the love of a brother and the charity of a Christian, and with the same love and charity the people must obey’ (see above, p. 82). It is the same ideal, expressed in the same key, as one finds both in ‘Rule VI’ of Erasmus’s *Enchiridion* and at greater length in his *Institutio principis christiani*. Cerdán de Tallada’s account, also, of a truly Christian society is focused on an ideal of Christian love (‘amor y dileción’) that places him in a close relation to both Erasmus and, through him, with Felipe de la Torre in this regard. The unifying power of the social concord that Cerdán envisages is emphasized when he writes, following Ephesians, of both Jew and Gentile being brought together in a shared participation in the social Body of Christ. This takes us back to that same ‘Rule VI’ of Erasmus’s *Enchiridion*.

The New Testament metaphor of the Christian society as the ‘Body of Christ’ is prominent in Camós’s *Microcosmia*, though now treated rather differently and in a fashion that brings out certain of its latent significances more explicitly than in the treatises of either de la Torre or Cerdán. For what Camós stresses in Book I of his own treatise is that the Christian society of the ‘Body of Christ’ is very largely to be identified with secular society in its corporate
aspect. This leads him to emphasize the Christian significance of the social existence of Christian lay people. Here, in Book I at least, Camós stresses that the living of an authentically Christian life does not require the adoption of the ‘religious life’ in the narrower and technical sense of that term, or even need to be centred on particular religious routines and devotional practices. But this was one of the fundamental convictions of Erasmus, expressed in a number of his most printed works, nowhere more so than in the *Enchiridion*.

To recognize a resemblance—even a close resemblance—between the positions of two writers on a major issue is, of course, not the same as to establish a connexion between them, still less the debt of the one to the other. In the case of the ‘Erasmian’ tradition in Spain over the whole span of the sixteenth century, the issue is made all the more difficult by questions of definition and the processes of transmission as well as by the large gaps that remain in our knowledge of the relevant intellectual context and even primary material. However, it seems clear from the evidence adduced here that views and evaluations of Christian society characteristic of Erasmus continued to be found in at least some quarters of Spanish society during the reign of Philip II, and it seems reasonable to conclude, at the least, that there was a connexion between the presence of those views and Erasmus himself, hard though it may be to specify the nature of that connexion in precise detail.

As to the intellectual values commended by these Spanish writers that are of interest as regards Erasmus, we met, in the first place, Fox Morcillo’s powerful endorsement of the humanist principle of ‘ad fontes’ applied to the whole spectrum of higher studies with a view to the promotion of sound learning. The larger purpose of this, in turn, was to serve the well-being of the king’s subjects generally and in particular to promote sound religion on the basis of the Scriptures, the Early Fathers, and the early ordinances of the Church (rather than their medieval successors). Fox Morcillo thus shows himself (as Vives also did, on a larger scale) to subscribe to the programme of renewal of the Church and of Christian living that was characteristic of North European humanism, of which Erasmus—himself dedicated to the principle of ‘ad fontes’, whether in literary or religious studies—was, of course, the dominating figure (McGrath, 1993, pp. 45–48, 53–58; Bierlaire, 1978, pp. 64–70).

The living of the Christian life on the basis of a true and enlightened understanding of its nature is referred to by Costa and Camós
in terms, respectively, of ‘Christian philosophy’ and ‘true philosophy’. For both writers, this ‘philosophy’ is more a matter of virtuous living than of intellectual disputation. Costa, more explicitly than Camós, accepts that the Christian’s pursuit of philosophy and wisdom will be aided by the teaching of the moral philosophers of Classical Antiquity; but both contrast the fruitfulness of the ‘Christian’ or ‘true’ philosophy which they commend with the uselessness, as they see it, of the quaestiones and subtle metaphysical disquisitions characteristic (as the reader is intended to see) of scholastic theology. The same contrast, very similarly expressed, is a recurrent topic in Erasmus—whether in his Paraclesis or his Ratio seu compendium verae theologiae or elsewhere; it indeed represents a profoundly important element in the understanding of the Christian religion that he sought to convey to his contemporaries. His sheer pre-eminence as an advocate of this position again makes it hard to doubt that this resemblance arises, directly or indirectly, from a connexion with his work, despite the intervening decades and all that they had brought.

On this basis one may venture to say that the works mentioned in the preceding paragraphs display certain ‘Erasmian’ elements or aspects that are of importance in the treatises where they occur. However, in those same works are to be found elements or aspects that either have nothing to do with themes of interest to Erasmus or diverge in greater or lesser degree from the positions that were characteristic of him. This divergence may amount to manifest conflict.

Thus we have found that Fox Morcillo, who had read Machiavelli, adopts a position regarding the issue of war that is very much at odds with Erasmus’s deeply held convictions on the matter. As for Camós, he not only endorses the legitimacy of war in general terms but argues in particular that it is the ruler’s duty to have resort to it when necessary for the defence of the Roman Catholic Church and voices strong hostility towards the ‘heretics’ of his time. This was bound up with his sense that the ‘new sects’ represented a grave danger to the unity and peace of kingdoms. We have noted his praise for Charles V and Philip II for taking measures to safeguard Spain from this danger. The very same attitude on this issue had already been adopted by Cerdán de Tallada, who has praise not only for Philip II but also for the Spanish Inquisition, on the grounds of its diligence in preserving Spain from the religious conflicts that had broken out north of the Pyrenees. His sense of the importance of maintaining religious unity in the interests of political unity and
strength seems to have been sharpened, as we have seen, by his reading of Machiavelli’s *Discorsi*.

(vi) Censorship, Inquisition, and intellectual life under Philip II.

This brings us to the question of what these treatises tell us about the effect on intellectual activity and expression of the official controls operated either by the Crown or by the Inquisition over the production and circulation of books in Spain.

Despite the connexion between these controls and earlier measures devised for the Low Countries, and despite the fact that, in all probability, alarm over the Louvain group studied in Chapter 3 lay behind certain of the measures adopted in Spain in the later 1550s, that group clearly belongs to a different context from the rest of our treatises and remains a case apart for our present purposes. Although the three treatises emanating from the Louvain group are of much interest now in relation to those published in succeeding decades in Spain itself, none was published there before the eighteenth century, and then it was Furió’s alone. None was included in the Spanish *Index*; on the other hand (apart from whatever resonance Fray Baltasar Pérez’s report to the Inquisition on the Louvain group may have acquired in relevant circles) each work had features that seem likely to have counted against the chances of its being published in the Peninsula or even of being explicitly mentioned. We have seen that certain passages of Furió’s *Del concejo y consejeros del principe* may find an echo in one or two of the treatises from Eastern Spain, but it is only Furió’s fellow Valencian, Cerdán de Tallada, who names the work, and only then in his *Veriloquium* in the first years of the next century.

So far as the situation in Spain is concerned, we must recall again the point recently emphasized by Kamen: that ‘until the end of the sixteenth century there was no regular or obligatory system of state censorship in the Aragonese realms’ (Kamen, 1993, p. 396). This perhaps helps to explain why, in Camós’s *Microcosmia*, passages survived into print—passages on the relative merits of the ‘active’ and ‘contemplative’ lives and the redemptive work of Christ—which, to judge from the treatment of Castillo de Bobadilla’s nearly contemporary *Política para corregidores* and from other evidence, seem likely to have attracted unfavourable attention from the censor in the Kingdoms of Castile. Again, the fact that these passages survived
unscathed in the second edition (of Madrid, 1595) may owe something to the fact that the work had first appeared with due authorizations at Barcelona, where the bishop approved the work for printing and circulation in his diocese.

Castillo de Bobadilla's *Política para corregidores* ran into trouble, as we have seen, with both the Crown authorities and the Inquisition. The Council of Castile at first refused permission for the printing of this work on the grounds that it was written in the vernacular, and required that it be put into Latin. Castillo made it clear that he had written in Spanish so that his work would be of more use to 'corregidores de espada y capa', as he put it—men discharging public office as corregidores but without professional training in the law. The response of the Council of Castile may seem surprising in view of the vigorous support that Castillo gives to the interests and prerogatives of the Crown and its agents vis-à-vis the institutional Church. It was perhaps felt that the very vigour with which he developed this case was excessive as regards the readership that he had in view. The Cortes in 1595, as we have seen, did not agree and persuaded the Council of Castile to change its mind.

It is where Castillo takes up the *topos* of the 'merit' and social usefulness of those who administer justice as compared with those who enter a religious Order that the censor's pen went to work on the first edition, blacking out the offending text where the now standard protective references to patristic authorities had been omitted. We are now dealing with the response of the Inquisition.

The position adopted by Castillo on this point is at one with that which he expresses in a number of other passages whose deletion was recommended by the same examiner or ordered by the subsequent *carta acordada* (or special instruction) issued by the Inquisition in 1604. In almost every case, what was found unacceptable was Castillo's attribution of superior standing, rights or powers to the Crown and the secular legal authorities vis-à-vis the ecclesiastical order, its courts and its property.

Mariana's *De rege* shows that a work—or its author—could create difficulties for its publication even when it did not earn formal disapproval and prohibition. We have seen that the process of publishing this work was initiated only several years after it was written: shortly after the death of Philip II and during the few months that García de Loaiza Girón (at whose request Mariana had written it for the instruction of the future Philip III) was archbishop of Toledo.
The edition of Toledo 1599 was the only one to appear in Spain until it was brought out in translation in the nineteenth century. The chances of its republication during Mariana’s own lifetime would not have been enhanced either by the trouble in which Mariana found himself with the Spanish government after the appearance of his *Tractatus VII* at Cologne in 1609, or by the fact that the *Index* of 1612 required a series of deletions in various of these treatises, including the one on the Vulgate version of the Bible. The *scandale* over the *De rege* at Paris in 1610, after the assassination of Henry IV, would have told in the same direction.

Despite these particular cases, the contents and fortunes of the works produced in the Peninsula leave one much more aware—when they are taken together—of how wide a range of discussion was possible in print than of any limitations placed upon it. These treatises do not give support to the contention that either the Crown or the Inquisition effectively imposed, or even tried to impose, a party-line on all significant issues, still less a unified and comprehensive ideological position.

This clearly has a bearing on the question of how far it is useful to discuss the intellectual production of Spain in the time of Philip II in terms of the ‘Counter-Reformation’. Precisely because—inevitably—the term has been so much used by students of this period of Spanish history and of *Siglo de Oro* literature, it is important to note that, in recent decades especially, a scholarly debate has developed in which the character and significance of both the Counter-Reformation and the Council of Trent have been searchingly re-examined and extensively re-evaluated. In the former case, the validity and usefulness of the very concept have been called into question, save in so far as its meaning is strictly limited to institutions deliberately established, or decisions taken, with the purpose of opposing the Protestants. It is not relevant to the aims of this present study to enter into the particular issues that arise here. However, it is clearly important to give due weight to the fact that ‘the Counter-Reformation’ is far from being an unproblematic term as regards the significance to be

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4 Here, *inter alia*, the whole passage containing Mariana’s much quoted remarks implicitly referring to the arrest of Luis de León and others is ordered to be removed. See *Index librorum prohibitorum et expurgatorum* (Madrid, 1612), p. 573a.

5 I am much indebted on this point to J.W. O’Malley’s lectures on ‘Whatever happened to the Counter-Reformation?’ given in the University of Oxford in 1994.
attached to it in the matter of giving an account of, and interpreting, Spanish intellectual and religious life in the time of Philip II. In particular, it is clear that much caution is necessary if one is to argue that the fostering and maintaining of a specific world-view or ideology was a purpose and achievement of the Council of Trent and is to be seen as an aspect of the Counter-Reformation.

Of the treatises examined here only that by Ribadeneyra lends itself to interpretation in this sense; and even in that case we have seen how difficult it proved for its author to maintain a clear and consistent position, even as regards the fundamental postulates and principles of which he sought to be the advocate. For the rest, these treatises produced in Philip II’s Spain (those produced in the Low Countries in the 1550s do not, of course, come into this issue) are little illuminated by examination in terms of the Counter-Reformation (or, alternatively, the Catholic Reformation). On the contrary, to view them in that perspective involves the risk of attributing to them a degree and kind of homogeneity which—the evidence surveyed here suggests—they do not possess.

We thus return to the point stressed at the start of this concluding chapter: the variety of these works, the variety of the voices that speak through them. Another way of approaching that variety would be to examine it in terms of ‘languages, standpoints and attitudes’, and to do so along the lines illuminatingly indicated some years ago by H.A. Hodges (1953). For Hodges, ‘standpoint’ signifies—all together—‘the basic assumption [made], the resulting aims and methods, and the way of seeing things to which these in turn give rise’ (p. 15). The operative basic assumption or presupposition may well not be wholly cognitive in nature, but rather may include elements of value-judgement or volitional determination, for, as Hodges says, these also are capable of being expressed as general principles and so of opening up fields of discourse. ‘Different languages represent different standpoints, and different standpoints require and generate different languages to be their vehicles’ (p. 16). Behind ‘standpoints’, however, lie ‘attitudes’, those dispositions of the mind which, in the last analysis, determine the course of [a man’s] thinking; for it is they which determine what he is interested in, and what kind of interest he takes in it, the questions which he wishes to ask about it, and the assumptions which he is prepared to make in order to obtain answers to these questions. His standpoint, in short, derives directly from his attitude to experience, and differences of standpoint depend on and reflect differences in the underlying attitudes (p. 49).
The works that have been examined here perhaps suffice to indicate the relevance of a study in such terms to Spain and its intellectual production in its Siglo de Oro. More immediately, in the course of offering material and arguments that are of interest as regards a wide range of particular issues, they illustrate the varied and complex character of Spanish intellectual culture during the reign of Philip II. They indicate that this was more varied and complex than has generally been taken to be the case; and it is to be hoped that what they show of that will serve as an invitation to explore the scene further.
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