ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL SCIENCE.

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In two volumes.

VOL. I.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

These Volumes contain an Abridgement, and for the most part a very brief one, of a series of Discourses, delivered in Marischal College, on Moral Philosophy and Logic.

It has long been the Author's practice, with a view to assist the memory of his hearers, to make them write Notes of each discourse. But as that was necessarily done in haste, inaccuracy was unavoidable: and many of them have expressed their wishes that he would put it in their power to procure correct copies of the whole Summary, a little enlarged in the
doctrinal parts, and with the addition of a few illustrative examples. This is one of his motives to the present publication; which some are pleased to think has been too long delayed: and which is become the more excusable, as hundreds of manuscript copies of the Notes, many of them incomplete as well as incorrect, are now extant; and as several extracts from them have got, he knows not how, into print, with more imperfections, it may be, than could reasonably be imputed to the author. He begs leave to add, as another reason for making these papers public, that he has been advised to it by many persons, whose judgment and love of good learning entitle them at all times to his most respectful attention.

It will no doubt be observed, that some of the following topics, though brevity has been aimed at in all, are treated more compendiously than others. This could, he thinks, be accounted for; but not without
much egotism, and a detail of particulars neither necessary nor interesting.

No body, he presumes, will be offended, if in these papers there be found, as there certainly will, numberless thoughts and arguments which may be found elsewhere. It will be considered, that, as a professor’s province is generally assigned him by public authority, his business is rather to collect and arrange his materials, than to invent or make them. In his illustrations, in order to render what he teaches as perspicuous and entertaining as possible, he may give ample scope to his inventive powers: but, in preparing a summary of his principles, he will be more solicitous to make a collection of useful truths, however old, than to amuse his readers with paradox, and theories of his own contrivance.—And let it be considered further, that, as all the practical, and most of the speculative, parts of Moral Science, have been frequently and fully explained by the ablest writers, he would, if he should at—
fect novelty in these matters, neither do justice to his subject, nor easily clear himself from the charge of ostentation.

Of such of the Author's Lectures as have already, under the name of Essays, been published in the same form in which they were at first composed, particularly those on Language, Memory, and Imagination, he has made this abridgement as brief as was consistent with any degree of perspicuity. Some may think, that he ought to have left out those parts; and he once thought so himself. But it occurred to him, that many persons, into whose hands this book would perhaps come, may have never seen those printed lectures, and possibly never would see them;—that he could not with a good grace recommend it to any body to purchase the volumes in which they are to be found;—and that, if those parts should be wholly omitted, his System, as exhibited in this Epitome, would have a mutilated appearance, and be still more imperfect than it is.
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INTRODUCTION.

1. **Human** knowledge has been divided into history, philosophy, mathematics, and poetry or fable.* History records the actions of men, and the other appearances of the visible universe. Poetry or fable is an imitation of history, according to probability, and exhibits things, not as they are, but as we might suppose them to be. Philosophy investigates the laws of nature, with a view to the regulation of human conduct, and the enlargement of human power. The mathematical sciences ascertain relations and proportions in quantity and number.—History and philosophy are founded in the knowledge of real things. Mathematical truths result from the nature of the quantities or numbers compared together. Poetical representations are approved of, if they resemble real things, and are themselves agreeable.

* Bacon considers poetry as a part of human knowledge, and mathematics as an appendage to natural philosophy.
2. These parts of knowledge are not always kept distinct or separate. Philosophical investigation may find a place in history, and historical narrative is often necessary in philosophy. Many things in natural philosophy are ascertained and illustrated by mathematical reasoning. Poetical description may contribute to the embellishment of history; as may be seen in many passages of Livy, Tacitus, and other great historians. And true narrative and sound reasoning may in poetry be both ornamental and useful, as we see in many parts of *Paradise Lost*.

3. History is referred to memory, because it records what is past, whereof without memory men would have no knowledge. Poetry is the work of fancy or imagination, that is, of the inventive powers of man; which however must be regulated by the knowledge of nature. Philosophy and mathematics are improved and prosecuted by a right use of reason: but there is this difference between them, that to the discovery of mathematical truth reason is alone sufficient; whereas, to form a philosopher, reason and knowledge of nature are both necessary. Mathematics, therefore, though an instrument of philosophy, and an appendage to it, cannot with propriety be called a part of it.
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4. Of philosophy different definitions and descriptions have been given, according to the different views which have been taken of it. As improved by Bacon, Boyle, Newton, and other great men, it may now be defined, the knowledge of nature applied to practical and useful purposes. It is useful in these four respects: first, because it exercises, and consequently improves, the rational powers of man: secondly, because it gives pleasure by gratifying curiosity: thirdly, because it regulates the opinions of men, and directs their actions: and, fourthly, because it enables us to discover in part the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being, the Creator of all things, who has established those general principles, which are called the laws of nature, and according to which all the phenomena of the universe are produced.

5. Without some acquaintance with nature, we could not act at all, either in pursuing good, or in avoiding evil; we should not know that fire would burn or food nourish us. In brutes, whose experience, compared with ours, is very limited, the want of this knowledge is supplied, as far as may be necessary for them or beneficial to us, by natural instinct.—We discover causes by comparing things together, and observing the relations, resemblances, and connections, that take place among
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them, and the effects produced by their being applied to one another. And, by comparing several causes together, we may sometimes trace them up to one common cause, or general principle; as Newton resolved the laws of motion into the vis inertiae of matter.

6. As all philosophy is founded in the knowledge of nature, that is, of the things that really exist; and as all the things that really exist, as far as we are concerned in them and capable of observing them, are either bodies or spirits, philosophy consists of two parts, the Philosophy of Body, and the Philosophy of Spirit or Mind. The latter, which is our present business, has been sometimes called the Abstract Philosophy, because it treats of things abstracted or distinguished from matter; and sometimes it is called Moral Philosophy, on account of its influence on life and manners. It consists, like every other branch of science, of a speculative and a practical part: the former being employed in ascertaining the appearances, and tracing out the laws of nature; the latter, in applying this knowledge to practical and useful purposes. But to keep these two parts always, and entirely distinct, would, if at all practicable, occasion no little inconvenience.
7. The speculative part of the philosophy of mind has been called Pneumatology. It inquires into the nature of those spirits or minds, whereof we may have certain knowledge, and wherewith it concerns us to be acquainted; and those are the Deity and the human mind. Of other spirits, as good and evil angels, and the vital principle of brutes, (if this may be called spirit), though we know that such things exist, we have not from the light of nature any certain knowledge, nor is it necessary that we should. Pneumatology, therefore, consists of two parts, first, Natural Theology, which evinces the being and attributes of the Deity, as far as these are discoverable by a right use of reason; and, secondly, the Philosophy of the Human Mind, which some writers have termed Psychology. We begin with the latter, because it is more immediately the object of our experience.—An Appendix will be subjoined, concerning the immortality and incorporeal nature of the human soul.

8. The mind of man may be improved, in respect, first of action, and secondly, of knowledge. The practical part, therefore, of this abstract philosophy consists of two parts, Moral Philosophy (strictly so called), which treats of the improvement of our active or moral powers; and Logic, which treats of the improvement of our intellectual
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faculties. Thus we see that the moral sciences may be reduced to four, PsYChology, NaTuRal ThEoLoGy, MRaL PHILOSOPHY, and LiOgIC. These, with their several divisions and subdivisions, I shall consider in that order which may be found the most convenient.
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of

MORAL SCIENCE.

PART FIRST.

PSYCHOLOGY.

9. This science explains the nature of the several powers or faculties of the human mind. By the faculties of the mind, I understand those capacities which it has of exerting itself in perceiving, thinking, remembering, imagining, &c.; and by the mind itself, or soul, or spirit,* of man, I mean that part of the human constitution which is capable of perceiving, thinking, and beginning motion, and without which our body would be a senseless, motionless, and lifeless thing. These

* These words are not strictly synonymous; but it is needless to be more explicit in this place.

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faculties were long ago divided into those of perception and those of volition; and the division, though not accurate, may be adopted here. By the perceptive powers we are supposed to acquire knowledge; and by the powers of volition, or will, we are said to exert ourselves in action.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERCEPTIVE FACULTIES.

10. These may perhaps be reduced to nine. 1. External sensation, by which we acquire the knowledge of bodies and their qualities. 2. Consciousness, by which we attend to the thoughts of our minds, and which is also called reflection. 3. Memory. 4. Imagination. 5. Dreaming. 6. The faculty of speech, whereby we discover what is passing in the minds of one another. 7. Abstraction, a thing to be explained by and by. 8. Reason, judgment, or understanding, by which we perceive the difference between truth and falsehood. 9. Conscience, or the moral faculty, whereby we distinguish between virtue and vice, between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.

11. Whether this distribution of our perceptive
powers be accurate, or sufficiently comprehensive, will perhaps appear afterwards; at present we need not stop to inquire. I shall consider them, not in the order in which I have just now named them, but in that order that shall seem the most convenient. And I begin with the faculty of speech: that subject being connected with some others that my hearers are already acquainted with, and therefore likely to be attended with little difficulty, even to those who are not much accustomed to abstract inquiry; to which it will, for that reason, serve as a proper and easy introduction. But, before I proceed to it, a few remarks must be premised for the purpose of explaining some words which will frequently occur in the course of these inquiries.

SECTION I.

Some words explained.

12. That we exist, and are continually employed about a variety of things, is certain and self-evident. Sometimes we perceive things themselves; and this happens when they are so far present with us as to affect our organs or powers of sensation: thus we just now perceive light, and the other things around us. Sometimes we think of things when they are not in this sense present with us. Thus at midnight, or when our eyes are shut, we can think of light, and the other things we have seen or heard.
during the day. When we thus think of that which we do not perceive, that is, which does not affect our powers of sensation or perception, we are said, in the language of modern philosophy, to have an idea or a notion of it. *Habere notionem rei alicujus*, is a Latin phrase of like import.

13. The word *idea* has been applied to many purposes; and, from the inaccurate manner in which some writers have used it, has proved the occasion of many errors. It has been used to denote opinion, as when we speak of the ideas of Aristotle, meaning his opinions or doctrines: but this sense of the word is rather French than English. Sometimes it means one's particular way of conceiving or comprehending a thing; as when we say, the Epicurean philosophy, according to Cicero's *idea* of it, was very unfriendly to virtue. It was long used to signify an imaginary thing, by the intervention of which we were supposed to perceive external things, or bodies. For many ancient and modern philosophers fancied, that the soul could perceive nothing but what was contiguous to it, or in the same place with it; and, as the bodies we perceive without us are not in the same place with the soul, (for, if they were, they would all be within the human body), it was said that we did not perceive those bodies themselves, but only ideas or unsubstantial images of them, which proceeded from them, and, penetrating the human body, might be in the same place with the soul,
or contiguous to it. All this is not only fiction, but unintelligible. We perceive bodies themselves; and can as easily understand how the soul should perceive what is distant, as how it should perceive what is contiguous or near.

14. In the Platonic, and perhaps too in the Pythagorean philosophy, ideas are those external, self-existent, and uncreated models, prototypes, or patterns, according to which the Deity made all things of an eternal and uncreated matter; and which, while he employs himself in creation, he continually looks upon: whence it is supposed that the word ἰδέα (from ιδεῖν, to see or behold) is derived. Cicero gives two Latin terms corresponding to idea, in this sense of the word; and those are species and forma. The first (derived from the old Latin verb specio, I behold) is more according to analogy; but is inconvenient, because those oblique cases in the plural specierum and speciebus cannot be admitted into good Latin; and therefore our author prefers the other word forma, to whose plural cases there can be no objection. Of these self-existent ideas Plato was, as Cicero says, marvellously fond; supposing that there was something divine in their nature. The word idea, in this sense of it, we shall not often have occasion to repeat.

15. The same word has still another meaning among philosophers; having been used to denote a thought of the mind, which may be expressed...
by a general term, or common appellative, that is, by a noun which is not a proper name. The words man, horse, mountain, &c. are significant of ideas in this sense of the term, and are general names or common appellatives, because they belong equally to every man, every horse, every mountain. That this may be the better understood, and in order to prepare my hearers for some things that will immediately follow, it is proper to introduce here a few remarks on that faculty of our nature, which some have called abstraction, or the power of forming general ideas by arranging things in classes; a faculty, which the brutes probably have not, and without which both language and science would be impossible.

16. All the things in nature are individual things: that is, every thing is itself and one, and not another or more than one. But when a number of individual things are observed to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a class, tribe, or species, to which we give a name; and this name belongs equally to every thing comprehended in the species. Thus, all animals of a certain form resemble each other in having four feet; and therefore we consider them as in this respect of the same species, to which we give the name quadruped; and this name belongs equally to every individual of the species; from the elephant, one of the greatest, to the mouse, one of the least.
17. Again, observing several species to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a higher class, called a genus, to which we give a name; which name belongs equally to every species comprehended in the genus, and to every individual comprehended in the several species. Thus all the tribes of living things resemble each other in this respect, that they have life; whence we refer them to a genus called animal; and this name belongs equally to every species of animals, to men, beasts, fishes, fowls, and insects, and to each individual man, beast, fish, fowl, and insect.

18. Further, All things animated and inanimate resemble each other in this respect, that they are created; whence we refer them to a genus still higher, which may be called creature: a name which belongs equally to every genus and species of created things, and to each individual thing that is created. Further still, all beings whatever exist, or are, and in this respect may be said to resemble each other: in which view we refer them to a genus still higher, called being, which is the highest possible genus.

19. The English word kind is said to have been originally of the same import with genus, and sort the same with species. But the words kind and sort have long been confounded by our best writers; and hence, when we would speak accurately on this subject, we are obliged to take the words genus
and *species* from another language. All those thoughts or conceptions of the mind, which we express by names significant of *genera* and *species*, may be called *general ideas*, and have been by some philosophers called *ideas* simply. And those thoughts or conceptions, which we express by proper names, or by general names so qualified by pronouns as to denote individual things or persons, may be called *singular* or *particular ideas*, and were by some English writers of the last century termed *notions*. In this sense of the words, one has a *notion* of Socrates, Etna, this town, *that house*; and an *idea* of *man*, mountain, *house*, *town*. It were to be wished, that the words *idea* and *notion* had been still thus distinguished; but they have long been applied to other purposes. And now *idea* seems to express a clearer, and *notion* a fainter, conception.

20. Of the manner in which the mind forms general ideas, so much has been said by metaphysical writers, that without great expence of time, not even an abridgement of it could be given: and I apprehend it would not be easy to make such an abridgement useful, or even intelligible. It appears to me, that, as all things are individuals, all thoughts must be so too. A thought therefore is still but one thought; and cannot, as such, have that universality in its appearance, which a general term has in its signification. In short, as I understand the words, to have general ideas, or general
conceptions, is nothing more, than to know the meaning and use of general terms, or common appellatives. Proper names occur in language much more seldom than general terms. And therefore, if we had not this faculty of arranging things according to their genera and species, general terms would not be understood, and consequently language (as already observed) would be impossible.

21. There is another sort of abstraction, which affects both our thinking and our speaking; and takes place, when we consider any quality of a thing separately from the thing itself, and speak and think of it as if it were itself a thing, and capable of being characterised by qualities. Thus from beautiful animal, moving animal, cruel animal, separate the qualities, and make nouns of them, and they become beauty, motion, cruelty; which are called in grammar abstract nouns; and which, as if they stood for real things, may be characterised by qualities, great beauty, swift motion, barbarous cruelty. These qualities, too, may be abstracted and changed into nouns, greatness, swiftness, barbarity, &c. Of these abstract nouns there are multitudes in every language.
SECTION II.

Of the Faculty of Speech.

22. The philosophy of speech is an important and curious part of science. In treating of it, I shall, first, explain the origin and general nature of speech; and, secondly, consider the essentials of language, by shewing how many sorts of words are necessary for expressing all the varieties of human thought, and what is the nature and use of each particular sort.

Origin and general Nature of Speech.

23. Man is the only animal that can speak. For speech implies the arrangement and separation of our thoughts; and this is the work of reason and reflection. Articulate sounds resembling speech may be uttered by parrots, by ravens, and even by machines; but this is not speech, because it implies neither reflection, nor reason, nor any separation of successive thoughts; because, in a word, the machine or parrot does not, and cannot, understand the meaning of what it is thus made to utter.

24. The natural voices of brute animals are not, however, without meaning. But they differ from speech in these three respects. First, man speaks
by art and imitation; whereas brutes utter their voices without being taught, that is, by the instinct of their nature. Secondly, the voices of brutes are not separable into simple elementary sounds, as the speech of man is; nor do they admit of that amazing variety whereof our articulate voices are susceptible. And, thirdly, they seem to express, not separate thoughts or ideas, but such feelings, pleasant or painful, as it may be necessary, for the good of those animals, or for the benefit of man, that they should have the power of uttering.

25. We learn to speak, by imitating the speech of others; so that he who is born quite deaf, and continues so, must of necessity be dumb. Instances there have been of persons, who had heard in the beginning of life and afterwards became deaf, using a strange sort of language, made up partly of words they had learned, and partly of other words they had invented. Such persons could guess at the meaning of what was spoken to them in their own dialect, by looking the speaker in the face, and observing the lips, and those other parts of the face, which are put in motion by speaking.

26. We speak, in order to make our thoughts known to others. Now thoughts themselves are not visible, nor can they be perceived by any outward sense. If, therefore, I make my thoughts perceptible to another man, it must be by means
of signs, which he and I understand in the same sense. The signs that express human thought, so as to make it known to others, are of two sorts, natural and artificial.

27. The natural signs of thought are those outward appearances in the eyes, complexion, features, gesture, and voice, which accompany certain emotions of the mind, and which, being common to all men, are universally understood. For example, uplifted hands and eyes, with bended knees, are in every part of the world known to signify earnest entreaty; fiery eyes, wrinkled brows, quick motions, and loud voice, betoken anger; paleness and trembling are signs of fear, tears of sorrow, laughter of merriment, &c. Compared with the multitude of our thoughts, these natural signs are but few, and therefore insufficient for the purposes of speech. Hence artificial signs have been universally adopted, which derive their meaning from human contrivance, and are not understood except by those who have been taught the use of them.

28. These artificial signs may be divided into visible and audible. The former are used by dumb men; by ships that sail in company; and sometimes by people at land, who, by means of fire and other signals, communicate intelligence from one place to another: but for the ordinary purposes of life such contrivances would be inconvenient and insufficient. And therefore audible
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CHAP. I. § 11.

Signs, performed by the human voice, are in all nations used in order to communicate thought. For the human voice has an endless variety of expression, and is in all its varieties easily managed, and distinctly perceptible by the human ear, in darkness as well as in light.

29. Human voice is air sent out from the lungs, and by the windpipe conveyed through the aperture of the larynx, where the breath operates upon the membranous lips of that aperture, so as to produce distinct and audible sound; in a way resembling that in which the lips of the reed of a hautboy produce musical sound when one blows into them. We may indeed breathe strongly, without uttering what is called voice: and, in order to transform our breath into vocal sound, it seems necessary, that, by an act of our will, which long practice has rendered habitual, we should convey a sort of tenseness to the parts through which the breath passes. New-born infants do this instinctively; which changes their breathing, when stronger than usual, into crying. And persons in great pain do the same; which transforms their breathing into groans.

30. The aperture of the larynx is called the glottis, and, when we swallow food or drink, is covered with a lid called the epi-glottis. As our voice rises in its tone, the glottis becomes narrower, and wider as the voice becomes more grave or deep. Now any ordinary human voice may sound
a great variety of tones; and each variety of tone is occasioned by a variation in the diameter of the glottis. And therefore, the muscles and fibres, that minister to the motion of these parts, must be exceedingly minute and delicate.

31. One may use one's voice without articulation; as when one sings a tune without applying syllables to it: in which case the vocal organs perform no other part than that of a wind instrument of music. But speech is made up of articulate voices: and articulation is performed by those parts of the throat and mouth, which the voice passes through in its way from the larynx to the open air; namely, by the tongue, palate, throat, lips, and nostrils. Speech is articulated voice: whispering is articulated breath.

32. Of vocal articulated sounds the simplest are those which proceed through an open mouth, and which are called vowel sounds. In transmitting these, the opening of the mouth may be pretty large, or somewhat smaller, or very small; and thus three different vowel sounds may be formed, each of which may admit of three varieties, according as the voice, in its passage through the inside of the mouth, is acted upon by the lips, the tongue, or the throat. In this way, nine simple vowel sounds may be produced. There are ten in the English tongue, though we have not a vowel letter for each. Indeed our alphabet of vowels is very imperfect. In other languages there
may be vowel sounds different from any we have: that of the French u is one.

33. When the voice in its passage through the mouth is *totally intercepted* by the articulating organs coming together, or *strongly compressed* by their near approach to one another, there is formed another sort of articulation, which in writing is marked by a character called a consonant. Now silence is the effect of a total interception of the voice, and indistinctness of sound is produced by a strong compression of it. And therefore, a consonant can have no distinct sound, unless it be preceded or followed by a vowel, or opening of the mouth.

34. The variety of consonants, formed by a total interception of the voice, may be thus accounted for. The voice, in its passage through the inside of the mouth, may be *totally intercepted* by the lips, or by the tongue and palate, or by the tongue and throat; and each of these interceptions may happen, when the voice is directed to go out by the mouth only, or by the nose only, or partly by the mouth and partly by the nose. In this way we form nine primitive consonants; which are divided into mutes, p, t, k; semimutes, b, d, and g, as sounded in egg; and semivowels, m, n, and that sound of ng which is heard in king, and which, though we mark it by two letters, is as simple a sound as any other. The mutes are so called, because their sound instantly and totally
ceases on bringing the organs together; the semimutes, because a little faint sound is heard in the nostrils, or roof of the mouth, after the organs intercept the voice; and the semivowels, because their sound, escaping through the nostrils, may be continued for a considerable time after the voice is intercepted.

35. When the voice, directed to go out by the mouth only, or by the mouth and nose jointly, is not totally intercepted, but strongly compressed, in its passage, there is formed another class of consonants, which are the aspirations of the mutes and semimutes. Thus $p$ is changed into $f$; $b$ into $v$; $t$ into that sound of $th$ which is heard in thing; $d$ into that sound of $th$ which is heard in this, that, thine. The semivowels do not admit of aspiration, or at least are not aspirated in our language. And we have some irregular consonants, that cannot be accounted for according to this mode of arrangement, as $l$ and $r$, $s$, and $sh$; and in other tongues there may be consonant as well as vowel sounds, with which we are not acquainted.

36. In English the simple elementary sounds are thirty-two or thirty-three; namely, ten vowels, and twenty-two or twenty-three consonants. Our alphabet, therefore, if it were perfect, would consist of thirty-two or thirty-three letters. But, like other alphabets, it is imperfect, having several unnecessary letters, and wanting some which it ought
to have. Our spelling is equally imperfect; for many of our words have letters which are not sounded at all; and the same letter has not in every word the same sound. Hence some ingenious men have thought of reforming our alphabet, by introducing new letters; and our spelling, by striking off such as are unnecessary, and writing as we speak. But both schemes are unwise, because they would involve our laws and literature in confusion; and impracticable, because pronunciation is liable to change, and no two provinces in the British empire have exactly the same pronunciation.

37. By attending to those motions of the articulating organs, whereby the elementary sounds of speech are formed, an art has been invented, of teaching those to speak who do not hear. But it is most laborious, and by no means useful; for the articulation of such persons is so uncouth, as to give horror rather than pleasure to the hearer. The time, therefore, that is employed in this study, might be laid out to better purpose, in teaching those unfortunate persons the use of written language, the art of drawing, and a convenient system of visible signs for the communication of thought. Every necessary letter of the alphabet might be signified by pointing to a certain joint of the fingers, or to some other part of the hand; and the more common words, by other visible signs of the same nature: and such a contrivance, when
a dumb man becomes expert in it, and has learned to read and spell, would be of very great use to him.

38. By combining consonants with consonants, and with vowels and diphthongs, an endless variety of syllables, and consequently of words, may be formed. In English, exclusive of proper names, and of words derived from them, the number of words does not amount to fifty thousand; but most of them have several, and some of them many significations. Two vowels coalescing in one syllable, so as to form a double vowel sound, make what is called a diphthong, as ou in round, ui in juice; and sometimes a diphthongal sound is expressed by a single vowel letter, as u in muse, i in mind, and sometimes by three vowel letters, as eau in beauty, ieu in lieu.

39. As much speech as we pronounce with one effort of the articulating organs, is called a syllable. It may be a single vowel, as a, o; or a diphthong, as oi; or either of these modified by one, or more consonants, placed before it, or after it, or on both sides of it; as to, of, toy, oyl, top, cup, boil, broils, swift, strength, &c. The least part of language that has a meaning is a word; and words derive their meaning from common use: and it is both our interest and our duty, to use them in the common acceptation.

40. Some words are long, and others short. Those that are in continual use, as articles, pro-
nouns, auxiliary words, prepositions, and conjunctions, ought to be short, and generally are so. Primitive words are in most languages short; which proves, that those authors are mistaken who affirm, on the authority of some travellers, that barbarous languages abound in long words. Such travellers probably mistook a description or circumlocution for a single word; and as the voice in speaking does not make a pause at the end of each word, it is not unnatural for those, who hear what they do not understand, to mistake two or more successive words for one. Short words do not make style inharmonious, or insipid, unless they be in themselves harsh, or of little meaning.

41. Words alone do not constitute speech: emphasis and accent belong to all languages. The former is of two sorts; the emphasis of words, and the emphasis of syllables. The first is a stronger exertion of the voice laid upon some words, in order to distinguish the more significant parts of a sentence. The last is an energy of the voice laid upon some syllables of a word more than upon others, because custom has so determined.

42. The first, which may be called the rhetorical emphasis, is necessary to make spoken language perfectly intelligible. For if the speaker or reader misapply the emphasis, by laying the force of his voice upon the less significant, or not laying it on the more significant words, the hearer must in
many cases mistake the meaning. And no person in reading can apply the emphasis properly, unless he read slowly, be continually attentive, and understand the full import of every word he utters. Children therefore, while learning to read, ought to read nothing but what they perfectly understand. The emphasis of speech is by most grammarians called accent; but accent is quite a different thing.

43. Accent is the tone with which one speaks. For, in speaking, the voice of every man is sometimes more grave in the sound, and at other times more acute or shrill. Accent is related to music or song; as appears in the formation of the Latin word, from ad and cantus, and in that of the correspondent Greek term προσωδία, from προς and ωδή. Many people are insensible of the tone with which themselves and their neighbours speak; but all perceive the tone of a stranger who comes from a considerable distance: and if his tone seem in any degree uncouth or unpleasant to them, theirs it is likely is equally so to him. This at least is true of provincial accents. That accent, and that pronunciation, is generally in every country accounted the best, which is used in the metropolis by the most polite and learned persons.

44. The Greeks used in writing certain marks called accents, in order to make the tones of their language of more easy acquisition to foreigners: and those still remain in their books; but we can make no use of them, because we know not in
what way they regulated the voice. Every language, and almost every provincial dialect, is distinguished by peculiarities of tone; and nothing is more difficult than to acquire those tones of language that one has not learned in early life: so that the native country, and even the native province, of a stranger, may be known by his accent; which in both public and private life is frequently an advantage.

45. We learn to speak when our organs are most flexible, and our powers of imitation most active; that is, when we are infants: and, even then, this is no easy acquisition; being the effect of constant practice continued every day, for some years, from morning to night. Were we never to attempt speech till grown up, there is reason to think, that we should never learn to speak at all. And therefore, if there ever was a time when all mankind were dumb, *mutum et turpe pecus*, as Epicurus taught, all mankind must, in the ordinary course of things, have continued dumb to this day. For speech could not be *necessary* to animals who were supposed to have existed for ages without it; and among such animals the invention of unnecessary and difficult arts, whereof they saw no example in the world around them, was not to be expected. And speech, if invented at all by them, must have been invented either by dumb infants who were incapable of invention, or by dumb men who were incapable of speech. *Mankind, there-
fore, must have spoken in all ages; the young constantly learning to speak by imitating those who were older. And if so, our first parents must have received this art, as well as some others, by inspiration.

46. Moses informs us, that the first language continued to be spoken by all mankind till the building of Babel, that is, for about two thousand years. But, on that occasion, a miraculous confusion of languages took place; which must have immediately divided the human race into tribes or nations, as they only would choose to keep together who understood one another; and which accounts for the great variety of primitive tongues now in the world. By primitive tongues I mean those, which, having no resemblance to any other tongue in the sound of their words, are not supposed to be derived from any other. Greek and Latin resemble one another not a little; whence it is probable, that both were derived from some primitive tongue more ancient than either. The modern languages of France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, resemble one another very much; and we know they are in a great measure derived from the ancient Latin.

47. But there is no reason to think, that at Babel any other material alteration was introduced into human nature. And as men ever since have had the same faculties, and been placed in the same or similar circumstances, it may be presumed, that
the modes of human thought must have been much the same from that time forward; and, consequently, as speech arises from thought, that all languages must have some resemblance, in structure at least, if not in sound. Those particulars in which all languages resemble one another, must be essential to language. The Essentials of Language I shall proceed to consider, when I have made a remark or two on speech made visible by writing.

48. A word is an audible and articulate sign of thought: a letter is a visible sign of an articulate sound. Every man can speak who hears, and men have spoken in all ages; but in many nations the art of writing is still unknown. For before men can invent writing, they must divide their speech into words, and subdivide their words into simple elementary sounds, assigning to each sound a particular visible symbol: which, though easy to us, because we know the art, is never thought of by savages, and has been overlooked, or not sufficiently attended to, by some nations of very long standing. By means of writing, human thoughts may be made more durable than any other work of man; may be circulated in all nations; and may be so corrected, compared, and compounded, as to exhibit within a moderate compass the accumulated wisdom of many ages. It is therefore needless to enlarge upon the usefulness of this art,
as the means of ascertaining, methodising, preserving, and extending human knowledge.

49. There is reason to think, that this art must have been in the world from very early times, and that the use of an alphabet was known before the hieroglyphics of Egypt were invented. These last were probably contrived for the purpose of expressing mysteries of religion and government in a way not intelligible to the vulgar. For a hieroglyphic is a sort of riddle addressed to the eye; as if the figure of a circle were carved on a pillar, in order to represent eternity; a lamp, to denote life; an eye on the top of a sceptre, to signify a sovereign. Such conceits imply refinement rather than simplicity, and the disguise rather than the exhibition of thought; and therefore seem to have been the contrivance of men, who were in quest not of a necessary, but of a mysterious art; who had leisure to be witty and allegorical; who could express their thoughts plainly, but did not choose to do it.

50. In China they understand writing and printing too, and have done so, we are told, for many ages: but to this day they have not invented an alphabet, at least their men of learning use none. They are said to have a distinct character for each of their words, about fourscore thousand in all; which makes it impossible for a foreigner, and extremely difficult to a native, to understand
their written language. In very early times, men wrote, by engraving on stone; afterwards, by tracing out figures with a coloured liquid upon wood, the bark of trees, the Egyptian papyrus manufactured into a sort of paper, the skins of goats, sheep, and calves, made into parchment: in a word, different contrivances have been adopted in different ages, and by different nations. Pens, ink, and paper, as we use them, are said to have been introduced into these parts of the world about six hundred years ago.

51. The first printing known in Europe was, like that of the Chinese (from whom, however, our printers did not borrow it), by blocks of wood, whereon were engraved all the characters of every page. This art is supposed to have been invented in Germany, or in Flanders, about the year 1420. Printing with moveable types was found out about thirty years later, and is a very great improvement upon the former method. By means of this wonderful art, books are multiplied to such a degree, that every family (I had almost said every person) may now have a Bible; which, when manuscripts only were in use, every parish could hardly afford to have; as the expence of writing out so great a book would be at least equal to that of building an ordinary country church. This one example may suggest a hint for estimating the importance of the art of printing.

52. Within less than a century after it was in-
vented, printing was brought to perfection in France, by the illustrious Robert Stephen and his son Henry; who were not only the greatest of printers, but also the most learned men of modern times; and to whom, for their beautiful and correct editions of the Classics, and for their dictionaries of the Greek and Latin tongues, every modern scholar is under very great obligations.

SECTION III.

Essentials of Language.

53. How many sorts of words are necessary in language? And what is the nature and use of each particular sort? When we have answered these two questions, we may be supposed to have discussed the present subject. In English, there are ten sorts of words, which are all found in the following short sentence—'I now see the good man coming; but, alas! he walks with difficulty.' I and he are pronouns; now is an adverb; see and walks are verbs; the is an article; good, an adjective; man and difficulty are nouns, the former substantive, the latter abstract; coming is a participle; but, a conjunction; alas! an interjection; with, a preposition. That no other sorts of words are necessary in language will appear, when we have seen in what respects these are necessary.
54. Of Nouns. A noun, or, as it is less properly called, a substantive, is the name of the thing spoken of. Without this sort of word, men could not speak of one another or of any thing else. Nouns, therefore, there must be in all languages. Those which denote a genus, as animal, or a species, as man, may be applied either to one or to many things, and must therefore be so contrived as to express both unity and plurality. But a noun which is applicable to one individual only, and which is commonly called a proper name, cannot, where language is suited to the nature of things, have a plural. Proper names, therefore, when they take a plural as well as a singular form, cease to be proper names, and become the names of classes or tribes of beings: so that, when one says duodecim Caesares, the twelve Caesars, the noun is used as an appellative common to twelve persons. Two numbers, the singular and plural, are all that are necessary in language. Some ancient tongues, however, as the Hebrew, the Celtic, and the Attic and poetic dialects of the Greek, have also a dual number to express two; but this is superfluous. And some nouns there are, in every language perhaps, that have no singular, and some that have no plural, even when there is nothing in their signification to hinder it; this is irregular and accidental.

55. Another thing essential to nouns is gender, to signify sex. All things are either male, or fe-
male, or both, or neither. Duplicity of sex being uncommon and doubtful, language has no expression for it in the structure of nouns, but considers all things, and all the names of things, as masculine or feminine, or as neuter; which last word denotes *neither* feminine nor masculine. Of all things without sex the names in some languages, particularly English, are, or may be, neuter: in Latin and Greek, and many other tongues, the gender of nouns denoting things without sex is fixed by the termination of the noun, or by its declension, or by some other circumstances too minute to be here specified.

56. Things without sex have sometimes masculine or feminine names from a supposed analogy which they seem to bear to things that have sex. Thus, on account of his great power, Death is masculine in Greek, and in English has been called the *king* of terrors. But this does not hold universally. In Latin, and many other languages, Death is feminine; and in German, and some other northern tongues, the sun is feminine, and the moon masculine. Sometimes the name of an animal species is both masculine and feminine; which, however, implies nothing like duplicity of sex, and means no more than that the name belongs to every individual of the species, whether male or female.

57. When the sex of animals is obvious, and material to be known, one name is sometimes given
to the male, and another to the female; as king, queen; son, daughter; man, woman, &c. When the sex is less obvious, or less important, as in insects, fishes, and many sorts of birds, one name serves for both sexes, and is masculine or feminine according to the custom of the language. And here let it be remarked, once for all, that in what relates to the gender of nouns, and indeed in almost every part of the grammar of every language, certain arbitrary rules have been established, which cannot be accounted for philosophically, from the nature of the thing; which, therefore, it belongs not to universal grammar to consider; and for which no other reason can be given, than that such is the law of the language as custom has settled it.

58. Of Pronouns. The name given to this class of words sufficiently declares their nature; they being in all languages put pro nominibus, in the place of nouns or of names. Persons conversing together may be ignorant of one another's names, and may have occasion to speak of things or persons, absent or present, whose names they either do not know, or do not care to be always repeating. Words therefore there must be, to be used instead of such names; and withal to ascertain the gender, situation, and some other obvious and general circumstances of the things or persons spoken of. These words are called pronouns. Some of them may introduce a sentence, and are
therefore called prepositive, as *I, thou, he, she, this, that*, &c. Others are termed subjunctive or relative, because they subjoin a clause or sentence to something previous, as *qui, quae, quod, who, which, that*. This sort of pronoun has the import of both a pronoun and a copulative conjunction, and may be resolved into *et ille, et illa, et illud*.

59. In conversation, the person who speaks is first and chiefly attended to, and the person spoken to is next. Hence *ego, I*, is called the pronoun of the first person; *tu, thou*, of the second; and, as distinguished from these, *he, she*, and *it*, are called pronouns of the third person. Those of the first and second need no distinction of gender, as the sex of the speakers is obvious to each other from the voice, dress, &c. But the pronoun of the third person must have gender, *ille, illa, illud, he, she, it*; because what is spoken of may be absent, and consequently its sex not obvious; or may be not a person, but a thing, and consequently of neither sex. The pronouns of all the three persons must have number; because the speaker, the hearer, or the thing or person spoken of, may be either one or more than one. Pronouns are not numerous in any language, very few being sufficient for all occasions on which they become necessary. The different classes of them are well enough distinguished in the common grammars.

60. Of Attributes. These are words which
denote the attributes, qualities, and operations, of things and persons. They form a very numerous class, and were by the ancient grammarians called προς τα, verba, whatever may be said or affirmed concerning persons or things. Thus of a man it may be said, that he is good, that he speaks, or that he is walking. Attributives are of three sorts, adjectives, verbs, and participles. An adjective, or epithet, denotes a quality, and nothing more; as good, bad, black, white. Verbs and participles denote qualities too, but with the addition of something else, as will appear by and by.

61. It is strange, that in all the common grammars the adjective should be considered as a noun. It is no more a noun than it is a verb. Nay, verbs and adjectives are of nearer affinity than nouns and adjectives. For the verb and adjective agree in this, that both express qualities or attributes; whereas the noun is the name of the thing to which qualities or attributes belong. And therefore the term adjective-noun is as improper as if we were to say participle-noun, or verb-noun.

62. In many languages it is a rule, that the adjective must agree with its noun in gender, number, and case: and where adjectives have gender, number, and case, the rule is reasonable and natural. But it is not so in all languages. English adjectives have neither gender nor number; but, like indeclinable Latin adjectives (as frugi, centum, nequam), are invariably the same. We say, a good
man, a good woman, a good thing; good men, good women, good things; without making any change in the adjective: and in this syntax we feel no inconvenience. And the same thing is true of English participles.

63. One variation, however, those English adjectives require, which in their signification admit of the distinctions of more and less. This paper is white, and snow is white, but snow is whiter than this paper. Solon was wise, Socrates wiser, Solomon the wisest of men. The degrees are innumerable in which different things may possess the same quality: it is impossible to say with precision, how much wiser Solomon was than Socrates, or by how many degrees snow is whiter than this paper. But in human art there is no infinity; and, therefore, we cannot in language have degrees of comparison to express all possible varieties of more and less.

64. Two degrees of comparison, the comparative and superlative, are all that seem to be necessary; and, for expressing these, different nations may have different contrivances: what is called the positive degree is the simple form of the adjective, and expresses neither degree nor comparison. Participles admit not of the variation we speak of: when they seem to assume it, as when we say doctus, doctior, doctissimus, they cease to be participles, and become adjectives. Some adverbs admit of this variety, as diu, diutius, diutis-
Verbs too may express degrees of comparison, but do it by means of auxiliary adverbs; as, *magis amat, vehementissime amat.*

65. The comparative degree denotes superiority, and implies a comparison of one, or more, persons, or things, with another, or with others, that is, or are, set in opposition; Solomon was wiser than Socrates; the Athenians were more learned than the Thebans; he is more intelligent than all his teachers. There are two superlatives; one implying comparison, and each denoting eminence or superiority. We use the former when we say, Solomon was the wisest of men; where Solomon is compared to a species of beings of whom he is said to be one. We use the latter, when we say, Solomon was a very wise, or a most wise man. In these last sentences, comparison, though remotely insinuated, is not, as in the former example, expressly asserted.

66. Of Verbs. Man is endowed, not only with senses to perceive, and memory to retain, but also with judgment, whereby we compare things and thoughts together, so as to make affirmations concerning them. When we say, Solomon wise, we affirm nothing, and the words are not a sentence. But when we say, Solomon is wise, we utter a complete sentence, expressing a judgment and an affirmation, founded on a comparison of a certain man Solomon, with a certain quality wise. The judgment of the mind is here expressed by
the affirmative word *is*; and this word is a verb. A verb, therefore, seems to be 'a word expressing 'affirmation, and necessary to form a complete 'sentence or proposition.'

67. Here observe, that every proposition affirms or denies something; as, snow *is* white, riches *are not* permanent. Observe further, that the thing concerning which we affirm or deny is called the *subject* of the proposition, namely, *snow* in the one example, and *riches* in the other; that what is affirmed or denied concerning the *subject* is called the *predicate* of the proposition, namely, *white* in the one example, and *permanent* in the other; and that the words whereby we affirm or deny, are called the *copula* of the proposition, namely, *is* in the one example, and *are not* in the other. It was said, that every proposition either affirms or denies. Now denial implies affirmation; to deny that a thing *is*, *is* to affirm that it is not. In every sentence or proposition, therefore, there is affirmation, and a verb is that which expresses it. Consequently, a verb 'is necessary in every sentence, 'and every verb expresses affirmation.'

68. Some affirmations have no dependence on time, with respect to their truth or falsehood. That *God* is good, that two and two are four, and that malevolence is not to be commended, always *was*, *will*, and *must be*, *true*. For expressing these, and the like affirmations, those verbs alone are necessary, which the Latins call *substantive*. 
and the Greeks more properly verbs of existence; as *sum, flô, existo, ému, γνωμαι, &c.* But innumerable affirmations are necessarily connected with time: I may affirm, that a thing was done, is done, or will be done. In verbs, therefore, there must be a contrivance for expressing time. Moreover, affirmations have a necessary connection with a person or with persons: *I, thou, he, may affirm; we, ye, or they may affirm.* In a verb, therefore, ‘affirmation is expressed, together with time, number, and person.’

69. Further: our thoughts shift with great rapidity; and it is natural for us to wish to speak as fast as we think. No wonder then, that we should often, where it can be done conveniently, express two or three thoughts by one word; and particularly, that we should by one word express both the attribute, and the affirmation which connects that attribute, with some person or thing. In this way, and partly for this reason, we say *scribo, I write,* instead of *ego sum scribens, I am writing.* And thus our idea of a verb is completed. And we may now define it, ‘A word necessary in every sentence, and signifying affirmation with respect to some attribute, together with the designation of time, number, and person.’ Thus *scribo, I am writing,* is a complete sentence, and comprehends these four things; first, *I the person,* and *one person:* secondly, *am the affirmation;* thirdly, *
writing, the attribute; and fourthly, now, or present time.

70. But the verbs of all languages are not so complex: and this definition applies rather to Greek and Latin verbs, than to those of the modern tongues. For we express a great deal of the meaning of our verbs by auxiliary words: whereas the Greeks and Romans generally varied the meaning of theirs by inflection, that is, by changing the form of the word. We must say, he might have written, where a Roman needed only to say scripsisset. Some auxiliary words indeed there are in Greek and Latin verbs, but not near so many as in ours. In English, French, Italian, and other modern tongues, the passive verb (or passive voice, as it is called), is entirely made up of auxiliary words introducing the passive participle; as, I am taught, they were taught, thou wilt be taught, &c.

71. This peculiarity in the structure of modern verbs is to be imputed to those northern nations who overturned the Roman empire, establishing themselves and their government in the conquered provinces; and who, being an unlettered race of men, and not caring either to learn the Latin tongue, or teach their own to those whom they had conquered, formed in time a mixed language, made up partly of Latin words and partly of idioms of their own; with a great number of auxiliary words, to supply the want of those Latin inflec-
tions, which they would not give themselves the trouble to learn. It is not wholly improbable, that, originally, the Greek and Latin inflections were also auxiliary words; which came to be, by the accidental pronunciation of successive ages, gradually incorporated with the radical part of the verbs and nouns to which they belong. This, however, is only conjecture; but it derives some plausibility from the nature of the inflections of the Hebrew tongue, many of which may be accounted for in the way here hinted at.

72. The attributes expressed by the verb may be reduced to four; first, being, as sum, I am; secondly, action, as vulnero, I wound; thirdly, being acted upon, as vulneror, I am wounded; and fourthly, being at rest, as sedeo, I sit, habito, I dwell. Now, without a reference to time, not one of these attributes can be conceived; for existence, action, suffering, and rest, do all imply time, and may all be referred to different parts of time. Hence the origin of the times of verbs, commonly, though improperly, called the tenses. Time is past, present, or future.

73. The tenses are in some languages reckoned five. But, if we consider the exact meaning of the several parts of the verb, we shall find, that, in the languages most familiar to us, there are eight or nine tenses; though each may not have a particular form of the verb adapted to it. In other languages there may perhaps be more: and
in some, the Hebrew for example, there are not near so many; two tenses, the past and the future, being all that the Hebrew grammarian acknowledges; though, as may be reasonably imagined, means are not wanting for expressing in his language the import of other necessary tenses.

74. Tenses may be divided; first, into those that are definite with respect to time, and those that with respect to time are indefinite or aorist: secondly, into those that in respect of action are perfect, and those which are imperfect in respect of action: thirdly, into simple tenses, expressive of one time, and compound tenses, expressive of more times than one. My examples on this subject I take from active verbs, they being the fullest and most complete of any.

75. Tenses definite in respect of time are, 1. The definite present, scribo, I write; which refers to the present point of time, and to no other. 2. The preterperfect, I have written, which generally refers to past time ending in or near the present. For this tense the Greeks have a particular form γεγραμμενης; but the Latins have not; for scripsi signifies not only I have written, but also I wrote and I did write, which last are aorists of the past, as will appear presently. 3. The paulo-post-future, scripturus sum, I am about to write, which implies future time that is just going to commence.

76. Tenses indefinite in time, or aorist, are, 1. The indefinite present, which appears in sentences
like the following; God is good; two and two are four; a wise son makes a glad father, &c.; in which no particular present time is referred to, because these affirmations may be made with truth at all times. In Hebrew and in Erse the import of this tense is expressed by the future; which sometimes happens in English: for whether we say, a wise son makes a glad father, or will make a glad father, the sense is the same. 2. The aorist of the past, γράφα, I wrote, or did write; which refers to past time, but to no particular part of past time. 3. The indefinite future, γράφω, scribam, I shall write; which in like manner refers to future time, but to no particular part of time future.

77. Tenses perfect or complete in respect of action are, 1. The preterperfect, γράφα, I have written. 2. The aorist of the past, γράφα, I wrote. 3. The plusquamperfect, γεγράφαμεν, scripseram, I had written. 4. The future perfect, scripsero, I shall have written, or I shall have done writing; a tense, which the Greeks cannot express in one word; and which is commonly, though very improperly, called the future of the subjunctive. Scripsero in Greek would be ἔγραμαι γράφαμεν. It is as truly of the indicative mood as scribam, or scriptus eram.

78. Tenses imperfect, or incomplete with respect to action, are, 1. The imperfect preterit γράφαμε, scribebam, I was writing. 2. The indefinite future, scribam, I shall write. 3. The paulo-post-
future, scripturus sum, I am about to write, which in Greek is μελα γραφω. Observe, that the Greek paulo-post-future (so called in the grammars), as expressed by a single word, is found only in the passive verb; γεγραφόμαι, I am about to be written. Observe also, that the imperfect preterit often denotes in Latin customary actions; dicebat, he was wont to say, the same as solerat dicere.

79. Compound tenses, which unite two or more times in one tense, are, 1. The preterperfect, which generally, though not always (at least in English), unites the past with the present, I have written; where observe, that the auxiliary verb I have is of the present tense, and the participle written signifies complete action, and implies past time. 2. The plusquamperfect, scripseram, I had written, which unites past time with past time, and intimates that a certain action was finished before another action which is also past. He came to desire me not to write, but I had written before he came. 3. The future perfect, scripsero, I shall have done writing; which unites present and past time with future; and intimates, that when a certain time now future shall come to be present, I shall then have finished a certain action. Cras mane hora decima scripsero has literas. To-morrow morning at ten I shall have finished the writing of this letter. 4. The paulo-post-future, which unites present with future time, as plainly appears in the Latin way of expressing it; scripturus
the participle being future, and *sum* the auxiliary present.

80. Tenses *expressive of one time* are, 1. The *definite present*. 2. The *aorist of the past*. 3. The *indefinite future*. 4. The *imperfect preterit*; which have all been described under other characters. In this analysis of the tenses, I have made their number nine. 1. The definite present. 2. The indefinite present. 3. The imperfect. 4. The aorist of the past. 5. The preterperfect. 6. The plusquamperfect. 7. The indefinite future. 8. The paulo-post-future. 9. The perfect future. All these tenses are not necessary in language; but, in most of the languages we know, the full import of each of them may in one way or other be expressed.

81. The *moods* of verbs express not only our thoughts, but also something of the intention or state of mind with which we utter them. If we affirm absolutely, we use the indicative or declarative mood; if relatively, conditionally, or dependently on something else, it is the subjunctive. If we declare our meaning in the form of a wish, it is called the optative; if in the form of a command or request, it is the imperative. And if we affirm concerning what might be done, or ought to be done, it has been called the potential. But there is no need of distinguishing moods so nicely.

82. They may be all reduced to two, the indicative, which affirms absolutely, and the sub-
junctive, which affirms relatively, or with a dependence on something else. For the imperative is only an elliptical way of expressing the indicative; go thou being the same with I entreat or I command thee to go: the potential is always either indicative or subjunctive: the Greek optative is a form of the subjunctive, and has much the same import: and the infinitive is neither a mood, nor a part of the verb, because it expresses no affirmation, and has no reference to any one person or number more than any other. The infinitive expresses abstractly the simple meaning of the verb, and does therefore in its nature resemble an indeclinable abstract noun; and, in fact, is often used as such in most languages: as cupio discere, studere delectat me, reddas dulce loqui, reddas ridere decorum.

83. Verbs are divided into active, passive, and neuter. An active verb denotes acting, as verberō, I beat: a passive verb denotes being acted upon, as verberor, I am beaten: a neuter verb denotes neither the one nor the other, and only signifies the state or condition of the thing or person concerning which the affirmation is made; as sedeo, I sit; sto, I stand; dormit, he sleeps. Active verbs are subdivided into transitive and intransitive. In the former, the action passes, transit, from the agent towards some other person or thing, as I build a house, I break a stone, I see a man. The latter denote action which does not pass from the
agent towards any thing else, as \textit{I run, I walk}. This sort of verb, when strictly intransitive, cannot assume a passive form; for where action does not pass from the agent, there is nothing that can be said to be acted upon. Nor do neuter verbs take a passive, because nothing is acted upon where there is no action.

84. When a thing or person acts upon itself, as \textit{Cato slew himself}, the Greeks, in very early times, are said to have made use of the \textit{middle} verb, or middle voice; which the grammarians endeavour to prove by quoting three or four examples from Homer. The Hebrews had a like contrivance. But in most of the Greek books now extant the middle voice has a signification purely active. The verbs called deponent, desiderative, frequentative, inceptive, &c. need not be considered here, being found in some languages only, and therefore not essential to speech. The \textit{impersonal} verb is so called, because the nominative, expressed or understood, on which it depends, is always a thing, and \textit{never a person}. The nature of this sort of verb is well enough explained in the common grammars.

85. \textbf{Of Adverbs.} It is the nature of the adverb, as the name imports, to give some additional meaning to the verb, that is, to the attributive (see § 60),—to the adjective, as \textit{valde bonus}; to the participle, as \textit{graviter vulneratus}; to the verb, as \textit{fortiter pugnavit}. Adverbs are also
joined to adverbs, as *magis fortiter, sat cito si sat bene*; and sometimes even to nouns; but when this is the case, the noun will be found to comprehend the meaning of an attributive, as *admodum puella*, which occurs in Livy, and signifies that the young woman was *very young*. Hence adverbs have been called *secondary attributives*, or words denoting the attributes of attributes.

86. But many of them are not of this character, and seem to have been contrived for no other purpose, but in order to express, by one indeclinable word, what would otherwise have required two or three words, as well as a more artful syntax. Thus *ubi* signifies, *in quo loco; quo, in quem locum; hoc, in hunc locum; diu, per longum tempus, &c.* Adverbs, therefore, if not essential to speech, are at least very useful, and all languages have them, and some in a very great number. Too many of them, however, have in writing a bad effect, and make a style harsh and unwieldy; and the same thing is true of attributives in general. The strength of language lies in its nouns or substantives.

87. Of Participles. The common definition of a participle is, 'A word derived from a verb, and signifying a quality with time.' This is indeed true of the future participle active, but not of the others. *Scribens*, writing, and *scriptus*, written, do not of themselves express time at all, and may apply to any time, even as an adjective
may do, according to the tense of the verb with which they are connected: I was writing yesterday, I am writing to-day and shall be writing to-morrow; the letter was written, is written, will be written. As to the future participle passive (as it is called) of the Latins, it generally denotes rather necessity or duty, than future time: dicit literas a se scribendas esse, he says that a letter must be written by him; dicit literas a se scriptum iri, he says that a letter will be written by him. When Cato in the senate said Delenda est Carthago, he did not utter a prophecy of what was to be done, but recommended what in his opinion ought to be done.

88. Written is a passive participle, and denotes complete action; the letter is written. Writing is an active participle, and denotes action continuing; I am writing now, I was writing yesterday, &c. If then it be asked, in what respect the participle differs from the verb, it may be answered, that the participle does not imply affirmation, which to the verb is essential. If again it be asked, what distinguishes the participle from the adjective, the answer is this: The adjective denotes a quality simply, and is not necessarily derived from a verb; the participle is always derived from a verb, and denotes a quality or attribute, together with some other considerations relating to the continuance, completion, and futurity, of action or condition.

89. Of Interjections. These words are found in all languages, though perhaps it cannot be said
that they are necessary. They are *thrown into discourse* *interjecta*, in order to intimate some sudden feeling or emotion of the mind; and any one of them may comprehend the import of an entire sentence: *alias, I am sorry; strange, I am surprised; fye, I hate it, I dislike it*. They are well enough described and divided in any common grammar; but a little more minutely perhaps than was requisite. Laughter is not speech, but a *natural* and *inarticulate* convulsion *universally understood*; and, therefore, that mark in writing which denotes it can be no part of speech. And as to interjections of *imprecation*, I cannot admit that in language they are either necessary or useful.—The Greeks referred interjections to the class of adverbs; but they are of a nature totally different; and therefore the Latins did better in making them a separate part of speech.—To express our feelings by interjections is often natural: but too many of them, either in speech or writing, have a bad effect.

90. All the sorts of words hitherto considered have each of them some meaning, even when taken separate. But there are other words, as *from, but, a, the*; which taken separately signify nothing. The two first of these are necessary in language; the other two are rather useful than necessary: the former are called *connectives*; the latter, *articles* or *definitives*. Connectives are of two sorts, prepositions, which connect words, and conjunctions, which connect sentences.
91. Of Prepositions. A preposition is a sort of word, which of itself has no signification, but which has the power of uniting such words, as the rules of a language, or the nature of things, would not allow to be united in any other way. When prepositions are thus employed in uniting words, they have signification: like cyphers in arithmetic, which taken separately mean nothing, but when joined to numbers have a very important meaning. And the same thing is true of conjunctions and articles. If I say, *he came town*, I join two words, which the rules of our language will not permit to unite so as to make sense. But if I take a preposition, and say, *he came to town* or *he came from town*, I speak good sense and good grammar.

92. Every body has seen a list of prepositions, and knows how they are used in syntax. They all express some circumstance relating to *place*, as *at, with, by, from, before, behind, beyond, over, under, &c.*: but in a figurative sense most of them are also used to express other relations than those of place. Thus we say, he rules *over* the people, he serves *under* such a commander, he will do nothing *beneath* his character, gratitude *beyond* expression, &c. They are sometimes prefixed to a word, so as to form a part of it; in which case they often, but not always, give it something of their own signification. Thus, to *undervalue* is to *rate* a thing under or within its value; to *overcome* is to subdue, for men must be subdued before they allow others to go or
come over them: but to understand does not mean
to stand under, but to comprehend mentally; to un-
dergo means, not to go under, but to bear, or suf-
fer.—An English preposition often changes the
meaning of a verb by being put after it. To cast,
is to throw; but to cast up may signify, to calcul-
ate: to give, is to bestow, but to give over, to cease
or abandon: to give up, to resign: to give out,
to publish, or proclaim, &c.

93. Some prepositions appear in the beginning
of words, but never stand by themselves, and are
therefore called inseparable. Of these there are
five or six in Latin, and about twice as many in Eng-
lish. Separable prepositions are not a numerous
class of words. In Latin there are about forty-five;
in Greek eighteen; and in English between thirty
and forty. But some prepositions have many dif-
ferent meanings. The English of has upwards of
twelve; from has at least twenty; and for has no
fewer than thirty. See Johnson's Dictionary.

94. In the modern languages of Europe, prepo-
sitions prefixed to nouns supply the want of cases;
of man, to man, with man, being the same with ho-
minis, homini, homine. The English genitive is
sometimes distinguished by subjoining s to the noun,
as man's life, hominis vita; and some of our pro-
nouns have an oblique case, as I which has me,
thou which has thee, she which has her, &c. With
these and a few other exceptions, we may affirm
that there are no cases in the English tongue; and
the same thing is true of some other tongues.
Hence we infer, that cases, though in Greek and Latin very important, and a source of much elegance, are not essential to language.

95. Of Conjunctions. A conjunction unites two or more sentences in one, and sometimes marks the dependence of one sentence upon another. If I say, he is good and he is wise, I unite two sentences in one: if I say, he is good because he is wise, I unite two sentences as before, and also mark the dependence of the one, as a cause, upon the other, as an effect. Conjunctions sometimes seem to unite single words; but, when that is the case, each of the words so united will be found to have the import of a sentence. When it is said, Peter and John went to the temple, there is the full meaning of two sentences, because there are two affirmations, Peter went to the temple, John went to the temple.

96. Some conjunctions, while they connect sentences, do also connect their meanings, making one as it were a continuation of the other; as, he went because he was ordered: these are called conjunctive. Others, termed disjunctive, connect sentences, while they seem to disjoin their meanings, and set, as it were, one part of a sentence in opposition to another: as, Socrates was wise, but Alcibiades was not. Each sort admits of subdivisions, which are sufficiently explained in the common Latin grammars.

97. Of the Article. When a thing occurs, which has no proper name, or whose proper name we know not, or do not choose to mention, we, in
speaking of it, refer it to its species, and call it man, horse, tree, &c. or to its genus, and call it animal, quadruped, vegetable, &c. But the thing itself is neither a genus nor a species, but an individual. To show, therefore, that it is an individual, we prefix an article, and call it a man, a horse, a tree, &c. If this individual be unknown, or perceived now for the first time, or if we choose to speak of it as unknown, we prefix what is called the indefinite article, and say, here comes a man, I see an ox: and this article coincides nearly in signification with the word one. The French, and many other nations, have a like contrivance. But, in the case now supposed, the Greeks would prefix no article: a man comes is in Greek Ἀνὴρ εἰς χειρὶ. If the individual be known to us, or if we choose to speak of it so as to intimate some previous acquaintance with it, we prefix the definite article, the, as the Greeks did their ὁ ἵππος; the man comes, ὁ ἄνὴρ εἰς χειρὶ. A correspondent article is found in French, Italian, Hebrew, and most other cultivated languages, the Latin excepted.

98. That which is very eminent is supposed to be generally known: which is also the case with those things and persons, whether eminent or not, which are nearly connected with us, or which we frequently see: and therefore to the names of such things or persons we sometimes prefix the same definite article. A king is any king; but the king is the person whom we acknowledge for our sovereign.
They who live in or near a town, even though it be a very small one, speak of it when at home by the name of the town.

99. Those words only take the article, which are capable of being made more definite with it than they are without it. I, thou, and he, are as definite as they can be, and therefore never take the article. Names that denote genera and species may be more or less definite, and may therefore take the article; a man, the man, an animal, the animal. Proper names too may take it when they become common appellatives; as the Caesars, the Catos. The proper names of some great natural objects, as mountains and rivers, take in English the definite article; as the Alps, the Grampians, the Thames. But one single mountain, however great, if it have a proper name, does not take it: we say, Etna, Atlas, Lebanon, Olympus; not the Etna, &c. The Greeks sometimes prefix their article to the proper name of a man or woman; in order, perhaps, to mark the gender of the name, or to make the expression more emphatical, or merely to improve the sound of the sentence. This is not usual in other languages. But the Italians sometimes prefix their definite article to proper names of favourite poets, singers, and fiddlers, and no doubt think that by so doing they give energy to the expression.

100. So far is the indefinite article from being necessary in language, that the Greeks have nothing like it; and in English we never prefix it to the
plural number. By the Greek poets the article is more frequently omitted than used; and it is also frequently omitted in the prose of the Attic dialect. Sometimes we may put the one article for the other without changing the sense: as, the proverb says, or a proverb says, that nothing violent lasts long. These things seem to show that articles are not very necessary. At other times, however, and for the most part, the two articles differ widely in signification. Thus, instead of, Nathan said unto David, hou art the man, if we were to say, thou art a man, we should entirely change the meaning of the passage.

101. In Latin, there is no article; its place, when it is necessary, being supplied by a pronoun, as ille and ipse. And this seems to be sufficient. The last example, translated thus, dixit Nathan Davidi, tu es ille homo, or tu es ille, is as significant in Latin as in English. Sometimes, by prefixing the definite article to a noun, we bestow a peculiar signification upon it. In Greek, ἀνθρώπος is a man, but ὁ ἀνθρώπος is, in the Attic dialect, the public executioner. In English, a speaker is any person who speaks; but the speaker is he who presides in the house of commons.

102. And now it appears, that in Latin there are nine sorts of words, the noun, pronoun, adjective, verb, participle, adverb, interjection, preposition, and conjunction. In Greek, Hebrew, English, and many other languages, there is also an article, and
consequently there are ten parts of speech. The noun, pronoun, adjective, verb, participle, preposition, and conjunction, seem to be essential to language; the article, interjection, and most of the adverbs, are rather useful than necessary. So much for the faculty of speech, and universal grammar.

SECTION IV.

Of Perception, or External Sensation.

103. As this subject is connected with natural philosophy, I shall make but a few slight remarks upon it; with a view chiefly to some things that are to follow.—The soul, using the body as its instrument, perceives external things, that is, bodies and their qualities. All animals have this faculty in a greater or less degree, and all complete animals in that precise degree which is necessary to their life and well-being. Corporeal things, when within the sphere of our perceptive powers, and attended to by us, affect our organs of sense in a certain manner, and so are perceived by the soul or mind. We know that this is the fact, but cannot explain it, or trace the connection that there is between our minds and impressions made on our bodily organs; being ignorant of the nature of that union which subsists between the soul and its body. Our perception of bodies is accompanied with a belief, that they exist and are what they appear to be, and that
we perceive the bodies themselves: and this belief is unavoidable, and amounts to absolute certainty. We cannot prove by argument, that bodies exist, or that we ourselves exist; nor is it necessary that we should: for the thing is self-evident, and the constitution of our nature makes it impossible for us to entertain any doubt concerning this matter.

104. It would be a task equally tedious and unprofitable, to explain the notions of philosophers with respect to the manner in which the mind has been supposed to perceive things external. Aristotle fancied, that, by means of our senses, outward things communicate to the mind their form without their matter; as the seal imparts to the wax the figures carved on it, without the substance. These forms of things, in their first appearance to the mind, he calls sensible species; which, as retained by the memory, or exhibited in the imagination, he terms phantasms. And these phantasms, when by the operations of the intellect they are refined into general ideas, he calls intelligible species. For example: I see a man; this perception is the sensible species. I afterwards remember his appearance; or perhaps his appearance occurs to my mind, without my remembering, or considering that I had perceived it before: this is a phantasm. Lastly, my intellect, taking away from this phantasm every thing that distinguishes it from others, and retaining so much of it only as it has in common with a kind or sort, (see § 19), transforms it into an intelligible species, or general idea, which we express by
the common appellative *man*. All this seems to imply, that a thought of the mind has something of body in it, and consists of parts that may be separated; which to me is inconceivable.

105. Most modern philosophers give an account of this matter in words that are indeed different, but seem to amount to the same thing. They will not admit that the mind can perceive anything which is not in the mind itself, or at least in the same place with it. Now the sun, moon, and stars, and the other things external to us, are neither in the mind, nor in the same place with it: for if they were, they would be in the inside of the human body. External things themselves, therefore, our mind, we are told, does not perceive at all; but it perceives *ideas* of them, which ideas are actually in the same place with the mind; either in the brain, or in something which has got the name of *sensorium*, in which the percipient being called the soul, or mind, is supposed to have its residence. See § 13.

106. When it was objected, that, on the supposition of our perceiving, not outward things themselves, but only ideas of them, we cannot be certain that outward things *exist*, the same philosophers, or rather their successors in the same school, admitted the objection; and came at last to affirm, that the soul perceives nothing but its own ideas; and that the sun and moon, the sea, and the mountains, the men and other animals, and, in a word, the whole universe which we see around us, has no
existence but in the mind that perceives it. Never were reason and language more abused than by this extravagant theory; which instead of illustrating any thing, involves a plain fact in utter darkness; and, by teaching that our senses are fallacious faculties, leads, as will appear hereafter, to the final subversion of all human knowledge.—The doctrine already laid down must therefore remain as it is. We perceive outward things themselves, and believe that they exist, and are what they appear to be. This is the language of common sense, and the belief of all mankind. This we must believe whether we will or not: and this even those who deny it must take for granted; otherwise they could not know how to act on any one emergence of life. And that the mind may perceive things at a distance, is as intelligible to us, as that it can perceive its own ideas.

107. The powers, by which the soul, using the body as its instrument, perceives outward things and their qualities, are called senses, and commonly reckoned five. Tastes or relishes are referred to the sense of tasting, and perceived by means of the tongue. Odours are referred to smelling, the organ of which is the inner part of the nose. Sounds are perceived by the sense of hearing, the organ whereof is the inner part of the ear. By means of the eye we perceive light and colours. All other bodily sensations are referred to touch, the organs whereof are diffused over the whole body.
108. Tastes and smells, as perceived by the mind, bear no resemblance to the bodies that produce them; nor is there always a likeness between the tastes and smells of similar bodies; for salt and sugar may be very like in appearance, and yet are very unlike in other respects. The nature, therefore, of any particular taste or smell is known by experience only. Tastes and smells are innumer-able; yet we have but few words to express them by, as sour, sweet, bitter, acid, musty, &c.; and some of these words are applied both to tastes and to smells: a proof, that these two senses are kindred faculties, and that the sensations we receive by them are somewhat similar; which also appears from the position of the organs, and from this well-known fact, that those persons who have no smell have never an acute taste.

109. On applying a body to our tongue and nostrils, we discover its taste and smell; the mind being, in consequence of this application, affected in a certain manner, by means of nerves or other minute organs. But what connects these organs with the mind, or why one body thus applied should convey to the mind the sensation of sweetness, and another that of salt or acid, it is impossible for man to explain. These two senses are necessary to life, because they direct us in the choice of what is fit to be eaten and drank; and the form and situation of their organs are the best that can be for this purpose. They are also in-
struments of pleasure, in a low degree indeed, but still in some degree. And they enlarge the sphere of our knowledge, by making us acquainted with two copious classes of sensible things discoverable by no other faculty. To many animals smell is necessary to lead them to their prey or food; and to man it sometimes gives notice of fire and wild beasts, and other dangerous things, which could not otherwise have been discovered till it was too late. And it recommends cleanliness, whereby both health of body and delicacy of mind are greatly promoted.

110. The word *taste*, as the name of an external sense or of a quality of body, has three different significations, which must be carefully distinguished. It means, first, a quality of body which exists in the body whether perceived or not; thus we speak of the *taste* of an apple. Secondly, it denotes a faculty in the mind, which faculty is exerted by means of the tongue, and which is always in the mind whether it be exerted or not; for no man imagines, that when he tastes nothing he has lost the power or faculty of tasting. In this sense we use the word when we say, I have lost my smell by a cold, and therefore my *taste* is not so acute as usual. Thirdly, it signifies a sensation as perceived by the mind, and which exists only in the mind that perceives it, and no longer than while it is perceived: in this sense we sometimes use the word when we speak of a sweet or bitter
taste, a pleasant or unpleasant taste, an agreeable or disagreeable taste. The same threefold signification belongs to the words smell, sight, and several others; which are used to denote an external thing, the faculty which perceives that thing, and the perception itself as it affects the mind.

111. Natural philosophy teaches, that all sounding bodies are tremulous, and convey to the air an undulatory motion, which, if continued till it enter the inner part of the ear, raises in the mind a sensation called sound; which bears no resemblance either to body or to motion; which is not perceived by any other sense; and which, being a simple feeling, cannot be defined or described, and is known by experience only. By experience also we learn, that all sounds proceed from bodies: and by attending to different sounds, as proceeding from bodies different in kind or differently situated, we are, in many cases, enabled to judge, on hearing a sound, what the sounding body is, and whether it be near or distant, on the right hand or on the left, before or behind us, above or under.

112. Sounds may be variously divided; into soft and loud; acute and grave; agreeable, disagreeable, and indifferent. And each of these sorts may be subdivided into articulate and inarticulate. Articulate sounds constitute speech, whereof, we have treated already. Inarticulate sounds may be divided into musical sound and
noise. Of musical sounds and their effects upon the mind, I shall speak hereafter; observing only, at present, that their intervals are determined by the natural risings and fallings of the human voice in singing; and that, when we call some of them high and others low, it seems to be with a view to the high or low situation of their correspondent symbols in our musical scale.* Indeed most of the epithets, which we apply to sound, are in that application figurative. High and low, soft, acute, grave, and deep, in their original and proper signification refer to objects, not of hearing, but of touch.

113. The ear is the great inlet to knowledge. Deaf men must always be very ignorant: but a man born blind, who hears, may learn many languages, and understand all sciences except those that relate to light and colours; and even of these he may in some measure comprehend the theory. The importance of this sense to our preservation

* It has been said, that in forming a grave tone our breath or voice seems to rise from the lower part of the throat, and from the upper part in forming an acute tone. This is no improbable account of the origin of the terms high and low as applied to musical sound. It may, however, be remarked, that the more ancient Greek writers considered grave tones as high, and acute tones as low. See Smith's Harmonics, § 1. The ancient Latin writers probably did the same. May not this have been owing to the situation of the strings on some of their musical instruments?
is obvious. A deaf man in the company of those who hear, and a blind man with those who see, may live not uncomfortably: but, in order to judge of the value of a sense, we ought to consider what would be the consequence, if all mankind were to be deprived of it, or had never been endowed with it.

114. The eye is the organ of seeing, and its objects are light and colours. Bodies become visible by means of light, of which, in order to vision, some animals require more and others less, but all require some. The threefold signification of the word *sight* was formerly hinted at: it means the thing seen, the faculty of seeing, and the sensation or act of seeing. This last we may put an end to, by shutting our eyes; but the visible object exists, whether we see it or not; and the faculty of seeing remains in the mind when it is not exerted. No man imagines, that by shutting his eyes he annihilates light, or his power of seeing it; but every man knows, that by shutting his eyes he puts an end to the act of seeing, and renews it again when he opens them. When I say, *my sight* is weak, the noun denotes the power or faculty of seeing: when I say, I *see* a strange *sight*, the same word denotes the thing seen: and when I add, that I have a confused or indistinct *sight* of it, the word signifies the sensation or act of seeing. What is necessary to distinct vision must have been ex-
plained to you in optics, and needs not be repeated here.

115. Colours inhere not in the coloured body, but in the light that falls upon it: and a body presents to our eye that colour which predominates in the rays of light reflected by it: and different bodies reflect different sorts of rays, according to the texture and consistency of their minute parts. Now the component parts of bodies, and the rays of light, are not in the mind; and therefore colours, as well as bodies, are things external: and the word colour denotes, always an external thing, and never a sensation in the mind.

116. The motion of the two eyes is nearly parallel; and yet the muscles that move the one are not connected with those that move the other. A picture of the visible object is formed in the retina of each eye; and yet the mind sees the object not double but single. The images in the retina are both inverted; and yet the object is seen, not inverted, but erect. These facts are by some writers so explained, as if we, at first, moved our eyes in different directions, and saw objects inverted and double; and afterwards, by the power of habit, came to see things as we now do, and to move our eyes as we now move them. But this theory is liable to unanswerable objections; for which my hearers are referred to the latter part of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the human mind on the
principles of common sense. The motion of the eyes is parallel from the first; unless where there happens to be convulsion or disease. And it is probable, that, when an infant can with his eye take in all the parts of a visible object, he sees it, as we do, erect and single. Nor is it more strange, that the mind, by means of an inverted and double image, should see an object erect and single, than that it should perceive a visible thing by the intervention of an image, whereof it is not conscious, which is not known to the greater part of mankind, which can only be discovered by very nice experiments, and which was never heard of till Kepler found it out about the middle of the last century.

117. Every part of the body being an instrument of touch, we cannot pretend to enumerate the objects and organs of this sense. Heat and cold, hardness and softness, hunger and thirst, the pain of weariness, and the pleasure of rest, and, in a word, all bodily sensations, are referred to touch, except those of smell, taste, sound, colour, and light. In modern philosophy it has been made a question, whether distance, magnitude, and figure, be perceived by sight, by touch, or by both. The question belongs to optics; and the truth seems to be this: distance, magnitude, and figure, are originally perceived, not by sight, but by touch; but we learn to judge of them from the informations
of sight, by having observed, that certain visible appearances do always accompany and signify certain distances, magnitudes, and figures.

SECTION V.

Of Consciousness, or Reflection.

118. By this faculty we attend to and perceive what passes in our own minds. It is peculiar to rational beings, for the brutes seem to have nothing of it. In exerting it, the mind makes no use of any bodily organ, so far as we know. It is true, that the body and mind do mutually operate on each other; that certain bodily disorders hurt the mind; and that certain energies of the mind affect the body. This proves them to be intimately connected; but this does not prove, that any one bodily part is necessary to consciousness in the same manner as the eye, for example, is necessary to seeing.

119. Of the things perceived by this faculty, the chief is the mind itself. Every man is conscious, that he has within him a thinking active principle called a soul or mind. And this belief seems to be universal; so that if a man were to say, that he was not conscious of any such thing, the world would suspect him of either falsehood or insanity. Nay, the general acknowledgment of
the immortality of the soul, or of its existing after
the dissolution of the body (an opinion which, in
one form or other, is found in all nations), proves,
that it is natural for mankind to consider the hu-
man soul and body as substances so distinct, that
the former may live, and be happy or miserable,
without the other.

120. Every man also believes, and holds him-
self to be absolutely certain, that, whatever changes
his body may undergo in this life, his soul always
continues one and the same. A temporary sus-
pension of all our faculties may happen in deep
sleep, or in a swoon; but we are certain, when we
awake or recover, that we are the same persons
we were before. In many things, both natural, as
vegetable and animal bodies; and artificial, as ships
and towns, the substance may be changed, and yet
the thing be supposed to continue the same; be-
cause called by the same name; situated in the
same place; applied to the same purpose; or hav-
ing its parts so united, that, though new substance
may have been added from time to time, or some
of the old taken away, there never was any change
of the whole substance made at once. But the
human soul is always the same; its substance being
incorporeal, as will be shewn hereafter, and con-
sequently indivisible.

121. The things perceived by consciousness do
as really exist, are as important, and may as well
serve for the materials of science, as external
things and bodily qualities. What it is to think, to remember, to imagine, to be angry or sorrowful, to believe or disbelieve, to approve or disapprove, we know by experience, as well as what it is to see and hear. And truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, are as real as sounds and colours, and much more essential to human happiness. Accordingly, in all cultivated languages, there are words to express memory, imagination, reason, conscience, true and false, just and unjust, right and wrong, &c.; which is a proof, that in all nations, not utterly barbarous, such things are attended to, and spoken of, as matters of importance. So much for consciousness in general. We are now to consider more particularly the several faculties comprehended in it. And first of memory.

**SECTION VI.**

**Of Memory.**

122. This is that faculty, by which we acquire experience and knowledge; and without which we should, at the end of the longest life, be as ignorant as at its beginning. Memory presents to us ideas or thoughts of what is past, accompanied with a persuasion that they were formerly real and present. What we distinctly remember to have seen we as firmly believe to have happened, as what is now present to our senses.
123. A sound state of the brain is no doubt necessary to the right exercise of both memory and judgment. And hence perhaps it is, that some philosophers have held, that all our perceptions and thoughts leave upon the brain certain marks or traces, which continue there for some time, and when attended to by the mind occasion remembrance; but that, when the brain is disordered by drunkenness, or any other disease, so as not to receive or retain such marks, or so as to receive or retain them imperfectly, there is then no remembrance, or a confused one. But this is mere conjecture, incapable of proof, and indeed absurd. For how thoughts of the mind, which are surely no corporeal things, should leave upon the brain, which is corporeal, particular stamps, variously sized and shaped according to the nature of the thoughts, and how the mind should take notice of those stamps, or remember by means of them, is altogether inconceivable. We know that we do remember; but of the immediate cause of remembrance we know nothing.

124. When we remember with little or no effort, it is called remembrance simply, or memory, and sometimes passive memory: when we endeavour to remember what does not immediately and (as it were) of itself occur, it is called active memory, or recollection. A ready recollection of our knowledge, at the moment when we have occasion for it, is a talent of the greatest importance. The
man possessed of it is generally of good parts, and seldom fails to distinguish himself, whatever sort of business he may be engaged in. But some persons, who are remarkable for what is here called passive memory, and can remember all the words of a long discourse on once hearing it, are, in other respects, of no great abilities. Brutes have memory, but of recollection they seem to be incapable; for this requires rationality, and the power of contemplating and arranging our thoughts. Great memory is perhaps necessary to form great genius, but is not always a proof of it.

125. The liveliest remembrance is not so lively as the sensation that produced it; and ideas of memory do often, but not always, decay more and more, as the original sensation becomes more and more remote in time. Those sensations, and those thoughts, have a chance to be long remembered, which are lively at first; and those are likely to be most lively, which are most attended to, or which are accompanied with pleasure or pain, or with wonder, surprise, curiosity, merriment, and other lively passions.

126. The art of memory, therefore, is little more than the art of attention. What we wish to remember we should attend to so as to understand it perfectly, fixing our view particularly upon its importance or singular nature; that it may raise within us some of the passions above mentioned: and we should also beforehand disengage our mind
from other things, that we may the more effectually attend to the new object which we wish to remember; that being apt to be forgotten which occurs to us when we are taken up with other things. The memories of children should be continually exercised; but to oblige them to get by heart what they do not understand, perverts their faculties, gives them a dislike to learning, and confirms them in habits of inattention, and inaccurate pronunciation.

127. A habit of strictly attending to that, whatever it is, in which we happen to be engaged, and of doing only one thing at one time, is of great importance to intellectual improvement. It produces clearness and readiness of comprehension, presence of mind, accuracy of knowledge, and facility of expression. Attention to our company is a principal part of politeness, and renders their conversation and behaviour both amusing and instructive to us. We ought, therefore, to be constantly on our guard against contracting any of those habits of indolence, or a wandering mind, which, when long persisted in, form what is called an absent man.

128. Our thoughts have, for the most part, a connection; so that the thought which is just now in the mind, depends partly upon that which went before, and partly serves to introduce that which follows. Hence we remember best those things whose parts are methodically disposed, and mutu-
ally connected. A regular discourse makes a more lasting impression upon the hearer than a parcel of detached sentences, and gives to his rational powers a more salutary exercise: and this may show us the propriety of conducting our studies, and all our affairs, according to a regular plan or method. When this is not done, our thoughts and our business, especially if in any degree complex, soon run into confusion.

129. The Greek and Roman orators, who sometimes had occasion to deliver very long orations, and all from memory, took pains to fix in their minds a series of objects or places naturally connected, such as the contiguous houses in a street, or the contiguous apartments in a house. By long habit, these places were so arranged in their memory, that when the first place occurred to them, it introduced the idea of the second, and the second the third, and so forward; even as when the first letter of the alphabet, or the beginning of a well-known tune, occurs to the mind, it introduces the subsequent letters and notes in the proper order. Then the orator connected the first head of his discourse with the first of these places, the second with the second, &c. by thinking of both at the same time. And thus they were enabled to recollect, without confusion, all the parts of the longest discourse. This was called the artificial memory. Cicero and Quintilian both speak of it, but neither of them so minutely as to make
it perfectly intelligible, at least to me: nor do I know that any modern orator has ever made use of it. It seems, indeed, to have been a laborious way of improving memory; as Quintilian himself acknowledges. In allusion to it, we still call the parts of a discourse places or topics, and say, in the first place, in the second place, &c.

130. What we perceive by two senses at once has a good chance to be remembered. Hence to read aloud, slowly, and with propriety, when one is accustomed to it, contributes greatly to remembrance. And that which we write in a good hand, without contractions, with dark-coloured ink, exactly pointed and spelled, in straight lines with a moderate space between them, and properly subdivided into paragraphs as the subject may require, is better remembered than what we throw together in confusion. For, by all these circumstances, attention is fixed, and the writing, being better understood, makes a deeper impression. Those things also, which are related in two or more respects, are more easily remembered than such as are related in one respect only. Hence, by most people, verse is more easily remembered than prose, because the words are related in measure as well as in sense; and rhyme than blank verse, because the words are related not only in sense and measure, but also by similar sounds at the end of the lines. And, in general, elegant and harmoni-
ous language is better remembered, than what is harsh and incorrect.

131. Memories differ greatly both in kind and in degree. One man remembers best one sort of things, and another another; which may, in part, be owing to habits contracted of attending to one sort of things more than to another: and this may be assigned as one cause of the varieties of genius that are observable among mankind. In the early part of life, memory is commonly strong; for then the mind is disengaged, curiosity active, the spirits high, and the agreeable passions predominant. Infants easily remember, and as easily forget. A child of six years, going into a foreign country, acquires the new language, and forgets his own, in a few months. Most things are easily learned in the first part of life, especially languages. In mature age, curiosity is abated, and the spirits less lively than in youth: but men are then more capable of strict attention, and both the memory and the judgment must be considerably improved by experience and long exercise. In old age, curiosity is still more abated, and few things yield amusement, or are much attended to; and therefore memory is for the most part weak, except in regard to transactions long since past, or peculiarly suited to the present disposition.

132. To improve this faculty, we must, as already observed, cultivate habits of strict attention,
not only when we read books, or hear discourses, but also in conversation, and in every part of our daily business. It will also be prudent to study according to a plan, to dispose our affairs methodically, and to study nothing but what may be useful. To read a great variety of books is not necessary; but those we read should all be good ones; and we shall do well to read them slowly and considerately, often recollecting what we have read, and meditating upon it; and we should never leave a good author till we be masters of both his language and his doctrine. A list will be given hereafter of some of those books in Greek, Latin, and English, that deserve to be studied in this accurate manner. For, as Bacon well observes, 'some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, with diligence and attention.' There is much good sense in the following aphorism of the same great author: 'reading makes a full man, writing an exact man, and conversation a ready man.'

133. It is hardly credible to what a degree both active and passive remembrance may be improved by long practice. There are clergymen who can get a sermon by heart in two hours, though their memory, when they began to exercise it, was rather weak than strong. And pleaders, and other orators who speak in public and extempore, often discover, in calling instantly to mind all the know-
ledge necessary on the present occasion, and every thing of importance that may have been advanced in the course of a long debate, such powers of re-tention and of recollection as, to the man who has never been obliged to exert himself in the same manner, are altogether astonishing.

134. Frequently to revise our knowledge; to talk about it when we have a convenient oppor-tunity, that is, when we are in the company of those who may wish to hear us talk about it; to teach it to others; to reduce it to practice as much as possible; and to set down in writing, not on loose papers, but in books kept for the purpose, whatever may occur to us on any subject, would greatly improve both our memory and our judg-ment. To transcribe literally from books is of little use, or rather of none; for it employs much time, without improving any one of our faculties. But to write an abridgment of a good book may sometimes be a very profitable exercise. In ge-neral, when we would preserve the doctrines, sen-timents, or facts, that occur in reading, it will be prudent to lay the book aside, and put them in writing in our own words. This practice will give accuracy to our knowledge, accustom us to recol-lection, improve us in the use of language, and enable us so thoroughly to comprehend the thoughts of other men as to make them, in some measure, our own.

135. The memory of brutes seems to serve
them no further, than is necessary to the preservation of them and their offspring, and for making them useful to man. In some of them it is attended with extraordinary circumstances. Bees, for example, can see but a very little way before them, as appears from the extreme convexity of their eyes: and yet find their way, from a long excursion, to their respective homes, and seldom or never mistake a neighbouring hive for their own. In this they must be guided, not only by memory, but also by smell, or rather by some other instinct whereof we have no conception. Yet, with all the helps that he derives from instinct, or from more acute organs of sense, the memory of the most sagacious brute is to that of men almost infinitely inferior. Many brutes are quite untractable; of such the memory must be very limited. Those that are docile soon reach the height of improvement; and the arts and habits which it is in our power to impress upon them are but few. Destitute of consciousness, of reason, of recollection, of conversation, and of the powers of invention and arrangement, the extent of their knowledge must be extremely small, and their memory proportionable. Of abstract notions in regard to truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, elegance and deformity, proportions in quantity and number, law, government, religion, commerce, and other sciences and arts, which are the most important parts of human knowledge, they are utterly ig-
norant: nor can they ever know any thing of what has happened in time past, is likely to happen in the time to come, or is now happening at a distance.

136. But to the power of human memory, and to the possible extent of human knowledge, we can set no bounds. And what is very remarkable, the more real knowledge we acquire, the greater is our desire of knowledge, and the greater our capacity of receiving it. In a word, we seem to be susceptible of endless improvement: which is a proof, not only of the immense superiority of our nature to that of other animals, but also that our souls are formed for endless duration.

SECTION VII.

Of Imagination.

137. I remember to have seen a lion; I can imagine a griffin or a centaur though I never saw one:—he who uses these words with understanding knows the difference between imagination and memory, though perhaps he may not be able to explain it. When we remember, we have a view to real existence and past experience: when we imagine, we contemplate a notion or idea simply as it is in itself, or as we conceive it to be, without referring it to past experience or to real existence.
Some writers limit the word *imagination* to the mental conception of *images* or things visible; and this may perhaps have been the original meaning of the word: but the modern use of language will justify that more general application of the term which is here given. For it would be improper to say, that men born blind must be destitute of imagination: such men may surely *invent* as well as *dream*; it is well-known they can do both: and both invention and dreaming are referred to this faculty. Imagination employed in its more trivial exertions is often called fancy. A sublime poet is a man of vast imagination: a witty author is a person of lively fancy.

138. That we may see more particularly the nature of the faculty in question, it is proper to observe here, that all things may be divided into *simple* and *complex*. The former do not seem to consist of parts that can be separated; and such are our sensations of heat, cold, hunger, thirst, or of any particular sound, or simple colour. Complex things consist of parts, which may be separated and conceived separately: such are all bodies. Now all our simple ideas, that is, all our notions of simple objects, are derived from experience: a man must have *seen* colour, and light, and *heard* sound, and *felt* the pain of hunger, before he can conceive what those things are. But complex ideas, or notions of complex objects, the mind can form for itself, by supposing a number
of simple or complex notions or things combined together in one assemblage. When such complex ideas are not derived from memory, we refer them to the imagination. No man ever saw a mountain of ivory; but he, who has seen ivory and a mountain, may easily imagine the substance of the one extended to the size and shape of the other, and thus form the idea of an ivory mount-

139. Memory suggests nothing to us but what we have really perceived; so that a being endowed with memory, but destitute of imagination, could never invent any thing: as all invention implies novelty, and that certain things or thoughts are put together which were never so put together before. Now this inventing power is ascribed, as observed already, to the imagination or fancy, and, when regulated by good sense and applied to useful purposes, is called genius. One may be learned who is not ingenious; in other words, one may have a good memory well stored with knowledge, and yet have little imagination or invention; as, on the other hand, one may be very ingenious with little learning. But genius and learning, when they meet in one person, are mutually and greatly assistant to each other; and, in the poetical art, Horace declares that either without the other can do little.

140. The succession of our thoughts is often regulated by memory; as when we go over in our
mind the particulars of a place we have seen, of a conversation we have heard, or of a book we have read. At other times, when our attention is not fixed on any one thing, a state of mind called a reverie, we may observe, that our thoughts are continually changing, so that in a little time our imagination wanders to something very different from that which we were thinking of just before. Yet if we could remember every thing that passed through our mind during this reverie, we should probably find, that there was some relation, connection, or bond of union, between those thoughts that accompanied, or came next after, one another. The relations, or bonds of union, which thus determine the mind to associate ideas, are various.

141. First, resemblance is an associating quality: that is, when we perceive, or think of, any thing, it is natural for us, at the same time, or immediately after, to think of something that is like it. When we hear a story, or see a person, we are apt to think of other similar stories or persons. Our discourse we often embellish with metaphors, allegories, and those other figures of speech, that are founded in likeness. And when any powerful passion, as anger or sorrow, takes hold of the mind, the thoughts that occur to us have generally a resemblance to that passion, and tend to encourage it.

142. Contrariety, or contrast, is another associating principle, especially when the mind is in a
disagreeable state. Great cold makes us think of heat, and wish for it. Hunger and thirst put us in mind of eating and drinking. In poetry, and other works of fancy, we are sometimes pleased when we find things of opposite natures succeeding each other; when, for example, the hurry of a battle is interrupted, as in Homer it often is, with a descriptive similitude taken from still life or rural affairs; or when, in the same fable, persons appear of opposite characters, and the violent is opposed to the gentle, the cunning to the generous, and the rash to the prudent.

143. Thirdly: when we think of any place which we are acquainted with, we are apt to think at the same time of the neighbouring places and persons: here the associating principle is contiguity, or nearness of situation. The sight of a house, in which we have formerly been happy or unhappy, renews the agreeable or disagreeable ideas that were formerly realised there. Hence, in part, arises that partiality which most people have for the town, province, or country, in which they passed their early years. Hence, on entering a church, even when nobody is present, a considerate mind is apt to feel some of those religious impressions which it has formerly experienced in such places: and sentiments of a different nature arise, when we go into play-houses, ball-rooms, or apartments that we have seen appropriated to purposes of festivity.
144. Fourthly: things related as cause and effect do mutually suggest each other to the mind. When we see a wound, we think of the weapon or the accident that caused it, and of the pain which is the effect of it. The idea of snow or of ice brings along with it that of cold; and we can hardly think of the sun without thinking of light and heat at the same time. The associations founded on this principle are equally strong, whether the causation be real or imaginary. He who believes that darkness and solitude are the cause of the appearance of ghosts, will find, when he is in the dark and alone, that the idea of such beings will occur to him as naturally, as if the one were really the cause of the other. It is true, that solitude and darkness may reasonably produce some degree of fear; because where we cannot see we must be in some danger; and, when every thing is silent about us, we must be at some distance from the protection and other comforts of society. But ghosts and apparitions have nothing more to do with darkness than with light: and the stories told of them will be found, on examination, to arise, either from imperfect sensations owing to the darkness, or from those horrors which disorder the imagination when one is very much afraid, or from the folly, credulity, or falsehood of them who circulate those silly tales.

145. Custom or habit is a very extensive principle of association. Things and thoughts that have no other bond of union may, by appearing together,
or being frequently joined together, become so closely related, that the one shall ever after introduce the other into the mind. Thus, in language written or spoken, the mind instantly passes from the word heard, or from the characters seen, to the thing signified; custom having so associated them that the one always reminds us of the other.—Upon associations established by custom many of the pains and pleasures of life depend. An indifferent thing may become very agreeable, or very much the contrary, according to the nature of the ideas thus connected with it; and, in like manner, in consequence of some perverse association, that which ought to make us serious may incline us to laughter.

146. Things solemn and sacred, therefore, should never be spoken of in terms of ridicule or levity; and places appropriated to the offices of religion should never be made the scene of any thing ludicrous, trifling, or unsuitable. Where these rules are not attended to, important and frivolous thoughts may be so jumbled together in the mind, as that the former shall sometimes, very unseasonably and indecently, suggest the latter. Let sacred things be always accompanied with serious language and solemn circumstances: and let those who wish to retain the government of their passions and the command of their thoughts, be careful to check in the beginning every tendency to perverse and impure associations.

147. Dresses both ugly and inconvenient become
fashionable; and custom reconciles us to the fashion, though at first, perhaps, it might appear ridiculous; which is also owing to associations founded in custom. For when we have long seen a particular form of dress worn by persons whom we love and esteem, and on occasions of the greatest festivity or solemnity, it acquires in our mind a connection with a great number of pleasing ideas; and whatever is so connected must itself be pleasing. It will appear by and by, that, from associations founded in habit, many, or perhaps most, of those pleasing emotions are derived, which accompany the perception of that which in things visible is called beauty.

148. This subject will often come in our way hereafter. But before we leave it now, it may be proper to remark, that some people contract strange habits of what may be termed external association, of joining together two actions that have no natural connection, and appear very awkward when they are so joined. You may have seen a boy button and unbutton his coat all the while he is repeating his catechism; and we have heard of a lawyer, who could not go on with his pleading, unless he was continually winding a piece of packthread about his finger. It should be our care to guard against these and the like absurd habits, and to be very thankful to those who caution us against them; for the eyes of a friend are, in a matter of this kind, much more to be depended on than our own.

149. It was already observed, that the talent of
invention applied to useful purposes is called genius: but it requires experience and good sense to enable one so to apply it. Every person is not a man of genius, nor is it necessary that he should. For in human society, as in an army, though there must be a few to contrive and command, far the greater number have nothing to do but to obey: and the efforts of the multitude are necessary to public good, as well as the contrivance of those who direct them. Besides, if every man were a man of genius, there would be so much ambition in the world, and so many projectors, and such a multiplicity of opposite interests, as would confound the order of human affairs. To the perfection of genius, learning and application are necessary, as well as natural talents. It is true, that some men of great genius have had little learning; but this was their misfortune: and it can hardly be doubted, that with a better education they would have made a better figure. Without industry and attention, genius is good for nothing.

150. Many are the degrees, and the varieties, of human genius. One man has a genius in mechanics; another, in architecture; a third, in the conduct of military affairs; or in painting, geometry, music, poetry, eloquence, &c.; and one man may make great progress, and contrive many improvements in one art, who could not have been so successful in another. And some men there are, of talents so universal, as to discover genius in every
thing to which they apply themselves. It is not easy, nor perhaps possible, to account for these peculiarities and varieties of intellectual character. They may be partly owing to habits contracted in early years; and partly, and perhaps chiefly, to that particular constitution of mind, by which, as well as by his face and other bodily peculiarities, one man is distinguished from another.

151. But, though we may be at a loss to explain the efficient cause of this variety, it is easy to see its final cause, that is, the intention of providence in appointing it. It is this that makes men take to different pursuits and employments; which renders them mutually useful to one another, and prevents too violent oppositions of interest. And hence mankind enjoy a variety of conveniences; arts and sciences are invented and improved; and many sources are opened of commerce and friendly intercourse, whereby the circulation of truth is promoted, and the bounds of social virtue enlarged.

152. When one takes a view of the arts that flourish in society, one is apt to wonder at two things; first, their vast number and mutual subserviency; and, secondly, that men should be found who voluntarily make choice of one or other of all the employments necessary in civilized life. This consideration affords a proof of the extreme pliability of the human mind, as well as of the goodness of providence. For, though some professions and trades are of low esteem, we find, that in every con
dition honest industry, with contentment may be happy. Let us therefore learn to set a proper value on all the useful arts of life, and on all those who practise them with integrity and industry.

153. The imagination is subject to certain disorders, which may be comprehended under the opposite extremes of levity and melancholy. Levity produces thoughtlessness, vanity, and contempt of others. Whatever therefore tends to make men considerate and humble may be proposed as a remedy for this disease, or rather as a means of preventing it. Habits of consideration may be acquired by studying history, geometry, and those parts of philosophy which lead to the observation of life and manners.—Persons in danger from this disease should be kept at a distance from flattery and novels, and taught, that honesty and attention to business are in every station respectable, and that contempt and misery never fail to attend a life of idleness or fantastic ambition. The company of those who are wiser and better than they, will also be of great and peculiar benefit to persons of this character: and some experience of adversity may be very serviceable in promoting that knowledge of one’s self, and that fellow-feeling for others, which repress vanity, by producing consideration and a lowly mind.

154. The practice of turning every thing into joke and ridicule is a dangerous levity of imagination. Wit and humour, when natural, are very
useful and very pleasing. But that studied and habitual jocularity, which I here speak of, and which some people affect, makes one a disagreeable and tiresome companion. It generally arises from vanity; it renders conversation unprofitable, and too often immoral; and it gradually perverts the understanding, both of those who practise it, and of those who take pleasure in hearing it. Our serious concerns demand our first attention: wit, humour, and merriment, may be used in the way of relaxation, but are not the business for which we were sent into this world.

155. An imagination disordered by melancholy is one of the greatest calamities incident to human nature. In order to prevent it, we ought by all means to avoid idleness, and lead an active life; to be temperate and social; to cherish every cheerful affection, as good nature, good humour, patience, forgiveness, piety, humility, and benevolence, by all which the health of both the mind and body is effectually promoted; and to check the gloomy passions of anger, revenge, pride, suspicion, jealousy, misanthropy, excessive anxiety, and immoderate sorrow, which are all productive of misery and disease, both mental and corporeal. They, who are in danger from a melancholy imagination, will do well to study nothing but what is amusing and practical; to abstain from tragical narratives, controversy, and law-suits, which wear out the spirits to no purpose; to use moderation
in study, as in every thing else; and to have recourse every day, more or less according to circumstances, to bodily exercise, innocent amusement, fresh air, and cheerful company. To guard against superstition and enthusiasm, by forming right notions of God's adorable nature and providence; and to avoid, as one would the pestilence, all books and all conversations that are likely to infuse impious, irreligious, or immoral opinions, is the duty, not of those only whose minds are oppressed with melancholy, but of all mankind without exception.

SECTION VIII.

Of Dreaming.

156. That may be very useful, of which we cannot discover the use: and dreams, though we know little of their nature, may yet be of great importance in our constitution. Most of the few unconnected remarks that follow are offered as mere conjecture; for it would be vain to attempt to treat this subject in a scientific manner.—Most men dream, but all do not; and sometimes we dream more than at other times. In dreams we mistake ideas of imagination for real things. But when awake, and in our perfect mind, we never mistake a reality for a dream. Realities are perceived intuitively. We cannot prove by argument, that we
are now awake; for we know of nothing more evident to prove it by: and it is essential to every proof to be clearer than that which is to be proved. But it is impossible for us to doubt of our being awake: such is the law of our nature. And our experience of the delusions of dreaming never affects, and is not supposed to affect, the certainty of human knowledge.

157. In good health we often dream of our ordinary business; which however is considerably disguised by imaginary circumstances. Such dreams partake of the nature of allegory: they resemble common life, and yet they differ from it. This the poets attend to; and, when they have occasion to describe any person's dream, they generally make it contain some shadowy representation of what is supposed to be in his mind when awake; and this we approve of, because we know it is natural. Disagreeable dreams accompany certain bodily disorders; and when there is any tendency to fever in the human frame, they are very fatiguing and tiresome: whence a man of prudence, who is free from superstition, may make discoveries concerning his health, and learn from his dreams to live more temperately than usual, or take more or less exercise, or have recourse to other means, in order to avert the impending evil.

158. Dreams may sometimes be useful, as fables are, for conveying moral instruction. If, for example, we dream that we are in violent anger, and
strike a blow which kills a man, the horror we feel on the occasion may dispose us, when awake, to form resolutions against violent anger, lest it should at one time or other prompt us to a like perpetration. In the Tatler (No. 117), there is an account of a dream that conveys a sublime and instructive lesson of morality.—Dreams are a striking instance of the activity of the human soul, and of its power of creating, as it were, without the help of the senses, ideas that give it amusement, and command its whole attention. Sometimes, however, in sleep, our memory, and sometimes our judgment, seem to have forsaken us: we believe the wildest absurdities, and forget the most remarkable events of our life. It is at least possible, that this temporary suspension of our faculties may make the soul act more vigorously at other times, even as our bodily powers derive refreshment from rest.

159. Dreams may in other respects be friendly to our intellectual nature. To think too long, or too intensely, on any one subject, is hurtful to health, and sometimes even to reason. They may therefore be useful in giving variety to our thoughts, and forcing the mind to exert itself, for a while, in a new direction. And persons who dream most frequently may perhaps, from their constitution, have more need, than others have, of this sort of amusement; which is the more probable, because it is found in fact, that those people are most apt
to dream who are most addicted to intense thinking. In this view, even disagreeable dreams are useful: as a life of violent activity, of hardship, and even of danger, is recommended, and known to give relief, to persons oppressed with melancholy, and other mental disorders.

160. In ancient times, the dreams of some men were prophetical; but as we are not prophets, we have no reason to think that ours are of that sort. It may happen indeed, in the revolution of chances, that a dream shall resemble a future event. But this is rare; and, when it happens, not more wonderful, than that an irregular clock should now and then point at the right hour. Nor can it be admitted, that dreams are suggested by invisible beings; as they are for the most part mere trifles, and depend so much on the state of our mind and body. The soul in herself seems to possess vivacity sufficient to account for all the odd appearances that occur in sleep. For even when we are awake, and in health, very strange thoughts will sometimes arise in the mind. And, in certain diseases, waking thoughts are often as extravagant as the wildest dreams.

161. Our dreams are exceedingly various; but that they should be so, is not at all surprising. A very slight impression made on our organs of sense in sleep; a sound heard imperfectly; a greater or less degree of heat; our breathing in any respect
interrupted, by the state of the stomach and bowels, by an awkward position of the head, or by external things affecting our organs of respiration; the temperature of the air in general, or that of our bed-chamber in particular;—these, and the like casualties, as well as the tenor of our thoughts through the day, the state of our health, and the passions that may happen to predominate in our mind, have all considerable influence in giving variety to our nocturnal imaginations. Uncommon dreams, therefore, should give us no concern. In these visionary appearances, uniformity would be more wonderful, than the greatest variety. Some people, it is true, often find the same dream recur upon them. Possibly this may be in part owing to habit; they dream the same thing a third or a fourth time, because they have talked or thought of it more than of other dreams. Hence, with respect to disagreeable dreams, we may learn a caution; which is, to banish them from our thoughts as soon as possible, and never speak of them at all. It is indeed a vulgar observation, but there is truth in it, that they who seldom talk of dreams are not often troubled with them.
SECTION IX.

Of some Secondary Sensations.

162. Of the perceptive powers of man there still remain to be considered, conscience, whereby we distinguish between vice and virtue; and reason, whereby we perceive the difference between truth and falsehood. These, to prevent unnecessary repetition, we pass by at present, as they will come in our way hereafter, the former in moral philosophy, the latter in logic. If I had not wished to avoid troubling my hearers with too many divisions and subdivisions in the beginning, I would have divided sensation into primary and secondary. The former has been spoken of already. The latter I now enter upon; and, indeed, could hardly bring it in sooner; what has been said on the subject of imagination being necessary as an introduction to it. These secondary faculties of sensation have, by some writers, been called internal senses; by others, emotions. The name is of little importance: the nature of the thing will soon appear.

163. We perceive colours and figures by the eye; we also perceive that some colours and figures are beautiful, and others not. This power of perceiving beauty, which the brutes have not,
though they see as well as we, I call a secondary sense. We perceive sounds by the ear; we also perceive, that certain combinations of sound have harmony, and that others are dissonant. This power of perceiving harmony, called in common language a musical ear, is another secondary sense, which the brutes have not, and of which many men who hear well enough are utterly destitute. Of these secondary senses there are, no doubt, many in the human constitution. I confine myself to those of novelty, sublimity, beauty, imitation, harmony, and ridicule; which, together with sympathy, which I shall also describe, form what is commonly called good taste. The pleasures received by the secondary senses are, by Addison, in the sixth volume of the Spectator, and by Aken-side, in the title of a poem which he wrote on the subject, termed pleasures of imagination.

164. Of Novelty. Things in themselves indifferent, or even disagreeable, may be agreeable when new; and novelty in general has a charm in it, of which every rational, or every human being at least, is sensible. Hence our passion for variety, for amusement, for news, for strange sights, and for knowledge in general. The pleasure we take in new things arises from the active nature of man. We are never happy unless employed about something; and when we have nothing to do in the way of business or amusement, the mind becomes languid, and of course uneasy. Yet into this state
we are apt to fall, when there is nothing to rouse our attention, or give play to our faculties. For when we have long been conversant about one set of objects, the mind comprehends them so easily, that they give it no exercise. In this case, a new object occurring gives an impulse to the mind, and puts it upon exerting itself; and the exertion, if moderate, is agreeable. If the new object occasion surprise, or any other lively and pleasing emotion, its novelty will be still more interesting, because it will convey to the mind a more sprightly and perhaps a more permanent impulse.

165. Some things are more disagreeable at first, than they come to be afterwards; which may be owing to one or other of these two causes. Either the new object may have required, in order to its being comprehended, a violent and painful exertion of the faculties; as in the case of one entering upon a new study, or a new course of life: or we may have fixed our first attention on what seemed disagreeable in the new object; not discovering its agreeable qualities till we were better acquainted with it. Hence let us learn, that a good course of life, though somewhat unpleasant at first, ought not on that account to be relinquished; for we may be assured it will in time become pleasant, if persisted in. It is remarkable, that men sometimes contract a most violent liking to certain tastes that were at first extremely offensive, as those of
tobacco and strong liquors. This depends on causes in which the mind has little concern. It may be, that, by the constant use of such things, the stomach or the palate, and of course the animal spirits, are reduced to such a state as to be uneasy in the want of them. The part of prudence, therefore, is, to abstain from such things altogether, which requires no effort, rather than to hazard the acquisition of a habit which it may be almost impossible to overcome. Unnatural pleasures of this sort it is no evil to be without, but it may be a fatal evil to acquire a relish for.

166. In all the arts that minister to rational pleasure, variety is studied, that the mind may be refreshed with a succession of novelties. The prose-writer, where it can be done conveniently, varies the length, the sound, and the syntax, of contiguous clauses and sentences; and amuses the reader's fancy with metaphors, similitudes, and other apposite figures of speech. The poet varies the structure of contiguous verses; and, in framing his fable, is careful to bring in events that are both probable and unexpected, and persons who differ from each other in character, appearance, and adventures. So in the other fine arts. In the works of nature there is great uniformity, and at the same time the most unbounded variety: so that he who studies them is continually delighted with new and wonderful discoveries; and yet is
never perplexed by their multiplicity, because order, proportion, and fitness, prevail through the whole system.

167. The taste for novelty is an important part of the human constitution. It is the source of much amusement, and prompts men to labour in the acquisition of knowledge. It is, besides, one of our first passions. You cannot gratify a child more, than by shewing him something new, or telling him a wonderful story. The same novelties are not equally captivating to all. Some seek after new attainments in science; some wander through the world to visit different nations; some explore the wonders of inanimate nature, and some the characters of men; some read history, some study the fine arts, some are curious in whatever relates to mechanism, and some mind little more than the news of the day; some amuse themselves with collecting pictures, prints, manuscripts, medals, shells, minerals; and some are fond of old, and others of new books. Thus men take to different pursuits and employments, and every part of knowledge is cultivated.

168. Of Sublimity. Things of great magnitude, as a large building, a high mountain, a broad river, a wide prospect, the ocean, the sky, &c. fill the mind of the beholder with admiration and pleasing astonishment, and with respect to this sensation are called sublime. Great height and depth, and great number too, as an army, a navy.
a long succession of years, eternity, &c. are sublime objects, because they fill our minds with the same pleasing astonishment. In contemplating such things, we are conscious of something like an expansion or elevation of our faculties, as if we were exerting our whole capacity to comprehend the vastness of the object.

169. Whatever it be that raises in us this pleasing astonishment, is accounted sublime, whether connected with quantity or number, or not. Hence loud sounds, like those of thunder, cannon, a full organ, a storm; hence those fictions in poetry, that produce an imaginary, and not painful terror; hence any uncommon degree of virtue, of genius, or even of bodily strength; and hence those affections which elevate the soul, as fortitude, devotion, and universal benevolence, or which are, in their objects, causes, or effects, connected with great number or great quantity; are all denominated sublime, and fill our minds with the same delightful astonishment and admiration.

170. The Deity—the source of happiness and the standard of perfection; who creates, preserves, pervades, and governs all things; whose power is omnipotent, whose wisdom is perfect, whose goodness is unbounded, whose greatness is incomprehensible; who was from all eternity, and of whose dominion there can be no end: he is undoubtedly, and, beyond all comparison, the most sublime ob-
ject which it is possible to conceive or to contemplate: and of all created sublimity (if I may so speak) his works exhibit the most perfect and most astonishing examples. There are, no doubt, sublime operations of human art, as ships of war, cathedral churches, palaces, mounds for repelling the sea, &c. But, in respect of greatness, these are nothing, when we compare them with mountains, volcanoes, the ocean, the expanse of heaven, clouds and storms, thunder and lightning, the sun and moon, the solar system, the universe.

171. Poetry, painting, and music, are called fine arts; because, though not necessary to life, they are highly ornamental. Architecture is also a fine art; for it improves building to a degree far beyond what is necessary. And by each of these arts the sublime is attainable. That is sublime music which inspires sublime affections, as courage and devotion; or which, by its sonorous harmonies, overwhelms the mind with a pleasing astonishment. Architecture is sublime, when it is large, lofty, and durable; and, at the same time, so simple and well-proportioned as that the eye can take in all its greatness at once. For a number of little parts and ornaments take away from the sublimity of a great building, though they may sometimes add to its beauty. Painting is sublime, when it exhibits men invested with great qualities, such as bodily strength; or actuated by sublime passions, as devotion or valour; or when it successfully imitates
great visible objects, artificial or natural, as mountains, precipices, palaces, storms, cataracts, volcanoes, and the like.

172. Poetry is sublime; first, when it elevates the mind, and makes it, as it were, superior to the cares and troubles of this world: secondly, when it infuses any sublime affection, as devotion, valour, universal benevolence, the love of virtue and of our country: thirdly, when it affects the mind with an awful and imaginary, but not unpleasing horror: fourthly, when it describes the sentiments or actions of those persons whose character is sublime: and fifthly, when it conveys a lively idea of any grand appearance, natural, artificial, or imaginary. That style is sublime, which makes us readily conceive any great object or sentiment in a lively manner; and this is often done when the words are very plain and simple.

173. It is true, that poets and orators, when they describe sublime objects, do often elevate their style with tropes and figures, and high-sounding expressions. And this is suitable to the nature of human speech: for, when we speak of any thing which we consider as great, it is natural for us, even in common discourse, to raise our voice, and pronounce with more than usual solemnity. But in the use of bold figures and sonorous language great caution is requisite: for, if they be too frequent, or seem to be too much sought after, or if they be not accompanied with a correspondent
elevation of thought, they become ridiculous, and are called bombast, or false sublime. Even in brutes there may be qualities which command our admiration and astonishment: whence lions, horses, and elephants, are sublime objects; not so much because their bodies are large, though this may have some effect, as on account of their uncommon strength, sagacity, or contempt of danger.

174. Though real greatness always raises admiration, littleness does not always excite the contrary passion of contempt. That which is little may be beautiful or useful, or ingeniously contrived, and so give pleasure in various ways, and sometimes raise admiration too; for who does not admire the beauty of a rose, and the wonderful instincts of the bee? Littleness is then offensive, and is called meanness, when we are disappointed by it, and meet with it in a place, where we had reason to expect something better. There is a meanness in certain words and phrases, which for that reason ought to be avoided on every solemn occasion, and in all elegant writing. Important sentiments expressed in mean words, raise indignation or laughter. Think what effect a sermon would have, if it were mixed with vulgar proverbs, or broad Scotch words. Now those are mean words, which are not used except by illiterate or by affected persons, or on very familiar occasions. Common proverbs, customary forms of compliment, ungrammatical expressions, cant phrases
and provincial barbarisms, have all more or less of this meanness; and, however they may pass on common occasions, or when people mean to talk ludicrously, will always give great offence in compositions that aim at sublimity or elegance. But of this more hereafter.

175. The contemplation of the divine nature, and of the works of creation and providence, will no doubt constitute our supreme and final felicity. To prepare us for such contemplation, and raise our minds above the present world, the Deity has been pleased to endow us with a capacity of receiving pleasure, even in this life, from the view of what is good or eminently great. Our taste for the sublime, cherished into a habit, and directed to proper objects, may therefore promote our moral improvement, by leading us to contemplate the Creator in his wonderful works; by keeping us at a distance from vice, which is the vilest of all things; and by recommending virtue for its intrinsic dignity and loveliness.

176. Of Beauty. This term is applied to many sorts of agreeable things: we speak of beautiful language, and of a beautiful song, as well as of a beautiful face. At present I speak of visible beauty chiefly; which may belong, first to colour, secondly to figure, thirdly to attitude or gesture, and fourthly to motion. In general it may be observed, that the pleasure we take in looking at what is beautiful, a rose for example, is very dif-
ferent in kind from the pleasure that attends the contemplation of a sublime object, as a great cataract, or a huge and craggy mountain. The latter sensation (if it may be so called) seems to rouse and elevate the mind, the former to compose it: the one is solemn and serious; the other has a mixture of gladness in it, which disposes the face of the beholder to a smile. Beauty and greatness may be united in the same object, in which case they mutually adorn each other. The rainbow in its colours and circular form is extremely beautiful, and at the same time very sublime, on account of its apparent magnitude and elevation.

177. Colours are beautiful, first, when they convey to the mind a lively sensation, as white and red; secondly, when they cherish the organ of sight, as green; thirdly, when they have that character which we term delicacy, and yield a sensation both lively and gentle, as pale red, and light blue. But, fourthly, the beauty of a colour depends chiefly on the agreeableness of the ideas it conveys to the mind; for the same colour which in one thing is very beautiful, may in another be very ugly. The verdure of the fields, for example, is delightful, because it leads us to think of fruitfulness, fragrance, and many other pleasant things; but greenness in the human face would be horrible, because it would suggest the notion of pain, of disease, or of something unnatural.
178. Colours that look as if they were stained or sullied, or which are so indefinite that one knows not what name to give them, are not often considered as beautiful. But those gradations of colour, which we see in flowers, in the plumage of some birds, in the rainbow, in the evening and morning sky, and in many other natural appearances, are beautiful in the highest degree; when the colours so melt away into one another, that, though we discern the change, we cannot mark where the one ends and the other begins. The delicacy wherewith they are blended so far surpasses the ordinary efforts of human skill, that we cannot behold it without admiration. In general, every colour is beautiful, that brings along with it the agreeable idea of perfection, of health, of convenience, of intellectual or moral virtue, or of any other sort of excellence. Negroes love their own colour for the same reason that we love ours; because they always see it; because all the people they love have it; and because none are without it but those who are thought to be strangers and enemies. This, at least, must be the negro's way of thinking, as long as he remains in his own country, or till he have the singular good fortune to find friends among white people. So much for beauty of colour.

179. Perfection and skill are always agreeable; and whatever suggests them to the mind must be so too, and, if visible, is entitled to be called beau-
tiful. For this reason it seems to be, that figures so well proportioned and so complete, as circles, squares, ellipses, hexagons, &c convey to us the notion of beauty. Want of proportion in figures is not agreeable, and therefore not beautiful, because it makes us think of inconvenience, unskilfulness, or imperfection. Figures, as they appear in furniture, in architecture, or in any other work of art, are more or less beautiful, according as they convey to us, more or less, the idea of skill, convenience, and usefulness. In fact, the beauty of things depends very much, as Socrates rightly thought, upon their utility: for if a thing be useless, we cannot like it; if we do not like it, it will give us no pleasure; and of all beauty it is the character, to be pleasing. Were the horse as slow as the snail, we should be more inclined to dislike his unwieldy size, than to admire his fine shape.

180. That form of the human body is accounted beautiful, which conveys the idea of bodily perfection. Now the human body is in its most perfect state in youth; and therefore, in respect of shape, a youthful body is more elegant than that of an infant or old man. Another reason may be given for this, as follows:—In all beautiful animals, and in all the most beautiful parts of animals, the figure is bounded rather by curves, than by straight lines; except where these last may be necessary, as in the legs of animals,
to strength and convenience. If the back and the breast of a fine horse were bounded by right lines, instead of that flowing curve which winds so gracefully about them, every one must be sensible, that the beauty of the shape would be lost. Now, in the outlines of the body of an infant, the curves are rather too much bent, on account of the redundancy of flesh compared with the smallness of the size; in the body of an old man they are too little bent, and approach to right lines, on account of the decay of moisture: in youth they are neither too much bent nor too little, but a middle between both; and then the shape of the body is most perfect.

181. In the works of nature, the greatest usefulness is often united with perfect beauty of colour and figure: and the more we study them, the more beautiful they appear; because we become the more sensible of their utility, as well as better acquainted with their form. In them too, that which we call beauty is generally smooth, or seems to be so; and is rather small than great, that is, rather below the usual proportion than above it. A craggy mountain is a sublime object, and its crags may add to its sublimity; but a beautiful hill is, or appears to be, smooth. The statue of Minerva may be tall, dignity being her character; but a gigantic Venus would be absurd. So much for beauty of shape or figure.

182. Those gestures are graceful, which shew
the body to advantage; or which are assumed with ease, and may continue a considerable time without giving pain; or which are suitable to the nature of the person or animal, and to the passion or sentiment that is supposed to be in the person's mind, provided that passion or sentiment be such as we approve. And no gesture is graceful, which conveys any disagreeable idea of unwieldiness, infirmity, constraint, affectation, or any evil passion.

183. The same remarks may be made on beauty of motion. Those motions in general are graceful, which are performed with ease; which imply bodily perfection; and which are naturally expressive of agreeable passions or sentiments in the mind of the person who moves. The motion of some inanimate things is very beautiful; as that of smoke ascending slowly in the sky, of unbroken waves in the sea, and of flags and streamers flying in the wind. The first pleases, as an emblem of tranquillity; the second, on account of the smoothness, greatness, and uniformity; and the last, by the glare of colours, by the easy curvature, and by suggesting agreeable ideas of busy life. The characteristics of beauty, according to some authors, are uniformity, variety, and proportion. How far each of these may be necessary to form beauty, and why each of them gives pleasure, will perhaps appear from what has been said.

184. That which in the smallest compass ex-
hibits the greatest variety of beauty, is a fine human face. The features are of various sizes and forms; the corresponding ones exactly uniform; and each has that shape, size, position, and proportion, which is most convenient. Here too is the greatest beauty of colours, which are blended, varied, and disposed, with marvellous delicacy. But the chief beauty of the countenance arises from its expression, of sagacity, good nature, cheerfulness, modesty, and other moral and intellectual virtues. Without such expression, no face can be truly beautiful; and with it, none can be really ugly. Human beauty, therefore, at least that of the face, is not merely a corporeal quality; but derives its origin and essential characters from the soul: and almost any person may, in some degree, acquire it, who is at pains to improve his understanding, to repress criminal thoughts, and to cherish good affections; as every one must lose it, whatever features or complexion there may be to boast of, who leaves the mind uncultivated, or a prey to evil passions, or a slave to trifling pursuits.

185. Of Imitation. Man is of all animals the most prone to imitation, and takes great delight in it. By imitating others, we learn to speak and walk, and do many other things, long before we could either attend to rules, or understand them. Many of the sports of children are imitations of the actions of men: and we find, that, in most nations, dramatic performances, which are
also imitations of what happens in real life, are much attended to, and greatly esteemed as an amusement.

186. We receive pleasure from seeing a good imitation, though the original be indifferent, or, perhaps, even disagreeable. A common plant we view with indifference, and a dead man we could not see without pain; but a good picture of either would give pleasure: and a picture, equally good, of a beautiful object, would please still more. And this pleasure arises chiefly from our admiration of the skill displayed in the work: for admiration is an agreeable emotion; and it gratifies a sound mind to see any thing perfect, or advancing to perfection.

187. Poetry, painting, and music, are called fine arts, for a reason formerly given. They are also called imitative arts; because in them the appearances or operations of nature are, or are supposed to be, imitated; in painting, by colour; in poetry, by language; and in music, by sound. The contemplation of nature is delightful to the human soul; and nothing that is unnatural, or contrary to nature, can please a well-informed mind. And, therefore, the fine arts, being all intended to give pleasure, must exhibit either what is according to nature, or what is similar to it; either what is real, or what is likely and probable.

188. That pictures are imitations of nature, is
obvious; and in them may be imitated almost every thing visible, not only animals and inanimate things, but also the passions and emotions of the mind; for these last produce visible appearances in the look and gesture, by which they are known, and which a painter may delineate. But, as no more than the events of one instant can be seen at one instant, and as the whole picture strikes the eye at once, the subject of every painting must be one event or appearance, or must at least be such a combination of appearances, as may be supposed to be contiguous in place, and to be seen at one and the same time. The progress, therefore, of action, or of thought, painting cannot imitate. However, by exhibiting visible things in those attitudes, in which they are never seen except when they move, it may give a very lively idea of certain kinds of motion; as of rolling billows, ascending smoke, trees waving in the wind, fluttering robes and streamers, and animal bodies running, walking, swimming, or flying. Those thoughts that produce no visible change in the appearance of the body, cannot be expressed in a picture.

189. Language, the instrument of poetical imitation, is applicable to all subjects, and may with the greatest accuracy imitate and describe human actions, passions, and sentiments, in each period of their progress, as well as every appearance in the animal or inanimate world. It has been doubted, whether poetry be an imitation, or a repre-
sentation, of nature. The controversy is of little moment, and may perhaps be thus determined. If we consider it as an art, that exhibits, not what is real, but only what is likely or probable, we must call poetry imitative; because there is something in it which is not in nature: for it is essential to an imitation to be in some respect or other different from the original. Ideas conveyed to the fancy by good poetical description would, if delineated by the painter, and made visible by means of colour, be found to resemble natural things; and if such a picture be an imitation, the description whence it is copied must be so to. Real things may indeed be truly described in poetical numbers; but this is not common; nor would this be any thing else than history in verse: it being the business of the poet (as will be shewn hereafter) to represent things not as they are, but rather as they might be. This reasoning refers chiefly to narrative and descriptive poems. In dramatic poetry, the imitation of human action is obvious and unquestionable. Whether music be imitative, will be seen by and by. Architecture is an useful and noble art, but cannot be called imitative. Only the pillars in old cathedral churches are said to have been framed in imitation of rows of trees, to which indeed they bear a great similitude; the people who invented this mode of building having, it seems, annexed some notion of sanctity to that appearance; probably because men
had been accustomed, before the use of temples, to perform the rites of their religion under the shade of trees in a grove.

190. So great is the pleasure we receive from seeing nature well imitated, that the representation of human misfortunes upon the stage, or in poems, gives delight, even while it infuses the painful passions of pity and sorrow. This is owing, partly to the agitation produced in the mind of the reader or spectator by the circumstances of the story; partly, to the art displayed in the representation by the player, or by the poet in the narrative; partly, to our being conscious, that what we read or see is not real, but imaginary, distress (for to those children who mistake it for real it is found to give pain instead of amusement); and partly, and perhaps chiefly, to the nature of pity, which, though a painful passion, is in the exercise accompanied with several gratifications; such as our consciousness of its being praiseworthy in itself, ornamental to our nature, useful in society, and amiable in the eyes of our brethren of mankind.

191. Of Harmony. That the sense of harmony, commonly called a musical ear, is a distinct faculty from the sense of hearing, appears from this; that many men receive no pleasure from music who hear very well, and that some who are dull of hearing are very fond of music: and other facts might be mentioned that prove the same thing. Observe, that, in the language of art,
harmony and melody are distinguished; the latter being the agreeable effect of a single series of musical tones; and the former, the agreeable effect produced by two or more series of musical tones sounded at the same time. Observe further, that melody gives pleasure to all who have a musical ear, our taste for it being natural, though very capable of improvement; whereas harmony is little relished, except by those who have studied it, or have been much accustomed to hear it. Yet harmony is in some degree pleasing to most people; its essential laws being so well founded in nature, that nobody who understands them questions their propriety.

192. Music consists of sound and motion. The peculiar motion of any piece of music is called its rhythm or number, or, in common language, its time. When a tune is accompanied with the drum, or with a dance, we hear the rhythm in the sound of the feet, or of the drumsticks. Rhythm belongs also to verse, and even to prose: for the pauses and the continuity of pronunciation, and the interchange of short and long, or of emphatic and non-emphatic, syllables, may all be imitated by the drum, or by the hand striking on a board. Do not confound rhythm with rhyme. Rhythm is a Greek word, and means what has been just now said. Rhyme is a modern word, and in English denotes the similar sounds that terminate contiguous verses in certain sorts of poetry.
193. By its sounds music may imitate sounds; and by its motion, motions. But irregular motions, or inharmonious sounds, it cannot imitate; because every thing in this art must be regular and harmonious. Its imitative powers, therefore, are very limited. And music may be strictly imitative, and yet intolerably bad; or not at all imitative, and yet perfectly good. The imitation of nature is, therefore, not essential to this art, as it is to poetry and painting. Consequently music pleases, not because it imitates nature, but for some other reasons which may be explained as follows.

194. First: some sounds, especially when continued, are pleasing in themselves, though they have neither meaning nor modulation: such is the murmur of groves, winds, and waters. Musical sounds, even when heard separate, are all pleasing in themselves, or ought to be so; and the more they resemble the tones of a good human voice, the more pleasing they are, and the more perfect.—Secondly: some tones, sounded at the same time, have an agreeable, and others a disagreeable effect: the former are called concords, the latter discords. All concords are not equally agreeable, nor all discords equally harsh; and the art of harmony lies in blending the harsher with the sweeter concords, or even with discords, in such a manner as most effectually to please the ear. The artful management of this matter is another source of the pleasure we derive from music.
195. Thirdly: In all regular music, variety and proportion are united, and have a pleasing effect upon the mind, similar to that which they have in things visible; that is, they gently exercise the faculties, without bewildering or fatiguing them, and they suggest the agreeable ideas of contrivance and skill. But in what manner variety and proportion enter into the composition of music, can be explained to those only, who know something both of the practice and of the theory of the art.—One artifice however may be mentioned, which the most unskilful may understand. Some pieces of music are contrived with the express purpose of introducing apparent confusion; as fugues, in which different instruments, or voices, take up the same air, but not all at the same time, so that one is, as it were, the echo of the other; and yet the general result is not confusion, which one would expect, but perfect harmony: which gives an agreeable surprise, and heightens our admiration of the author's skill, and of the dexterity of the performers.

196. Fourthly: music is agreeable, which infuses into the mind, or prepares it for being affected with, agreeable passions. Now, as all the rules of the art tend to give pleasure, all the passions it can raise must be of the agreeable kind. It may dispose the soul to devotion, gladness, courage, compassion, or benevolence; but has no expression for impiety, cowardice, anger, envy, or malice. The meaning, however, or expression of music is not
determinate, unless it be united with poetry, or language: so that the most perfect music is song; in which elegant words, distinctly pronounced, give significance to melody well modulated by the voice, and enforced by suitable harmonies. And therefore, music merely instrumental is to a certain degree imperfect; unless we are led by custom, or by some outward circumstance, to assign it a definite meaning.

197. Fifthly: all music is agreeable, which conveys agreeable thoughts to the mind of the hearer. We have heard it formerly in an agreeable place perhaps, or performed by an agreeable person, or accompanied with agreeable words, or some other pleasing circumstance. Hence, when we hear it again, we hear it with pleasure, because it suggests some pleasing recollection, or some idea at least of former happiness. From this principle, a great deal of the pleasure may be accounted for, which we derive from music, especially from that of our own country.

198. That the sense of harmony is no unimportant part of the human constitution, will appear, when we consider, that in all civilised, and many unpolished nations, music has ever been accounted agreeable as an amusement, and useful as a means of inspiring courage, devotion, gladness, and other good affections. Polybius, a grave and wise historian, ascribes the humanity of the ancient Arcadians to their knowledge of this art, and the barbarity of
their neighbours the Cynethians to their neglect of it. And as he was a native of Arcadia, we can hardly suppose that a man of his penetration could be mistaken in a matter of this kind.

199. Of Laughter. To perceive an object, and to laugh at it, are different things: brutes perceive, but never laugh. Risibility is one of the distinguishing characters of man. Some things excite laughter mixed with contempt or disapprobation; as the absurdities of a lying traveller, a boastful soldier, or a great miser: such things are properly termed ridiculous. Other things, which provoke laughter merely, without contempt or disapprobation, may be called ludicrous. Such are the tricks of monkies and young cats: and such, though in all other respects totally different, are those examples of wit and humour, which we laugh at in books or persons whom we admire and esteem. Here we are to consider ludicrous objects chiefly; as laughter, and not contempt, is the object of the present inquiry.

200. Laughter may be occasioned by tickling, or in children by gladness. But I speak of that laughter, which is the outward expression of a certain agreeable emotion raised in the mind by the view, or by the conception, of something which we call oddity, drollery, or by some such name. This feeling may be in the mind, when laughter, the outward sign, does not appear; for one may restrain laughter, when one is much tempted to indulge it.
In like manner, tears are an outward sign of sorrow, but one may be very sorrowful who does not weep. What, then, is this drollery, or oddity? what is that quality or character, which all ludicrous or laughable objects have in common?

201. First: The object of ridicule in comedy is very well defined by Aristotle; who calls it, some small fault or turpitude, not attended with pain, and not destructive: for to laugh at distress, or at great faults, is at once unnatural and wicked; and therefore a writer of comedy is highly blameable, when he introduces misfortunes or crimes on the stage, in order to make us laugh at them. But Aristotle’s definition does not hold true of laughter in general, or even of all innocent laughter: for men may laugh innocently at that in which they perceive no turpitude. Fine turns of wit and humour may be ludicrous, even when they suggest to the mind nothing which it is possible either to despise or to disapprove.

202. Secondly: Mr. Hobbes is of opinion, and he is rashly followed by the author of the fortieth paper of the Spectator, that laughter is a sudden exultation of mind, arising from the conception of pre-eminence in ourselves, and of inferiority in that which we compare with ourselves as we are at present. This resolves laughter into pride. But nothing is more absurd. Proud men are more remarkable for gravity than for laughter; and laughter is seldom taken for a sign of pride.
And men laugh at things which they do not compare with themselves at all; and at the wit and humour of authors, whom they believe to be their superiors in every respect.

203. Thirdly: Hutcheson says, that a mixture of dignity and meanness, appearing in the same object, or suggested to the mind by one and the same appearance, is the cause of laughter. And indeed it often is, but not always. For such a mixture appears in the people, and in the houses, of every large town; and yet a large town, or a great multitude, is rather a sublime than a ludicrous object. And laughter may be raised by some sorts of wit and humour, in which it is impossible to discern any mixture of dignity and meanness. And a mimic may make us laugh, by imitating the manner of a person who has no more dignity than the mimic himself has.—These theories, therefore, are either false, or not sufficiently comprehensive.

204. If a painter, says Horace, were to join to the head of a man the neck of a horse, feathers of different birds, limbs of different animals, and the tail of a fish, the whole would be ludicrous. This, it seems, was true in Horace’s time, and no doubt is so still. It would appear then, that a ludicrous object must be made up of several parts; that the parts whereof it is made up must be in some degree inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous; and that they must be considered as united in one assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual connection.
from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them. And therefore it may be inferred, that laughter is occasioned by an incongruity or unsuitableness of the parts that compose, or seem to compose, any complex object or idea. Incongruous objects may in several ways be united so as to make the union ludicrous.

205. First: When they happen to be placed together. Erasmus, in a dialogue called *absurda*, endeavours to provoke mirth by a conference between two persons, who speak alternately, each pursuing a subject of his own, without any regard to what is said by the other. It looks like a dialogue between two deaf men: and the humour, such as it is, if there be any, arises merely from the juxtaposition of sentences, which have no other relation but that of place. When Pope says of Prince Eugene, that 'he is a great taker of snuff as well as of towns,' the two things spoken of, which are utterly incongruous, acquire an unexpected relation by being placed together, and made equally dependent on the word *taker*; which of course becomes a *pun*, by being used at one and the same time in two different senses. And it is this mixture, of incongruity and seeming relation, that makes the passage ludicrous.

206. Secondly: When things appearing in the relation of *cause and effect* are very incongruous and inadequate to each other, they sometimes provoke a smile; as when a man is thrown into a violent
passion by a trifling cause; as if we were to see a person seriously attempt (like the child in Quarles's emblems) to blow out the sun with a pair of bellows, or four men take hold of the four corners of a church with an intention to lift it from the ground.

207. Thirdly: The unexpected discovery of resemblance between things supposed to be unlike, when it is clearly expressed in few words, constitutes what is commonly called wit; and is a very copious source of pleasantry. Such, to give one instance, is that comparison in Hudibras, of the dawn of the morning to a boiled lobster; 'like a lobster boil'd the morn from black to red began to turn.' At first, there seems to be no resemblance at all: but, when we recollect, that the lobster's colour is by boiling changed from dark to red, we recognise a likeness to that change of colour in the sky which happens at day-break.

208. Fourthly: Dignity and meanness unexpectedly united, or supposed to be united, in the same assemblage, is a frequent cause of laughter. As when a mean sentiment unexpectedly appears in a solemn discourse, or a serious sentiment in a trifling one:—as when the phraseology of a solemn passage in a well-known author is, by a little change of words, made to express, in the way of parody, something frivolous or very different:—as when mean ideas and images are expressed in pompous language, as in the Dunciad and Splendid Shilling:
as when important ideas are debased by mean words or provincial barbarisms, whereof we have had some examples already. (See § 174). But observe, that mixtures of this sort, when they seem to proceed from want of taste, or from any mental depravity, are more apt to move indignation than laughter.

209. In ludicrous writing two sorts of style are used, and both imply a mixture of dignity and meanness; namely, the mock-heroic and the burlesque. The former considers little things as great, and describes them with pomp of language and of harmony. The Dunciad, the Splendid Shilling, the Battle of the frogs and mice, commonly, though erroneously, ascribed to Homer, are masterpieces in this way of writing; as are also the Lutrin of Boileau, and Pope's Rape of the Lock. The burlesque author assumes the character of a buffoon, and considers great things as little, and little things as less than the reality; and affects vulgar language, and, if he write in verse, a peculiar levity in the construction of his numbers. Hudibras, and the History of John Bull, are in the burlesque style, the one verse, the other prose, and both excellent in their kind.

210. Some works of humour are written in a grave style, without either meanness or elevation of language. Many of the humorous papers in the Tatler and Spectator, and many passages in Gulliver's Travels, are of this sort. The author takes
the character of a plain man delivering a simple and serious narrative of a matter which he seems to think important and true; and this, if the subject be trifling, or the narrative palpably fabulous, has the same pleasing effect, as when a person tells a merry story with an unaffected gravity of countenance. See particularly the journal of the court of honour in the Tatler.

211. Incongruity is not always ludicrous. It ceases to be so, when it comes to be customary and common; and, therefore, ludicrous incongruity must have in it something uncommon, or, at least, unexpected. New fashions of dress often seem at their first appearance ridiculous; but, when generally adopted, are ridiculous no longer. Besides, the inward emotion that prompts to laughter is not very powerful; many other emotions have naturally more strength, and have therefore a natural right to suppress it. Consequently, those incongruous associations, that give rise to pity, disgust, fear, anger, hatred, or moral disapproval, are not laughable; because they call forth passions of greater power, and more importance. In these cases the weaker emotion gives place to the stronger.

212. And every one is sensible that it ought to be so. Were a man to laugh at distress, or at any thing which his conscience tells him is criminal, he would be severely censured; for it would be said, with respect to the first, that he ought to
pity, and not to laugh; and, with respect to the second, that superior considerations ought to have restrained his laughter; for that they are fools who laugh at sin. And most people must have observed, that we are not apt to laugh at that which disgusts us, or makes us very angry, or seriously afraid. Had the writers of comedy paid a proper regard to these things, and never attempted to call forth either immoral or unnatural laughter, the comic muse would, in respect both of utility and of elegance, have been more worthy of honour, than I am afraid she can be said to be in any nation.

213. Laughter, notwithstanding what Lord Chesterfield has said against it, is perfectly consistent with elegant manners; as might be proved from the practice of some of the most distinguished characters both of these and of former times. Good breeding, however, lays some restraints upon it, which may be thus explained. Good breeding is the art, or rather the habit, of pleasing those with whom we converse. Now we cannot please others, if we either shew them what is unpleasing in ourselves, or give them reason to think that we perceive unpleasing qualities in them. All emotions, therefore, which may betray our own bad qualities, or might naturally arise from the view of bad qualities in others; and all those emotions or passions in general, which our company may think too violent, and cannot sympathize with or par-
take in, good breeding requires that we suppress. Laughter that is too loud, or too frequent, is an emotion of this kind. And, therefore, a well-bred man will be careful not to laugh louder or longer than others; nor to laugh at all, when he has reason to think, that the jest will not be equally relished by the company.

214. This rule, a little extended, may be of great use for the regulation of all those emotions that display themselves in the outward behaviour. Truth we should never violate, nor offer any outrage to virtue or decency. But, within the bounds of innocence, it is both our duty and our interest, to make ourselves agreeable to those with whom we associate, especially to the wise and good. This, however, we shall not be able to do, unless we take pains to regulate all our passions, and bring them down to that level, on which they will be agreeable to the more intelligent part of mankind. The suppression of evil passions, even for a short time, weakens their force, and will at last, if persisted in, give us the victory over them. And hence, in regular society, where the rules of good breeding are observed, and where inordinate passions are not suffered to appear outwardly in the behaviour, we live together on a more agreeable footing, and in a way more favourable to virtuous improvement, than in any of those states of society, in which men are at no pains to conceal or govern their passions. The savage is impetu-
ous, and a slave to sudden and violent passion; in the man of breeding we expect coolness, moderation, and self-command.

215. The emotions connected with risibility are a source of much amusement to persons of every age and condition. Wit and humour, when innocent, as they always may be and ought to be, enliven conversation, and endear human creatures to one another; and, when discreetly applied, may be of singular advantage in discountenancing vice and folly.

SECTION X.

Of Sympathy.

216. There is in our nature a tendency to participate in the pains and pleasures of others; so that their good is in some degree our good, and their evil our evil: the natural effect of which is, to unite men more closely to one another, by prompting them, even for their own sake, to relieve distress and promote happiness. This participation of the joys and sorrows of others may be termed sympathy, or fellow-feeling. Sympathy with distress is called compassion, or pity. Sympathy with the happiness of another has no particular name; but, when expressed in words to the happy person, is termed congratulation. Every
good man knows, that it is natural for him to rejoice with them who rejoice, and to weep with those that weep.

217. Even for some inanimate things we have a sort of tenderness, which, by a licentious figure of speech, might be called sympathy. To lose a staff which we have long walked with, or see in ruins a house where we had long lived happily, would give a slight concern, though the loss to us were a trifle, or nothing at all. We feel something like pity for the dead bodies of our friends, arising from the consideration of their being laid in the solitary grave, a prey to worms and reptiles; and yet we are sure that from that circumstance the dead can never suffer any thing. Towards the brute creation, who have feeling as well as we, though not in the same degree or kind, our sympathy is more rational, and indeed ought to be strong: 'A righteous man regardeth the life,' and is not insensible to the happiness, 'of his beast.'

218. But our sympathy operates most powerfully towards our fellow-men; and, other circumstances being equal, is for the most part more or less powerful, according as they are more nearly, or more remotely, connected with us by kindred, by friendship, or by condition. With a friend, with a relation, or with a person of our own condition, we are more apt to sympathise, than with people of different circumstances or connections. If we were to be tried for our life, we should wish
to have a jury of our equals. He who has had the toothache or the gout, is more inclined to pity those who suffer from the same distempers, than that person is who never felt them.

219. We sometimes sympathize with another person in a case in which that person has little feeling of either good or evil. We blush at the rudeness of another man in company, even when he himself does not know that he is rude. We tremble for a mason standing on a high scaffold, though we have reason to believe he is in no danger, because custom has made it familiar to him. On these occasions, our fellow-feeling seems to arise, not from our opinion of what the other person suffers, but from our idea of what we ourselves should suffer if we were in his situation, with the same habits and powers of reflection which we have at present.

220. Our fellow-feeling is never thoroughly roused, till we know something of the nature and cause of that happiness or misery which is the occasion of it: for till this be known, we cannot so easily imagine ourselves in the condition of the happy or unhappy person. When we meet with one in distress, where the cause is not apparent, we are uneasy indeed, but the pain is not so great, or at least not so definite, as it comes to be when he has answered this question,—what is the matter with you? which is always the first question we ask on such occasions. And then our sympathy is in proportion to what we think he feels, or per-
haps to what we may think it reasonable that he should feel.

221. Many of our passions may be communicated or strengthened by sympathy. In a cheerful company we become cheerful, and melancholy in a sad one. The presence of a multitude employed in devotion tends to make us devout; the timorous have acted valiantly in the society of the valiant; and the cowardice of a few has struck a panic into an army. In a historical or fabulous narrative, we sympathise with our favourite personages in those emotions of gratitude, joy, indignation, or sorrow, which we suppose would naturally arise in them from the circumstances of their fortune. Passions, however, that are unnatural, as envy, jealousy, avarice, malice; or unreasonably violent, as rage and revenge, we are not apt to sympathise with; we rather take part with the persons who may seem to be in danger from them, because we can more easily suppose ourselves in their condition.

222. Nor do we readily sympathise with passions which we disapprove, or have not experienced. It is, therefore, a matter of prudence in poets, and other writers of fiction, to contrive such characters and incidents, as the greater part of their readers may be supposed to sympathise with, and be interested in. And it is their duty to cherish, by means of sympathy, in those who read them, those affections only which invigorate the mind,
and are favourable to virtue; as patriotism, valour, benevolence, piety, and the conjugal, parental, and filial charities. Scenes of exquisite distress, too long continued, enervate and overwhelm the soul: and those representations are still more blamable, and cannot be too much blamed, which kindle licentious passion, or promote indolence, affectation, or sensuality. Of the multitudes of novels now published, it is astonishing and most provoking to consider, how few are not chargeable with one or other of these faults, or with them all in conjunction. But immoral or extravagant novels would not be brought to market, nor of course written, if from the buyers of such things there were not a demand for extravagance and immorality.

223. Let us cherish sympathy. By attention and exercise it may be improved in every man. It prepares the mind for receiving the impressions of virtue; and without it there can be no true politeness. Nothing is more odious, than that insensibility, which wraps a man up in himself and his own concerns, and prevents his being moved with either the joys or the sorrows of another. This inhuman temper, however common, seems not to be natural to the soul of man, but to derive its origin from evil habits of levity, selfishness, or pride; and will therefore be easily avoided by those who cultivate the opposite habits of generosity, humility, and good-nature. Of these ami-
able affections, the forms of common civility, and the language of polite conversation, are remarkably expressive; a proof that good-breeding is founded in virtue and good sense, and that a kind and honest heart is the first requisite to an engaging deportment.

224. The essential parts of good-breeding are, to speak little and modestly of one's self, candidly of the absent, and affectionately to those who are present; to shew, by our looks and behaviour, that we respect our company, and that their happiness or convenience is the chief thing we have in view; to sympathise readily and tenderly in their joys and sorrows; not to obtrude ourselves upon the conversation, or seek to draw general notice; and, in all ordinary cases, when we differ in opinion from others, to do it with that respect for them, and that diffidence in ourselves, which become a fallible creature who wishes to be better informed. Such behaviour cannot be permanent or graceful, where it is hypocritical; and therefore they are greatly mistaken, who think, with Lord Chesterfield, that good-breeding consists in disguise, or that the malicious or the arrogant are at all susceptible of that accomplishment.

225. There are men, neither arrogant nor malicious, who sometimes, without bad intention, give offence, by saying or doing that which, if they had entered more readily into the views and circumstances of the company, their own good-nature
would have determined them to avoid: while others apprehend so quickly the situation and sentiments of every one present, that they give no offence to any, but great satisfaction to all. Habitual inad-
vertence, or perhaps a disposition to be more att-
tentive to one’s self than to one’s company, may have produced the unpoliteness of the former class of men; which will probably be found to arise from one’s not having been accustomed, in the early part of life, to the society of well-bred people. They, on the other hand, who have been much in the world, and have found it necessary, from the first, to accommodate themselves by obliging de-
portment to persons of various characters, acquire a great facility of conceiving what modes of con-
versation and behaviour will be most agreeable to those with whom they may happen to be associ-
ated. And thus it appears, that the sensibilities, here comprehended under the general name of sympathy, may, by education and habit, be greatly improved; or greatly weakened, if not destroyed, by inattention and want of practice.

226. There is a third class of men that one has sometimes the misfortune to meet with, who affect what they call a bluntness of manners, and value themselves on speaking their mind on all occasions whether people take it well or ill. Now it is right that people should speak their minds; but the mind that is fit to be spoken (if I may express my-
self so strangely) ought to be free from pride,
ostentation, and ill-nature; for from these hateful passions the bluntness here alluded to may generally be derived. Such people may have a sort of negative honesty; but of delicacy they are destitute. In their company one sweats with the apprehension of their committing some gross indecorum; for nobody knows what limits an indelicate mind may choose to prescribe to itself. From injury, punishable by law, they may abstain; but they often give such offence as amounts not to injury only, but to cruelty. The thief that picks our pocket does not so much harm in society, nor occasion so much pain, as they may be charged with who shock the ear of piety with profaneness, or tear open the wounds of the bleeding heart by forcing upon it some painful recollection.

227. Sympathy with distress is thought so essential to human nature, that the want of it has been called inhumanity. Want of sympathy with another's happiness is not stigmatised by so hard a name; but it is impossible to esteem the man who takes no delight in the good of a fellow-creature; we call him hard-hearted, selfish, unnatural; epithets expressive of high disapprobation. Habits of reflection, with some experience of misfortune, do greatly promote the amiable sensibility of which we now speak. *Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco,* says Dido, in Virgil. Inconsiderate men are seldom tender-hearted, and mere want of reflection leads children into acts of cruelty.
SECTION XI.

Of Taste.

228. That faculty, or those faculties, which fit us for receiving pleasure from what is beautiful, elegant, or excellent, in the works of nature and art, has in modern times been called *taste*. He who derives no pleasure from such elegance, excellence, or beauty, is said to be a man of *no taste*: he who is gratified with that which is faulty in works of art, is a man of *bad taste*: and he who is pleased, or displeased, according to the degree of excellence or faultiness, is a man of *good taste*. This way of expressing critical sagacity by an allusion to the sensations received by the tongue and palate, though it be now found in most of the languages of Europe, is of no great antiquity. Petronius, indeed, uses *Sapor* in this sense: from which, as well as from many other circumstances, I suspect, that the trifling book which bears that name is partly modern.

229. Good taste implies several talents, or faculties. The first is *a lively imagination*. This qualifies a man for readily apprehending the meaning of an author or artist, tracing out the connection of his thoughts, and forming the same views of things which he had formed. Without this
talent, it is impossible to form a right judgment of an author's work. Delicacy of connection, and such contrivances in a fable or story as tend to produce surprise, are among the chief beauties of poetry; but these a man of dull imagination is apt to overlook, or not to understand. This liveliness of fancy must be corrected and regulated by the knowledge of nature both external and internal, that is, both of the visible universe, and of the human mind. For he who is unacquainted with nature can never be a man of taste; because he cannot know whether the productions of art resemble nature or not: and, if he know not this, he cannot receive from the imitative arts any real satisfaction.

230. The second thing necessary to good taste is, a clear and distinct apprehension of things. Some men think accurately on all subjects: the thoughts of other men are almost always indefinite and obscure. The former easily make you comprehend their meaning; the latter can never speak intelligibly except upon familiar topics. He who is master of his subject, says Horace, will not be at a loss either for expression or for method: whence we may learn, that accurate knowledge is the best, and indeed the only solid, foundation of true eloquence. Lord Chesterfield seems to think otherwise; but the eloquence he recommends is, like his favourite system of manners, not solid, but showy and superficial. It is plain, that they
who are accustomed to think with precision, must be the only competent judges of what they study, because they alone can thoroughly understand it. Habits of accuracy and method will gradually improve the mind in this respect: and indeed study is good for little when it is not methodical and accurate.

231. The third thing necessary to good taste is, a quick perception of, or a capacity of being easily and pleasurably affected with, those objects that gratify the secondary senses, particularly sublimity, beauty, harmony, and imitation. In this respect different minds are differently constituted. Many have little or no taste for harmony either in language or in musical sound. Some have great talents in wit and humour, with hardly any relish for the sublime and beautiful: Swift is an instance. Others, like Milton, have an exquisite invention in regard to sublimity and beauty of description, and harmony of language, without any talents for wit or delicate humour. And some have excelled both in sublimity and in wit; as Shakespeare did in a high degree, and Pope in a very considerable degree. Homer, too, is said by Aristotle to have excelled in ludicrous as well as sublime composition, and to have written a comic poem, called Margites, which is lost. The only way of improving the secondary senses, is by studying nature and the best performances in art; by cultivating habits of virtue; and by keeping at a dis-
tance from every thing gross and indelicate, in books and conversation, in manners and in language.

232. The fourth thing necessary to good taste is, that sympathy, or sensibility, above described; by which, supposing ourselves in the condition of other men, we readily adopt their sentiments and feelings, and make them as it were our own; and so receive from them some degree of that pain or pleasure which they would bring along with them if they were really our own. Without this moral sensibility, our minds would not be open to receive those emotions of pity, joy, admiration, sorrow, and imaginary terror, which the best performances in the fine arts, particularly in poetry, are intended to raise within us; nor, by consequence, could we form a right estimate of the abilities of the author, or of the tendency and importance of his work.

233. The last thing requisite to form good taste is judgment, or good sense; which is indeed the principal thing, and may, without much impropriety, be said to comprehend all the rest. Without this, we could not compare the imitations of nature with nature itself, so as to perceive how far they agree or differ; nor could we judge of the probability of events in a fable, or of the truth of sentiments; nor whether the plan of a work be according to rule, or otherwise. For in every art certain rules are established; some resulting from
the very nature of the thing, and the end proposed by the artist, and these are essential and indispensable rules; and others that may be called mechanical or ornamental, which depend rather upon custom than upon nature, and claim no higher origin, than the practice of some great performer, whom it has become the fashion to imitate.

234. The violation of an essential rule discovers want of sense in an author, and consequently want of taste; for where good sense is not, taste cannot be. To depart from a mechanical rule may be consistent with the soundest judgment, and is sometimes a proof both of good taste and of great genius. Take an example or two:—to divide a tragedy or comedy into five acts, and rigidly to observe, in dramatic fable, the unities (as they are called) of time and place, are rules, which, though many poets have observed, and many critics enjoined them, are not essential. But, to make poetical persons speak and act suitably to their characters; to adhere, in history and philosophy, to truth, and in poetry to probability; and to give to every work, whether prose or verse, a moral tendency, with simplicity of contrivance and of style, and unity of design—are essential rules, which no writer is at liberty to violate.

235. All men, and even children, have something of taste, as appears from the pleasure they take in songs, tales, wit and humour, pictures,
and other imitations. But education and study are necessary to the improvement of taste; and it may be improved by various methods, some of which have been mentioned already. Whatever tends to enlarge, correct, or methodize, our knowledge, either of men or of things, is to be considered as a means of improving judgment, and consequently taste. History and geometry, and those parts of philosophy which convey clear ideas, and are attended with satisfactory evidence, are peculiarly useful in this respect; to which must be added such an acquaintance with life and manners, as fits a man for business and conversation.

236. Taste is further improved, as already hinted, by studying nature, and the best performances in art. Among these are to be reckoned the Greek and Latin classics; the most valuable of which are Homer, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Thucydides, Sophocles, Plutarch's lives; Terence, Cæsar, Cicero, Sallust, Virgil, Horace, and Livy. He who has read these few authors with due attention, may be truly said to be a man of learning, and can hardly fail to be a man of taste. I need not add, that bad books, and bad company, not only deprave the taste, but also pervert the understanding, and poison the heart; and that the practice of reading even good books superficially, breeds a habit of inattention alike unfriendly to intellectual and to moral improvement. It was formerly said, that we should read none but ap-
proved authors, and never leave a good one till we understand every point of his doctrine and every word of his language. To prepare us for study so rigidly accurate, an exact, and even a minute knowledge of grammar is necessary: indeed it is not easy to say, to what degree, and in how many different ways, both memory and judgment may be improved by an intimate acquaintance with grammar; which is therefore, with good reason, made the first and fundamental part of literary education. The greatest orators, the most elegant scholars, and the most accomplished men of business, that have appeared in the world, of whom I need only mention Cæsar and Cicero, were not only studious of grammar, but most learned grammarians; and Horace and Virgil, and most of the great authors above mentioned, appear, from the wonderful correctness of their style, to have been the same.

237. Taste is also improved by reading the best books of criticism; particularly, the critical works of Horace, Quintilian, Longinus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and the poetics and rhetoric of Aristotle. In Pope’s notes on his translation of Homer; in Dryden’s prefaces; in Addison’s papers on Paradise Lost in the fourth and fifth volumes of the Spectator; in Hurd’s commentary on Horace’s art of poetry and epistle to Augustus; in Pope’s and Johnson’s prefaces to Shakespeare, and in Mrs. Montagu’s Essay on his writings and
genius; in Rollin's method of studying and teaching the Belles Lettres, and in the Abbe Du' Bos's reflections on poetry and painting; you will find a great deal of good criticism perspicuously and elegantly expressed. My last remark on this subject is, that taste is greatly improved by cultivating all the generous, benevolent, and pious affections, and repressing pride, malice, envy, and every other selfish and wicked passion. Virtue is the perfection of beauty; and the love of virtue might have been, and perhaps ought to have been, mentioned as essential to true taste.

238. It cannot be denied, that some unskilful writers have obtained considerable reputation, and that inelegant modes of writing have frequently been fashionable. There have been men, who could prefer Pliny to Cicero, Lucan to Virgil, Waller to Spenser, and Cowley and Blackmore to Milton. But from this we must not infer, as some have done, that taste is a variable thing. Its principles are real and permanent, though men may occasionally be ignorant of them. Very different systems of philosophy have appeared; yet nature and truth are always the same. Fashions in dress and furniture are perpetually changing; and yet, in both, that is often allowed to be elegant which is not fashionable: which could not be, if there were not, in both, certain principles of elegance, which derive their charm, neither from
caprice, nor from custom, but from the very nature of the thing.

239. In the fine arts, the standard of excellence may be presumed to be still more permanent. There are now extant, statues, carvings, and remains of ancient buildings, which were the admiration of antiquity, and are as much admired now as ever. And there are authors, Homer and Virgil for example, whom, for these two thousand years, all who understood them have considered as the greatest of poets. When an author, or when a work of art, has been long in possession of the public esteem, and has been admired by the most candid and enlightened minds, it must be taken as a proof of extraordinary merit; and the dissatisfaction of a few cavillers may not unreasonably be imputed to ignorance or affectation.

240. To be pleased with novelty and imitation, to prefer good pictures to bad, harmony to harshness, and regular shape to distortion; to be gratified with accurate representations of human manners; to be interested in a detail of human adventures, and more or less, according to the degree of probability: to look with delight on the sun, moon, and stars; the expanse of heaven; grand and regular buildings; human features expressive of health, sagacity, cheerfulness, and good nature; colours, and shapes, and sizes, of plants
and animals, that betoken perfection and usefulness; the scenery of groves and rivers, of mountains and the ocean; the verdure of spring, the flowers of summer, and even the pure splendour of winter snow; is surely natural to every rational being, who has leisure to attend to such things, and is in any degree enlightened by contemplation.

241. If this be denied, I would ask, whence it comes, that the poetry of all nations, which was certainly intended to give pleasure to those for whom it was made, should abound in descriptions of these and the like objects; and why the fine arts should have been a matter of general attention in all civilized countries? And if this is not denied, a standard of taste is acknowledged; and it must be admitted further, that, whatever temporary infatuations may take place in the world of letters, simplicity and nature sooner or later gain the ascendant, and prove their rectitude by their permanency. Opinionum commenta delet dies; naturae judicia confirmat.
CHAPTER II.

OF MAN'S ACTIVE POWERS.

SECTION I.

Of Free Agency.

242. Action implies motion; but there may be motion, as in a clock, where, properly speaking, there is no agent. Many motions necessary to life are continually going on in the human body; as those of the heart, lungs, and arteries: but these are not human actions, because man is not the cause of them. For the same reason, breathing, and the motion of the eye-lids, are not actions; because, though we may act for a little time in suspending them, for the purpose of seeing or hearing more accurately, they commonly go on without any care of ours; and, while they do so, we are, in regard to them, not active, but passive.

243. In like manner, the casual train of thought, which passes through the mind in a reverie (see § 140) is not action; but when we interrupt it, in
order to fix our view upon a particular object, that interruption, and the attention consequent upon it, are mental actions. Recollection is another, and investigation a third; but a remembrance occurring to us, without any exertion on our part, is not action, and our minds in receiving it, or becoming conscious of it, are as really passive, as the eye is in receiving the images of those visible things that pass before it when it is open. Nor is the mere perception of truth or falsehood a mental action, any more than the mere perception of hardness: the stone, which we feel, we must feel while it presses upon us; and the proposition, which our judgment declares to be true, we must, while we attend to it and its evidence, perceive to be true. But to exert our reason in endeavouring to find out the truth, or to be wilfully inattentive to evidence, are actions of the mind; the one laudable, and becoming our rational nature, the other unmanly and immoral.

244. All action is the work of an agent, that is, of a being who acts; and every being who acts is the beginner of that motion which constitutes the action. The bullet that kills a man, the explosion that makes it fly, the sparkles from the flint which produce the explosion, and the collision of the flint and steel whereby the sparkles are struck out, are none of them agents, all being passive and equally so; nor is it the finger operating upon the trigger that begins the motion, for that is in like manner a
passive instrument: it is the mind, giving to the finger direction and energy, which is the first mover in this business, and therefore is, properly speaking, the agent. And if we were to be supernaturally informed, that the mind thus exerted was made to do so by the secret but irresistible impulse of a superior being, we should instantly declare that being the agent, and the mind as really a passive instrument, as the finger or the gunpowder.

245. To ask therefore, and the question is almost as old as philosophy itself, whether man in any of his actions be a free agent, seems to be the same thing as to ask, whether or not man be capable of action. To every action, using the word in its proper sense, it is essential to be free: necessary agency (unless we take the word in a figurative sense, as when we say, the agency of the pendulum regulates the clock) is as real a contradiction in terms as free slave. If every motion in our mind and body is necessary, then we never move ourselves; and those motions, which are commonly called human actions, are not the actions of men, but of something else, which, according to the language of this theory, we must term necessity. To be an active being, is to have a power of beginning motion; to act, or to be an agent, is to exert that power. Brutes have a power of beginning motion; which, being in them not accompanied with any sense of right and wrong, has been called Spontaneity; to distinguish it from that power which rational beings pos-
sens of beginning motion, and which, being accompanied with a consciousness of moral good and evil, is denominated liberty.

246. Mental actions were mentioned; and them the mind performs without any dependance, that we can explain, on any bodily part. Bodily exertions do also take their rise in the mind, which has the power of beginning motion in the body, as well as in itself. But the human body, like every other piece of matter, possesses not in itself the power of beginning motion; and therefore bodily motions proceeding from the mind are not properly actions of the body; because, in regard to them, the body is only the passive instrument of the soul.—The power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called volition or will. It is in man the immediate cause of action. We will to exert ourselves in recollection or attention; and at the same instant the act of recollecting or attending is begun: we will to move our arm, or leg, or any particular finger, and instantly it is moved; and we feel, that this energy of mind, which we call will, is the cause of the motion. But in what way, or by what means, the mind operates upon itself so as to produce attention or recollection, or upon the muscles that move the several parts of our body so as to give motion to those muscles, we can neither explain nor conceive.

247. Some things we can, and others we cannot
do; we can walk, but we cannot fly. Those things it is in our power to do, which depend upon our will; and from them proceeds whatever may be called moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious, praise-worthy or blameable, in our conduct. For no man is seriously blamed or praised for that in the performance of which he is not considered as a free-agent; that is, as one who had it in his power either to do or not to do. This, according to the sense of the words agent and action, as already explained, is saying nothing more, than that no man is seriously blamed or praised, except for actions done by himself, and not by another.

248. Our mind and body are put in motion by the will; and philosophers have said, that the will is determined by motives, purposes, intentions, or reasons. Granting this to be true, I cannot admit, that by such motives or purposes the will is necessarily determined. It is the will itself, or the self-determining power of the mind, that gives a motive that weight and influence whereby the will is determined: in other words, it depends on ourselves, whether we are to act from one motive or from another. A man, for example, is tempted to steal. His motive to commit the crime is the love of money; his motive to abstain is a regard to duty. If he suffer himself to be determined by the former motive, he is a thief, and deserves punishment; if he comply with the latter, he has done well. Now all the world knows and believes, and the laws of
every country suppose, that he had it in his power
to act according to the impulse of either the one
motive or the other; that is; that he had it in his
power to give to either of them that influence which
would determine his conduct.

249. To set this matter in another light. Action
implies motion; and where there is not a power
to begin motion, there cannot be action, there must
always be rest. Now, though motion, when be-
gun, may be communicated from one body to an-
other, nothing, so far as we know, can begin motion,
but mind. If therefore motives or purposes have
in themselves a power to determine necessarily the
mind to act, they must also in themselves possess
the power of beginning or communicating motion;
that is, they must be either minds or bodies. But
a motive, such as the love of money, or a sense of
duty, is neither a mind, nor a body, and therefore
cannot begin motion, nor consequently be of itself
the immediate and necessary cause of action.

250. A motive may indeed raise within us a cer-
tain desire or aversion, or may itself be that desire
or aversion when raised: but desire and aversion
are so far from being understood to be actions, that
in all the languages we know they are called by a
name corresponding to the English word passions,
and signifying, not acting, but suffering, or being
acted upon. We may indeed act according to the
impulse of aversion or desire; but still it is we that
act; and it depends upon our will, upon our pow
er of self-determination, whether we are to act according to that impulse, or not. A hungry man has a great desire to eat; but within his reach there may be victuals, which, though he knows to be good, he may refrain from eating; though at the same time he is conscious it is in his power to eat, notwithstanding any motive, a regard to health— for example, that may urge him to abstain. Every man has an aversion to pain and death; but whether a soldier shall flee from both, or bravely in his country's cause set both at defiance, depends entirely upon himself;—as long at least as he retains the use of reason, and the power of managing his limbs; that is, as long as he is an accountable being.

251. There are writers, who maintain, that the human frame is wholly corporeal, and that there is no good reason for distinguishing between the soul and the body of man. This doctrine has been called Materialism. If I could acquiesce in it, I should perhaps grant, that all human actions are necessary; because, being produced by one bodily part operating upon another, they must as really be the effects of mechanism, as the motions of a clock. But if this be true; and if motives, that is, thoughts and abstract ideas, have the power of producing human action; those motives or ideas must have the power of putting that great machine, the human body, or part of it at least, in motion, and must therefore themselves be either bodies, which
is inconceivable and impossible, or spirit, which the materialist denies to be in human nature. Here is a difficulty, which it seems impossible to get over, without renouncing both materialism and necessity; that is, without admitting, that there is in man something which is not matter, and which has the power of beginning motion both in itself, and in the human body.

252. I do not here mean to enter minutely into the question concerning liberty and necessity: first, because I have explained myself at some length on that subject in another place; secondly, because to give even a summary of all that has been written about it would take up too much time; and, thirdly, because in these moral inquiries I think it my duty to avoid controversy and unprofitable speculation, and confine myself to plain, practical, and useful truth. I therefore only add a few miscellaneous remarks. The first is, that the freedom of the human will is a matter of fact and experience, whereof the human mind is conscious, and which the language and behaviour of mankind in all ages prove that they did, and do, and must acknowledge. In all cases of conduct, in which I consider myself as an accountable being, I feel that I have it in my power to do or not to do, to speak or be silent, to speak truth or falsehood, to do my duty or neglect it. And were I to speak and act as if such things did not seem to me to be in my power, the world would charge me with affectation or insanity.
253. Even those few speculative men, and they are but few, who in words deny the freedom of the will, do yet in the ordinary affairs of life speak and act like other people; making promises, giving advice, laying down rules and precepts, blaming certain actions as what ought not to have been done, and praising others as right and what ought to be done: the propriety of which conduct it is not easy to reconcile, in a satisfactory manner, to the tenets of those who teach, as the advocates for necessity do, that no past action of our lives could have been different from what it is, and that no future action can be contingent, or such as it is in our power to do or not to do. The condition of these theorists is similar to that of those who argue against the existence of matter. Both affirm what contradicts the opinion and experience, not of the vulgar only, but of the most acute philosophers, and of mankind in general: both say, they believe that, which is inconsistent with what common sense taught them to believe, and with what they would still have believed, if they had kept to their natural sense of things, and not perplexed themselves with metaphysical arguments: and both assert to be true what they cannot reduce to practice, and what is not warranted by Christianity, or by the morality and politics of any enlightened nation.

254. With respect to the Christian religion, as concerned in this matter;—it may be observed, than one strenuous fatalist urges the doctrine of
necessity, as an argument, either in favour of atheism, or against the turpitude of vice; and that another zealous necessarian, who avows his belief both in God and in Christ, seems to admit, that the testimony of the sacred writers is rather against necessity than for it. Judging, then, either from the affirmation of the one, or from the concession of the other, we must infer, that the Christian religion and the doctrine of necessity are not friendly to each other; which is indeed what the asserters of liberty have generally maintained. If necessity lead to atheism, or if it confound the distinctions of vice and virtue, (and I not only agree with Mr. Hume, that it does either the one or the other, but am satisfied that it does both), it is surely subversive of all religion. And if the sacred writers seem to declare in favour of liberty, (which I agree with Dr. Priestley that they do); and if it is from them, and from them only, that I learn what Christianity is; I must either question their infallibility as teachers, or I must with them declare in favour of liberty. But, though the belief of necessity would, if I were capable of it, be fatal to my religious and moral principles, I am far from thinking, that it must have the same effect on every other person: different minds may no doubt conceive of it differently. Yet it is remarkable, that some of its most distinguished advocates, of whom I shall only mention Spinosa, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, and Voltaire, were enemies to our faith; whereas of the modern
defenders of liberty I do not recollect one who was not a Christian. The opinion of necessity, says bishop Butler, seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself.

255. We are permitted, and commanded, to pray: we consider it as a high privilege, and most reasonable service: we feel that it produces good effects on the mind; and our religion promises particular blessings to those who piously perform it. But if every change in our minds for the better or for the worse, if all the blessings we can receive, and if our praying, or not praying, are all things necessary, and the unalterable result of a long series of causes, that began to operate before we were born, and still continue to operate independently on us, why is prayer, or indeed any thing else, enjoined as a duty? and how are we to blame for neglecting, or how can we be rewarded for doing, that which it is not possible for us either to do or to neglect? In like manner, if no past action of our lives could have been different from what it is, why do we blame ourselves for any action of our past life? we may as reasonably blame ourselves for not having learned to fly, or for not coming into the world before the present century. And yet, if we do not blame any part of our past conduct, we cannot repent of it; and if we do not repent, we cannot be saved. Here seems to be another strange and striking opposition between the doctrine of the New Testament, and that of the fatalist. In short,
all the precepts of morality and religion, all purposes of reformation, and all those sentiments of regret, self-condemnation, and sorrow, which accompany repentance, proceed on a supposition, that certain actions are so far in our power, that we may either do them or not do them. And most of the words we make use of in speaking of the morality of actions are, on the principles of those who deny free agency, unintelligible. Such are the words, ought, ought not, moral, immoral, merit, demerit, reward, punishment, and many others.

256. By a very zealous asserter of necessity some concessions have lately been made, which seem to convey notions of this doctrine, that are not much in its favour. He says, that nothing can be plainer than the doctrine of necessity; that it is as certain as that two and two are four: and yet he admits, that nine tenths of the generality of mankind will always disbelieve it. What can this mean but that nine tenths of mankind are irrational; or that necessity is an incredible thing, notwithstanding its being as certain as that two and two are four; or that the teachers of this doctrine are unable to explain it? Were it self-evident, I should grant, that argument could not make it plainer. But that cannot be self-evident, which nine tenths of mankind deny, and which many of the acutest philosophers that ever lived have to the satisfaction of thousands proved to be absurd.
He admits, that, according to his doctrine of necessity, the Deity is the cause of all the evil, as well as of all the good actions of his creatures. What can this mean, but either that there is no difference between moral good and moral evil, between harm and injury, between crimes and calamities; or that the divine character is as far from being in a moral view perfect, as that of any of his creatures? The same writer affirms, that the doctrine of philosophical necessity is a modern discovery, not older than Hobbes, or, perhaps he might mean, than Spinoza. Strange, that a thing, in which all mankind are so much interested, and of which every man, who thinks, is a competent judge, and has occasion to think and speak, every day of his life; should not have been found out till about two hundred years ago, and should still, in spite of all that can be said for it, although as certain as that two and two are four, be disbelieved by all mankind, a few individuals excepted. I shall only add, that, if the Deity be, as this author affirms, the cause of all the evil, as well as of all the good actions of his creatures, resentment and gratitude towards our fellow-men are as unreasonable as towards the knife that wounds, or the salve that heals us; and that to repent of the evil I am conscious of having committed would be not only absurd but impious, because it would imply a dissatisfaction with the will of Him, who was the almighty cause of that evil,
and was pleased to make me his instrument in doing it.

258. I deny not, that the opposite doctrine of liberty may be thought to involve in it some difficulties which our limited understanding cannot disentangle, particularly with respect to the divine prescience and decrees. But in most things we find difficulties which we cannot solve; nor can any man, without extreme presumption, affirm, that he distinctly knows, in what manner the divine prescience exerts itself, or how the freedom of man's will may be affected by the decrees of God. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us: but of our own free agency we are competent judges, because it is a matter of fact and experience; and because all our moral and religious notions, that is, all our most important knowledge, may be said to be either founded on it, or intimately connected with it.

259. As omnipotence can do whatever is possible, so omniscience must know whatever can be known. Every thing which God has determined to bring certainly to pass, he must foresee as certain: and can it be thought impossible, that he should foresee, not as certain but as contingent, that which he has determined to be contingent and not certain? Or will it be said, that it is not possible for the Almighty to decree contingencies, as well as certainties; to leave it in my power, in certain cases, to act according to the free deter-
mination of my own mind? Our bodily strength, and our freedom of choice in regard to good and evil, are matters of great moment to us; but the latter can no more interfere with the purposes of divine providence, than the former can retard or accelerate the motion of the earth. It would not be very difficult for a prudent man, who should have the entire command of a few children, to make them, in certain cases, promote his views, without laying any restraint on their will. Infinitely more easy must it be, for the almighty and omniscient Governor of the universe, so to over-rule all the actions of his moral creatures, as to make them promote, even while they are acting freely, his own wise and good purposes.

SECTION II.

Further Remarks on the Will.*

260. It was said, that the power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called volition, or will. The word will has other significations; but I wish, at present, to use it in this sense. I call it a power of beginning motion; meaning by the term motion every change in the human mind or body which

* See Dr. Reid's Essays on the active powers of man.
is usually denominated action. When we *will* to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power; and when we *will* we always *will* something, (and this something may be termed the object of volition); even as when we remember we always remember something, which may be called the object of remembrance. Things, therefore, done voluntarily, are to be distinguished from things done, like a new-born infant's sucking, by instinct, as well as from things done by habit, like the constant motion of the eye-lids.

261. *Will* and *desire* are not the same. What we *will* is an action, and our own action: but we may *desire* what is not action, as that our friends may be happy, or what is no action of ours, as that our friends may behave well. Nay, we may *desire* what we do not *will*, as when we are thirsty and abstain from drink on account of health; and we may *will* what we have an aversion to, as when, on the same account, we force ourselves to swallow a nauseous medicine. Let us also distinguish between *will* and *command*; although, in common language, what a man commands is often called his will. We *will* to do some action of our own; we *command* an action to be done by another. Desires and commands are also, in popular language, confounded: but here too we must distinguish. 'O if such a thing were given me,' is not the same with 'Give me such a thing:' and if a tyrant, to get a pretence for punishing, were
to command what he knew could not be done, it might be a command without desire.

262. I said, that when we *will* to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power, or to depend upon our will. In exerting myself to raise a weight from the ground, I believe either that I can raise it, or that it is in my power to try whether I can raise it or not. A very great weight, which I know to be far above my strength, I never attempt to raise. I never exert myself for the purpose of flying; I never *will* to speak a language I have not learned; because I know it to be out of my power. Our will may, however, be exerted in attempting to do what we know to be at the first trial impracticable; as when one begins to learn to perform on a musical instrument: but in this case we believe, that frequent attempts, properly directed, will make the thing possible, and at last easy. And we know, that the first principles of musical performance, as well as of other arts, are adapted to the ability of a beginner, and consequently in his power.

263. Some acts of the will are transient, others more lasting. When I *will* to stretch out my hand and snuff the candle, the energy of the will is at an end as soon as the action is over. When I *will* to read a book, or write a letter, from beginning to end, without stopping, the will is exerted till the reading or the writing be finished. We may *will* to persist for a course of years in a
certain conduct; to read, for example, so much Greek every day, till we learn to read it with ease: this sort of will is commonly called a resolution. We may will or resolve to do our duty on all occasions as long as we live; and he who so resolves, and perseveres in the resolution, is a good man. A single act of virtue is a good thing, but does not make a man of virtue: he only is so, who resolves to be virtuous, and adheres to his purpose. Aristotle rightly thought, that virtue consists not in transient acts, but in a settled habit or disposition; agreeable to which is the old definition of justice, *Constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi*. So of the other virtues. He is not a temperate or valiant man, who is so now and then only, or merely by chance; but he who is intentionally and habitually temperate or valiant. Him, in like manner, we judge to be a vicious character, not who through the weakness of human nature has fallen into transgression, but who persists in transgression, or intends to transgress, or is indifferent whether he transgress or not, or resolves that he will not take the trouble to guard against it.

264. For actions wherein the will has no concern, a man, as observed already, is not accounted either virtuous or vicious, and can deserve neither reward nor punishment, neither praise nor blame. This is the universal belief of rational nature, and on this the laws of all enlightened nations are...
founded. It is true, that laws have entailed inconvenience upon the guiltless offspring of the guilty. But such laws either were unjust, or were made with a political view, to restrain fathers the more effectually from certain great crimes, high treason for example: in which last case they may, as many human laws are, be good upon the whole, because profitable to the community, though a grievous hardship to individuals. Inequalities of this kind are unavoidable. At my return from a long voyage my health may require the refreshments of the land; and yet, if there be a suspicion of plague in the ship, I may, without having any reason to charge the government with cruelty, be forced to remain on board many days, even though my death should be the consequence. With his parents a man is indeed so closely connected, that, even where the law does not interpose at all, he may, and often must, derive good from their virtue, or evil from their misconduct; competence, for example, from their industry, or poverty from their sloth; a sound constitution from their temperance, or hereditary disease from their sensuality; honour from their merit, or dishonour from their infamy. This may suggest an obvious and important lesson both to parents and to children.
SECTION III.

Principles of Action.

265. In strict propriety of speech, and in all rational inquiry concerning the imputableness of actions, every thing that is called human action is supposed to depend on the human will. But, in common language, the word action is used with more latitude, and animals are often said to act, or do, what they do not will, and even what they do not think of. An infant is said to act, while it sucks; a bee, while it gathers honey; and a man, while he takes snuff without knowing that he takes it, as I have been told that snuff-takers often do. In speaking of the principles of action, I must now use the word in this inaccurate and popular sense. A principle of human action is, that which incites a man to act.* Our principles of action are many and various; I will not undertake to give a complete enumeration: it may be sufficient to specify a few of the most remarkable; which I arrange under the following heads. 1. Instinct. 2. Habit. 3. Appetite. 4. Passions and Affections. 5. Moral Principles; deferring these last

* See Dr. Reid on the Active powers of man.
at present, as they will find a place hereafter in moral philosophy.

OF INSTINCT.

266. Instinct is a natural impulse to certain actions which the animal performs without deliberation, without having any end in view, and frequently without knowing what it does. It is thus the new-born infant sucks, and swallows, and breathes; operations, which in their mechanism are very complex, though attended with no labour or thought to the infant: thus, when hungry, it has recourse to the mother's milk, before it knows that milk will relieve it: thus it cries while in pain or in fear; and thus it is soothed by the simple song and soft accents of the nurse. Similar instincts are found in the young of other animals: and, as they advance in life, the same unerring principle, derived not from experience, or art, or habit, but from the all-wise author and preserver of their being, makes them provide for themselves and their young, and utter those voices, betake themselves to that course of life, and use those means of self-defence, which are suitable to their circumstances and nature.

267. The arts of man are all of human invention, and advance to perfection gradually; and long practice is necessary to make us perform in them with ease. But the arts of inferior animals,
and their manufactures (if we may use so strong a catachresis); the nest of the bird, for example, the honey and honeycomb of the bee, the web of the spider, the threads of the silkworm, the holes or houses of the beaver, &c. are not invented or taught, are uniform in all the individuals of a species, are not more exquisite now than they were four thousand years ago, and, except where outward circumstances are unfavourable, are all perfect in their kind. Those things, however, which the more sagacious animals may be taught to do, are more or less perfectly done, according to their degree of sagacity, and the skill and pains employed in their education.

268. Instinct, being partly intended to make up for the weakness or the want of understanding in animals, is more or less necessary to their preservation and comfort, according as the understanding is more or less defective. In the beginning of life we do much by instinct, and little by understanding: when we have got the use of reason, the case is in some measure reversed. Yet, even when arrived at maturity, there are occasions innumerable on which, because reason cannot guide us, we must be guided by instinct. Reason informs us, that we must do a certain action, swallow our food, for example, stretch out our arm, move our limbs, &c.: but how the action is done we know not; we only know that it follows or accompanies an energy of our will. We will
to swallow, to walk, &c. and the very complex machinery of nerves and muscles necessary to those actions is set going by instinct, and instantly produces them. There are actions too, as the motion of our eye-lids, which must be done so frequently, that, if we were obliged to intend and will them every time they are done, we could do nothing else: these, therefore, are generally instinctive. And sometimes, for our preservation, we must act so suddenly, that there is no time for determination and willing; as when we pull away our hand from any thing that burns it, shut our eyes against a stroke that seems to be aimed at them, or throw out our arm to recover the balance of our body when in danger of falling. Such motions may also be ascribed to instinct; as well as those efforts which animals, in immediate danger of death by drowning, strangling, &c. make to preserve themselves.

269. Our proneness to imitation is also, in some degree, instinctive. In the arts indeed, as painting and poetry, imitation is the effect of will and design. But a child who lives in society learns of himself to speak, though no particular pains be taken to teach him; and acquires at the same time the accent, and frequently the sound of voice, of those with whom he lives, as well as their modes of thinking and acting. What a happiness, then, is it for a young person to be brought up in the company of the wise and the good! Wild men,
who in their younger years lived savage, solitary, and dumb, and were afterwards brought into civilized society (a few instances there have been of such), were found incapable of acquiring either speech or a right use of reason, though pains were taken to teach them both. In many cases children, and in some cases grown men, may be said to believe by instinct. Thus an infant believes what a man seriously tells him is true; and that what has once or twice happened in certain circumstances, will, in the same circumstances, happen again—as in the case of his finger having been burned by the candle. And thus we all believe, that things are as they appear to our senses, and that things were what we remember them to have been.

270. The word habit is used in two different significations, which frequently are, and may without inconvenience be, confounded in common language. It denotes a facility of doing a thing acquired by having frequently done it; in this sense of the word, habit can hardly be called a principle of action. See § 265. Habit is a principle of action, when, in consequence of having frequently done a thing, we acquire an inclination to do it. A man, who is accustomed to walk every day at a certain hour, is uneasy if he be kept from walking: and they who read much are never happy at
a distance from books. Choose the best course of life, said an ancient moralist, and custom will make it the most pleasant. If frequency of performance did not produce facility, art would be impossible; but why the one should produce the other we cannot explain; we can only say that such is the law of our nature. And if doing a thing frequently did not breed an inclination to do it, the improvement of our nature would be impossible, and we could hardly be said to be moral beings. Without instinct an infant could not live to be a man, and without habit a man would always continue as helpless as an infant.

271. Habit, in both senses of the word, is observable in the more sagacious brutes, and in none more than in dogs trained to hunting, and horses inured to the discipline of war. The war-horse not only learns to obey command, but is impetuous to obey it; and the beagle seems to take as much delight as his master in the sports of the field. The power of habit in forming rational beings to vice or virtue, to elegant or rustic manners, to attention or inattention, to industry or idleness, to temperance or sensuality, to passionateness or forbearance, to manual dexterity or the want of it, is universally acknowledged: something, no doubt, depends on the peculiar constitution of different minds; and something too, perhaps, on the structure and temperament of different bodies: but in fashioning the character, and in giving impulse and
direction to genius, the influence of habit is certainly very great.

272. As in early life our powers of imitation are strongest, our minds most docile, and our bodily organs most flexible, so good or bad habits, both mental and corporeal, are then most easily acquired. Hence the necessity of early discipline, the unspeakable advantages of a good education, and the innumerable evils consequent upon a bad one. It amazes one to consider what progress, in the most difficult arts, may be made, when our faculties of mind and body are properly directed in the beginning of life; and how easy an action, which at first seemed impracticable, comes to be when it has grown habitual. Performances in music and painting, and many other sorts of manual dexterity, might be mentioned as examples: to say nothing of those barbarous arts of balancing, tumbling, and legerdemain, which in all ages have been deemed so wonderful, that the clown is inclined to impute them to magic, and even the more considerate spectator, when he first sees them, can hardly believe his own eyes.

273. But nothing in a more astonishing manner displays the power of habit, or rather of habit and genius united, in facilitating the performance of the most complex and most difficult exertions of the human mind, than the eloquent and unstudied harangue of a graceful speaker, in a great political assembly. It is long before we learn to articulate
words; long before we can deliver them with exact propriety; and longer still before we can recollect a sufficient variety of them, and, out of many that may occur at once, select instantly the most proper. Then, the rules of grammar, of logic, of rhetoric, and of good breeding, which can on no account be dispensed with, are so numerous, that volumes might be filled with them, and years employed in acquiring the ready use of them. Yet, to the accomplished orator all this is so familiar, in consequence of being habitual, that, without thinking of his rules, or violating any one of them, he applies them all; and has, at the same time, present to his mind whatever he may have heard of importance in the course of the debate, and whatever in the laws or customs of his country may relate to the business in hand: which, as a very acute and ingenious author observes, 'if it were not more common, would appear more wonderful, than that a man should dance blindfold, without being burned, amidst a thousand red-hot plowshares.'

OF APPETITE.

274. The word appetite in common language often means hunger, and sometimes, figuratively, any strong desire. It is here used to signify a par-

* See Reid on the Active powers of man. Essay III.
ticular sort of uneasy feeling in animals, returning at certain intervals, and demanding such gratification as is necessary to support the life of the individual, or to continue the species. The gratification being obtained, the appetite ceases for a while, and is afterwards renewed. Hunger and thirst are two of our natural appetites; their importance to our preservation is obvious; brutes have them as well as we; and the same remarks that are here made on the one, may, with a little variation, be made on the other. Hunger is a complex sensation, and implies two things quite different from each other, an uneasy feeling, and a desire of food. In very young infants it is at first only an uneasy feeling; which, however, prompts the little animal instinctively to suck and swallow such nourishment as comes in his way, and without which he must inevitably perish. Afterwards, when experience has taught him that the uneasy feeling is to be removed by food, the one suggests the other to his mind, and hunger becomes in him the same complex feeling as in us. In the choice of food, the several species of irrational animals are guided, by instinct chiefly, to that which is most suitable to their nature; and in this respect their instinct is sometimes less fallible than human reason. The mariner in a desert island is shy of eating those unknown fruits, however delectable to sight and smell, which are not marked with the pecking of birds.
275. Before we cease to be infants, our reason informs us that food is indispensable; but through the whole of life appetite continues to be necessary, to remind us of our natural wants, and the proper time of supplying them: for as nourishment becomes more needful, appetite grows more clamorous; till at last it calls off our attention from every thing else, whether business or amusement; and, if the gratification be still withheld, terminates in delirium and death. Hunger and thirst are the strongest of all our appetites, being the most essential to our preservation: it is generally owing to criminal indulgence, when any other appetite acquires unreasonable strength. In obeying the natural call of appetite, in eating when hungry or drinking when thirsty, there is neither virtue nor vice; unless by so doing we intentionally promote some good purpose, or violate some duty. But rightly to manage our appetites, so as to keep them in due subordination to reason, is a chief part of virtue; as the unlimited or licentious indulgence of them degrades our nature, and perverts all our rational faculties.

276. Rest after motion is essential to life, as well as food after fasting; and, when rest becomes necessary, nature gives the sensation of weariness; which, like hunger and thirst, comes at last to be irresistible, is made up of an uneasy feeling and a desire of a certain object, goes off on being gratified, and after a certain interval returns. But we
must not call weariness an appetite, nor is it commonly called so. Appetite prompts to action, weariness to rest; appetite rises though no action have preceded, weariness follows action as the effect follows the cause. We have a sort of appetite for action in general: it may be called activity; and, when excessive or troublesome to others, is termed restlessness: for, as action is necessary to our welfare both in mind and body, our constitution would be defective, if we had not something to stimulate to action, independently on the dictates of reason. This activity is very conspicuous in children; who, as soon as they have got the faculty and habit of moving their limbs, and long before they can be said to have the use of reason, are, when in health and awake, almost continually in motion. It is, however, through the whole of life, so necessary, that without it there can be no happiness. To a person of a sound constitution, idleness is misery: if long continued, it impairs, and at last destroys, the vigour of both the soul and the body.

277. It were well for man, if he had no appetites but those that nature gave him; for they are but few; and they are all beneficial, not only by ministering to his preservation and comfort, but also by rousing him to industry and other laudable exertions. But of unnatural or artificial appetites, if they may be called appetites, which man creates for himself, there is no end; and the more he ac-
quires of these, the more he is dependent, and the more liable to want and wretchedness. It behoves us, therefore, as we value our own peace, and the dignity of our nature, to guard against them. Some of the propensities now alluded to may, no doubt, have been occasioned in part by disease of body, or distress of mind; but they are, in general, owing to idleness and affectation, or to a foolish desire of imitating fashionable absurdity. They are not all criminal, but they all have a tendency to debase us; and by some of them men have made themselves disagreeable, useless, contemptible, and even a nuisance in society. When I mention tobacco, strong liquors, opiates, gluttony, and gaming, it will be known what I mean by unnatural appetite, and acknowledged that I have not characterised it too severely.

SECTION IV.

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Passions and Affections.

278. The word passion properly means suffering; but is seldom used in that sense, except when we speak of our Saviour's passion, as in the beginning of Acts of the Apostles. By passion the common people mean little more than anger; and
anger is a passion, but it is only one of many. Some philosophers have used the word to signify whatever moves us to action; but this use of it is too extensive. The sense in which I here understand it will appear by and by. When we act voluntarily, it is in order to obtain what is, or appears to be, good, or to avoid what is, or appears to be, evil. Good, real or apparent, excites desire; evil, real or apparent, excites aversion: but in this acceptation, the words desire and aversion are used with great latitude. Desires and aversions are two copious classes of passions; and assume different forms, and are called by different names, according to the nature of the good or evil that draws them forth, and its situation with respect to us. For example; present good gives rise to joy, probable good to hope, present evil to sorrow, probable evil to fear; good qualities in another person raise our love, or liking, evil qualities in another our dislike, &c.

279. Each variety of desire and aversion, as well as every other passion, is agreeable in the feeling, or is disagreeable; and, if in any degree violent, is attended with some commotion in the body as well as in the mind: for, by varying the human countenance and attitude, painters may express almost every passion; which could not be, if the passions did not make perceptible changes in the outward appearance of the body. A passion, therefore, may be said to be 'a commotion
of the soul, attended with pleasure or pain, affecting both the mind and the body, and arising from the view of something which is, or appears to be, good or evil.' If we rank admiration among the passions, which I think is commonly done, we must vary the last clause thus:—'and arising from the view of something which is, or appears to be, good, or evil, or uncommon.' In treating of the passions, I shall, first, make some general remarks upon them; secondly, I shall endeavour to arrange them in classes, and describe the more remarkable ones; and I shall conclude with some rules for the right management of this part of our moral nature. I do not promise, I will not even attempt, a complete enumeration. Some passions may, probably, occur to me, which yet I shall forbear to mention, because I would not put my hearers in mind of them.

280. These emotions have got the name of passions, probably, because in receiving the first impressions of them our mind is passive, being acted upon, or influenced, by the body, by external things, or by the imagination. We may distinguish between the cause of a passion and its object. The cause is that which raises it; the object is that towards which it prompts us to act, or on which it inclines us to fix our attention. The cause and the object of a passion are often, but not always, one and the same thing. Thus pre-
sent good is both the cause and the object of joy; we rejoice in it, and we rejoice on account of it. But of love or esteem, the cause is some agreeable quality, and the object is some person supposed to possess that agreeable quality: of resentment, in like manner, injury is the cause, and the injurious person the object.

281. That may be well enough understood which it is not easy to describe philosophically. This part of human nature is, in general, so well understood, that most people know what will draw forth the passions of men, and in what manner those passions operate; yet a complete analysis of them is still, if I mistake not, a desideratum in moral science. The following sketch (for the outline of which I am indebted to Dr. Watts) may have its use, but is very susceptible of improvement. The difficulties attending this subject arise from several causes: from the insufficiency of human language, which does not supply a name for each form and variety of human affection, and of course makes it necessary to express different affections by the same name; from the complex nature of the passions themselves, as they vary their appearance in men of different characters, and in the same man at different times and in different circumstances; and perhaps too from that partiality, which inclines us to think and speak too favourably of those passions that most easily beset
ourselves, and with too little favour of such as may seem to predominate in other men.

282. The passions have been variously arranged, according to the various views which have been taken of them. They may be divided into pleasant and painful. Criminal passions bring pain; virtuous affections pleasure. And, therefore, to cherish good affections makes a man happy, and to indulge evil passions makes him wretched: happiness being rather a habit of the mind, than a thing that depends on outward circumstances—for, amidst the greatest worldly prosperity, the state of a man’s mind, who is haunted with the horrors of a guilty conscience, or with envy, jealousy, malice, and other evil passions, may make him completely miserable; and disease and poverty united will not make that person unhappy, who has a good conscience, and is piously resigned to the divine will. It may be objected, that some evil passions, as revenge, give pleasure; and that some good ones, pity for example, are painful. But the answer is easy. Of pity, as both a painful and a pleasurable emotion, I have spoken already (§ 190): and, with respect to revenge, I shall only observe at present, that though it may to an indelicate and inconsiderate mind give a momentary gratification, even as gluttony and excessiv drinking may to a depraved appetite, it can never bring happiness along with it; because it is accompanied with many tormenting thoughts; because the promiscuous
perpetration of it would unhinge society, and, in
time, exterminate the human race; and, because
the opposite virtue of forgiveness is one of the most
amiable and most delightful (I had almost said, most
godlike) affections whereof rational nature is capable.

283. Though the passions are justly reckoned
principles of action, (indeed if we had no passions
we should never act voluntarily, at least we should
never act with alacrity or vigour), they may, how-
ever, be divided into such as do not prompt to ac-
tion, and such as do. Of the former class, which
incline rather to rest, by fixing the attention upon
their causes or objects, are admiration, joy, and
sorrow. Of the latter, which are properly active
principles, are hope, fear, desire, aversion, benevo-
rence, gratitude, anger, &c. If joy in the possess-
sion of good be blended with the fear of losing it,
this will produce an active propensity, disposing
us to exert ourselves in the preservation of it. In
like manner, if sorrow be mixed with hope, as in
the case of one whose friend is dangerously ill; or
with fear, or with curiosity, as in the case of one
who hears he has lost a friend, but is not informed
of the person: in these cases, sorrow will become
active, and make a man exert himself in procuring
relief for his friend in the one case, and in ob-
taining full information in the other. In all our
active passions there is a certain degree of anxiety,
restlessness, or desire; which, however, is not al-
ways painful. Benevolence is anxious to promote
another's good, and \textit{gratitude}, to make acknowledgments and requite the favour; but these are delightful emotions notwithstanding.

284. The passions may be divided into \textit{selfish} and \textit{benevolent}: the former aim at our own good, the latter at the good of others. A rational desire of our own happiness, which may be called \textit{self-love}, is a powerful and useful propensity, and when rightly managed tends to happiness universal. In this respect, 'true self-love and social are the same.' For that must be beneficial to the species, which, without injury to any, promotes the good of the individual; even as that which removes disease from one of the limbs contributes to the health of the whole body. Self-love, when excessive, or when injurious to others, may be called \textit{selfishness}, and is a hateful disposition.

285. With rational self-love we must not confound those desires which men take to particular worldly things, as power, pleasure, and riches: for so far are these from making a man happy, that they often make him miserable. And it is not so much with a view to happiness, that ambitious, covetous, and sensual men pursue their favourite schemes, as in order to obtain power, wealth, and pleasure; to the possession of which they must know, if they know any thing, that happiness is not annexed. But without power, pleasure, wealth, say they, we cannot be happy, and therefore we pursue them. Sots, in like manner, say, they can-
not be happy without the means of intoxication. But surely no man in his senses can believe that self-love is gratified by excessive drinking; or that brandy and tobacco* have any thing to do with rational felicity, except, perhaps, by their tendency to destroy it. There have been drunkards, who could persevere in their vile habits, even while they knew that ruin and death would be the consequence. Such men being really their own enemies, it would be a strange abuse of words to say, that they were actuated by self-love: and the same thing may be affirmed of all who are enslaved to ambition, covetousness, or sensuality.

286. It has been questioned, whether there be in man any principle of pure benevolence, which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one’s self? By doing good to others we do indeed most effectually gratify ourselves; for what can give a man more pleasure, than to reflect that he has been instrumental in promoting a fellow-creature’s happiness! Yet every good man may be sensible, that he often does good, and wishes well, to others, without any immediate view to his own gratification, nay, without thinking of himself at all. In fact, if we had not principles purely benevolent, we could not gratify ourselves by doing others good. Children have been known to sacrifice their inclinations to the

* I speak of them not as medicines but as luxuries.
happiness of those they loved, when they themselves believed that their own interest would, in every respect, suffer by doing so. It is not my meaning, that all children, or all men, are so disinterested; I only say, that pure benevolence is to be found in human nature: a doctrine, which, though to many it may appear self-evident, has been much controverted; and which there are men in the world, who, judging of all others by themselves, will never heartily acquiesce in.

287. It has also been made a question, whether there be in man a principle of universal benevolence? But does not every good man wish well to all mankind? and is not this universal benevolence? He who wishes harm to those who never offended him, or who cares not whether a fellow-creature be happy or unhappy, is a monster, and deserves not the name of a man. It is true, that every man, even in civilized society, is not capable of forming extensive views of things, or of considering the whole human race, or the whole system of per- cipient beings, as the objects of his benevolence. But in every good man there is a benevolent principle, which makes him wish well, and do good, to every one to whom he has it in his power to be serviceable; and this sort of benevolence will do as much real good in the world, as benevolence universal. Accordingly our religion, which is suited to our general nature, and enjoins nothing as incumbent on all men, but what every man, of
extensive or narrow views, of much or little knowledge, may perform;—our religion, I say, instead of recommending universal benevolence in the abstract, requires, that we do good to all men, as we have opportunity; and commands us to love our neighbour as ourselves; declaring every man to be our neighbour who needs our aid, and to whom we have the means of giving it.

288. Concerning universal benevolence some have argued in this manner.—'Benevolence arises from love; and love from the view of agreeable qualities in another. Now the good qualities of others can be known to us in two ways only; from personal acquaintance, or from information. Of one whom we never saw or heard of, we cannot know either the good qualities, or the bad: him, therefore, we cannot love; but benevolence is founded in love: therefore towards such a person we cannot be benevolent. It follows, that there can be no such affection as universal benevolence in human nature.' This reasoning is good for nothing. Whether the principle in question be a part of our frame, is a query that relates to a matter of fact, and is therefore to be determined, not by argument, but by observation and experience. He who is conscious that he wishes well to all his fellow-creatures, is a man of universal benevolence; and I have no scruple to affirm, that every good man does so, and that to do so is in the power of every man.
289. Though one were to grant the premises of the foregoing argument, the conclusion would not follow: for, though we are not personally acquainted with every man upon earth, we know that all men possess certain agreeable qualities, for which we may and ought to love them. We know, that all men are percipient beings, are endowed with reason and speech, are animated with souls intelligent and immortal, are descended from our first parents, and are dependent on the same Great Being on whom we depend. On these accounts, a good man loves all mankind; and may, therefore, if benevolence arise from love, be benevolent towards all mankind. The very circumstance of our all inhabiting the same planet, and of being all liable to the same wants and infirmities, will naturally serve as a bond of endearment; for similarity of fortune never fails to attach men to one another.

290. Some passions are called unnatural, as envy, malevolence, and pride. The reason is, because they are destructive of good affections that are natural. We naturally love excellence wherever we see it; but the envious man hates it, and wishes to be superior to others, not by raising himself by honest means, but by injuriously pulling them down. It is natural to rejoice in the good of others; but the malevolent heart triumphs in their misery. It is natural for us to regard mankind as our companions and brethren; but the proud man
regards himself only, despising others as if they were beneath him. These unnatural passions are always evil; they make a man odious to his fellow-creatures, and unhappy in himself; and they tend to the utter depravation of the human soul. Anger and resentment may lead to mischief; but, if kept within the due bounds, are useful for self-defence, and therefore not to be altogether suppressed. We may be angry without sin; and not to resent injury is the same thing as not to perceive it, which would be insensibility. Nay, on some occasions resentment and anger are further useful, by cherishing in us an abhorrence of injustice, and fortifying our minds against it. But pride, malevolence, and envy, can never be useful or innocent; to indulge them, even for a moment, is criminal.

291. The passions have long ago been divided into calm and violent. Of the former sort, commonly termed affections, are benevolence, pity, gratitude, and, in general, all virtuous and innocent emotions. Of the latter, are anger, hatred, avarice, ambition, revenge, excessive joy or sorrow, and, in general, all criminal and all immoderate emotions; which, in imitation of the Greeks, we may call passions, using the word in a strict sense. The former are salutary to the soul, the latter dangerous. Those resemble serene weather, accompanied with such gales and refreshing showers, as prevent stagnation, and cheer by
their variety: these may be likened to storms and other elemental commotions that terrify and destroy. Violent passions, very properly expressed by the Latin word *perturbationes*, always discompose the mind, and impair reason to a certain degree; and have been known to rise even to phrensy, and hurry men on to perpetrations, that have shortened their days, and made life miserable, and death infamous. Many of them are attended with feverish symptoms; some give an unaccountable addition of bodily strength, which, however, soon ends in languor; and some have brought on fainting, apoplexy, and instant death. Nothing more needs be said to show the dreadful effects of violent passion, the indispensable duty of guarding against it, and the inexcusable temerity of speaking and acting under its influence.

292. The peripatetics, or followers of Aristotle, rightly thought, that the passions, dangerous as they are, ought not to be extinguished, even though that were possible; for that, being natural, they must be useful; but that they are to be regulated by reason, and kept within the bounds of moderation. All those violent emotions, that urge us on to pleasure, or to the avoidance of pain, by a blind impulse, were by the schoolmen, who professed to derive their tenets from the same source, referred to what they called the sensitive appetite, because they seemed to partake more of the senses than of reason: and those calmer affections, that
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prompt us to pursue good rationally and with tranquillity, they referred to the rational appetite, because more nearly allied to reason than to the senses.

293. Pythagoras and Plato ascribe to the soul two natures, or, to give it in the words of Cicero, animum in duas partes dividunt, divide the soul into two parts, the one rational, the other irrational. In the rational nature they placed what they called tranquillity, that is, as Cicero explains the word, placida et quieta constantia, an easy and quiet consistency or uniformity. To the irrational part they referred what the Greeks called πάθη, or passions, and the Latins, more properly, perturbationes, or discomposures, those turbulent emotions both of anger and of desire, which are contrary and unfriendly to reason. There is, in Cicero's fourth book of Tusculan Inquiries, a particular enumeration of the several sorts of perturbationes and constantia, according to the stoical system. The passage deserves attention; not so much for the philosophy contained in it, as because it ascertains the signification of some Latin words, which are not, for the most part, exactly understood.

294. Indeed, it is not very easy to comprehend what the stoics say on this subject. Sometimes they would seem to require the extinction of all our passions, of all, at least, that are influenced by external things; for they hold, that nothing external is either good or evil, virtue being, ac-
cording to them, not only the greatest, but the only good. At other times they are not so unfavourable to the passions; but grant indulgence to those that interrupt not that calm constancy and steady uniformity, which they supposed to constitute the glory of the human character. Thus they allow, that gaudium, or rational and tranquil joy, may be permitted to have a place in the human breast; but they proscribe laetitia, which it seems is a more tumultuous sort of gladness, as unworthy of a wise man. They are indeed licentious, and frequently whimsical, in their use of words; so that it is difficult to understand them in their own tongues, the Greek and Latin, and still more so to translate their doctrines into any modern language. Mrs. Carter has, however, been singularly successful in her version of the discourses of Epicurus; to which she has prefixed an elegant introduction, of more value than all the rest of the book. To that introduction I would refer those who wish to form a just idea of the spirit and genius of the stoical philosophy.

295. It cannot be doubted, that pure and created spirits may be susceptible of emotions somewhat similar to human passions, as joy, gratitude, admiration, esteem, love, and the like. Hence some authors, in treating of the passions, have divided them into spiritual and human. The former we are supposed to be capable of in common with angels and other created spirits; the
latter are peculiar to our present constitution as composed of soul and body. I need not take further notice of this division. Through the whole of the following arrangement I must be understood to speak of the passions, as they affect human creatures in the present state. Of the emotions of pure spirits we may form conjectures; but we can speak with certainty, and scientifically, of those only which are known to us by experience.

SECTION V.

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Passions and Affections.

296. The first class of passions that I shall take notice of comprehends admiration, and some other emotions allied to it. What is either uncommon in itself, or endowed with uncommon qualities, raises admiration or wonder. The sun is seen every day, and therefore is, in one respect, not uncommon; yet who does not admire his extraordinary magnitude and splendour, and beneficial influences! When, as in this example, the object we contemplate is transcendently excellent or great, admiration becomes astonishment; and an uncommon or unexpected object appearing on a sudden, raises within us an emotion called surprise. The passions
of this class, when under no restraint, naturally express themselves by opening the mouth and eyes, raising the eyebrows, lifting up the hands and spreading the fingers: surprise, when violent, occasions starting and other nervous symptoms. These are all kindred emotions, and yet they are not the same.

297. *Admiration* and *wonder* may be distinguished. The former is generally a pleasurable passion, its object being for the most part good, or great, or both; the latter may be agreeable, or otherwise, according to circumstances. We wonder at the folly and wickedness of some people, but can hardly be said to admire it. We wonder at the ingenuity displayed in harnessing a flea to a microscopic chariot; but the genius of the artist we do not admire, because it exerts itself in nothing that can be called either great or good; and because, though at first view it may yield a slight gratification, one is rather vexed than pleased to think that so much skill and time should be thrown away upon such a trifle. We may also distinguish between admiration and surprise. The sudden appearance of a person in a place where we did not expect him, may surprise us without being matter of admiration. And admiration, as already observed, is generally, if not always, pleasing; but it is not so with surprise.

298. We speak of disagreeable as well as agreeable surprises, and of astonishment that confounds,
as well as of astonishment that delights; but of disagreeable or painful admiration I think we seldom or never speak. It would be an agreeable surprise, if, on going to visit a friend whom we believed to be dangerously ill, we should find him in perfect health; and, in contrary circumstances, our surprise would be painful in the extreme. Delightful astonishment we receive from the contemplation of pure sublimity (see § 168); but the astonishment that seizes the young warrior, when the thunder of the battle begins, confounds at first and stupifies, though valour and a sense of duty soon get the better of it. This extreme and painful astonishment is sometimes, both in English and Latin, called consternation, as if it had a tendency to throw a man down. It is to be observed here, and while we treat of the passions it must not be forgotten, that as two or more passions really different may, in some respects, be similar, it is not strange, that the name of one should often be put figuratively for another. Instances might be given of the words admiration, surprise, astonishment, and wonder, used indiscriminately; but the philosopher must endeavour to distinguish as well as he can. From this licentious or indefinite use of language, disputes frequently arise where there is no real difference of opinion.

299. Admiration, says Plato, is the mother of wisdom; but, when excessive or misplaced, becomes folly. The young and inexperienced are
most liable to it, and to them it is, unless directed to mean or improper objects, peculiarly beneficial: for curiosity prompts them to search for what is new, and admiration fixes their view upon it till it be imprinted on the memory. Our admiration of things great or good heightens the pleasure we take in them; and the astonishment that arises when any thing uncommonly evil attracts our notice, serves to quicken disgust and preserve us from contagion. Horace considers what the Greeks called ἀξιωματικα, nil admirari, an exemption from admiration, as a security against those turbulent emotions that interrupt the happiness of life: but he is there speaking of that admiration which is bestowed upon unworthy objects. And in this view his doctrine is right: for whatever raises this passion is apt to kindle others of equal or superior violence, as love, hatred, or desire; and where these are improperly directed, the mind must be subject to perturbations incompatible with virtue, and consequently with happiness. So much for the first order of passions, whereof the object is, in general, uncommonness. See § 279.

300. A much more copious class are those of the second order; which take their rise from the view of what is, or appears to be, good or evil. That which is, or appears to be, good or agreeable, raises some modification of love: that which is, or appears to be, evil or disagreeable, excites one form or other of hatred. Now a thing may
seem to be good, either *in itself* simply, or both *in itself* and also *with a reference to us*: and that which, with respect to us as well as in itself, appears to be good, may seem fit, or in a condition, either to *do us good*, or to *receive good from us*. In like manner, a thing may seem to be evil, *in itself* simply, or both *in itself* and also *with a reference to us*: and that which, with respect to us as well as in itself, appears to be evil, may seem fit, either to *do us evil*, or to *receive evil from us*. From good and evil things thus arranged, rise three forms of *love* and of its opposite *hatred*: I shall call them *esteem* and *contempt*; *benevolence* and *malevolence*; *complacency* and *dislike*. Esteem, benevolence, and complacency, may be so blended as that one and the same being shall be the object of all the three; and this happens when that being appears good in itself, fit to do us good, and fit to receive good from us. In like manner, contempt, malevolence, and dislike, may unite so as to form one complex passion; as when one and the same object appears at once evil in itself, fit to do us evil, and fit to receive evil from us. Thus the passions in question may coalesce; but it is proper to analyse, and consider them separately.

301. That love, which we bear to a person whom we consider as a good character merely, without taking into the account his fitness either to do us good or to receive good from us, may be called *esteem*. We esteem strangers the moment...
we form a favourable opinion of their merit; and those good men, whom we never saw or can see, and of whom we know nothing but by report: and this emotion (for passion it can hardly be called) inclines us to speak of them with affection and praise, and endeavour to make others think of them as we do. If there be any thing great or uncommonly good in such persons, admiration will heighten our esteem into respect and reverence. Things, as well as persons, are sometimes said to be the objects of esteem; we say, of a good book or a good picture, that it is well esteemed: but this use of the word is figurative. To esteem, and to value, are different things. However much we may value a good horse, a convenient house, or a fine garden, we can hardly be said to esteem them.

302. Mind, therefore, and rationality seem necessary to draw forth the affection we speak of. Nor are these alone sufficient. An acute understanding employed in sophistry, a great genius exerting itself in pursuits either criminal or trifling, may raise our wonder, perhaps our astonishment, but has no more claim to our esteem than the juggler, rope-dancer, or dexterous player at cards. In short, esteem implies moral approbation; and probity, industry, and other moral virtues, are the objects of it. This being the case, it follows, that we ourselves, as moral beings, may either rise or sink in our own esteem. Self-esteem, kept within
due bounds, and warranted by the approbation of conscience, would be a rational as well as delightful emotion. But to keep it within due bounds is difficult and rare; for where is the man, who has a just sense, neither too high nor too low, of his own merit?

303. When we think too highly of ourselves, which we are very apt to do, self-esteem degenerates into the evil passions of vanity, pride, arrogance, and insolence. These, though nearly allied, are not the same. Pride and vanity may be distinguished. The proud man is sufficiently happy in the consciousness of his own supposed dignity; the vain man is not happy unless he believe that others admire him. Hence the former is reserved and sullen, the latter ostentatious and affable. Pride implies something, and generally not a little, of ill-nature; vanity is often officiously obliging. The vain man laughs, and is himself a ludicrous animal; the proud man is a hateful being, and unwilling even to smile; 'or if he smile, it is in 'such a sort, as if he scorn'd to smile at any 'thing.' It is generally true, that, in proportion as a man behaves proudly towards those whom he thinks beneath him, he is fawning and servile with respect to those whose superiority he feels himself constrained to acknowledge: Swift observes, that the posture of climbing is pretty much the same with that of crawling. Pride and vanity, though in some things inconsistent, have been

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known to meet in the same character; but he may be vain who is not proud; and some men are too proud to be vain. The language of the former would be, admire me, and I will love you dearly; that of the latter, we value not your good opinion, and will give ourselves no trouble to obtain it.

304. Pride, arrogance, and insolence, may perhaps be thus distinguished. Pride, though no degree of it is excusable, may be so restrained by good-breeding, as not to do injury, or give great offence to others: arrogance is always offensive, because in demanding more than its due (for this meaning appears in the etymology of the word), it manifests a petulant and injurious disposition, that disdains to be controlled by good-breeding or any other restraint. Insolence is pride co-operating with arrogance and ill-nature in gratifying itself by insulting others: a temper utterly detestable, and such as no elevation of rank, of wealth, or of genius, can render pardonable in any person: nay, let a man's superiority be what you please, this alone is sufficient to cancel all his merit. And true it is, that they who are really distinguished by rank or by genius are not apt to be either insolent or arrogant; and, if not wholly exempt from pride, will however be careful to conceal it; which it is very much their interest to do. Of all writers the petty verbal critic is, I think, the most addicted to these enormities: Newton's meek-
ness and modesty were as exemplary, as his genius was transcendant.

305. Pride is an artificial passion: in early life, unless enjoined by precept, or recommended by example, it seldom appears. The Psalmist, speaking of his exemption from haughtiness, compares himself to a young child; and the humble docility of little children is, in the New Testament, represented as a necessary preparative to the reception of Christian faith. But there is a sort of pride, from which a weak and inexperienced mind may be in danger, which refuses advice and instruction from an opinion that they are unnecessary: it is sometimes called self-conceit. This mental disease, at first infused by the fondness and flattery of parents perhaps, or of inferiors, gives rise to innumerable disappointments and ridiculous undertakings; and, if years and experience do not speedily remove it, hardens into incurable folly.

306. Contempt seems to stand in opposition to esteem, and arises from our considering an object as insignificant, or destitute of merit. But it is not every sort of insignificance that draws forth contempt: things of no value we are apt to overlook, or attend to with indifference; and indifference and neglect are no passions. When a thing is of such a nature as gives us reason to expect to find good in it, we despise it if we find none. An insignificant man, for example, is always the object of contempt, unless he be known to labour under
some infirmity which prevents his exerting himself to any good purpose. In those who pretend to knowledge, or have had the means of acquiring it, ignorance is contemptible; but ignorance in a child, in a savage, or in any person who neither pretends to knowledge, nor has ever had the means of it in his power, is not contemptible at all, but pitiable.

307. In like manner, a child’s first attempts in drawing or writing, however rude, are not to be contemned: but were a fond father to display such things as wonderfully ingenious, we should despise both the work and him who praises it: yet the child who made it we should not despise, unless he partook of his father’s vanity; because from a child nothing better is to be expected. In short, what we despise we always in some degree disapprove; and the object of disapprobation, as of esteem (see § 302), is a rational being. For I think we cannot be properly said to disapprove of an inconvenient house, or untractable horse, nor consequently to despise either, even as we cannot be said to esteem their opposites; but the conceited architect who built the one, and the knavish jockey who would cheat us in the other, we may have good reason both to disapprove and to despise.

308. A man habitually contemptuous is an unamiable character, because he is generally both malevolent and proud: but it is does not follow,
that contempt is an evil or useless passion, or a blemish in the human constitution. For the fear of incurring it, (and who would not be afraid of being despised?) proves a good preservative from pride, vanity, rashness, and other follies, as well as a powerful incentive to the acquisition of those talents and virtues which the world has reason to expect from us, and for which, if we acquire them, it will esteem us. It is scarce necessary to add, that esteem and contempt are more or less to be regarded, according to the wisdom and goodness of him who esteems and contemns. To have the esteem of fools, can gratify none but fools; to be despised by such, can never dishearten a man of spirit. To be praised for good qualities which we are conscious that we do not possess, is, to a generous mind, not pleasing but mortifying; to be despised or blamed by an incompetent or uncandid judge, may give a momentary pain, but ought not to make us unhappy. The lady who paints her face to make us admire her complexion,* and the fop who tells lies to raise our opinion of his wit or valour, are among the most despicable characters in human shape. Disdain and scorn are terms denoting different forms or degrees of contempt. To distinguish them with precision, and unexceptionably, would perhaps be difficult, and is not

* Face-painting, where it is fashionable and avowed, deceives nobody.
necessary; those words being, in general, well enough understood.

309. The opposite of pride is humility; which consists in a just sense of our own imperfections, inclining us to bear with and pity those of others: a most amiable disposition in the sight of both God and man; but which, as it settles and soothes the mind, and occasions little or no commotion in the bodily frame, is to be called, not a passion, but a virtue. And a virtue it is of the most essential importance to happiness; indeed, without it, there can be no virtue, in the Christian sense of the word. Proud men are continually beset with affronts real or imaginary, and harassed with anger, indignation, revenge, and other pernicious and painful emotions, from which the humble are entirely free. The lowly mind is considerate and recollected, benevolent and pious, at peace with itself and with all the world; and is generally accompanied with a simplicity of manners, a serenity of countenance, a gentleness of speech, and a sweetness of voice, which recommend one to the love of good men, and to respect even from the thoughtless. Good-breeding, which all men who understand their own interest are ambitious to acquire, always assumes the look and the language of humility: a proof, that it is universally pleasing; as ostentation and pride are to the same extent and in the same degree offensive.

310. There is in some minds a timorous diffi-
dence, which, making them judge too harshly or too meanly of themselves, depresses them with melancholy thoughts that disqualify them equally for happiness and for the business of life. This cannot be called a fault, but it is a dangerous infirmity; and for the most part owing to disorder of body as well as discomposure of mind. Of our virtue, as it must appear to a being of infinite perfection, we cannot think too meanly; and of our abilities, as compared with those of other men, we should always speak and think modestly. But we shall do well to guard against unreasonable dejection. And this in all ordinary cases we may do, by entertaining right notions of the divine goodness and mercy; judging with candour of ourselves as well as of others; cultivating habits of activity, cheerfulness, and social intercourse; improving our talents and faculties to the utmost of our power; and never engaging in enterprises above our strength, or in schemes that seem likely to expose us to the tyranny of unruly passion.

311. So much for esteem and contempt, and the passions allied to them. They are all different modifications of love and hatred; and all, or most of them, seem to arise from our considering things or persons as simply, and in themselves, good or evil. The next class of passions are those which arise in us when we consider objects as good or evil not only in themselves, but also with a peculiar reference to us. If a thing, or rather a per-
son, seem fit to receive good from us, we regard it with that sort of love which is termed benevolence; if fit to receive evil from us, our hatred to it we may call, till we get a more proper name, malevolence: if a thing or a person give us pleasure, or seem fit to do us good, we regard it with complacency or delight; if fit to do us evil, or deprive us of pleasure, with displacency, or, to use a more common word, with dislike.

312. Benevolence and esteem, though often united, are not the same. A man is benevolent to his new-born infant, whom he cannot be said to esteem; and to a poor profligate, whom it may be impossible for him not to despise. Nor are malevolence and contempt the same, though they also go often together: our hatred of a powerful adversary, though blended with malevolence, may be without the least mixture of contempt; nay, if he have great abilities, may be consistent with admiration. Esteem and complacency must, in like manner, be distinguished; though frequently, as when we converse with a friend, they have one and the same person for their object: for we have complacency in, that is we receive pleasure from, things inanimate, as a house, a garden, a book, a picture, none of which is, properly speaking, the object of our esteem. Contempt and dislike must also be distinguished; for that which we do not despise may be fit to do us evil, as a highwayman, a serpent, a storm, &c.
313. As benevolence prompts us to promote, or at least to wish, the happiness of others, its object must be, not only a percipient being, but a being who is capable of deriving happiness or comfort from us: complacency, as already observed, may have for its object, not only percipient, but even inanimate beings. These two passions must, therefore, be yet further distinguished. Good men delight, or have complacency, nay, may be said even to rejoice, in God: indeed the contemplation of his adorable nature yields the highest and most lasting felicity whereof rational minds are capable. But we cannot be said to be benevolent towards God; because our goodness extends not to him, he being, in and of himself, eternally and infinitely happy. Further still: the object of our complacency must always be, or seem to be, agreeable; but the object of our benevolence may be neither agreeable nor good; it is enough if it have a capacity of being made so. A good man takes no delight in the wicked; but he wishes them well, and endeavours, if he can, to reform them.

314. The passion that rises within us towards those percipient beings who seem fit to receive evil from us, I called malevolence, as being, according to etymology at least, the opposite of benevolence. But the term is not proper. An undutiful child may to the most affectionate parent seem a very proper object of correction; but it would be an abuse of words to say, that such a parent is ma-
levolent towards his child. To a good magistrate malefactors may seem fit to receive, from the laws of their country, as administered by him, even capital punishment; but there is no malevolence in a good magistrate, nor is the law capable of it: and sanguinary laws are enacted from a principle, not of ill-will to individuals, but of love to the community. To be indifferent to the welfare of those who are fit to receive good from us, would manifest a savage disposition which might be considered as the opposite of benevolence; but indifference is not a passion. The passions that counteract this amiable affection, by disposing men to do no good, but positive evil to others, will be hereafter taken notice of, under the names of resentment, anger, revenge, &c.

315. Dr. Watts seems to think, that benevolence to our equals may be called friendship, and to our inferiors mercy. And it is true, that we are always the friends of those towards whom we are benevolent; and that in popular language a good man may be said to be merciful to his beast. But, in order to constitute what is commonly called, friendship, acquaintance, esteem, and complacency are necessary, as well as benevolence; whereas we may, and indeed ought to exercise benevolence towards strangers, criminals, and even enemies; that is, towards those in whom we take no delight and repose no trust, and with whom we have but a slight acquaintance, or none at all. And the ob-
ject of, what is properly called mercy, is a person liable to punishment: mercy is what we all pray for from God; and it is mercy which a condemned malefactor implores from his sovereign. It may be added, with respect to friendship, that, though the proverb says it either finds men equal or makes them so, equality of condition, or of talents, is by no means essential to it. For a master and his servant, a peer and a commoner, a sovereign and his subject, an unlettered man and a philosopher, may be affectionate and faithful friends to each other: and if a man were to forsake his friends on being promoted to a rank above them, the world would censure his conduct as equally ungenerous and unnatural.

316. Benevolence towards the brute creation has, I think, no other name than humanity, or tender-heartedness, nor needs any other; for he who is cruel to his beast, would be so to his servant or neighbour, if he durst. Useful and inoffensive animals have a claim to our tenderness, and it is honourable to our nature to befriend them; by exposing them to no unnecessary hardship, making their lives as comfortable as we can, and, if we must destroy them, putting an end to their pain in an instant. But more of this hereafter. Some people contract a fondness for certain animals, as horses and dogs, which are indeed furnished by nature with the means of recommending themselves to us in various ways; some,
less excusably, for cats, parrots, monkeys, &c. When this sort of fondness becomes immoderate, it is something worse than folly, and seldom fails to withdraw our affections from our brethren of mankind, as well as to reconcile us to habits of idleness and nastiness. Low company, of whatever kind, debases our nature in proportion as we become attached to it.

317. Fondness is founded in complacency. It partakes also of benevolence, but often counteracts it: as when it imprisons for life that playful, beautiful, and harmless creature, a singing bird; mangles the ears of a dog, or the tail of a horse; pampers a lapdog, so as to make him more helpless and useless than nature made him; and, which is infinitely more cruel, corrupts a child by indulgence and flattery. These are melancholy proofs of the weakness of human reason. But there is, in some of our best affections, a tenderness of love, which has also obtained the name of fondness, and which, so far from being an infirmity, may be justly accounted a virtue, being highly natural, amiable, and beneficial. Such is that fondness, which unites itself with the several forms of natural affection, whereby parents and children, brothers and sisters, and other near relations, are mutually attached to, and delighted with, one another. These parental, conjugal, filial, and fraternal charities, not only humanize the heart of man, and give a peculiar and exqui-
site relish to all the comforts of domestic life, but also cherish that elevating principle, a sense of honour, which heightens the gracefulfulness, and adds to the stability, even of virtue itself.

318. The passion opposite to complacency is displacency, or dislike. It has for its object that which seems fit to do evil, or take away good; that, in a word, which is disagreeable; and, according to the degree of violence wherewith it operates, assumes different names, as disgust, loathing, abhorrence, abomination, detestation. We dislike an ill-natured countenance; we are disgusted with the conversation of a vain-glorious fool; we loathe or nauseate food when we are sick; we abhor an unjust or ungenerous action; we abominate the impious rites of pagan superstition; we detest such characters as Tiberius, Herod, Caligula, Nero. By these examples I do not mean to ascertain the exact signification of the words; which, perhaps, could not be easily done; as people in the choice of such words may be determined by their present feelings, or merely by the habit of using one word more than another: but I give these examples, to shew that the words above mentioned mean, not different passions, but rather different degrees of the same passion. Words expressive of very keen dislike ought not to be employed on ordinary occasions. In general, the frequent use of hyperbolical expressions,
though some people affect them, is a sign of levity or intemperance of mind.

319. We are sometimes conscious of strong dislike which we can hardly account for, and which to others, and to ourselves too perhaps, may appear capricious or even ridiculous. This has been called *antipathy*. Most people feel it on seeing a crawling toad or serpent; and such antipathy is useful, and therefore reasonable, because it contributes to our safety: but whether it be owing to constitution or to acquired habit, I cannot say; as I know not whether a child, previously to advice or example, would be conscious of it. To certain kinds of food, as pork and cheese, some people have an antipathy; which may be the effect of unpleasing associations; or, perhaps, it may be constitutional; for I have heard of those who would grow sick if cheese were in the room, though they did not see it. I know men both healthy and strong, who are uneasy when they touch velvet, or see another handling a piece of cork. And I remember that, in my younger years, if my hands happened to be cold, I could not, without uneasiness, handle paper, or hear it rustle, or even hear its name mentioned. What could give rise to this, I know not; but I am sure there was no affectation in the case.

320. Of this *papyrophobia* I need not inform the reader that I was cured long ago. And I
doubt not, that such unaccountable infirmities might be in many, perhaps in most, cases got the better of; which, when it can be done, ought not to be neglected; as every thing is a source of inconvenience, which gives one the appearance of singularity, or makes one unnecessarily dependent on outward circumstances. Persons, however, there are, who, from an affectation of extreme delicacy, are at pains to multiply their antipathies and other singularities, to the no small molestation of themselves as well as others. Such people will scream at the sight of a spider, a caterpillar, a mouse, or even a frog: and if, at table, you be conveying salt to your plate with a careless or trembling hand, will sweat with apprehension lest you let it fall, and so bring mischief, as they are willing to believe, upon one or other of the company. But this last example savours more of superstition than of false delicacy. All such fooleries are quite inconsistent with that manly simplicity of manners, which is so honourable to the rational character.

321. From the different forms of love and hatred, complacency and dislike, which I have been endeavouring to analyze, a third class of passions derive their origin, which vary in their feelings and names, according as their objects vary with respect to us. If that which seems fit to do us good be so far in our power that we may consider it as attainable, it excites desire; if probably
attainable, hope; if actually obtained, joy; and the person who helps us to obtain it is the object of our gratitude. If that which seems fit to do us harm may possibly come upon us, it excites what may be called aversion; if it may probably come upon us, fear; if it be actually come upon us, sorrow, or grief: and if any of our fellow-men has been instrumental in bringing it upon us, that person is the object of our anger. On these pairs of opposite passions, desire and aversion, hope and fear, joy and sorrow, gratitude and anger, I shall make a few remarks, and so conclude this part of the subject.

322. Desire and aversion. Things may seem desirable, in the popular sense of that epithet, which are not attainable: such is an affluent fortune, to those who are sure they can never have it; and such is health, to him who knows that he is dying of a consumption. But in general, it is true of those things which draw forth the active passion of desire, that they seem to be within the reach of the person who wishes to have them. Few people can be said to desire to fly, or to desire to be the governors of kingdoms; and to those who have aspired to crowns and sceptres, the attainment of such things must have appeared at least possible. Desire is a restless passion; and if every sort of excellence, whether attainable or unattainable, were to raise it, there would be no end of disappointments, and human life would be completely
wretched. This passion, as it arises from the view of something agreeable, is partly a pleasurable feeling; and it is also painful, and sometimes intensely so, because it implies a consciousness of our wanting something, without which we think we are not so happy as we should be if we had it.

323. Nothing more discomposes the mind than inordinate desire, or more effectually disqualifies it for prudent exertion. It is a torment in itself, and it exposes to disappointment; and the anguish of disappointment is in proportion to the violence of desire. And, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to our virtue and happiness, and indeed to our reputation as men of prudence, that we inure ourselves to habits of moderation in all our desires, in all those at least that are liable to become extravagant, that is, in all that regard this world. To effect this, we shall do well to meditate frequently on the shortness of life, the uncertainty of present things, and their insufficiency to yield those gratifications which are expected from them. If we are anxious to be wealthy, eminent, or great, let us attend to the fates and fortunes of those who have acquired renown, riches, or power, and consider how much happier they were than other men; what proportion of their happiness arose from such things, and whether a reasonable share of felicity might not be attained without them: continually bearing in mind, that, though
happiness is not always in our power, contentment is; and that contentment is enough.

324. A slight degree of desire has been called *propensity*, or *inclination*; when it becomes very importunate, it is termed *longing*; and longing may grow stronger and stronger, till it overwhelm the mind and destroy the body. This may happen, not only in regard to food and drink, and other things necessary, but also when the object of desire may seem to many to be essential neither to life nor to happiness. Men have lived long and comfortably at a great distance from the place of their birth, the neighbourhood of which is surely no necessary of life: yet there have been men who sickened and died of an excessive longing to revisit their native land. To this malady the Swiss were formerly so subject, that they gave it a name signifying the disease of the country: the Scots too have suffered from it; and Homer makes Minerva say, of the wandering Ulysses, that, to enjoy the happiness of again seeing the smoke ascend from his native Ithaca, he would willingly die.

325. Some of our desires take different names, according as their objects differ. To desire the good that others possess may be termed *covetousness*; as in the tenth law of the decalogue, where it is very emphatically prohibited: as in the New Testament it is not only prohibited, but branded with the name of idolatry, and declared to be 2
sin that excludes from heaven. Desire of riches has also been called covetousness. But this desire, if moderate, and if it pursue its object without injury to any person, cannot be called criminal; nay, if it engage in the pursuit in order to obtain the means of doing good, it is very commendable, and gives rise to industry, temperance, and other virtues equally beneficial to individuals and to society. Desire of the pleasures of sense is termed sensuality; especially when it becomes habitual, and excludes or weakens the more generous principles of action: and then it is a disease of the most debasing nature, and reduces man to the condition of a beast. Temperance, a hardy way of life, and a superiority to the fascinations of luxury, are by all moralists recommended, as friendly to our moral improvement, and highly honourable to man as a rational being.

326. The desire of honour and power has obtained the name of ambition. It is very apt, as Cicero observes, to spring up in noble minds; and it may, if properly regulated, produce good; but when in any degree immoderate (as it seldom fails to be when it has been in any great degree successful), it is almost impossible to restrain it within the proper limits. Dreadful are the miseries which unbridled ambition has introduced into the world; as may be seen in the histories of all nations: history, indeed, contains little more than the acts of ambitious men, and their consequences; and the
very word *ambition* conveys to us some idea of evil. And yet the love of power, or a desire of superiority, is natural to man, and so far from being in itself censurable, that a total want of it is blamed or pitied as mean-spiritedness. The only principles that can controil ambition, so as to render it at once innocent and beneficial, are benevolence and the love of justice; principles so nearly allied, that the one cannot exist without the other. Cicero has some good remarks on this subject in the eighth chapter of his first book *De Officiis*.

327. To desire money for its own sake, and in order to hoard it up, is *avarice*; an unnatural passion, that disgraces and entirely debases the soul, from which it seldom fails to eradicate every generous principle and kind affection. It impairs the understanding also, and contracts the genius. To this vile passion Horace scruples not to ascribe the inferiority of the Roman literature to the Greek; and Longinus imputes the decay of eloquence in his time to the same cause. Against avarice the ridicule of the comic muse has been pointed, and the scourge of satire brandished, in every age; and by no writer more successfully than by Horace. Indeed we should be tempted to think, that he recurs rather too frequently to this topic, if we did not recollect, that, in the decline of the republic, the Romans, and some of the most splendid characters among them too, were beyond measure addicted to the hoarding up of money.
328. Many vices bring their punishment along with them, and none more conspicuously than avarice. The more it is indulged, and the more it has been successful, the more miserable it makes the poor wretch that is enslaved to it; to whom, in our language, with an allusion no doubt to this circumstance, the appellation of miser has long been appropriated. Even when misers, at the close of life, have applied their accumulations to a charitable purpose, the erection of hospitals, for example, they have not been able to rescue their memory from contempt and detestation. For the world knows well, that there is no liberality in giving away what one can no longer keep; no virtue in rearing monuments to one's own vanity; and neither good nature nor common honesty in robbing society of the benefits that arise from commercial intercourse and a free circulation of wealth, or in adopting a plan of life which one cannot persist in without hardening one's heart against the deserving and the poor.

329. The desire of having that which others also desire gives rise to rivalry; and a desire to be equal or superior to others is emulation. Between rival candidates for the same object there ought to be no enmity; and between those who are ambitious to equal or excel one another there ought to be no envy. Enmity and envy, in cases of this nature, are marks of a little mind: and nothing gives a more favourable opinion of a man's
candour and temper, than to live on good terms with those whom he considers as his antagonists in the career of honour, or in the pursuit of that, which, if he obtain, his rivals must lose. We are to consider those as our enemies (says Tully, adopting a sentiment of Plato) who carry arms against us, not those who aspire to the same posts of honour which we wish to gain: imitating the moderation of Africanus and Metellus, between whom there was rivalship, but no bitterness.

330. Emulation, when without any mixture of malice or envy, is a noble principle of action, and a powerful incitement to the acquisition of excellence. Prudent parents and teachers are at pains to cherish it in young persons, and find that, when properly directed, it has better effects than the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward. There are writers, who, viewing human nature in an unfavourable light, have thought fit to affirm, that emulation cannot be without envy, and that therefore it is dangerous to encourage it in schools or families. But this is a mistake. These two passions differ as widely as candour differs from cunning, or a reasonable regard to ourselves from ill-will to our neighbour. Emulation wishes to raise itself without pulling others down, that is, without doing or wishing them any injury; and no principle of action is in itself more commendable, or more useful to others as an example to rouse them to honest industry: there is great generosity
in such emulation; and the man who exerts himself in it is making continual advances in virtue, because he is every moment acquiring more and more the command of his own spirit.

331. Envy is the reverse of all this. The envious man wishes to be superior, not by raising himself, but, as already observed, by pulling others down; and their prosperity, nay even their genius and their virtue, are to him matter not of joy, but of anguish: which is part of the character we ascribe to the devil. The envious man sets an example of selfishness, rancour, pride, and almost every other perversity incident to a despicable mind. Envy is a proof, not only of malignity, but of incapacity also. Hence it is, that no man is willing to acknowledge himself liable to this detestable passion; for that would be to provoke and acquiesce in his own disgrace. One exception to this remark I have indeed met with, and one only. I formerly knew a person, who would own that he was envious, and that it tormented him to hear even his best friends praised, or to see them treated with any uncommon degree of complaisance. But this was not the only foolish singularity which that person affected in order to make himself remarkable.

332. The exertions of generous emulation are highly delightful; for they rouse the soul, they amuse it, and they improve it. But Horace well observes, that the most cruel tyrants have never
devised a torment greater than envy. Surely, it must be of infinite importance that we guard against a passion so productive of folly, wickedness, and misery. And caution is the more necessary here, because, emulation, though, as we have seen, entirely different from envy, is very apt, through the weakness of our nature, to degenerate into it. Let then the man, who thinks he is actuated by generous emulation only, and wishes to know whether there be any thing of envy in the case, examine his own heart, and ask himself, Whether his friends, on becoming, though in an honourable way, his competitors, have less of his affection than they had before? whether he be gratified with hearing them depreciated? whether he would wish their merit less, that he might the more easily equal or excel them? and whether he would have a more sincere regard for them, if the world were to acknowledge him their superior? If his heart answer all or any of these questions in the affirmative, it is time to look out for a cure; for the symptoms of that vile distemper, envy, are but too apparent.

333. If that which seems fit to do us evil may possibly come upon us, it raises what may be called 

aversion; a term which, in its etymology, implies 

turning away from: dislike is a word of similar import, though perhaps not so emphatical. On dislike, as opposed to complacency, I made a remark or two already, and have little more to say
about it. Aversion, or active dislike, exerts itself with more or less energy, according to the magnitude of the evil, or rather according as we seem to be more or less in danger from it. We dislike, nay we may detest, the character of a person who died two thousand years ago, Nero, for example; but, because we have no reason to apprehend evil from it, I know not whether it would be strictly proper to say, that we have an aversion to Nero's character. Yet, if I were desired to write the history of Nero, I might say with propriety that I have an aversion to the subject: for, though Nero himself can do me no harm, it might seriously hurt me to employ much time in thinking of matters so disagreeable. Aversion, in short, seems to point at some evil which may come upon us; even as its opposite, desire, has for its object a good that is not altogether beyond our reach.

334. Hope and fear. These two passions are more restless and active than the preceding pair; as they view good and evil in a nearer situation. If the absent good is not only possible to be attained, but also probably attainable, it quickens desire into hope: if the absent evil not only may come upon us, but probably will, it changes simple aversion into fear. In this country, whatever aversion we may have to a plague of locusts, we can hardly be said to fear it, because, if we may judge of the future by the past, there is no probability of our being exposed to such a visitation:
and, in like manner, we cannot hope that our fields will yield a hundred times the grain we sow in them; because, though such a thing may be possible elsewhere, we have no reason to think it ever happened here, or will happen. The purchaser of a lottery-ticket wishes, no doubt, to gain the first prize; but he is a fool if he hope for it, the probabilities against him being so very great.

335. Things in our power cannot properly be called the objects of hope and fear. For if the good which we desire be within our reach, we possess ourselves of it, and so hope is extinguished; and of the evils, from which we have it in our power at any time to escape, it is our own fault if we be afraid. Yet in the possession of good there may be, and generally is, the fear of losing it, and the hope of preserving it; and, while we suffer evil, we may hope its removal, and fear its continuance. In fact, in every circumstance of life, hope and fear may be said to be present with us, as long, at least, as we are intelligent and active beings: for these passions are the great springs to action, and without them the mind would be in a state of torpor hardly consistent with rationality. Even in the hour of death, man's hopes and fears do not forsake him; the approbation of his own mind cherishes the most transporting hope of divine favour; as an evil conscience would awaken fear so intensely tormenting that nothing short of
hell could exceed it. These passions are in other respects beneficial. In prosperity we ought to fear, lest we should become high-minded; and in adversity hope is a good defence against trouble. Hope in adversity is favourable to happiness: fear in prosperity is friendly to virtue.

336. Hope with little or no fear has been called confidence, or security: a temper of mind, which it is unsafe to indulge, as it embitters disappointment, to which, in a world so changeable as this, we are always more or less liable. Sometimes, however, in cases of great difficulty and danger, this passion has animated men to extraordinary efforts, and proved successful, where timidity, or even prudent circumspection, would have had nothing to expect but disaster. But these are cases which in common life rarely occur. Even in war this sort of enthusiasm is at best but a desperate expedient: it may have gained victories, but it has also been productive of defeat. How much more respectable was Fabius Maximus in that caution which broke the power of Hannibal, than Pompey in that ostentatious confidence which preceded and partly occasioned his ignominious overthrow at Pharsalia!

337. Fear without any mixture of hope is despair; a passion, which it is misery to feel, and impiety to entertain. Despair implies inattention to the vicissitude of human affairs, which often, and sometimes rapidly, make a transition from ad-
verse to prosperous; and which, at any rate, are of so mixed a nature, that in the deepest gloom they are seldom without rays of comfort, and in the greatest brightness not entirely free from clouds of apprehension. It implies further, an audacious and most unwarrantable distrust of both the wisdom and the goodness of God; who never chastises but in order to reform, and who, if it is not our own fault, will undoubtedly make present evil terminate in future good. A meek and humble spirit is not in danger from this hideous passion. Despair arises from pride and hardness of heart, is generally preceded by long perseverance in evil habits, and frequently ends in phrensy and self-destruction.

338. How much then is it our interest, as well as duty, to cultivate benevolence and piety, humility and cheerfulness, temperance and patience! These are the sunshine of the mind; and as effectually exclude the demons of despair, as the radiance of the morning drives the birds of night to their abodes of darkness. Little hope, with a great mixture of fear, is termed despondence; which, as it enervates the soul, ought to be avoided; and may be, if we are moderate in our expectations and desires; not hasty to engage in what is likely to be very interesting; and always prepared to submit, without a murmur, to the will of Providence. Let hope be encouraged, but not to excess. When rational and moderate, it is an
excellent auxiliary in surmounting the difficulties of life; when in any degree extravagant, it leads to folly and misery.

339. Fear should not rise higher than to make us attentive and cautious: when it gains an ascendency in the mind, it becomes an insupportable tyranny, and renders life a burden. The object of fear is evil; and to be exempt from fear, or at least not enslaved to it, gives dignity to our nature, and invigorates all our faculties. Yet there are evils which we ought to fear. Those that arise from ourselves, or which it is in our power to prevent, it would be madness to despise, and audacity not to guard against. External evils, which we cannot prevent, or could not avoid without a breach of duty, it is manly and honourable to bear with fortitude. Insensibility to danger is not fortitude, no more than the incapacity of feeling pain can be called patience; and to expose ourselves unnecessarily to evil, is worse than folly, and very blameable presumption: it is commonly called fool-hardiness, that is, such a degree of hardiness or boldness as none but fools are capable of.

340. Courage and fortitude, though confounded in common language, are however distinguishable. Courage may be a virtue or a vice, according to circumstances; fortitude is always a virtue: we speak of desperate courage, but not of desperate fortitude. A contempt or neglect of danger without regard to consequences may be called courage;
and this some brutes have as well as we: in them it is the effect of natural instinct chiefly; in man it depends partly on habit, partly on strength of nerves, and partly on want of consideration. But fortitude is the virtue of a rational and considerate mind; it is indeed a virtue rather than a passion: and it is founded in a sense of honour and a regard to duty. There may be courage in fighting a duel, though that folly is more frequently the effect of cowardice; there may be courage in an act of piracy or robbery; but there can be no fortitude in perpetrating a crime. Fortitude implies a love of equity and of public good: for, as Plato and Cicero observe, courage exerted for a selfish purpose, or without a regard to justice, ought to be called audacity rather than fortitude.

341. This virtue takes different names, according as it acts in opposition to different sorts of evil: but some of those names are applied with considerable latitude. With respect to danger in general, fortitude may be termed intrepidity; with respect to the dangers of war, valour; with respect to pain of body or distress of mind, patience; with respect to labour, activity; with respect to injury, forbearance; with respect to our condition in general, magnanimity. Fear in war, or fear that hinders a man from doing what he ought to do, is cowardice; sudden fear without cause is panic; habitual fear is pusillanimity; fear of the labour that one ought to undergo is laziness. Fear with
surprise is terror; and violent fear with extreme detestation it horror. Those unaccountable fears too are called horrors, which sometimes arise in the imagination in sleep, or in certain diseases, and produce trembling, sweating, shivering, and other nervous symptoms.

342. Fortitude is very becoming in both sexes; but courage is not so suitable to the female character: for, in women, on ordinary occasions of danger, a certain degree of timidity is not unseemly, because it betokens gentleness of disposition. Yet from those of very high rank, from a queen or an empress, courage in emergencies of great public danger would be expected, and the want of it blamed. We should overlook the sex, and consider the duties of the station. In general, however, masculine boldness in a woman is disagreeable; the term virago conveys an offensive idea. The female warriors of antiquity, whether real or fabulous, Camilla, Thalestris, and the whole community of amazons, were unamiable personages. But female courage exerted in defence of a child, a husband, or a near relation, would be true fortitude, and deserve the highest encomiums.

343. The motives to fortitude are many and powerful. This virtue tends greatly to the happiness of the individual, by giving composure and presence of mind, and keeping the other passions in due subordination. To public good it is essential; for, without it, the independence and liberty
of nations would be impossible. It gives to a character that elevation, which poets, orators, and historians have in all ages vied with one another to celebrate. Nothing so effectually inspires it as rational piety. The fear of God is the best security against every other fear. A true estimate of human life; its shortness and uncertainty; the numberless evils and temptations, to which by a long continuance in this world we must unavoidably be exposed, ought by no means to discourage, or to throw any gloom on our future prospects; but should teach us, that many things are more formidable than death; and that nothing is lost, but much gained, when, by the appointment of Providence, a well-spent life is brought to a conclusion.

344. Let it be considered, too, that pusillanimity and fearfulness can never avail us anything: on the contrary, they debase our nature, poison all our comforts, and make us despicable in the eyes of others; they darken our reason, disconcert our schemes, enfeeble our efforts, extinguish our hopes, and add tenfold poignancy to all the evils of life. In battle, the brave soldier is in less danger than the coward; in less danger even of death and wounds, because better prepared to defend himself; in far less danger of infelicity; and has before him the animating hope of victory and honour: so, in life, the man of true fortitude is in less danger of disappointment than others are, because this under-
standing is clear, and his mind disencumbered; he is prepared to meet calamity, without the fear of sinking under it; and he has before him the near prospect of another life, in which they, who piously bear the evils of this, will obtain a glorious reward.

345. When our minds are greatly moved with the apprehension of approaching, but not certain, evil, the emotion is called anxiety, or solicitude, and generally gives more pain than the evil itself would give, if present and real. It is, therefore, very imprudent to give way to this passion, which will certainly do us harm, and probably can do us no good. Our Saviour himself prohibits it; 'Take no thought for to-morrow;' that is, (according to the sense in which the translators of the Bible, and other writers of their time, often used the word thought), be not anxious, or very solicitous, about to-morrow, 'sufficient to the day is the evil thereof.' There is great benignity in this, as in all the other precepts of our Divine Lawgiver: do not afflict yourselves with evil which is only imaginary, and, perhaps, may never be realised: it is enough that you have evils to bear when they are actually come upon you. Excessive anxiety, long indulged, becomes a disease worse than death. To guard against it, we have nothing to do, but to obey this short command: Trust in God, and hope the best.
346. *Suspicion* is a painful passion, nearly allied both to fear and to anxiety, yet different from both. We may fear, and may be anxious, without being suspicious of any body; because, the evil we apprehend may be such as our fellow-creatures can neither prevent nor bring upon us. Such is the anxiety and the fear occasioned by the illness of a friend. But, if we think the physician, from interested motives, unwilling to cure the disorder, suspicion arises in us, with respect to him. This passion, therefore, seems to have, for its object, some person who, we think, is likely to prevent our attaining, or possessing, good, or to bring upon us some dreaded evil. Suspicion, like fear, may have its use on many occasions, when it serves merely to put us on our guard, but, to be habitually inclined to it, makes a man malevolent, timorous, and odious. How different is Christian charity, which 'is not easily provoked, and thinketh no evil!'

347. The word *jealous* is sometimes used in a good sense; as when we say of a man, that he is jealous of his honour; which means, that he is solicitously cautious against dishonour. 'I am jealous over you with a godly jealousy,' says St. Paul to the Corinthians; that is, I am very vigilant to secure your spiritual welfare. In this acceptation, *jealous* is of similar import with *zealous*. *Jealousy*, taking the word in another sense, is the same nearly with *suspicion*, but is somewhat more limited in its use. The suspicion which one man
may entertain of another’s honesty, or credit, can hardly be called jealousy, this term being more commonly used to denote suspicion in love; as when a husband suspects his wife’s fidelity, or a wife her husband’s. This is a tormenting and furious passion, and has driven even generous minds into deeds of the most fatal extravagance. Often has it formed the subject of tragedy; but no other poet describes it so forcibly as Shakespeare, in his Othello.

348. Joy and sorrow. I mentioned these as a third pair of opposite passions derived from love and hatred. When the good we desired is actually obtained, our fear and hope, with respect to it, cease, and joy takes possession of the heart. When that evil, which was the object of our aversion, is really come upon us, the hopes and fears, to which it formerly gave rise, disappear, or are swallowed up, in sorrow. But, if there be danger of our losing the good we possess, or if there be a chance of our escape from the present evil, hope and fear will continue to unite themselves with joy in the one case, and with sorrow in the other. And, as all worldly enjoyment is uncertain, and unexpected deliverances from evil sometimes happen, a considerate mind, even when joy is predominant, will not be wholly exempt from fear; and, in the deepest affliction, a pious mind will not be without hope of deliverance, or at least of consolation. Joy and sorrow belong properly to the mind, pleasure and
pain to the body. There may be bodily pain without sorrow, as when a valiant soldier is wounded in gaining a victory for his country: there may be bodily pleasure where there is no joy, as in the case of a thirsty man drinking while he is in great anguish of mind: and every one knows, that there may be sorrow without pain of body, and joy without any positive bodily pleasure.

349. Moderate joy, in Latin *gaudium*, we may term *gladness*. The stoics allowed it, as already observed, to be not unworthy of a wise man, although, in general, they affected to be very unfriendly to the passions. Great joy, in Latin *laetitia*, the same philosophers condemned. Exultation, or extravagant joy, is, no doubt, unseemly, at least on ordinary occasions; for it betrays such levity and want of consideration as, though excusable in a child, we should not easily pardon in a man, especially in one who has any dignity of character to support. The appearance of excessive joy in a king or commander, on occasion of a victory, would be unbecoming, and seem to foretell an equal degree of unmanly dejection, in the event of a defeat.

350. I cannot however go so far, as the stoics did, in blaming every sort of violent *discomposure*, whether expressive of happiness or of affliction; for I think, that the strongest emotions are neither ungraceful, nor likely to give offence, when they discover an exquisite degree of moral sensibility. A
child, after long absence, springing to the embrace of a parent; a wife meeting her husband alive and well whom the moment before she believed to have perished by shipwreck; the man, who had been lame from his birth, entering the temple, on being miraculously cured by Peter, 'walking and 'leaping, and praising God.' These, with a thousand other instances of agreeable surprise that might easily be imagined, would give delight to the beholder, however extravagantly the passion might express itself. And in surprises of an opposite nature, and equally violent, the most immoderate sorrow would hardly be censurable.

351. Different degrees of joy are signified by the words gladness, mirth, exultation, rapture, ecstasy; and different degrees of sorrow by grief, trouble, anguish, misery. Mirth is accompanied with laughter, and exultation (as the name literally imports) with leaping and dancing. The joy that one feels on having overcome opposition has been called triumph; but this word is frequently so used as to convey an idea of insult, which is quite unworthy of a generous mind. 'Triumph not over thine enemy,' says an old adage; 'victory is sufficient.' Nothing does less honour to the national character of the Roman people than their triumphs. There might be policy in them; but policy that shocks humanity is not good. Rejoicing for victory may be allowed, and is natural, and indeed, by its influence in diffusing public spirit,
beneficial. But to expose to public view noble and royal prisoners in chains, in order to shew our power over them, is almost as barbarous as to laugh at a fallen enemy writhing in the agonies of death.

352. Savages are addicted to this sort of cruelty; and the Romans cannot be said to have emerged from the savage state, when this barbarous exhibition was first introduced among them by Romulus. Its continuance after they became civilized we may partly impute to fashion; which frequently betrays poor mortals into strange inconsistencies of conduct and sentiment. In their better days, the Romans were neither ill-natured nor ungenerous: yet, if we knew no more of their story than what relates to their triumphs and gladiators, we must have thought them brutal and bloody barbarians.

353. When gladness, or moderate joy, settles into a habit, or continues for a considerable time, it is called cheerfulness: and habitual sorrow is termed dejection, heaviness, melancholy. Cheerfulness is far preferable to mirth: the former is a habit, the latter a temporary act. Mirth is not always friendly to virtue, and when too frequently indulged, betrays an intemperate mind not a little tinctured with folly: cheerfulness is a great support as well as ornament to every virtue, and is consistent with dignity, and even with sanctity of character. Our mirth is liable to be succeeded by
dejection; our cheerfulness dispels melancholy both from ourselves and from others. A merry companion is often teasing, and sometimes intolerable: a cheerful friend is always welcome, and one of the greatest comforts of life. Mirth, says Addison, is like a flash of lightning that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment: cheerfulness keeps up a kind of sunshine in the soul, and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity. A cheerful man is master of himself, and enjoys a sound judgment and untroubled imagination: mirth, to a considerate mind, soon becomes oppressive; and, for a time, discomposes all its faculties.

354. There are persons who, from bodily infirmity, or a deficiency of animal spirits, cannot for any length of time be cheerful; but if their mind be suited to their condition, and their desires proportioned to what they possess, they have contentment; and that, when founded in a firm persuasion of the goodness and wisdom of Providence, creates a heaven upon earth. I know not whether contentment and cheerfulness ought not to be called virtues rather than passions, as they are not, when moderate, as the former always is, accompanied with bodily commotion. Yet, in the countenance, they display themselves very significantly: and he must be a superficial observer indeed, who cannot distinguish gay from gloomy features, and the placid smile of contentment from the surly
look of dissatisfaction. They who wish to be contented and cheerful must cultivate habits of benevolence, humility, and rational piety. Pride, malice, and superstition, disfigure the face with frowns, and harass the soul with endless vexation.

335. When we rejoice on account of the joy of others, or grieve because they are in trouble, it may be called sympathetic joy, or sorrow. The remarks formerly made on it need not be repeated. Joy, when softened by tender passions, as conjugal love, natural affection, gratitude, and the like, does sometimes express itself by two symptoms, which one would think inconsistent, a smiling countenance, and eyes full of tears. Homer ascribes them to Andromache on a particular occasion, δεκτφετ γαλακτια, when her husband Hector, going out to battle, puts his child in her arms, after having held him in his own, and solemnly invoked the blessing of heaven upon him. A face with this expression is one of the most interesting objects in nature. Painters have endeavoured to do justice to Homer's idea: indeed there cannot be a finer subject for painting. Many other emotions allied to joy are apt to express themselves in the same way; especially in those who have weak nerves, or very delicate minds. There are persons, who cannot, without tears, read sublime verses, or hear or speak of any extraordinary instance of generosity. The sensations that ac-
company such weeping are, if I may so speak, painful from excess of pleasure.

356. The satisfaction one feels in the approbation of one's own conscience may be called moral joy; and is of all human feelings the most delightful and permanent. An approving conscience is a counterbalance to all the evils of life, and supplies, even in the hour of death, the sweetest consolation. Without it there can be no happiness, and with it there can be no misery. As, on the other hand, moral sorrow, in all its forms of remorse, regret, and self-condemnation, unless alleviated by those hopes of pardon which the truly penitent are permitted and encouraged to entertain, is alone sufficient, even in the greatest worldly prosperity, to make life a burden. 'The spirit of a man will sustain his infirmity,' that is, may support the natural evils that flesh is heir to; 'but a wounded spirit who can bear?' A condemning conscience has often driven men to distraction; and sometimes made them confess crimes, which it was in their power to conceal, and which they knew would, when confessed, bring upon them capital punishment.

357. Shame is a passion which always accompanies moral sorrow. Some persons are, indeed, incapable of shame; but those, it is to be hoped, are few: for to say of a man, that he is impudent, or has lost the sense of shame, is a most severe censure, and seems to imply, that he has no con-
science, no fear of God, and no regard to man. The word *shame* has several significations, and is applied to several passions, similar perhaps in their nature, but not the same. Consciousness of reputation lost, or in danger of being lost, causes one sort of shame, which is also called *confusion of face*, and discovers itself by blushing, downcast eyes, and abject behaviour. We feel in some degree the same passion, when any thing dishonourable is unjustly charged upon us: only in this case our knowledge of our own innocence supports the mind, and yields great consolation; and the shame that may then remain proceeds from our apprehension that others, whose opinion we revere, may think hardly of us, from not having the means of being better informed.

358. Upon the bare mention of any thing indecent, though not imputed to any body, a person of delicacy is conscious of a passion or feeling, which has also been called shame, and discovers itself by the same symptom of blushing. This, as a sign of an uncorrupted mind, is a very amiable affection, and particularly becoming in young people; as the rudeness or impudence of those who give occasion to it is detestable. Profane talkers, lewd jesters, and they, who by speech or writing, present to the ear or to the eye of modesty any of the indecencies I allude to, are pests of society. Against the thief and the highwayman, we may, with the assistance of law, guard so as to be in no
great danger from them; but a shameless profli-
gate, by scrawling his execrable trash on the walls
or windows of an inn, may, to the young and
harmless, do lasting mischief, which it is impos-
sible to punish, and which, therefore, the law can-
not prevent. In this respect there is not, I have
been told, any other country so infamous as our
own. It is some comfort however to reflect, that
none but the vilest of the people are capable of
this enormity. Those specimens of it that I have
had the misfortune to see, appear, from the spell-
ing and other circumstances, to have been the
work of wretches who were equally destitute of
sense, delicacy, and literature.

359. There is another sort of shame, commonly
called bashfulness, which often gives great pain to
the young and unexperienced, when they appear
before strangers, or in the presence of their su-
periors, or have occasion to speak or act in public.
When this evil shame (as the French call it) is ex-
cessive, so as to make people act absurdly, or dis-
qualify them for doing their duty, it is very incon-
venient as well as awkward, and pains should be
taken to get the better of it; not all at once, how-
ever, nor in haste; for thus they might be driven
into the opposite and much worse extreme of im-
pudence; but by little and little. Young persons
of great sensibility are apt to be too much dis-
couraged in the consciousness of this infirmity;
but they have no occasion to be so: for, if they
are attentive and respectful to their company, bashfulness will not injure them in the opinion of the discerning; it will rather raise prepossessions in their favour.

360. Even when the season of youth is past, a slight degree of bashfulness is not at all ungraceful on particular occasions, especially in those public speakers who wish to gain upon their audience by the gentle arts of persuasion; because it betokens humility and respect. Homer, who discriminates human characters with the greatest accuracy, tells us, that this was one of the peculiarities that distinguished Ulysses as an orator; and the poet adds, that his eloquence was irresistible. Ovid attended to this circumstance, as appears from his account of the contest between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles. Ajax, who by the by lost his cause, begins with exclamation and blustering, suitable to his character; but nothing can be more modest or delicate than the attitude and exordium of Ulysses.* I mention this, because, in the hope that some of those who hear me may in time become public speakers, I would caution them against that air of confidence and self-sufficiency, which I have seen some preachers assume, and which is very offensive to a hearer of discernment and delicacy. I may add, that, as humility is one of the distinguishing virtues of a

* See Ovid. Metam. xiii, 124.
Christian, a gentle, unassuming, and modest deportment, especially in public, is indispensable in a clergyman. Among senators in debate, a more vehement animation takes place, and may sometimes be proper; yet the modest speaker never fails to interest the audience in his favour.

361. Anger and gratitude. These are the last pair of opposite passions which I mentioned as derived from hatred and love. The person, who is instrumental in bringing evil upon us, or otherwise offending us, raises our anger; which, Locke says, implies a present purpose of revenge, as well as a sense of injury. Revenge and anger do indeed too often go together; but surely there may be anger, as in an affectionate parent towards his child, without any purpose of revenge. The chastisement that may follow such anger is not vindictive; it aims at nothing but the good of the child; and to the good parent, whom duty compels to administer so harsh a remedy, it gives pain instead of pleasure. The person who is instrumental in doing us good, is the object of our gratitude; which is a very pleasing emotion: as anger is so much the reverse, that we often call it displeasure. Some people are so prone to anger, that one would almost think they delighted in it. But if this is really the case, there must be something unnatural in the disposition of their minds.

362. Every thing that hurts us is not the object of anger. We are not angry at the stone, which,
falling by accident from the top of a house, gives us a wound: but if we believed that a man occasioned its fall, we should be angry, either at his malice if he did it on purpose, or at his negligence if he took no pains to prevent it. A sudden fit of instinctive anger may, indeed, break out against an inanimate thing; as when we say bitter words to the bench that bruises our shin in the dark: but such anger is not rational; we immediately become ashamed of it; and were it to continue, it would make us ridiculous. An irrational animal, a horse that kicks, or a dog that without provocation bites us, may raise our anger, because we have some notion, though perhaps not well founded, that he might and ought to have let us alone; and the punishment we apply in such cases is neither blamed nor ridiculed; because the provocation was great; and because our blows may be effectual, by frightening the animal, in preventing such evil for the future.

363. Anger is generally made up of dislike and some degree of ill-will; but of such ill-will as does not always imply malevolence. Parents, as already observed, may be angry with those children whom they fondly love; and that anger is not only consistent with benevolence, but is even a proof of it. For if a parent were not angry when his child is guilty of transgression, we should say that he does not love his child so much as he ought to do. In like manner, we may be angry with a friend or
neighbour; that is, we may be offended at some injury he has done us, and wish something to happen to make him sensible of his fault, and prevent his doing the like for the future: and all the while we may be, and indeed ought to be, far from wishing him any real or lasting evil; but, on the contrary, ready to forgive him, desirous of reconciliation, and inclined to do him a favour when it is in our power.

364. Anger is called by Horace a short madness. When in any degree violent, it is truly so; for it deprives a man for a time of the use of his reason, occasions absurd and immoral conduct, and, if long continued, may terminate in real phrenzy. Anger that is both lasting and violent is termed rancour, or malignity, a passion which makes a man miserable and detestable. When anger is apt to rise on every trifling occasion, it is called peevishness; and renders one a torment to one's self, and a plague to others. Anger that breaks forth with violence, but is soon over, is termed passionateness; which, though not inconsistent either with good nature or with generosity, ought to be restrained, because it is extremely inconvenient to friends and dependents, and may hurry a man on to the perpetration of crimes. Anger that is cool, silent, and vindictive, is a much worse passion: it is indeed so bad, that nothing good is to be expected from him who is capable of it.

365. Anger was implanted in our constitution
for many valuable purposes, particularly for self-defence. Had we nothing irascible in us, there would be no end of injuries and indignities; but our knowledge of the nature and effects of anger makes us unwilling to provoke it: and thus men stand in awe of one another, which greatly contributes to the peace of society. If an injury be accompanied with circumstances of peculiar baseness or meanness, our anger is termed indignation. When anger exceeds the bounds of self-defence, and contrives to bring real harm upon others, without any view to their good, or to that of the community, it becomes revenge, or vengeance: which, if generally practised, would introduce endless confusion.

366. For we are apt to think the injury we have just now received greater than it really is; and, therefore, if we were to retaliate immediately by word or deed, we should hardly fail to go beyond the due bounds, and so become injurious in our turn; which would call for new revenge from the opposite party; and that, being no doubt equally outrageous, would provoke to further vengeance, so that the evil would be incurable. Accordingly, revenge is forbidden by the laws both of God and of man. Savages, who enjoy not the protection of law, are their own avengers: whence they become addicted to this dreadful passion; and their vengeance is always excessive. One is not a competent judge in one's own cause: and, therefore,
in regular society, persons of impartiality and considerable learning are appointed judges, to punish according to the exact amount of the transgression, and give the injured party reasonable redress, and no more.

367. When civilized nations go to war, or individuals go to law with one another, the principle of their conduct ought to be, not revenge, but a regard to public good; which, in order to discourage injury, and defend our violated or endangered rights, compels us to have recourse to violent measures, that are justifiable only from the necessity of the case. To go to law to plague a neighbour, or, in order to obtain reparation for a petty trespass that does neither us nor the public any material injury, has in it more of malice than of love to justice. In war, to kill unnecessarily, or with a view to gratify private malevolence, is nothing less than murder; and is indeed disowned by the opinions and practice of all enlightened nations. While the enemy attacks or resists, it is lawful, because necessary, to repel force by force: when he submits, he is entitled to mercy, and even to the generosity of the conqueror. 'Cowards are cruel, but the brave love mercy, and delight to save.'

368. There are many occasions, on which anger is not to be blamed; there are many, on which it is praiseworthy. The Scripture intimates, that we may be angry without sin: nay, our Saviour.
himself once looked round with anger on the Jews, 
‘being grieved for the hardness of their hearts.’
Aristotle has very perspicuously, though with great brevity, marked the boundaries within which this passion may innocently operate, and so as to deserve praise, instead of blame. ‘Ο μεν εν ιφ’ αἰς δεὶ, 

Αὐτὶς δεὶ αὐξησμενος, ἡτὶ ἤ ὡς δεὶ, ἢ ὅτε, ἢ ὅταν χρονον, ἵππειται.* He who is angry only on such occasions as he ought, and with such persons as he ought, and in such manner, and at such time, and for such length of time, as he ought, is actuated by a laudable anger. I shall make a few remarks on the several parts of this aphorism.

369. First, anger is laudable, when the occasion is such as renders it, in some degree, our duty: and that happens, when not to be angry would discover on our part a want of moral sensibility, or might prove an encouragement to wickedness in others. Parents overlooking a child’s transgression, or being equally indulgent to him when he is, and when he is not, in a fault, would shew a very blameable indifference: they could hardly take a more effectual way to corrupt his mind. A woman listening, without extreme indignation, to a licentious proposal from a man, would undoubtedl give him reason to think that she did not disapprove of it. To speak without emotion of any shocking instance of cruelty, ingratitude, injustice,

* Ethic. ad Nic. iv, 5.
blasphemy, or any other impiety, would make us suspect the speaker, not only of insensibility, but of a total want of principle. In cases of this nature, anger, under certain limitations, is a virtue, and the want of it a vice.

370. With respect to indignities offered to ourselves, though we ought always to exercise forbearance, and be ready to forgive; yet if, on receiving a very gross and public insult, we were to shew no resentment, the world would blame our meanness of spirit, and think us not very fit to be entrusted with the important concerns of another, when we shewed so little attention to our own. Peculiar circumstances, however, and the dignity of certain characters, might make great alteration in a matter of this kind. When, at the trial of Charles I, one of the by-standers spat in the king's face, and he, without speaking, or even looking at the traitor, calmly wiped his cheek with a handkerchief, he manifested a greatness of soul that had in it something more than heroic, and almost more than human. But what words can express our detestation of the ruffian who could perpetrate such a deed?

371. Anger is laudable, secondly, when a man is angry with such persons as he ought. The persons with whom we may reasonably be angry have been, most of them, specified already. Those towards whom we ought to exercise particular lenity and forbearance, are, first, our benefactors and
friends, who may happen, in an unguarded moment, through the weakness of human nature, to give us offence. Secondly, men eminently good, or whom we know to be good. Great reverence is due to good men; and if we only hint to them, in the gentlest terms, that they have without design done us injury, it will wound them as deeply as they ought to be wounded; they will readily make acknowledgments; and further reproach from us would be cruel. Thirdly, they who are liable to be too much disheartened by our anger, as dependents, affectionate children, persons in adversity, or of delicate health and spirits, or weak in understanding, are all entitled to peculiar tenderness; being all objects of pity, and not likely to offend, except through inadvertence. And, fourthly, those whom our anger would probably irritate, or to whom it could not do any good, we ought to bear with, or let alone, for our own sakes, as well as for theirs.*

372. I need not add, that to be angry with our Creator is, of all passions, the most shocking, unnatural, and inexcusable; insomuch that you may, perhaps, think the human heart, bad as it is, incapable of such impiety. But are not they guilty of it, who repine at Providence, either for bringing on them adversity which they may fancy they do not deserve, or for making their neighbour

* See Archbishop Secker's Sermons, vol. v.
prosperous beyond what they may think him entitled to? All such murmurings, envyings, and discontents, however common, and however disguised, are so many instances of anger, if not of hatred, towards both God and man. This ought to be seriously considered. Contentment with our lot, joy in our neighbour's prosperity, and resignation to the divine will, diffuse ineffable tranquillity over the soul, prevent the intrusion of anger, and every other painful passion, keep us at peace with all the world, and make us rejoice in God and in all his dispensations.

373. Thirdly, anger is laudable, when the manner of it is consistent with propriety and duty. It appears from what has been said, that our anger may be in too slight a degree; as, when it sets before others an example of blameable indifference, or tends to repress, and consequently to weaken, our moral sensibility. But excess of anger is the more common and more dangerous extreme: and it is hardly possible, and perhaps would not be expedient, to fix the boundary to which anger, consistently with innocence, may go. If this were ascertained, and people taught that they might safely proceed so far, they would think they might proceed a little and a little further, till at last they might lose all remembrance of the boundary. For he who ventures to the utmost verge of innocence seldom fails to go beyond it: there is criminal presumption in venturing so far. Two rules, how-
ever, may be given on this head: the first, that our anger should never make us lose the government of ourselves; the second, that it should never do injury to others.

374. Anger, thus moderated, will not produce in us any commotion so violent as to hurt our health, or our character as men of prudence; nor will it break out in boisterous, or insulting language, far less in that impious and barbarous practice of cursing and swearing. To whatever degree we may be irritated, we shall do well neither to speak nor to act, while our agitation is such as to prevent calm reflection. It is said of Socrates, that, when greatly provoked, he became instantly silent; and, I suppose, he never had occasion to repent of his silence. And I have heard it recommended as a good rule, that, before a man give way to his passion, he should take time to do something else that is not connected with it, and, if possible, retire for a moment, if it were only to recollect some passage of a favourite author, or even to repeat the letters of the alphabet. A little delay may do good, and forbearance and mildness can never do harm.

375. Fourthly, anger is laudable, when it is well-timed. Now it is not well-timed, when it interferes with the performance of any important duty: to pray, or go to church, in anger, would be very indecent. Nor is anger well-timed, when we have not had the means of knowing, whether
any real offence has been given, or what is the true amount of the offence: mistakes of this nature are not uncommon; men are often offended without cause, and generally more than they ought to be. Anger is also unseasonable, when it is likely to give pain, or shew disrespect to our company; or when it is directed against a man whose present temper of mind makes him, from an excess of levity, or from any other intemperance, deaf to reason, or in a condition of being easily exasperated. Such infirmities we all have; and, as we all wish allowances to be made for them in ourselves, we all ought to make the like allowances in favour of others.

376. Fifthly, anger is not blamed when it continues no longer than is reasonable. Lasting resentment is inexcusable, whatever the provocation may have been. It sours the temper, and so makes a man unfit for society, and unhappy in himself; it excludes from his mind benevolent and pious thoughts; it cherishes pride, envy, contempt, and other violent and gloomy perturbations. 'Let not the sun go down on your wrath,' is an excellent rule: but, for the most part, anger is censurable if it last an hour, or even a much shorter space. The moment the offender owns his fault, or seems desirous of reconciliation, our anger ought to be lost in forgiveness. Though he should not own his fault, nor give reason to believe that there is any change in his mind for the better, we
shall do well to check our anger; or, if it be prudent to keep up an appearance of it, to take care that it be an appearance only: for, because he is injurious, it does not follow that we ought to make ourselves unhappy; which we shall certainly do, if we suffer this tormenting passion to take and to keep possession of us.

377. Let those who are prone to anger abstain at least from every outward expression of it, from reproachful words and vindictive deeds, and conceal it carefully within their own breast. In this way they may in time get the command of it; for most passions thus restrained become weaker. Let them resolve that they will abstain from anger for a day, for two days, for a week, for a month; and, if they adhere to the resolution, they will soon congratulate themselves on the happy consequences. Let them, as much as possible, keep aloof from vexatious business, and from quarrelsome and litigious men; and avoid not only those altercations which may lead to anger, but disputes in general, and all that sort of reading which is termed controversial. Let them never for a moment imagine, as passionate men are apt to do, that their anger is incurable. They can manage it sometimes for the sake of interest: let them learn to manage it for God's sake, and for the sake of their fellow creatures and themselves.

378. Gratitude was mentioned as the passion that seems to stand in opposition to anger. We
naturally love a man, because he is of the same condition with ourselves; we have good-will towards him, because he stands in need of our aid, and may be profited by it; we love him yet more, if we know him to be of a mild disposition, and more still when he proves himself a friend to mankind, by acts of beneficence: but if we ourselves are the objects of that beneficence, our good-will towards him, and our delight in him, ought to be very strong. When we thus contemplate our benefactor, not only with sentiments of complacency and benevolence, but also with a disposition to requite his favours, this mixture of pleasurable emotions is termed gratitude. The reverse is ingratitude; which, if it cannot be called a passion, because it occasions little commotion in the corporeal part of our nature, is however a vice of such enormity, that the most profligate man would be ashamed to acknowledge himself guilty of it.

379. Si ingratum dixeris, omnia dixeris, says the Latin maxim: if you call a man ungrateful, you have called him every thing that is base; you need say nothing more. The ungrateful man is an enemy to the human race; for his conduct tends to discourage beneficence: and he is unfit for society, and unworthy of it, because his indifference or hatred towards his benefactor proves him to be hard-hearted and unjust. There are two forms of this vile disposition; one, when a man neglects to requite a favour when the requital is in his power;
the other, when he returns evil for good. The last is no doubt the worst; but both are so bad that they are called by the same name; it being difficult to find in language an epithet of more re-proachful import than ungrateful. Gratitude is a gentle affection, and makes no great commotion in the animal economy; yet is an active principle, and often displays itself visibly in the countenance, by raising the complexion, brightening the eyes, and sometimes filling them with tears. An eye that weeps with gratitude has a particular splendour and earnestness in the expression.

880. Gratitude towards things irrational, or even inanimate, (if the term gratitude may be used in such a connection), is not the object of censure or ridicule; for every emotion that resembles this amiable virtue betokens a goodness of nature, which the passions allied to anger frequently do not. The plank that brought the mariner on shore from a shipwreck, we should not blame him for taking particular care of, refusing to part with for any pecuniary consideration, and even sheltering from the injuries of the weather: we might smile at the circumstance; but it would be a smile, not of scorn, but of kindness. Dogs and horses have been instrumental in saving mens' lives. Particular goodwill towards such a dog, or such a horse, would be laudable; and to shoot the one for running down a sheep, or to harass with toil the old age of the other, would be cruel, and without any violent figure of
speech might even be termed ingratitude. However, what is properly, and without a figure, called gratitude (and the same thing is true of anger), has for its object a being that acts, or seems to act, with some degree of intention. We are grateful, not to the medicine, but to the physician, that cures us; and angry, not at the knife which wounds, but with the person who intentionally or negligently wielded it. Gratitude is due to every benefactor, and ought to be ardent in proportion to the magnitude of the favour, and the benevolence of those who confer it. Persons of small ability confer great favours, when what they do proceeds from a high degree of good-will: by him, who saw the generosity of the giver, the widow's mite was accounted a great sum.

881. To the Supreme Being, who freely gives us life, and every other good thing, our highest gratitude is due, and should be continually offered up in silent thanksgiving, and often expressed in words, that it may have the more powerful effect on our own minds, and on those whose devotion we wish to direct or to animate. Parents are in the next degree our benefactors, at least in ordinary cases: for to an attentive and affectionate parent, who must have done so much for us when we could do nothing for ourselves, and watched so long and so anxiously, and so frequently and fervently prayed, for our welfare, we are more indebted than to any other fellow-creature. A
stranger who relieves us, though he never saw us before and may never see us again, is also entitled to peculiar acknowledgments of gratitude, on account of the disinterestedness of his virtue. But we must not think ourselves exempted from the obligation of this great duty, even when our benefactor is a person on whom we may have conferred many favours. A parent ought with thankfulness to receive what a dutiful child offers for his relief. 'This is nothing more than I was well entitled to,' would be an improper speech on such an occasion. It would intimate, that the parent, in taking care of his child, had been actuated, as much at least by the hope of recompence, as by natural affection and a sense of duty.

SECTION VI.

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Passions and Affections.

382. I have now given a brief account of some of our more remarkable passions, but have not gone through the subject, and could easily have proceeded further, if there had been time for it. Hints have been occasionally thrown in, with respect to the government of particular passions: I subjoin some brief remarks of a more general nature.—
The government of the passions is a difficult work; but absolutely necessary, if we wish to be happy either in the next world, or in this. And as it is the more difficult the longer it is delayed, it is the part of prudence, as well as matter of duty, to begin it without delay. The difficulty of this duty may appear from the concurreing testimony of wise men in every age; from the earnestness with which all moralists, particularly the inspired writers, recommend it; from what we may feel in ourselves of the unmanageableness of our passions, especially of those to which we are most inclined by nature or by habit; and from what we must have observed in the world around us, where we see men of good understanding, in other respects, enslaved to criminal inclinations, and led on to ruin, with their eyes open, by the strength of prevailing appetites.

383. Temperance, and an active life, are of the greatest benefit in preserving the health of both the body and the mind; and in giving us at all times the command of our thoughts, and consequently of our passions. Savages are much addicted to intemperance and idleness; and their passions are proportionably outrageous. As the passions depend in a great measure upon the imagination, whatever tends to regulate that faculty tends also to make them regular. And imagination is kept regular by cultivating habits of industry and soberness, piety and humility, and by cherishing the
love of nature, simplicity, and truth. The passions also depend in part on the bodily constitution, and in some men are naturally stronger than in others. But every man may govern his passions, if he will take the necessary pains. The more the body is pampered, the greater strength will every evil passion acquire: and therefore a hardy, as well as busy, life tends to keep them manageable. Intemperance puts us off our guard, and disqualifies us for that strict self-government, which is at all times incumbent on us as moral and accountable beings. A very slight degree of it has this effect.

384. The regulation of the passions ought to begin as early in life as possible. Then indeed they are strong, but then the mind is docile, and has not contracted many evil habits. They, therefore, who have the care of children should be very attentive to their passions and opinions, as soon as these begin to appear; rectifying the latter if erroneous, and of the former repressing such as seem to partake of malice, pride, vanity, envy, or suspicion. The benevolent and pious affections cannot be indulged too much; and joy, hope, and fear, are useful when moderate, and properly directed. As a restraint on the passions of childhood, a sense of honour and shame, if cherished from the beginning, will be found to have better effects than bodily punishment; which ought never to be had recourse to, till all other means have been tried and
found ineffectual. But nothing in a teacher or parent has more salutary consequences, than to set a good example, of candour, moderation, good nature, humanity, and modesty. 'Let no visible or audible impurity,' says Juvenal, 'enter the apartment of a child; for to children the greatest reverence is due.' See his fourteenth satire; in which are many excellent remarks to the same purpose. It is pity that author was in this respect so very inattentive to his own precepts.

385. Let no evil passion impose on us by assuming a false name; for this often happens, and is often fatal to virtue. Men are apt to mistake their own avarice for frugality, profusion for generosity, suspicion for cautious discernment, pride for magnanimity, ostentation for liberality, detraction for the love of truth, insolence for plain dealing, revenge for resentment, envy for emulation, and sensuality for necessary amusement. We must carefully guard against these and the like errors, by studying our own character with impartiality, and attending to what is said of us, not only by our friends, but also by our enemies, and by the world in general. For though our faults and infirmities are sometimes magnified by malicious misrepresentation, it does not often happen, that a man is universally blamed for a fault from which he is altogether free.

386. Even from lawful gratifications we should accustom ourselves frequently to abstain; for we
ought always to have our passions and appetites in our power, remembering that the present is a life of trial, and was never intended for a state of complete happiness. Nor will this abstinence take away from our sum of worldly enjoyment; on the contrary, it will add to it. As temperance, and even fasting sometimes, may not only contribute to health, but also by quickening appetite increase the pleasure of eating and drinking, so it is with our other appetites. Continual indulgence makes them unruly, and less sensible to pleasure; abstinence quickens them, and keeps them manageable.

387. Restrain needless curiosity; nor inquire into that business or those sentiments of other men in which you have no concern; nor puzzle yourselves with intricate and unprofitable speculation. There is in some people a restless and captious spirit, which is perpetually finding fault, and proposing schemes, and contriving arguments for the support of paradox, and meddling with matters that are not within their sphere. Hence arise anxiety, vexation, disappointment, misanthropy, scepticism, and many passions both unruly and unnatural, which we may easily avoid, if we take the apostle's advice, and 'study to be quiet, and to mind our own business.'

388. Avoid all companies, all books, and all opportunities of action, by which you may have reason to apprehend that irregular passions may be raised
or encouraged. How much good manners may be corrupted by evil communications, the sad experience of every age, I had almost said of every man, can abundantly testify. The world judges of men from the company they keep; and it is right that it should be so. No man will choose for his companion the person whom he either despises or disapproves. He therefore who associates with the wicked and the foolish gives proof of his own wickedness and folly. We may be the better, as long as we live, for having conversed one hour with a wise and good man; and the same time spent with those of an opposite character may give our virtue an incurable wound.

389. Consider all those books as dangerous, by which criminal passions may be inflamed, or good principles subverted; and I again warn you to avoid them as you would the pestilence. To take pleasure in such things is a mark of as great corruption of mind, and ought to be accounted as dishonourable, as to keep company with pickpockets, gamblers, and atheists. Study the evidence of your religion, so as to be able to give a reason to those who may have a right to question you concerning your faith; and steadily, though calmly, defend your principles, if you should have the misfortune to fall into the company of those who controvert them; but do not rashly engage in this sort of altercation; nor choose for your friend or companion the man who takes pleasure
in the books of infidelity. Such a man you will hardly convert by reasoning, as his unbelief is founded, not in reason, but in prejudice; and you need not expect to receive from him much useful information in these matters, as you will find, (at least I have always found), that he has attended to one side only of the question.

390. Games of chance, where money is the object, are dangerous in the extreme. They cherish evil passions without number; as avarice, anger, selfishness, discontent; and give rise to altercation and quarrelling, and sometimes, as I am well informed, to the most shocking impiety; they occasion, as long as they continue, a total loss of time, and of all the rational pleasures of social life: they are generally detrimental to health, by keeping the body inactive, and encroaching on the hours of rest: they produce a feverish agitation of the spirits, as hurtful to the mind, as habitual dram-drinking would be to the body: they level all distinctions of sense and folly, vice and virtue; and bring together, on the same footing, men and women of decent and of the most abandoned manners. Persons who take pleasure in play seldom fail to become immoderately attached to it; and neglect of business, and the ruin of fortune, family, and reputation, are too frequently the consequence. Savages are addicted to gaming; and, in this respect, whatever difference there may be in the dress, or colour of the skin, the characters of the gentleman
gambler and gambling savage are not only similar, but the same. The savage at play will lose his wife, and children, and personal liberty; the other will throw away, in the same manner, what should support his wife and children, and keep himself out of a jail; and it is well if he stop short of self-murder. Is it possible to keep at too great distance from such enormities? and can the man, who once engages in this dreadful business, say when he will stop, or how far he may go? LET NO SUCH MAN BE TRUSTED.

391. Our thoughts, as well as the real occurrences of life, may draw forth our passions; and one may work one's mind into a ferment of anger, or some other violent discomposure, without having been exposed to any temptation, and merely by ruminating on certain objects. When we find this to be the case, let us instantly give a new, and if possible an opposite, direction to the current of our thoughts. If any evil passion get hold of us, and will not yield to reason, if, for example, we be very angry with an injurious neighbour, let us cease to think of him, and employ ourselves in some other interesting and more agreeable recollection; let us call to mind some happy incident of our past life; let us think of our Creator, and of his goodness to mankind, and to us in particular; let us meditate on the importance of our present conduct, and of that tremendous futurity which is before us: or, if we be not at this particular
time well prepared for serious thought, let us apply to some book of harmless amusement, or join in some entertaining conversation: and thus we shall get rid of the passion that haunts us, and forget both its object and its cause.

SECTION VII.

Of the Passions, as they display themselves in the Look and Gesture.

392. Passions being commotions of the body as well as of the mind, it is no wonder that they should display themselves in the looks and behaviour. If they did not, our intercourse with one another would be much more difficult and dangerous than it is; because we could not so readily discover the characters of men, or what is passing in their minds. But the outward expression of the passions is a sort of universal language; not very extensive indeed, but sufficiently so to give us information of many things which it concerns us to know, and which otherwise we could not have known. When a man is even at pains to conceal his emotions, his eyes, features, complexion, and voice, will discover them to a discerning observer; and when he is at no pains to hide or disguise what he feels, the outward indications will be so
significant, that hardly any person can mistake their meaning: his anger, for example, though he should not utter a word, will contract his brows, flash in his eyes, make his lips quiver, and give irregular motions to his limbs. Sallust says of Catiline, that his eyes had a disagreeable glare, that his complexion was pale, his walk sometimes quick and sometimes slow, and that his general appearance betokened a discomposure of mind approaching to insanity.

393. It must be remarked here, that all are not equally quicksighted in discerning the inward emotion by means of the outward sign. Some have great acuteness in this respect, some very little; which may in part be owing to habits of attention or inattention. If there be men, as I believe there are, who study almost every countenance that comes in their way, whether of man or of beast, and if there be others who seldom mind things of that nature, it is reasonable to suppose that the former will have more of this acuteness than the latter. The talent I speak of is sometimes called skill in physiognomy, or physiognomony; which last form of the word is more suitable to its Greek original. Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers, wrote of it; and there were in ancient times persons whose profession it was to judge of the character from the outward appearance. One of these, having seen Socrates, without knowing who he was, pronounced him to be a very bad man, and enslaved to
some of the worst passions in human nature. This was reported to Socrates, as a proof of the presumption and folly of the physiognomist. But Socrates told them, that the man had discovered uncommon penetration; for that he was by nature subject to all those passions, though with the aid of reason and philosophy he had now got the better of them.

394. I remark, secondly, That as all human minds are not equally susceptible of warm emotion, so all human bodies are not equally liable to receive impressions from the mind. There is an awkwardness in the gestures of some people, and a want of meaning in their faces, which make the outward appearance pretty much the same at all times, unless they be under great agitation. This may be in part constitutional, and partly the effect of habit. That uniformity of feature which the stoics affected, and in which they supposed the dignity of man in a great measure to consist, was no doubt in many of them assumed and artificial. But when we see the looks of one child continually varying as his thoughts vary, and those of another rarely undergoing any sensible change, we must impute this diversity to constitution, as we cannot suppose there is art or affectation in the case. In the countenance of Garrick there was more variety of expression than I ever saw in any other. This, after he became a player, he studied and practised with extraordinary application: but the same thing
was observable in him from his earliest years, as I have been assured by those who knew him when a boy.

395. I remark, thirdly, that all states of society do not allow equal scope to the outward and visible display of the passions. People in civilized life, from the awe in which they stand of the fashion, and of one another, are at pains to curb, or, at least, to hide, their more violent emotions: whereas, among savages, and persons little acquainted with decorum, there is hardly any restraint of this sort. Hence the intercourse of the latter is always more boisterous than that of the former, whether the conversation lead to joy or sorrow, merriment or anger; and their countenances are more deeply impressed with the traces of their predominant passions. Artists, too, as I have elsewhere remarked, who employ themselves in the nicer parts of mechanics, have, generally, a fixedness of feature suited to the earnest attention which they are obliged to bestow on their work: while those who can ply their trade, and amuse themselves at the same time with discourse, have, for the most part, smoother faces, and features less significant.

396. Though there are many, who, from inattention, or other causes, are not acute in discerning human characters; yet, almost every man is, to a certain degree, a physiognomist. Every one can distinguish an angry from a placid, a cheerful from a melancholy, a thoughtful from a thought-
less, and a dull from a penetrating, countenance. Children are capable of this; and soon learn to fear the frowns, and take encouragement from the smiles, of the nurse; to participate in her joys or sorrows, when they see the outward signs of those emotions; and to stand more in awe of an acute than of a listless observer. The faces of the more sagacious brutes are not without expression. A Gurst cur and a well-natured dog, a high-mettled and a spiritless horse, are known by their countenance and carriage; and one might perceive intuitively, that wolves, foxes, polecats, and bulldogs, are dangerous animals; and that from asses, sheep, calves, lambs, and kids, one has nothing to fear. He who acknowledges these facts, and has observed what varieties of expression may be displayed in pictures and statues, will admit, that physiognomy is a sort of science, and not destitute of truth; and that by a careful observer considerable progress may be made in it.

397. But observe, that it is not from the countenance alone that physiognomists form their opinions. They must hear a man speak, and see him move, and act, and smile; they must be acquainted with his general carriage, before they can decide upon his character. Painters have observed, that the position of the head is particularly expressive. Humility and sorrow appear in its hanging down; arrogance, in lifting it up, and tossing it back; some of the gentler affections, in its inclining to
one side; and steadiness, in its rising erect between the shoulders. Love, hatred, joy, grief, entreaty, threatening, mildness, as well as admiration, anger, and scorn, have visible effects on the attitudes of the head. The hands too, which it is difficult to move gracefully, and which those who have not been accustomed to elegant society ought to move but seldom, and with caution; the hands, I say, by their motions and gestures, express various states of the mind, as admiration, hope, consent, refusal, fear, entreaty, and many others. But to describe those motions with accuracy is hardly possible; and, in a matter of this kind, inaccurate rules are worse than no rules at all, as they lead to affectation, and, consequently, to ungracefulness.

398. Some people shew their characters more slowly than others. With one, you think yourself acquainted at first sight; of another, after long trial, you can make nothing, and, if he is very cautious, he may elude your acutest observation for years. Hence let the physiognomist learn to be rather slow than hasty in forming a judgment. Let him be on his guard, though appearances are favourable; and let charity incline him to moderation, even when he may think he has certainly detected a dangerous, or disagreeable associate. We are often dissatisfied with a man at his first appearance, whom we afterwards find worthy of high esteem. In short, physiognomy is, in most
cases, a conjectural science, and must not be implicitly trusted; for objections may be found to almost every one of its principles. Marshal Turenne, the greatest commander, and one of the best men of his time, had so unpromising a look, that when meanly dressed, as he often was, strangers were apt to mistake him for a simpleton. The same thing is recorded of another illustrious commander, Philopæmen: and our Charles II, though a man of great pleasantry and good nature, had a stern and forbidding countenance.

399. Though I have long been studious of physiognomy, and sometimes flattered myself that I had skill in it, I dare not venture to treat of it in any other way, than by offering a few slight observations; well knowing, that on such a subject people are apt to run into wild theories more likely to mislead than to inform. The opinions of Aristotle, and other old writers, have been collected by Joannes Baptista Porta; whose book, though formerly in some esteem, will give little satisfaction to the unbiassed and inquisitive observer. He, and some others, have amused themselves with fancying likenesses between the faces of men and of brutes, and assigning that character to the man which predominates in the beast he resembles. They have also, from the proportions of particular parts of a human body, drawn conclusions with respect to the virtues or vices of the soul with which it is animated. And some would estimate
the powers of a man's understanding by the shape of his skull, and the outline of his brow and nose. I have neither time nor inclination to enter into these inquiries; though I will not take it upon me to say, that they are wholly without foundation.

400. Of all the physiognomists I know, ancient or modern, the most eminent is John Gaspard Lavater, a clergyman of Zurich, in Switzerland. He has published two or three magnificent volumes, and adorned them with many curious drawings. The work has noble strains of eloquence, and proves the author to be a man of great piety and goodness of heart; and many of his remarks on the human, and other figures, which he presents to his reader, are such as, I think, no person of observation can refuse to acquiesce in. But he is frequently whimsical, and in affirmation too positive. His style, though beautiful in particular passages, is, upon the whole, diffuse, incoherent, and declamatory, to such a degree, that, I believe, it would be a difficult matter to digest his notions into a system. Some persons in his neighbourhood having been poisoned with the wine in the Eucharist, Lavater, supposing it had been done intentionally, preached a sermon with extraordinary vehemence; in which was this remarkable saying, which I mention, to shew his confidence in his art: 'I would not advise the perpetrator of this horrid deed to come in my way; for I shall cer-
'tainly know him by his look, if ever I set my 'eyes upon him.' Lavater is a man of genius and penetration, and a good deal of entertainment may be found in his book. But I am afraid it will not teach sagacity to those on whom nature has not bestowed that talent; nor form to habits of minute attention those who are habitually inattentive. And if it should encourage the unskilful to form rash judgments, there is reason to apprehend that it may do more harm than good. I shall not attempt to give a more particular account of it; for that would lead me too far from my present purpose.

401. Every body knows, that virtuous and innocent affections give an agreeable expression to the countenance, and criminal passions the contrary. Anger, discontent, despair, disfigure the features, distort the limbs, and give dissonance to the voice; while good humour, contentment, hope, joy, benevolence, have a pleasing effect in setting off the body to advantage. Emotions that are innocent, and at the same time, in some degree, painful, as pity and rational sorrow, discompose the features; but such discomposure, far from being unseemly, may be even captivating: beauty in tears has been found irresistible. When a passion becomes habitual, it is reasonable to suppose, that those muscles of the brows, eyes, nostrils, cheeks, and mouth, over which it has influence, will, by acting continually in the same way, produce traces
in the countenance, and fix upon it a visible character. This appears even in early life: a peevish or good-humoured, a cheerful or melancholy, boy, soon contracts what we call a peevish or good-humoured, a cheerful or melancholy, look. And, if these dispositions continue to predominate in him, the lines produced by them in the several parts of the face, will, in time, become as permanent as those which are seen in the palm of the hand. What it may be, which connects certain emotions of the soul with certain configurations of the muscles of the face, and certain attitudes of the head and limbs, I cannot determine; Des Cartes, and others, have inquired into this matter, but without success; and, till the union of the soul and body be understood, this will, probably, remain a mystery impenetrable to man.

402. In order to form some idea of the expression of the countenance, we are desired to suppose four parallel lines to be drawn across it; one in the direction of the eyebrows, another in that of the eyes, a third in that of the lower part of the nose, and a fourth in that of the mouth. It is not meant that these must be right lines, or parallel in the geometrical sense of the word; they are only supposed to have the same direction nearly, and to extend from the one side of the face to the other. While they remain parallel and with little or no incurvation upwards or down
wards, the countenance will indicate tranquillity, that is, a composed state of mind without emotion. If they seem depressed in the middle of the face, and elevated towards the sides of it, the expression will incline to cheerfulness; if raised in the middle and depressed towards the sides, the effect will be contrary, and convey an idea of melancholy, or, at least, of sedateness. I do not say, that this holds invariably; I mean, that it is so for the most part: and every thing must be understood to be thus limited that relates to the present subject.

408. The raising of the line of the mouth at the two extremities is so well known to express cheerfulness, that unskilful painters, in order to give that meaning to their portraits, turn up the corners of the mouth, even when the rest of the countenance betokens composure, as the features of those who sit for their picture commonly do. But this contrivance produces a smirk, or affected grin, rather than a smile, because the rest of the face is not conformable to it. When the lines above mentioned, especially that of the eyebrows (the most expressive of them all) are twisted, or irregularly bent, it generally intimates discomposure of mind, and, when much twisted, violent discomposure. There is expression too, as everybody knows, in the colour of certain features. A bright and sparkling eye, and increased ruddiness in the cheeks and lips, accompany keen emotions,
as languid eyes and pale lips and cheeks betoken the contrary.

404. Admiration, as formerly observed, elevates the eyebrows, opens the mouth and eyes, fixes the attention upon the admired object, raises the hands, and spreads the fingers: astonishment opens the mouth and eyes still wider, and gives a greater and more irregular elevation to the brows. If to astonishment fear be added, both rows of the teeth will appear, and those ends of the eyebrows which are next the nose will be much wrinkled, and drawn downward so as to hide the upper eyelid. Esteem composes the countenance, elevates the pupils of the eyes, draws the eyebrows down towards the nose, contracts the nostrils, opens the mouth a little, and gently depresses the corners of it. Veneration sometimes assumes the same appearances a little heightened, elevating the pupil of the eye till it almost disappear under the eyelid; and sometimes shuts the mouth and eyes, inclining the face towards the ground, and spreading the hand upon the breast.

405. Contempt elevates and draws back the head, wrinkles and pulls down the brows, distends and raises the nostrils, shuts the mouth and depresses the corners of it, makes the under lip more prominent than the upper, turns away the face from the despised object, and directs the eyes towards it obliquely. Grief raises the brows
towards the middle of the forehead, depressing them at the temples, gives a similar direction to the line of the mouth, half shuts the eyes, hiding the pupils under the upper eyelids, and frequently draws forth tears. Joy smooths the forehead, opens and illuminates the eyes, raises the brows and the corners of the mouth, gently distends the nostrils, and heightens the complexion. Laughter raises the corners of the mouth still higher, giving the same direction to the line of the brows, discovers both rows of the teeth, moistens and almost shuts the eyes, diffuses wrinkles over several parts of the cheeks and forehead, and affects the voice in a very sensible and peculiar manner.

406. I need not enter further into the detail of this subject; what has been said may serve as a specimen, and that is perhaps sufficient. Descriptions of physiognomy it is not easy to make intelligible without drawings; and if one had a good assortment of these, little description would be necessary. Le Brun's Passions are in every print-shop, and must be allowed to have considerable merit; though the features, expressive of the more violent emotions, are, perhaps, exaggerated into what the Italians call caricatura. Chodowiecki has made some valuable additions to Le Brun, which may be found in Lavater. I conclude with observing, that several energies of the understanding, as belief, doubt, perplexity, denial, &c. do
also display themselves visibly in the look and gesture; as may be seen in that admirable Cartoon of Raffaelle, which represents Paul preaching at Athens.

THE END OF PSYCHOLOGY.
PART SECOND.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

407. NATURAL theology explains what human reason can discover concerning the being and attributes of God. It is a science of boundless extent; but we must confine ourselves to a few general principles. In respect of certainty it is equal to any science; for its proofs rise to demonstration: in point of dignity it is superior to all others; its object being the Creator of the universe: and its utility is so great, that it lays the only sure foundation of human society and human happiness. The proofs of the divine existence are innumerable, and continually force themselves upon our observation; and are withal so clear and striking, that nothing but the most obstinate prejudice, and extreme depravity of both
heart and understanding, could ever bring any rational being to disbelieve, or doubt of it. With good reason, therefore, it is, that the Psalmist calls the man 'a fool, who saith in his heart, there is 'no God.' Without belief in God, a considerate person (if it were possible for such a person to be without this belief) could never possess tranquility or comfort; for to him the world would seem a chaos of misery and confusion. But where this belief is established, all things appear to be right, and to have a benevolent tendency; and give encouragement to hope, patience, submission, gratitude, adoration, and other good affections essential to human felicity.

408. That men, from education, or from nature, might have some notion of duty, even though they were to harden themselves into atheists, can hardly be doubted: but that notion would, in such men, be wholly ineffectual. From the fear of shame, or of human laws, the atheist may be decent in his outward behaviour; but he cannot act from any nobler principle. And if, at any time, he could promote (what he takes to be) his interest, by the commission of the greatest crime, it is plain that there would be nothing to restrain him, provided he could conceal his guilt; which any man might do occasionally, and which men of great wealth or power could do at any time. Atheism is utterly subversive of morality, and, consequently, of happiness: and as to a commun-
nity, or political society, of atheists, it is plainly impossible, and never took place in any nation. They, therefore, who teach atheistical doctrines, or, who endeavour to make men doubtful in regard to this great and glorious truth, the being of God, do every thing in their power to overturn government, to unhinge society, to eradicate virtue, to destroy happiness, and to promote confusion, madness, and misery.

409. On what human reason discovers of the divine nature is partly founded the evidence even of revelation itself. For no pretended revelation can be true, which contradicts what, by human reason, is demonstrable of the divine perfections. We do not prove from Scripture, that God exists; because they who deny God, deny the authority of Scripture too. But when, by rational proof, we have evinced his being and attributes, we may then ascertain the truth of divine revelation, or detect the falsehood of a pretended one. When we have, from the purity of its doctrine, and the external evidence of miracles, prophecy, and human testimony, satisfied ourselves of the truth of the Christian revelation, it becomes us to believe even such parts of it as could never have been found out by human reason. And thus it is, that our natural notions of God and his providence are wonderfully refined and improved by what is revealed in holy writ: so that the meanest of our people, who has had a Christian education, knows a great deal
more on these subjects, than could ever be discovered by the wisest of the ancient philosophers. That many things in the divine government, and many particulars relating to the divine nature, as declared in Scripture, should surpass our comprehension, is not to be wondered at; for we are daily puzzled with things more within our sphere: we know that our own soul and body are united, but of the manner of that union we know nothing. A past eternity we cannot comprehend; and a future eternity is an object by which our reason is astonished and confounded: yet nothing can be more certain, than that one eternity is past and another to come.

410. In evincing the being of God, two sorts of proof have been employed; which are called the proofs a priori and a posteriori. In the former, the being of God is proved from this consideration, that his existence is necessary, and that it is absurd and impossible to suppose that he does not exist. This argument is fully discussed by Dr. Clarke, in the first part of his excellent book on the evidence of natural and revealed religion. The proof a posteriori shews, from the present constitution of things, that there is, and must be, a supreme being, of infinite goodness, power, and wisdom, who created and supports them. This last is the most obvious proof, and the most easily comprehended; and withal, so satisfying, that the man must be mad who refuses to be convinced by it.
I shall, therefore, give a brief account of this argument; referring to Dr. Clarke for the other. Natural theology consists of two parts: in the first, we demonstrate the existence of God; in the second, his attributes. These parts, however, are strictly connected; for the same arguments that prove the first, prove also the second.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

411. That we ourselves, and innumerable other things, exist, may be taken for granted as a first principle, as evident as any axiom in Euclid. Hence we infer, that something must always have existed. For if ever there was a time when nothing existed, there must have been a time when something began to be; and that something must have come into being without a cause; since, by the supposition, there was nothing before it. But that a thing should begin to exist, and yet proceed from no cause, is both absurd and inconceivable; all men, by the law of their nature, being necessarily determined to believe, that whatever begins to exist proceeds from some cause; therefore some
being must have existed from eternity.—This being must have been either dependent on something else, or not dependent on anything else. Now an eternal succession of dependent beings, or a being which is dependent, and yet exists from eternity, is impossible. For if every part of such a succession be dependent, then the whole must be so; and, if the whole be dependent, there must be something on which it depends; and that something must be prior in time to that which depends on it, which is impossible, if that which is dependent be from eternity. It follows, that there must be an eternal and independent being on whom all other beings depend.

412. Some atheists seem to acknowledge a first cause, when they ascribe the origin of the universe to chance. But it is not easy to guess what they mean by this word. We call those things accidental, casual, or the effects of chance, whose immediate causes we are unacquainted with; as the changes of the weather, for example; which however every body believes to be owing to some adequate cause, though we cannot find it out. Sometimes, when an intelligent being does a thing without design, as when a man throwing a stone out of his field happens to strike a man whom he did not see; it is called accidental. In affirming that the universe proceeds from chance, it would appear, that atheists mean, either that it has no cause at all, or that its cause did not act intelligently, or with
design, in the production of it. That the universe proceeds from no cause, we have seen to be absurd, and therefore, we shall overturn all the atheistical notions concerning chance, if we can shew, what indeed is easily shewn, and what no considerate person can be ignorant of, that the cause of the universe is intelligent and wise, and in creating it, must have acted with intelligence and wisdom.

413. Wherever we find a number of things, complex in their structure, and yet perfectly similar, we believe them to be the work of design. Were a man to find a thousand pairs of shoes, of the same shape, size, and materials, it would not be easy to persuade him that the whole was chance-work. Now the instances of complex and similar productions in nature are so very numerous as to exceed computation. All human bodies, for example, though each of them consists of almost an infinite number of parts, are perfectly uniform in their structure and functions; and the same thing may be said of all the animals and plants of any particular species. To suppose this the effect of undesigning chance, or the production of an unintelligent cause, is as great an absurdity as it is possible to imagine.

414. Further, a composition of parts mutually adapted we must always consider as the work of design, especially if it be found in a great variety of instances. Suppose a body, an equilateral prism,
for example, to be formed by chance; and suppose a certain quantity of matter accidentally determined to resolve itself into tubes of a certain dimension. It is as infinite to one, that these tubes should have orifices equal to the base of the prism; there being an infinity of other magnitudes equally possible. Suppose the orifices equal, it is as infinite to one that any of the tubes should be prismatical; infinite other figures being equally possible. Suppose one of them prismatical, there is, for the same reason, an infinity of chances, that it shall not be equilateral. Suppose it equilateral, there are still infinite chances that the tube and prism shall never meet. Suppose them to meet, there are innumerable chances that their axes shall not be in the same direction. Suppose them to have the same direction, there are still many chances that the angles of the prism shall not coincide with those of the tube: and supposing them to coincide, there are innumerable chances that no force shall be applied in such a direction as to make the prism enter the tube.

415. How many millions of chances, then, are there against the casual formation of one prism inserted in a prismatic tube! which yet a small degree of design could easily accomplish. Were we to find, in a solitary place, a composition of this kind, of which the tube was iron and the prism of wood, it would not be easy for us to believe, that such a thing was the work of chance. And if so
small a thing cannot be without design, what shall we say of the mechanism of a plant, an animal, a system of plants and animals, a world, a system of worlds, an universe! No person, who has any pretensions to rationality, and is not determined to shut his eyes against the truth, will ever bring himself to believe, that works so stupendous could be the effect of undesigning chance.

416. To set this argument in a proper light, it would be necessary to take a survey of the works of nature; in which the vast number of systems, the artful union of parts, the nice proportions established between every part and system and its respective end, the innumerable multitudes of species, and the infinite numbers of forms in every species, are so conspicuous as to prove, beyond all doubt, that the Creator of the world is infinitely wise, powerful, and good. Let a man examine only a grain of corn, by cutting it open, and viewing it with a microscope; and then let him consider another grain as planted in the earth, and by the influence of heat, soil, air, and moisture, springing up into a plant, consisting of a great number of vessels that disperse the vital sap into every part, and endowed with the power, or susceptibility, of growing in bulk, till in due time it produce a number of other grains of the same kind, necessary to the existence of man and other creatures;—let a rational being attend to this fact, and compare it with the noblest efforts of human
art; and if he is not struck with the infinite superiority of the one to the other,—what can we say of him, but that he is void of understanding! And yet the mechanism and growth of a vegetable seems an inconsiderable thing, when we think of the wisdom and power displayed in many other works of nature.

417. What a fabric is our solar system! wherein bodies of such enormous magnitude accomplish their revolutions through spaces immense; and with a regularity, than which nothing can be more perfect. The distance of the planets from the sun, and their several magnitudes, are determined with the utmost wisdom, and according to the nicest geometrical proportion. The central orb, whether we consider its glorious appearance, its astonishing greatness, or the beneficial influence of its light and heat, is such an object as no rational being can contemplate without adoring the Creator. We have good reason to believe, that there are thousands of other suns and systems of worlds, more glorious perhaps, and more extensive than ours; which form such a stupendous whole, that the human soul, labouring to comprehend it, loses sight of itself and of all sublunary things, and is totally overwhelmed with astonishment and veneration. With such thoughts in our view, we are apt to forget the wonders that lie immediately around us, and that the smallest plant or animal body amounts to a demonstration of the divine
existence. But God appears in all his works, in the least as well as in the greatest; and there is not, in the whole circle of human sciences, any one truth confirmed by so many irresistible proofs, as the existence of the Deity.

418. The diurnal motion of the planets is the easiest way possible of exposing all their parts to the influence of light and heat. Their globular form is the fittest for motion, and for the free circulation of atmosphere around them; and at the same time supplies the most capacious surface. The principle of gravitation, prevailing through the whole system, and producing innumerable phenomena, is a most amazing instance of unbounded variety united with the strictest uniformity and proportion.—But it is impossible in a few pages to give such an enumeration of particulars, as would do any justice to the subject. The man, who should suppose a large city, consisting of a hundred thousand palaces, all finished in the minutest parts, and furnished with the greatest elegance and variety of ornament, and with all sorts of books, pictures, and statues, executed in the most ingenious manner; to have been produced by the accidental blowing of winds and rolling of sands, would justly be accounted irrational. But to suppose the universe, or our solar system, or this earth, to be the work of undesigning chance, is an absurdity incomparably greater.
419. And now,—from a particular survey of the terraqueous globe; of the atmosphere, so necessary to light, and life, and vegetation; of the different productions of different countries, so well adapted to the constitution and use of the inhabitants: from the variety of useful minerals to be found in all parts of the earth; from the wonderful mechanism and still more wonderful growth of vegetables, their vast number and variety, their beauty and utility, and the great abundance of such as are most useful, particularly grass and corn; from the structure, life, motion, and instincts, of animals; from the exact correspondence of their instincts to their necessities; from the different kinds of them and of vegetables having been so long preserved; from the similitude between all the individuals of each species; from the body and soul of man so replete with wonders; from his intellectual and moral faculties; and from innumerable other particulars that come under the cognizance of man;—we might proceed to set the Divine Existence in a still clearer light, if that were necessary, but the subject is so copious that we cannot enter upon it. We should injure it by a brief summary; and a full detail would comprehend astronomy, geography, natural history, natural philosophy, and several other sciences. I therefore refer you to what has been written on it, by Xenophon, in the fourth chapter of his first book of Memorabilia; by Cicero, in his second book De
natura deorum; by Derham, Ray, Fenelon, Niewentyt; by Clarke, Bentley, Abernethy, &c. in their sermons; and by other ingenious authors.

420. Some have urged, that there are in the universe many marks of irregularity and want of design, as well as regularity and wisdom; and that therefore we have no evidence, that the Being, who made all things is perfectly good and wise.—But though we were to admit the fact, the inference would not be fair. The wonderful contrivance, which appears in the arrangement of the solar system, or even in the human body, abundantly proves the Creator to be infinitely wise. That he has not thought fit to make all things equally beautiful and excellent, can never be an imputation on his wisdom and goodness: for how absurd would it be to say, that he would have displayed more wisdom, if he had endowed all things with life, perception, and reason! Stones and plants, air and water, are most useful things, and would have been much less useful if they had been percipient beings; as the inferior animals would have been both less useful and less happy, if they had been rational. Their existence, therefore, and their natures, are proofs of the Divine goodness and wisdom, instead of being arguments against it.

421. Besides, no man of sense accounts himself a complete judge of any work, even of a fellow-creature, unless he understand its end and
structure, as well as the workman himself does. When we wish to know with certainty the value of a ship, or a house, or any complex machine, we consult those who are skilled in such things; for them only we hold to be competent judges. In a complex contrivance there may be many parts of the greatest importance, which an unskilful observer would not perceive the use of, or would perhaps declare to be useless. Now, in the course of Providence, a vast number of events and objects may be employed to accomplish one great end; and it is impossible for us to pronounce reasonably of any one event, or object, that it is useless, or improper, unless we know its tendency and connection with other things both past and future; which in cases innumerable we cannot do. For of the past we know but little, the present we know imperfectly, and of the future we have no certain knowledge beyond what is revealed. The system of Providence relating to us and to our final destination, extends through thousands of years, as we have good reason to believe; but our life is short, and our views are bounded by our experience, which is very limited. That therefore may be a most wise and beneficent dispensation, which to a captious mind and fallible judgment may appear the contrary.

422. Moreover, the Deity intended, that the nature of all created things should be progressive. Many years pass away before a man arrives at ma-
tuity; and many days, before a plant can yield good fruit. Every thing is imperfect, while advancing to perfection; and we cannot say of any thing, whether it be well or ill contrived for answering its end, till we know what its state of matu-
turity will be, and what the effects are whereof it may be productive. Physical evils may, as will be shewn by and by, be improved into blessings; and it will also be shewn, that moral evil is a conse-
quence of that law of nature which makes us capa-
bale of virtue and happiness. Even in this world, Providence often brings good out of evil; and every man of observation must have perceived, that certain events of his life, which when they hap-
pended seemed to be great misfortunes, have been found to be great blessings in the end.

423. If, then, that which seems evil may really be good, for any thing we know to the contrary, and if that which is really evil often does, and always may, produce good: how can man be so presumptuous as to suppose, because he cannot distinctly see the nature and use of some things around him, that therefore the Creator of the world is not supremely good and wise! No man can draw this conclusion, unless he believe himself infallible in his knowledge of all things past, present, and future; and he who believes so, if there be any such, is a fool.
424. Our knowledge of the Divine Nature, though sufficient to raise within us the highest adoration and love, must needs be very imperfect; for we cannot form a distinct idea of any moral or intellectual quality, unless we find some trace of it in ourselves. Now God must possess innumerable perfections, which neither we, nor any created being can comprehend. When we ascribe to him every good quality that we can conceive, and consider him as possessed of them all in supreme perfection, and as free from every imperfection, we form the best idea of him that we can: but it must fall infinitely short of the truth. The attributes of God, which it is in our power in any degree to conceive, or to make the subject of investigation, have been divided into natural, as unity, self-existence, spirituality, omnipotence, immutability, eternity; intellectual, as knowledge and wisdom; and moral, as justice, goodness, mercy, holiness.

425. That God is, has been proved already. That there are more gods than one, we have no evidence, and therefore cannot rationally believe. Nay, even from the light of nature, we have evi-
dence, that there is one only. For, in the works of creation, there appears that perfect unity of design, which naturally determines an attentive spectator to refer them all to one first cause. Accordingly, the wisest men in the heathen world, though they worshipped inferior deities, (I should rather say, names which they substituted for deities), did yet seem to acknowledge one supreme god, the greatest and best of beings, the father of gods and men. It is probable, that belief in one god was the original belief of mankind with respect to deity. But, partly from their narrow views, which made them think that one being could not, without subordinate agents, superintend all things; partly from their flattery to living great men, and gratitude to the dead, disposing them to pay divine honours to human creatures; partly from fanciful analogies between the Divine Providence and earthly governments; and partly from the figures of poetry, by which they saw the attributes of the deity personified, they soon corrupted the original belief, and fell into polytheism and idolatry. And no ancient people ever retained long their belief in the one true God, except the Jews, who were enlightened by revelation; and even they were frequently inclined to adopt the superstitions of their neighbours. We see then, that, in order to ascertain and fix men's notions of the Divine unity, revelation seems to be necessary.
426. Self-existence, or independence, is another natural attribute of God. If he depended on any thing, that thing would be superior and prior to him, which is absurd; because he himself is the supreme and the first cause: therefore his existence does not depend on any thing whatever. The attribute of self-existence is something that surpasses our comprehension; and no wonder; since all the beings that we see around us in the world are dependent. But, as already observed, there are many things which we must acknowledge to be true, notwithstanding that we cannot comprehend them.

427. We see the material universe in motion; but matter is inert, and, so far as we know, nothing can move it but mind; therefore God is a Spirit. We do not mean that his nature is the same with that of our soul: it is infinitely more excellent. But we mean, that he possesses intelligence and active power in supreme perfection; and as these qualities do not belong to matter, which is neither active nor intelligent, we must refer them to that which is not matter, but mind.—Some of the ancients thought, that God is the soul of the universe, and that the universe is, as it were, his body. But this cannot be; for wherever there is body, there must be inactivity, and consequently imperfection. He is therefore a pure Spirit. Nor can we conceive, that he is confined within the limits of creation, as a soul is within its body; or
that he is liable to impressions from material things, as the soul is from the body; or, that material things are instruments necessary to the exertion of his attributes, as our bodies are to the exertion of our faculties. It must be as easy for him to act beyond the bounds of creation, as within them; to create new worlds, as to cease from creation. He is everywhere present and active; but it is a more perfect presence and activity, than that of a soul within a body. Another notion once prevailed, similar to that which has been just now confuted, that the world is animated, as a body is by a soul, not by the Deity himself, but by an universal spirit, which he created in the beginning, and of which the souls of men, and other animals, are parts or emanations. This I mention, not because a confutation is necessary, for it is mere hypothesis, without any shadow of evidence; but, because it may be of use in explaining some passages of ancient authors, particularly of Virgil, who once and again alludes to it.*

428. In order to be satisfied, that God is omnipotent, we need only to open our eyes, and look round upon the wonders of his creation. To produce such astonishing effects, as we see in the universe, and experience in our own frame; and to produce them out of nothing, and sustain them in the most perfect regularity, must certainly be the effect of power, which is able to do all things,

* Æneid. vi, 724. Geor. iv, 220.
and which, therefore, nothing can resist. But the
divine power cannot extend to what is either im-
possible in itself, or unsuitable to the perfection of
his nature. To make the same thing at the same
time to be and not to be, is plainly impossible;
and to act inconsistently with justice, goodness,
and wisdom, must be equally impossible to a being
of infinite purity.

429. That God is from everlasting to everlasting,
is evident from his being self-existent and
almighty. That he was from all eternity, was
proved already; and it can admit of no doubt,
that what is independent and omnipotent must
continue to all eternity. In treating of the eternity
of God, as well as of his omnipresence, some
authors have puzzled themselves to little purpose,
by attempting to explain in what manner he is con-
nected with infinite space and endless duration.
But it is vain to search into those mysteries; as
they lie far beyond the reach of all human, and,
most probably, of all created intelligence. Of
this we are certain, for, upon the principle just
now mentioned it may be demonstrated, that the
Supreme Being had no beginning, and that of his
existence there can be no end. That which is omni-
potent and eternal, is incapable of being changed
by any thing else; and that which is infinitely
wise and good can never be supposed to make any
change in itself. The Deity, therefore, is un-
changeable.
430. As he is the maker and preserver of all things, and everywhere present (for to suppose him to be in some places only, and not in all, would be to suppose him a limited and imperfect being), his knowledge must be infinite, and comprehend, at all times, whatever is, or was, or shall be. Were his knowledge progressive, like ours, it would be imperfect; for they who become more wise, must formerly have been less so. Wisdom is the right exercise of knowledge: and that he is infinitely wise, is proved, incontestably by the same arguments that prove his existence.

431. The goodness of God appears in all his works of creation and providence. Being infinitely and eternally happy in himself, it was goodness alone that could move him to create the universe, and give being, and the means of happiness, to the innumerable orders of creatures contained in it. Revelation gives such a display of the divine goodness, as must fill us with the most ardent gratitude and adoration: for in it we find, that God has put it in our power, notwithstanding our degeneracy and unworthiness, to be happy both in this life and for ever; a hope, which reason alone could never have permitted us to entertain on any ground of certainty. And here we may repeat, what was already hinted at, that although the right use of reason supplies our first notions of the divine nature, yet it is from revelation that we receive those distinct ideas of his attributes and providence,
which are the foundation of our dearest hopes. The most enlightened of the heathen had no certain knowledge of his unity, spirituality, eternity, wisdom, justice, or mercy; and, by consequence, could never contrive a comfortable system of natural religion; as Socrates, the wisest of them, acknowledged.

432. Lastly, justice is necessary to the formation of every good character; and, therefore, the Deity must be perfectly just. This, however, is an awful consideration to creatures, who, like us, are immersed in error and wickedness, and whose conscience is always declaring, that every sin deserves punishment. It is reasonable to think, that a being infinitely good must also be of infinite mercy: but still, the purity and justice of God must convey the most alarming thoughts to those who know themselves to have been, in instances without number, inexcusably criminal. But, from what is revealed in Scripture, concerning the divine dispensations with respect to man, we learn, that, on performing certain conditions, we shall be forgiven and received into favour, by means, which at once display the divine mercy in the most amiable light, and fully vindicate the divine justice.

433. It is, indeed, impossible to understand the doctrines of our religion, and not to wish, at least, that they may be true: for they exhibit the most comfortable views of God and his providence;
they recommend the purest and most perfect morality; and they breathe nothing throughout, but benevolence, equity, and peace. And one may venture to affirm, that no man ever wished the gospel to be true, who did not find it so. Its evidence is even more than sufficient to satisfy those who love it. And every man who knows it must love it, if he be a man of candour and a good heart.

THE END OF PNEUMATOLOGY.
APPENDIX.

Of the Incorporeal Nature of the Human Soul.

434. MAN is made up of a body and a soul, intimately connected together, we know not how, or when. In consequence of this connection, the body lives and moves, is nourished with food and refreshed by sleep, and, for a certain time, increases in bulk. When this connection is dissolved, the body is insensible and motionless, soon becomes cold, and gradually moulders into dust. That the soul and body are distinct and different substances, was formerly inferred (see § 119), from the general consent of mankind in regard to this matter. It seems to be natural for us to believe, that the soul may exist, and be happy or miserable, without the body. This appears from those notions, which, in every age and country have prevailed, concerning a future state.

435. But of the soul's immateriality there is other evidence. When two things have some es-
sential qualities in common, we refer them to one class, or, at least, consider them as somewhat similar in their nature. But when two things are found to have not one quality in common, we must consider them as totally unlike and different. If, therefore, any piece of matter (or body) appear to have qualities which we know, for certain, do not belong to matter, we conclude, that to this piece of matter there is joined something which is not matter. The human frame presents to our outward senses a certain quantity of matter, divided into various parts of different shapes and colours. Now the essential qualities of matter we know, from experience, to be gravity, extension, solidity, inactivity, and some others. These qualities are all in the human body: but in the human frame there are many qualities, not only different from these, but altogether unlike them. We are conscious of perceiving, remembering, judging, imagining, willing, and of a variety of passions, affections, and appetites. Surely these qualities, which are indisputably in the human frame, are very different from, and very unlike to, hardness, softness, weight, extension, and the other qualities of body. There is therefore in man, something which cannot be called body, because from body it is in every respect different.

436. Moreover; the further we carry our inquiries into matter, and its qualities, the more we are convinced, that it is essentially inactive, or in-
capable of beginning motion. But in the human frame we know, for certain, that there is something essentially active, and capable of beginning motion in a thousand different ways. In the human frame, therefore, there are two things whose natures are not only unlike, but opposite: the one is body, which is essentially inactive; the other, which is essentially active—shall we call it body too? Then body must be something which unites in itself qualities directly opposite, and destructive of each other: that must be in it which is not in it; it must at once have a certain quality, and not have that quality; it must be both active and inactive. Round squareness, white blackness, or red-hot ice, are as natural, and may be as easily conceived by the mind, as that one and the same thing should be, at one and the same time, capable of beginning motion, and incapable of beginning motion. The human frame is partly material. It follows, therefore, from what has been said, that the human frame must also be in part immaterial, spiritual, or not corporeal. That part of it which is material we call our body; and that part of it which has been proved to be immaterial,* we call our soul, spirit, or mind.

* Till of late there was no ambiguity in this epithet, as here applied. But since our language began to decline, immaterial has been licentiously used to signify unimportant. The true English sense of it is, incorporeal, distinct from matter.
437. Many controversies have been raised about the origin of the soul, and the time when it is united with the body. The common opinion seems to be the most probable; namely, that the soul is created and united with the body when the body is prepared for its reception. At what time, or in what manner, this union may take place, it is impossible for us to determine, and therefore vain to inquire. Let us not suppose it derogatory from the happiness or perfection of the Deity, to be always employed (if we may so speak) in creation. To omnipotence it must be as easy, and as glorious, to create, as not to create. The best philosophers have thought, that his continual energy is necessary to produce gravitation, and other appearances in the material world. That the divine providence extends to the minutest parts of creation, has been believed by wise men in all ages; is confirmed by revelation; and is agreeable to right reason. For as he is everywhere present, and of infinite power, it is impossible that any thing should happen without his permission.

438. When we consider man's helpless condition at his coming into this world; how ignorant he is, and how unfit for action; that all he ever acquires in knowledge is by experience and memory; that we have no remembrance of any thing previous to the present state; and that both revelation, and the conscience of mankind, declare
the punishment which the wicked fear, and the reward which the good hope for, hereafter, to be the consequence of their behaviour in this life:—when, I say, we lay all these things together, we must be satisfied, that the present is our first state of being. But it is said, that in this world we sometimes suffer evil which we do not deserve; that the vicious triumph, while the virtuous are unsuccessful; that the infant child may be liable to want or disease, from the profusion or debauchery of the parent, and the harmless villager to ruin, from the crimes of his sovereign: and that, therefore, we must, in a former state, have incurred guilt, of which these, and the like evils, are the punishment.

439. This leads to an important, and, as many think, a difficult subject, the origin of evil; on which I shall make some remarks, after I have offered an observation or two upon the opinion that introduced it. First, it may be observed, that the unequal distribution of good and evil in this life, naturally turns our thoughts, not to a former, but to a future state of being; and does, in fact, as we shall see by and by, afford a proof of a future state. Secondly: of virtues performed, or crimes committed, in a former state, we have no remembrance, consciousness, or belief: and to punish us for crimes which we cannot conceive that we ever committed, and of which we know nothing, is inconsistent with divine justice. And,
thirdly, if we sinned, or suffered, in a former state, the origin of that sin, or suffering, must be as hard to be accounted for, as the origin of present evil.

440 Evil is of two sorts; physical, as pain, poverty, death; and moral, or vice. 1. Our being subject to physical evil puts it in our power to exercise patience, fortitude, resignation to the divine will, trust in providence, compassion, benevolence, industry, temperance, humility, and the fear of God. If there were no physical evil, there would hardly be an opportunity of exercising these virtues; in which case our present state could not be, what both reason and scripture declare it to be, a state of probation. Besides, our present sufferings we may, if we please, convert into blessings; which we shall do, if we take occasion from them to cultivate the virtues above mentioned: for thus they will prove means of promoting our eternal happiness. The existence, therefore, of physical evil, being necessary to train us up in virtue, and, consequently, to prepare us for future felicity, is a proof of the goodness of God, instead of being an objection to it.

441. 2. Without virtue, such a creature as man could not be happy. In forming an idea of a happy state, we must always suppose it to be a state of virtue; the natural tendency of virtue being, to produce happiness; as vice invariably leads to misery. Now, man could not be capable...
of virtue, nor, consequently, of happiness, if he were not free, that is, if he had it not in his power to do either good or evil. And if he have this in his power, he must be liable to vice. Vice, therefore, or moral evil, is the effect of that law of divine providence, whereby man is made capable of virtue and happiness. As the possibility of falling into error, and mistaking falsehood for truth, is necessary to the improvement of our rational powers, so the existence of evil, as well as of good, is necessary, at least in this life, to the improvement of our moral nature. And upon our improvement of our moral nature our future happiness must depend.

442. Supposing the present life to be preparatory to a future and eternal state, the evils we are now exposed to must, to a good man, appear inconsiderable. What are a few years of sorrow to an eternity of happiness? Not so much as a headache of an hour is to a thousand years of good health. And who would scruple to suffer pain for several months, if he could thus ensure health for many years? But, in fact, the evils of life are not so great as some people represent them. There is in human nature a pliability, by which it can adapt itself to almost any circumstances: and contentment, and resignation to the divine will, which are virtues in every person's power, are sufficient to render all the evils of life tolerable. And if to these virtues there be added a well-grounded hope
of future felicity, which is also in the power of every person who is willing to be good, our present afflictions may become not only tolerable, but light. The wicked, indeed, must be unhappy, both now and hereafter: but they will not suffer more than they deserve; they will be punished according to their works. And so far is their suffering from being an objection to the divine character, that it would be a very strong objection if they were not to suffer. For he who is perfectly good must be perfectly just: and a being perfectly just must punish those who deserve punishment.

443. To ask, why we are not made infallible and perfect, and capable of happiness without virtue or liberty, is an impertinent, and, perhaps, an impious question. It may as reasonably be asked, why there are not twenty planets in the solar system? why a stone was not made a man or an angel? or, why the Deity did not make all his creatures equal to himself? Such questions deserve no answer, but this; that whatever God has been pleased to do must be right, whether we can account for it or not. Creatures who have it in their power to be happy, and whose happiness will ever increase as they improve in virtue, are surely under the greatest obligations to be thankful to that Providence which has made them what they are.
Of the Immortality of the Soul.

444. It is unnecessary to prove to a Christian, that his soul will never die; because he believes that life and immortality have been brought to light by the gospel. But, though not necessary, it may be useful, to lay before him those arguments, whereby the immortality of the soul might be made to appear, even to those who never heard of revelation, probable in the highest degree. Whether the human soul shall die with the body, or survive death and live for ever, is an inquiry which may be said to comprehend the three following questions. 1. Does the light of nature, unaided by revelation, afford any reason to think, that the soul of man may possibly survive the body? 2. Does the light of nature afford any reason to believe, that the soul will actually survive the body? 3. If it does, what may be reasonably conjectured concerning a future state?

445. Section I. Does the light of nature, unaided by revelation, afford any reason to think, that the human soul may possibly survive the body? First, death destroys the body by disuniting its parts, or preparing them for being disunited: and we have no reason to think that death can destroy in any other way, as we have never seen any thing die, which did not consist of parts. But the soul consists not of parts; having been proved to be
incorporeal. Therefore, from the nature of death and of the soul, we have no evidence that death can destroy the soul. Consequently, the soul may possibly, and for any thing we know to the contrary, survive the body.

446. Secondly, the soul is a substance of one kind, and the body of another; they are united; and death dissolves the union. We may conceive them to exist after this union is dissolved; for we see that the body does exist for some time after; and may, by human art, be made to exist for a long time. And as most men have, in all ages, entertained some notion of a future state, it must be agreeable to the laws of the human understanding to believe, that the soul may live when separated from the body. Now the dissolution of the union of two distinct substances, each of which is conceived to be capable of existing separate, can no more be supposed necessarily to imply the destruction of both the united substances, than the dissolution of the marriage union by death, can be supposed to imply, of necessity, the destruction of both husband and wife. Therefore the union of the soul and body is not necessary to the existence of the soul after death. Consequently, the soul may possibly survive the body.

447. Thirdly, naturalists observe, that the particles whereof our bodies consist are continually changing; some going off, and others coming in their room: so that in a few years a human body
becomes, not indeed different in appearance, but wholly different in substance. But the soul continues always the same. Therefore, even in this life, the soul survives, or may survive, several dissolutions of the body. And if so, it may possibly survive that other dissolution which happens at death. It is true, these dissolutions are gradual and imperceptible; whereas that is violent and sudden. But if the union of the soul and body be necessary to the existence of the soul, the dissolution of this union, whether sudden or gradual, whether violent or imperceptible, must destroy the soul. But the soul survives the gradual dissolution. Therefore, for any thing we know to the contrary, it possibly may, and probably will, survive that which is instantaneous.

448. Some object, that it is only additional matter joined to our original body, which is gradually dissolved by the attrition of the parts; whereas death dissolves the original body itself. Though this were granted, it must, at any rate, be allowed, that the soul has as much command over this additional matter as over the original body. For a full-grown man has, at least, as much command of his limbs, as an infant has of his; and yet, in the limbs of the former there must be a great deal of additional matter, which is not in the limbs of the latter. And the soul and body of a full-grown man do mutually affect each other, as much, at least, as the soul and body of an infant. Conse-
quently, the union between our soul and this supposed additional matter, is as strict and intimate as that between the soul and its supposed original body. But, we find, that the former union may be dissolved without injury to the soul: therefore, the union of the soul, with its supposed original body, may also be dissolved, without endangering the soul’s existence.

449. Further: admitting the same doctrine of an original body, we must, however, observe, that living men may lose several of their limbs by amputation. Those limbs must contain parts of this original body, if there be any such thing. There is, then, a dissolution of the union between the soul and part of the original body; and a violent one too; which, however, affects not the existence of the soul: and, therefore, for any thing that appears to the contrary, the soul may possibly survive the total dissolution at death.

450. But it is now time to reject this unintelligible doctrine of an original body. From a small beginning, man advances gradually to his full stature. At what period of his growth is it, that the original body is completed, and the accession of additional matter commences? What is the original body? Is it the body of an embryo, of an infant, or of a man? Does the additional matter begin to adhere before the birth, or after it, in infancy, in childhood, in youth, or at maturity? These questions cannot be answered; and, there-
fore, we cannot admit the notion of an original body, as distinguishable from the additional matter whereby our bulk is increased. Consequently, the third argument remains in full force; and is not weakened by this objection.

451. Fourthly, if the soul perish at death, it must be by annihilation; for death destroys nothing, so far as we know, but what consists of parts. Now we have no evidence of annihilation taking place in any part of the universe. Our bodies, though resolved into dust, are not annihilated; not a particle of matter has perished since the creation, so far as we know. The destruction of old, and the growth of new, bodies, imply no creation of new matter, nor annihilation of the old, but only a new arrangement of the elementary parts. What reason then can we have to think, that our better part, our soul, will be annihilated at death, when even our bodies are not then annihilated; and when we have no evidence of such a thing as annihilation ever taking place? Such an opinion would be a mere hypothesis, unsupported by, nay, contrary to, experience; and, therefore, cannot be reasonable. We have, then, from reason and the light of nature, sufficient evidence, that the soul may possibly survive the body, and, consequently, be immortal; there being no event before us, so far as we know, except death, which would seem likely to endanger its existence.

452. Section II. Does the light of nature af-
ford any reason to believe, that the soul *will actually* survive the body? The following are reasons for this belief.—First: It is natural for us to think, that the course of things, whereof we have had, and now have, experience will continue, unless we have positive reason to believe that it will be altered. This is the ground of many of those opinions, which we account quite certain. That, to-morrow, the sun will rise, and the sea ebb and flow; that night will follow day, and spring succeed to winter; and, that all men will die, are opinions amounting to certainty: and yet we cannot account for them otherwise than by saying, that such has been the course of nature hitherto, and that we have no reason to think it will be altered. When judgments of this kind admit of no doubt, as in the examples given, our conviction is called moral certainty. I am *morally certain*, that the sun will rise to-morrow, and set to-day, and that all men will die, &c. The instances of past experience, on which these judgments are founded, are innumerable; and there is no mixture of such contradictory instances, as might lead us to expect a contrary event.

453. But it often happens, that the experiences on which we ground our opinions of this sort, are but few in number; and sometimes too they are mixed with contradictory experiences. In this case, we do not consider the future event as morally certain; but only as more or less probable, or
likely, according to the greater or less surplus of the favourable instances. If, for example, a medicine has cured in five cases, and never failed in one, we should think its future success probable, but not morally certain; still more probable, if it has cured in twenty cases; and more still, if in a hundred, without failing in one. If a medicine has cured in ten cases, and failed in ten, our mind, in regard to its future success, would be in a state of doubt; that is, we should think it as probable that it would fail on a future trial, as that it would succeed. If it had cured ten times, and failed only six, we should think it more probable that it would cure on a future trial, than that it would fail; and still more probable, if it had cured ten times and failed only once.

454. These remarks, which properly belong to logic, will help to explain in what manner our judgments are regulated, in regard to the probability or moral certainty of future events. To make us morally certain of a future event requires, we cannot tell how many, but requires a very great number of favourable experiences, without any mixture of unfavourable ones. It is true, we have heard of two men, Enoch and Elijah, who did not die, yet we expect our own death with absolute certainty. But these instances are confessedly miraculous; and, besides, are so very few, compared with the infinite number of instances on the other side, that they make no alteration in our judgment.
455. To apply all this to the present subject. Our bodies just now exist, but we foresee a cause that will destroy them, namely, death; and, therefore, we believe that they will not exist long. Our souls just now exist; but we do not foresee any positive cause that will destroy them: it having been proved, that they *may* survive the body; and there being no cause, so far as we know, that will then, or at any other time, destroy them. We must, therefore, admit, that our souls *will probably* survive the body. It is natural for us to believe this: the rules of evidence, which determine our belief in similar cases, determine us to this belief. But there are other arguments, which prove the same thing, by evidence, still higher.

456. Secondly, we are conscious of being, in many respects, capable of endless improvement. The more knowledge we acquire, the greater is our capacity and our relish for further acquisitions. It is not so with the brutes; for such of them as are at all docile, soon reach the highest improvement whereof they are capable. Disease may put a stop to our improvement as well as curiosity, for a time; but when it goes off, we are curious and improveable as before. Dotage is a disease; from which, if we could recover, there is reason to think, that we should be as rational and ingenious as ever; for there have been instances of recovery from dotage; and of persons, who, at the close
of life, have regained the full use of those faculties, of which they had been, for several years, deprived. And it often happens that old people retain all their mental powers, and their capacity of improvement, to the last. Now God, being perfect in wisdom, cannot be supposed to bestow upon his creatures useless or superfluous faculties. But this capacity of endless improvement is superfluous, if man be to perish finally at death; for much more limited powers would have suited all the purposes of a creature, whose duration comprehends no more than ninety or a hundred years. It is, therefore, unreasonable to suppose, that the soul will perish with the body.

457. Thirdly, the dignity of the human soul, compared with the vital principle of brutes, leads to the same conclusion. Brutes have some faculties in common with us; but they are guided by instinct chiefly, and incapable of science. Man’s arts, and his knowledge, may be said to be, in one sense, of his own acquisition; for, independently on experience and information, he can do little, and knows nothing. But then, he is improveable, as was just now observed, to an extent to which we can set no bounds. He is, moreover, capable of science; that is, of discovering the laws of nature, comparing them together, and applying the knowledge of them to the regulation of his conduct, and to the enlargement of his power. He has a sense of truth and falsehood, virtue and
vice, beauty and deformity. He is impressed with a belief that he is accountable for his conduct. He is endowed with the capacity of knowing, obeying, and adoring his creator; on whom, he is sensible, that he and all things depend, and to whom he naturally looks up for protection and comfort; and he expects that his being will not end with this life, but be prolonged through eternity. These are principles and sentiments, whereof the most sagacious brutes are not, in any degree, susceptible.

458. The instincts, appetites, and faculties, which we have in common with them, are necessary to our existence and well-being as animals; but, for what purpose are we endowed with moral and religious principles? These are not necessary to the support of our animal nature; these are useless, or, at least, fallacious, if there be no future state. To those who attend to the economy and analogies of nature, and observe how nicely every thing is fitted to its end, it must appear incredible, that man should have the same final destiny with the brutes; considering that his mental constitution is so very different, that his capacities are transcendentally superior; and that his highest happiness and misery arise from circumstances whereof the brutes feel nothing, and know nothing, namely, from his virtue and vice, and from his hope of the approbation, and fear of the disapprobation of his creator.
459. Fourthly, we are possessed of many faculties, which, in the present life, are never exerted. This we know to be the case with those who die young, or uninstructed, that is, with the greatest part of mankind: and we have reason to think, that this is the case, in some measure, with all; for we seldom prosecute any new study, without finding in ourselves powers which we were not conscious of before; and no man, after the greatest attainments in art and science, and at the end of the longest life, could say, that he had exercised all his powers, or knew the full extent of his own capacity. In most men, therefore, we are sure that there are, and in all men we have reason to think that there are, faculties, which are not exerted in this life; and which, by consequence, must be useless if there is no other. But in the works of creation there is nothing useless: therefore, the souls of men will exist in a future state.

460. Fiftly, all men have a natural desire and expectation of immortality. The thought of being reduced into nothing is shocking to a rational soul. These hopes and desires are not the effect of education; for, with a very few exceptions, they are found in all ages and countries. They arise not from self-conceit, or pride, or any extravagant passion; for the conscience of mankind approves them as innocent, laudable, and right: and they prevail most in those who are most re-
remarkable for virtue, that is, for the moderation and right government of their passions and desires. They must, therefore, take their rise from something in the original frame of human nature: and, if so, their author is God himself. But is it to be supposed, that he, who is infinitely wise and good, should have inspired his creatures with hopes and wishes, that had nothing in nature to gratify them? Is it to be supposed, that he should disappoint his creatures, and frustrate those very desires which he has himself implanted? The expectation of immortality is one of those things that distinguish man from all other animals. And what an elevating idea does it give us of the dignity of our nature!

461. Sixthly, it is remarkable, that the wisest men in all ages, and the greatest part of mankind in all nations, have believed that the soul will survive the body; how much soever some of them may have disfigured this belief by vain and incredible fictions. Now here is a singular fact, that deserves our attention. Whence could the universal belief of the soul's immortality arise? It is true, that all men have believed that the sun and starry heavens revolve about the earth: but this opinion is easily accounted for; being warranted by what seems to be the evidence of sense. It is also true, that most nations have, at one time or other, acknowledged a plurality of gods: but this is a corruption of an original true opinion; for it
is highly probable, nay, it appears from history, that believing in one God was the more ancient opinion, and that polytheism succeeded to it, and was a corruption of it. Now it is not at all surprising, that when a true opinion is introduced among mankind, it should, in ignorant ages, be perverted by additional and fabulous circumstances. But the immortality of the soul is not a corruption of an original true opinion; nor does it derive any support from the evidence of sense. It is itself an original opinion, and the testimony of sense seems rather to declare against it. Whence, then, could it arise?

462. Not from the artifice of politicians, in order to keep the world in awe, as some have vainly pretended: for there never was a time when all politicians were wise, and the rest of mankind fools: there never was a time when all the politicians on earth were of the same opinion, and concurred in carrying on the same design: there never was a time when all politicians thought it their interest to promote opinions so essential to human happiness, and so favourable to virtue, as this of immortality: and, in ancient times, the intercourse between nations was not so open as to permit the universal circulation of this opinion, if it had been artificial. To which, I may add, that mankind have never yet adopted any opinion universally, merely upon the authority of either politicians or philosophers. This opinion, there-
fore, must have arisen from a natural suggestion of the human understanding, or from a divine revelation communicated to our first parents, and by them transmitted to their posterity. In either case, this opinion will be allowed to be of the most respectable authority; and it is highly absurd and dangerous to reject it, or call it in question. Another argument is founded upon the unequal distribution of good and evil in the present life. This will be considered by and by.

463. Section III. What may be reasonably conjectured concerning a future state? First, from the wisdom and goodness of God, we may reasonably infer, that it will be governed, like the present, by established laws. What those may be, it is not for us to determine; but we may rest assured, that they will be wise and good. Secondly, from the different circumstances wherein we shall then be placed, and from the different beings with whom we shall then probably have intercourse, it may be inferred, that in a future state we shall be endowed with many new faculties, or, at least, that many faculties, now hidden and unknown, will then exert themselves. In our progress from infancy to mature age, our powers are continually improving, and new ones often appear and are exerted. We may therefore expect, that the same progression will be continued hereafter. It is true, we cannot now form any idea of faculties different
from those of which we have experience: but this argues nothing against the present conjecture. A man born blind has no notion of seeing, nor has an ignorant man any idea of those operations of the human mind whereby we calculate eclipses, and ascertain the periods of the planets: yet it would be absurd, in those who want these powers, to deny their reality or possibility.

464. Thirdly, as the future state will be a state of happiness to the good, we may reasonably conjecture, that it will be a state of society: for we cannot suppose it possible, for such creatures as we are, to be happy in perfect solitude. And if we shall then have any remembrance of present things, which is highly probable, there is reason to hope, and good men have, in all ages, rejoiced in the hope, that the virtuous will then know and converse with those friends, with whom they have been intimately connected in this world. This, we cannot but think, will be an addition to their happiness. But painful remembrances, of every kind, will, probably, be obliterated for ever.

465. Fourthly, the future state will be a state of retribution; that is, of reward to the good, and of punishment to the wicked. This is intimated by many considerations; which prove, not only that a future state, if there be one, will be a state of retribution, but prove also, that there will be a future state. Vice deserves punishment, and virtue
reward: *this is clear from the dictates of reason and conscience. In the present life, however, the wicked sometimes meet with less punishment than they deserve, while the virtuous are often distressed and disappointed. But, under the government of him, who is infinitely good and just, who cannot be mistaken, and whose purposes it is impossible to frustrate, this will not finally be the case; and every man must, at last, receive according to his works.

466. Further: good men have a natural hope, and wicked men a natural fear, in consequence of what they expect in the life to come. Those hopes and fears result from the intimations of conscience, declaring the merits of virtue, and the demerits of vice: and, therefore, as it is impossible for us to believe, that the dictates of conscience, our supreme faculty, are delusive or irrational, we must believe, that there is future evil to be feared by the wicked, and future good to be expected by the righteous. Even in this life there are signs of a retribution begun; whence we learn, that we are subject to the moral government of God, and that things have a tendency to retribution. Certain virtues, as temperance and industry, are frequently their own reward, and the opposite vices seldom fail to bring along with them their own punishment. Nay, sometimes, even here, the wicked are

* In what respects virtue is meritorious, will be afterwards considered.
overtaken with judgments of so peculiar a kind, that we cannot help ascribing them to a just providence. But the retribution here begun is not perfect. Perfect, however, under the government of a just and almighty being, it must be in the end. And, therefore, there will be a future state of most righteous retribution.

467. Fifthly, in a future life, the virtuous will make continual improvements in virtue and knowledge, and, consequently, in happiness. This may be inferred, from the progressive nature of the human mind, to which, length of time, properly employed, never fails to bring an increase of knowledge and virtue even in this world; and, from the nature of the future state itself, in which we cannot suppose, that any cross accidents will ever interfere to prevent virtue from attaining happiness, its natural consequence and reward.

468. Lastly, in the future state, virtue shall prevail over vice, and happiness over misery. This must be the final result of things, under the government of a being who is infinitely good, powerful, and wise. Even in this life, virtue tends to confer power as well as happiness: many nations of vicious men might be subdued by one nation of good men. There is hardly an instance on record of a people losing their liberty while they retained their virtue; but many are the instances of mighty nations falling, when their virtue was lost, an easy prey to the enemy. In this life, the natural
tendency of virtue to confer superiority is obstructed in various ways. Here, all virtue is imperfect; the wicked, it is to be feared, are the most numerous; the virtuous cannot always know one another; and, though they could, many accidents may prevent their union. But these causes extend not their influence beyond the grave; and, therefore, in a future state, happiness and virtue must triumph, and vice and misery be borne down.

469. This is a very brief account indeed, of the arguments that human reason, unaided by revelation, could furnish, for the immortality of the soul. All taken together amount to such a high probability, as can hardly be resisted by any rational being. Yet we must acknowledge, that, unassisted reason makes this matter only in a very high degree probable. It is the Gospel, which makes it certain; and which, therefore, may with truth be said to have brought life and immortality to light.
PART THIRD.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

470. MORAL philosophy treats of the cultivation of our active or moral powers. It has been defined, the science which explains our duty, and the reasons of it; and, more briefly by Dr. More, *Ars bene beateque vivendi.* As it would be neither easy nor expedient to keep the several divisions of the abstract philosophy entirely separate, I have not scrupled, in the former part of this summary, to anticipate some things which properly belong to this part, and which it is unnecessary to repeat. By the omission of these here, the extent of the science now before us will be contracted, as well as by this other consideration, that, as the most perfect system of duty is contained in holy writ, no person, who has had
Christian education, can be ignorant of morality. The chief points of it, and the more important speculations connected with them, I shall briefly illustrate, and endeavour to arrange in a scientific form: and this is all, perhaps, that can reasonably be expected, considering the shortness of the time, and the great number of subjects that fall within my province.

471. The word moral signifies, *of, or belonging to, manners*. Manners are human actions, or, rather, human habits acquired by action. But all human actions and habits are not of that sort which we call moral. Manual dexterity, bodily activity, and the exertions of memory and genius, are not, in themselves, either moral or immoral; for it is not from circumstances of this kind that we form an estimate of the human character, as dignified by the performance of duty, or debased by the neglect of it. An ingenious mechanic, a strong and active man, a person of lively fancy, or tenacious memory, may be the object of our esteem, disapprobation, or contempt, according as he applies his talents to a good, a bad, or an insignificant purpose. But moral goodness implies a regard to duty, and is always the object of esteem and approbation.

472. The common use of language requires, that a distinction be made between *morals* and *manners*: the former depend upon internal dispositions, the latter on outward and visible accom-
plishments. A man’s manners may be pleasing, whose morals are bad: such a man shews what is good in him, and conceals what is evil. They who in their manners are agreeable, and who also exert themselves in doing good, that is, in promoting happiness, are of good morals as well as of good manners. And to do good, or, at least, to wish to do good, and be ready to do it when opportunity offers, is in every person’s power, and every person’s duty: whereas, to have manual dexterity, a sound state of mind and body, great genius, great memory, or elegant manners, is not every man’s duty, because not in every man’s power. Those actions and habits, therefore, are properly called moral, or immoral, which are in the power of the agent, and which he knows to have an influence, favourable or unfavourable, on human happiness.

473. Some duties are incumbent on all men without exception, because tending to promote good in general. Other duties are incumbent on us in consequence of our connection with particular societies; because they tend to promote the good of those societies. To enumerate all the forms of society with which we may be connected, is impossible: but there are two, which may be considered as the most important, and with which every one of us either is, or may be, connected; and those are, a family, and a state or government. Hence moral philosophy may be divided into three
parts. The first, which I call ethics, treats of the morality of actions, as arising from the disposition of the agent, and as tending to promote good in general. The second, called economics, regulates human conduct, so as to make it promote the good of that family of which one may be a member. The third, which may, without impropriety, be termed politics, explains the nature of political or civil society, and the duties and rights of men with respect to it. A more minute, as well as more comprehensive, distribution of this science might be given: but, considering the limits within which our academical rules oblige me to confine myself, this may, perhaps, be thought sufficient.
474. Here we are to consider human actions as good or bad, according to the motives, principles, intentions, or dispositions, from which they proceed; and, according as they tend to promote good in general, or the contrary. In prosecuting this subject, I shall inquire, first, into the nature and foundation of man's moral goodness, that is, of human virtue; and, secondly, into the nature and foundation of particular virtues, or duties. The former may be called speculative ethics, and the latter practical ethics. Observe here, that the words virtue and duty have often, but not always, the same signification. He is a man of virtue who does his duty; he is a vicious man who neglects it: and modesty, humility, piety, benevolence, may be called either virtues, or duties. But, when called virtues, we consider
them as performed, or acquired; when called duties, we consider them as what it is incumbent on us to perform, or acquire. Accordingly, we call a good man, not a man of duty, but a man of virtue; because we mean a person who has actually done what he ought to do, or who has acquired those habits, or dispositions, which he ought to acquire: but a regard to duty, and a regard to virtue, are phrases nearly synonymous.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

475. This word, in its most general acceptation, denotes power, or ability. As applied to man, and characterised by the epithet moral (to distinguish it from other sorts of virtue, which will be specified afterwards), it signifies some quality, disposition, or habit, which fits a man for answering his end, that is, for living as he ought to live, and being what he ought to be; or, more explicitly, for living as the author of his nature intended that he should live, and being what the author of his nature intended that he should be.
But, can human reason discover what the author of nature intended in making men such beings as they are? Yes: reason can discover this, in the same way in which it discovers (and with the same degree of certainty), that an artist, in making a clock such a thing as we see it is, intended that it should measure time, and announce the hour. For what end was man made, is, therefore, the first inquiry in ethics. Till we know this, we cannot know what is suitable to his end, or what is unsuitable; that is, we cannot know what is his virtue, or what is not his virtue.

476. Human nature is a very complex object, and, confessedly, in a state of lamentable degeneracy. But neither from its degeneracy, nor from its complexity, can any reasonable supposition arise of the impossibility of discovering its end. From many appearances in a ruinous building, it might be easy to see the intention of the builder; whether he meant it for a church, or a storehouse, a dwelling for men, or a shelter for cattle. And a person moderately skilled in mechanics might find out the use of a very complex machine, even though every part of it were new to him; which, it cannot be pretended, that any part of human nature is to us. And when, from the structure and relations of the parts, the end of any system is fairly investigated, the complex nature of that system proves nothing against the certainty of the investigation, but is an argument for it.
477. Man was made for two ends, or purposes, action and knowledge. This will be readily admitted by every person who has observed, that all the powers of our nature fit us (as was formerly intimated) for action, for knowledge, or for both. That of these two ends action is the nobler, and that, by consequence, action is man’s chief end, will appear, when we consider, that our happiness depends rather on what we do, than on what we know; that extensive knowledge falls to the share of but few, whereas action is the business of all men; and that knowledge is valuable only as it serves to promote or assist action—those speculations being of no value, which can be applied to no practical purpose. Now we are capable of various sorts of action. The next inquiry, therefore, is, for what sort of action was man made?

478. We discover the end for which a system is made, by examining its fabric, or constitution. In this way one might find out for what end a clock or watch was made, though one had never seen or heard of such a thing before. But the mere knowledge of the parts, taken and examined separately, would not be enough; the wheels and pegs lying in a heap, or detached from one another, would, to a person unskilled in the art, convey no idea of a clock or watch, or of the use of either: they must be put together according to the intention of the maker, and examined in their connected state, and as operating on one another:
and that circumstance, in the structure, must be particularly attended to, that they are all subservient to, and regulated by, the balance, or the pendulum. Human nature, though not a machine, is a most curious system, more so than any other that this sublunary world can exhibit, and consists of many parts, or faculties, mutually operating upon, or influencing one another; one of which, in common language called conscience, has a natural supremacy over all the rest; as I shall endeavour to prove, when I have first given a brief account of this faculty. (§ 162).

479. Every man must be conscious, that he approves of some actions, because they seem to him to be good, and right, and what ought to be done; and disapproves of other actions, because he thinks them bad, wrong, and what ought not to be done. Now it is this faculty of conscience, that gives rise to these sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, and so enables us to distinguish between virtue and vice, between moral good and moral evil, between what is our duty and what is contrary to duty. This faculty is peculiar to rational nature; brutes have nothing like it: the being who is destitute of it we cannot consider as rational. It is this faculty which makes man capable of virtue, and, consequently, of happiness; for, without virtue, rational beings cannot be happy. Some modern philosophers are willing to believe, that of every human faculty the inferior
animals participate, in some degree; and, because a dog loves and fears his master, infer, that brutes are not quite destitute of moral and religious notions. With equal reason it might be inferred, because dogs bark at the moon, and wolves behold, or howl it, as Shakespeare says, (either reading will serve in this place), that they are also studious of astronomy.

480. Actions performed through compulsion, or against our will, conscience does not approve, even though they may tend to good; nor disapprove, though they may have an evil tendency: those only are approved as morally good, or disapproved as immoral, in the performance of which man is understood to be a free agent. Nor is it the action merely, that we either approve or disapprove. A man may kill another by accident, or may kill another by design; and, in both cases, the action may be the same; the firing of a musket may do either. But, in the former case, the manslayer may be entirely innocent; in the latter, he may be guilty of murder: for, in the latter, there may be a criminal purpose—in the former, there is, or may be, none. Our affections, therefore, dispositions, motives, purposes, or intentions, are the real objects of moral approbation or disapprobation.

481. The actions we consider as the signs and proofs of what was in the mind of the agent: for man cannot see the heart; and we call an action
immoral, or virtuous, according as it seems to us to manifest a criminal, or a virtuous intention. In our intentions themselves, though not exerted in action, there may be virtue, or there may be vice. He who intends to murder, is really, and in the sight of God, who knows the heart, a murderer: and he who does all the good he can, and wishes he were able to do more, is virtuous in proportion to the extent of his wishes, however small his ability may be.

482. In this notion of moral approbation, suggested to every man by his conscience, several notions, or sentiments, are comprehended, similar, indeed, in their nature, but which may be verbally distinguished. A generous, or good action, delights us when we think of it; and we say, that it is fit, right, and what ought to be done, and that he who has done it deserves reward or praise. A wicked action gives us pain when we think of it; and we say, that it is improper, wrong, and what ought not to be done, and that he who has done it deserves punishment or blame. These notions are universal among mankind. We are conscious of them in some degree, and frequently in a great degree, when the good or evil is done by others: we are conscious of them in a very great, and often in a most intense degree, when it is done by ourselves. A man's moral judgment, applied to the consideration of his own conduct, is, in common language, called his conscience; when
applied to the consideration of moral good or evil in general, it may be called the moral faculty; and has sometimes, both by modern and by ancient philosophers, been termed the moral sense. Disputes have been raised about the propriety of these appellations; but, if the thing be understood, the name is of small importance.

483. That this faculty is implanted in us as a rule of conduct, and has a natural right to regulate the whole human system, will appear from the following considerations. To counteract our bodily appetites; to abstain from food when we are hungry, from drink when thirsty, from any other similar indulgence when appetite stimulates, may be not only innocent, but laudable: but to counteract conscience, to neglect to do what the moral faculty declares to be incumbent, is always blamable. He had a craving for food, but would not eat, is a phrase which implies no censure; nay, a man might do so from a regard to health, in which case it would be praiseworthy: but, his conscience urged him to abstain, but he would not—intimates criminal behaviour; and no man is ever blamed for acting according to conscience, or praised for acting in opposition to it. Cases might be mentioned, in which every other sort of self-denial would be right; but to resist or disregard conscience, is, in all possible cases, wrong. Such is the opinion of mankind, especially of all wise and good men. The opinion, therefore, must be ra-
Consequently, the principle of conscience is naturally superior to our bodily appetites, and ought to regulate and control them.

484. Secondly, to prefer deformity to beauty, discord to harmony, bad imitations to good ones, Cowley to Milton, broad Scotch to the English of Addison, is only an instance of bad taste, which might be innocent, or indifferent; and the person who should do so might be a worthy man upon the whole: but to prefer an action which our own conscience condemns to another which it approves, to prefer fraud to honesty, malice to benevolence, blasphemy to devotion, impudence to modesty, is a proof of a bad heart, which every man of sense and virtue must condemn as worthy of blame, and even of punishment. Are not, then, the dictates of conscience more sacred, and of higher authority, than the principles of taste?

485. Thirdly, to act upon the supposition, that the three angles of a triangle are less than two right angles, or that the history of Julius Cæsar is a fable, or that the sun and starry heavens revolve round the earth, would be absurd, and a proof of ignorance; but might, possibly, be innocent: and a lawgiver would act foolishly who should prohibit, on pain of fine and imprisonment, the holding of such opinions. But to act upon a supposition, that what conscience dictates ought not to be done; that ingratitude and perjury are duties; or that piety to God, and benevolence to man, are
not incumbent, can never be innocent in any rational being. I do not say, however, that false opinions in matters of mere science are always innocent; I only say, that they may be so, and often are. But to act contrary to conscience, or to disregard its dictates, is always a proof of a wicked heart, and always blameable.

486. Fourthly, to gratify hunger and thirst, to prefer elegance to deformity, to act conformably to mathematical, historical, and physical truth, is right; but we do not suppose that a man deserves reward or praise for having done so. But when we do that which the moral faculty commands, and abstain from what it forbids, we are conscious, and all mankind acknowledge, that we deserve reward, or praise at least, which is a species of reward. He is a man of taste, an acute mathematician, an intelligent historian, skilled in astronomy, and rational in his political notions: all this is very well. A man, however, may be all this, who is impious, unjust, and intemperate; and who, of course, merits nothing from society, and can entertain no reasonable hope of happiness in the life to come. But he who acts in a conformity to moral truth, and obeys the dictates of his conscience, is entitled to the approbation and esteem of his fellow-creatures, and may, through the divine goodness, entertain the hope of future reward; though he be skilled very imperfectly, or not at all, in human sciences. Does not this prove, that.
there is inherent in the dictates of conscience a peculiar sanctity and supremacy, that distinguish them from the other suggestions of rational nature?

487. Fifthly, conscience often obtrudes itself upon us against our will, and in the midst of outward prosperity makes the sinner miserable, in spite of all his endeavours to suppress it: and it is never so keen in its reproaches as when a wicked person comes to die, and has nothing further to fear from man. To paint the horrors of a guilty conscience, some ancient poets have typified it by the image of a fury, brandishing a scourge made of serpents, and thundering condemnation in the ear of the criminal. A gnawing worm, that never dies, is a scriptural emblem of similar import. The images are strong, but not hyperbolical: for of all the torments incident to human nature, that of a guilty and awakened conscience is the most dreadful. Bad men have sometimes felt it so insupportable, as to make life a burden (see § 356); and good men will defy death, and torture, and distress of every kind, rather than do that which their conscience declares to be unlawful. Surely there must be something very peculiar in that faculty, which has so powerful an influence on the felicity of man, and can triumph so easily, and so effectually, over sublunary things. So high is the authority of conscience, in declaring the merit of virtue, and demerit of vice, that considerate men,
not finding that the one obtains a suitable reward, or the other an adequate punishment, in this world, have been led, even by the light of nature, to look forward to a future life of more perfect retribution.

488. Conscience, therefore, is our supreme faculty. We see that every other power of our nature ought to submit to it; and that it may be stronger than even our love of life, or horror of infamy. And when this is the case, all men acknowledge that it is no stronger than it ought to be, and has a natural right to be: whereas, if any other passion, principle, or propensity, were to gain such influence, or assume such authority, disorder would prevail in the mental system, and neglect of duty would discompose the procedure of human affairs. Even to the love of learning (for I speak not of criminal or debasing pursuits), if we were to sacrifice every other concern, we should justly incur censure. But too conscientious we can never be; the best of us are not sufficiently so; and if all men were as much so as they ought to be, nothing would be wanting to make society happy.

489. Conscience being proved to be the supreme regulating principle of human nature, it follows that virtuous action (see § 477) is the ultimate end for which man was made. For virtue is that which conscience approves; and what contradicts the supreme principle of any system, must
be contrary to the end of that system. It is true, that in most men for a little, and in bad men for a long time, conscience may lose its power, when borne down by evil habit, or tumultuous passion: even as the strongest man, by being kept long in fetters, may lose the use of his limbs; and as the most lively genius, if doomed to slavery, may sink into inactivity and stupefaction. But though conscience may lose its power, it still retains its authority, that is, its right to govern. A good king may be dethroned by the rebellion of a wicked subject, and may, for a time, be unable to enforce his own laws; but he still retains that right to govern, which is secured to him by the constitution of his country. He, however, may die without being restored: but sooner or later, in the next world, if not in this, conscience will resume its rights, and cover the guilty head with confusion.

490. We act, therefore, according to the end and law of our nature, when we act according to conscience. By doing so, we may, and, indeed, often must, control our inferior appetites; but then we promote the happiness and perfection of our whole nature. So a medicine may do good to the whole body, though it be offensive to the taste, or even to the stomach. By complying with an appetite in opposition to conscience, we may obtain a slight gratification; but then we introduce disorder and unhappiness into our nature, and
make it more imperfect than it was before. So things may please the palate, and give momentary comfort to the stomach, which yet have poisonous qualities.

491. And now, we see in what respects a life of virtue may be said to be, what some ancient moralists called it, a life according to nature. The indulgence of any natural appetite may be called a natural indulgence; but, to act suitably to the dictates of the moral faculty, is according to the general tendency of our whole nature, because agreeable to the supreme principle of the human system. Some vices may be called natural; because there are in us passions that prompt to them, and a principle of corruption, or degeneracy, that urges our compliance: but no vice can be said to be according to our whole nature; because nothing is so, but what conscience, our supreme regulating principle, approves. What pleases the palate may hurt health, and be therefore pernicious to the human constitution. That only can be called natural food, which preserves, or promotes the health of the whole body.

492. Yet, it has been said, that a life of virtue is a life of mortification and warfare. And nothing is more true; notwithstanding that, upon the whole, such a life must be the most happy. The nature of man is miserably corrupted. Criminal passions crave indulgence; and it requires great efforts to resist them: criminal habits must
be overcome; and this is a work of long and difficult labour. Things, that by their agreeable qualities attract our notice, and engage our liking, often prove a snare; and it requires incessant watchfulness to keep aloof from them, or, when they fall in our way, to prevent their gaining on our affections. The best men fall into transgression, which, in a good man, is always followed by repentance; and repentance, though most salutary in its effects, is attended with great anguish of mind. How many dangers and disappointments must they encounter who engage in active life! Yet such a life is incomparably happier than security, with idleness. Even so, virtue may be a warfare; but it is, upon the whole, happy as well as honourable, and never fails to be crowned with victory and eternal peace. Vice is a warfare too; but it is neither honourable nor happy, and, necessarily, ends in shame and punishment.

493. We may further learn, from what has been said, how foolishly those men argue, who give way to all their passions without reserve, and excuse themselves by saying, that every passion is natural, and that they cannot be blamed for doing what nature prompts them to do. The fallacy of this plea must be very apparent to those, who, in their notions of man, can distinguish between the whole and a part. Partial indulgence may, no doubt, be obtained by gratifying criminal propensity; as a man may please his palate while he is
swallowing poison: but every indulgence is unnatural, or, at least, improper, which disorders the moral system, by counteracting its supreme regulating principle. From the wheels of a clock, or watch, if you take off those restraints whereby the motion is made regular, the wheels must move irregularly. Such motion you may, if you please, call natural; because it is natural for bodies to move according to the force that impels them: but such motion you cannot call right, or agreeable to the purpose of the maker, because it is not governed by that principle which was intended to controul and regulate the whole machine.

494. Few sentiments are more familiar to the human mind than this, that vice deserves punishment, and virtue reward. But, to prevent mistakes, it is necessary to add, that, in strict propriety of speech, our virtue is meritorious with respect to our fellow-creatures only. Considered in his relation to the Supreme Being, man, when he has done his best, is an unprofitable servant. To enter into some particulars on this subject.—Life is, by all men, accounted a great blessing; for, in the general intercourse of the world, few things are more valued than that which supports it. Now life is a blessing, which the Deity confers on his creatures gratuitously: we cannot say that our virtue gives us a title to it, or is an adequate return for it. Our reason, conscience, susceptibility of happiness, and capacity for virtue, are all the
free gift of God: and who can imagine that there is merit in having received what has been given us? If we abuse his benefits, we deserve punishment; if we make a right use of them (which no man of sense will say that he does), we do nothing more than what is incumbent on us in consequence of our having received them, and for which our enjoyment of them is more than an adequate recompence.

495. Besides, virtue, even in this life, obtains very considerable gratifications. It obtains peace of mind, and an approving conscience; blessings, more precious than life. It generally obtains the esteem of good men, and some degree of respect even from the worthless: the advantages whereof will be allowed to be great by those who consider, that good reputation, which alone can procure us the esteem of others, is, by every generous mind, accounted invaluable. Now, let it not be forgotten, that this peace of mind, esteem of good men, and respect from all men, are the result of laws established by our beneficent creator, for the comfort of the virtuous in this world of trial. These are high privileges: for what other terrestrial consolations would a wise man exchange them?

496. It is to be observed further, that all human virtue is very imperfect; and that the best man on earth can scarce be said to pass a day, without violating the divine law in thought, word, or deed. There are hardly any human actions, how virtuous
soever they may seem, and how meritorious soever with respect to our fellow-creatures they may be, of which the agent, if a man of sense, will not readily acknowledge, that they must, in the sight of the creator, appear tainted with imperfection; and that we have always reason to pray, with humility and contrition, that God would pardon what is wrong, or wanting, even in our best performances. We all know, that criminal habits pervert the understanding, and debase the moral faculty; and that we have contracted many evil habits, which, with proper attention, we might have avoided, and are, of course, accountable for those debasements and perversities which are owing to our inattention, and for all the errors and follies thence resulting.

497. Now, since all human excellence is so defective; since even the best men are so great offenders; and since the advantages that virtue may enjoy, even in this life, are so important; what man is there who can say, that his virtue in titles him to receive any other rewards from that God whom he is continually offending; to whose goodness he is every moment under unspeakable obligations; and, compared with whose consummate purity, all human attainments are in the proportion of weakness to omnipotence, of finite to infinite, of time to eternity! From the placability of our judge, who knows our frailty, reason, unenlightened by revelation, might, perhaps, encour-
rage the penitent to hope for pardon; but, to
pardon a criminal, and to receive him into favour,
are different things: and what proportion is there
between human virtue, debased as it is with vice
and with error, and a state of never-ending felici-
ty in the life to come? Can we merit such a
reward?—we, whose goodness, if we have any,
is, even in this world, rewarded beyond what it
deserves!

498. These speculations might lead into a laby-
rinth of perplexity, if it were not for what revela-
tion declares concerning the divine government.
It declares, that man may expect, on the perform-
ance of certain conditions, not only pardon, but
everlasting happiness; not on account of his own
merit, which in the sight of God is nothing, but
on account of the infinite merits of the Redeemer;
who, descending from the height of glory, vo-
luntarily underwent the punishment due to sin,
and thus obtained those high privileges for as
many as should comply with the terms announced
by him to mankind. So much for the supremacy,
and general nature, of the faculty of conscience.

499. It was hinted, and partly proved, that
man's chief happiness results from virtue. A
more explicit proof of this point may now be
proper, and is as follows.—If we could at once
gratify all the propensities of our nature, that
would be our highest possible happiness, and what
we might call our *summum bonum*, or chief good.
But that cannot be; for our propensities are often inconsistent, so that if we comply with one, we must contradict another. He who is enslaved to sensuality, cannot at the same time enjoy the more sublime pleasures of science and virtue: and he who devotes himself to science, or adheres to virtue, must often act in opposition to his inferior appetites. The ambitious man cannot labour for the acquisition of power, and taste the sweets of indolence at the same time: and the miser, while he indulges himself in the contemplation of his wealth, must be a stranger to the pleasures of beneficence. The gratification of all our appetites at once, is therefore impossible. Consequently, some degree of self-denial must be practised by every man, whether good or bad, by the ruffian as well as the saint, the sensualist as well as the hermit: and man's greatest possible happiness must be, at least in the present state, not a complete gratification of all our propensities, but the most comprehensive gratification of which we are capable. Now some pleasures conduce more to happiness than others, and are therefore more important than those others. And if we sacrifice a less important to a more important one, we add to our sum of happiness; and we take away from that sum, when we sacrifice a more important pleasure to one of less importance.

500. In forming a judgment of the comparative importance of gratifications, the following
maxims may be safely admitted. First, some are of greater dignity than others, because more suitable to our rational nature, and tending more to improve it: the pleasures of the glutton, or the miser, are surely of less dignity than those which we derive from the discovery of truth, from the study of nature, or from the performance of a generous action. Pleasures, therefore, which have more dignity, are preferable to such as have less. And it will be readily allowed, in the second place, that a more intense pleasure is more valuable than one that is less intense; and that such as are not attended with pain are better than those that bring pain along with them. Thirdly, considering the manifold evils of life, it will hardly be doubted, that pleasures which alleviate distress are preferable to those that do not; and that those which give a relish to other pleasures are better than such as make others insipid. Fourthly, durable gratifications are preferable to such as are transient; and those that do not please on reflection, are of less value than those that do. Fifthly, some grow more insipid the more we are used to them, others continually improve upon repetition; the last are undoubtedly preferable. And, lastly, those which may be had at all times, and in all places, must contribute more to happiness, than such as depend on circumstances, and are not in our own power.

501. If we be satisfied of the truth of these re-
marks on the comparative value of human gratifications, and we can hardly call them in question, if we allow experience to be a rational ground of knowledge, we must also be satisfied, that of man's chief good, or greatest possible happiness, the following is a just character. It must be something that gratifies the more dignified powers of his nature; yields intense pleasure, unmixed, and unaccompanied, with pain; alleviates the calamities of life; is consistent with, and gives a relish to, other pleasures; is in itself durable, and pleases on reflection; does not pall upon the sense, but grows more exquisite the more we are accustomed to it; is attainable by every man, because dependent on himself, and not on outward circumstances; and is accommodated to all times and places. Now, every gratification, whereof human nature is capable, may be comprehended under one or other of these three classes: the pleasures of outward sense; the pleasures of imagination and intellect, that is of taste and science; and the pleasures that result from the right exercise of our moral powers. Let us see then in which of these classes we are likely to find our chief good, or greatest felicity.

502. First, That the pleasures of sense contribute not a little to our comfort, and that some of them are not momentary, is acknowledged. But they are confessedly, at least in the opinion of all the enlightened part of mankind, the lowest grati-
fications of our nature; for no man ever yet became respectable by attaching himself to them. They often bring disgust and even pain along with them; they please not upon reflection; and they tend to disqualify us for the nobler delights of science and virtue. They depend not on ourselves, but on other things and persons; they are attainable in certain circumstances only; and we lose all taste for them in adversity. To them therefore the character of man's chief good is not applicable.

503. Secondly, The pleasures of imagination and science have great dignity; the pursuit of them is honourable, though it may run to excess; and they are consistent both with moral and with sensual gratification, and in an eminent degree friendly to the former. They are not momentary; they please upon reflection; and they grow more exquisite by being frequent. But they do not alleviate the calamities of life: and so far are they from being accommodated to all times and places, that by all the uninstructed, that is, by the greater part of the human race, they are absolutely unattainable. Consequently, the character of man's chief good does not belong to them.

504. Thirdly, The delights that arise from the right exercise of our moral powers, and from the approbation of conscience, are of all gratifications the most dignified: the more a man attaches himself to them, the more respectable he becomes, and it is not possible for him to carry such attach-
ment to excess: with disgust, or with pain, they are never attended: they give a relish for other pleasures, by preserving the mind cheerful, and the body in health: they are not inconsistent with any innocent gratification, that is, they are consistent with all pleasures except those which bring pain and misery: they please intensely on reflection; are a perpetual source of comfort in adversity; become more exquisite the more we are accustomed to them; are within the reach of every man, high and low, learned and ignorant; are suited to all times and places: and, so long as we retain our rationality, it is not in the power of malice or of fortune to deprive us of them. To virtue, therefore, which is the right exercise of our moral powers, the character of man's chief good does belong; which will appear still more evident when we consider, that the hope of future felicity is the chief consolation of the present life, and that the virtuous alone can reasonably entertain that hope. As, on the other hand, vice, in the most prosperous condition, is subject to the pangs of a guilty conscience, and to the dreadful anticipation of future punishment; which are sufficient to destroy all earthly happiness.

505. I am far from adopting, in its literal sense, that maxim of the poet, 'Virtue alone is happiness below.' For though I say, with the Peripatetics, that virtue is the chief good, I do not say, with the Stoics, that it is the only good. That a
virtuous man in health and prosperity may be happier than a man of equal virtue beset with adversity and disease, I see no reason to doubt; and if so, health and prosperity are good, and disease and adversity evil.—Besides, if destitute of the hope of immortality, the mind of a good man (especially if he were a man of sensibility and penetration) would not be happy in this world, but would, on the contrary, be a prey to perplexity and anguish. Such a man would be perpetually shocked with the confusion which would then appear in the universe, and of which he could foresee no end. The world to him would seem to be governed by a being, whose power was indeed great, but whose justice and goodness were not equally conspicuous. It is the belief of a future state of retribution that satisfies the rational mind of the infinite rectitude of the Divine government; and it is this persuasion only, that can make the virtuous happy in the present life. And as we could not, without revelation, entertain a well-grounded hope of future reward, it is only the virtue of the true Christian that can obtain the happiness we now speak of.

506. Virtue being the chief good of individuals, it is hardly necessary to add, that it must be the chief good of society. For of individuals society is made up, and that is the happiest society in which there is most private happiness. We cannot conceive a community, or a nation, to be pro-
sperous, if the people who compose it are miserable. Kingdoms in every age have been flourishing and happy no longer than they maintained their virtue.

507. And now it appears, that virtue is founded in our constitution, and agreeable to our whole nature, of which indeed it is the perfection; that it must therefore be conformable to the will of him who is the author of our nature; and that it is the only means of making mankind truly happy. Vice, consequently, is contrary to our whole nature, and tends to debase and destroy; it is contrary to the will of God, and contrary to our own interest. I conclude the chapter with the following description, every part of which will be found to have been enforced and illustrated by the foregoing reasonings. 'Moral virtue is a disposition of the mind, voluntary and active, agreeable in itself, and praiseworthy, incumbent on all men, and tending to improve our whole nature, and promote our happiness both here and hereafter.' So much for the general nature of virtue. I shall proceed to the practical part of Ethics, when I have made a few miscellaneous observations.
CHAPTER II.

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.

508. The word *Virtue*, like many other abstract terms, has great latitude of signification. Often it denotes power or agency; as when we speak of the virtues of a plant or mineral. Sometimes it means that which makes a thing good or agreeable: thus perspicuity, simplicity, correctness, and harmony, have been called the virtues of a good style. The Romans by the word *virtus* frequently signified valour and public spirit, because they held these qualities in peculiar esteem. The same term is used to signify any quality, or perfection of qualities, which fits a thing for answering its end; and, in this sense, has been applied not only to the moral, but also to the intellectual, and even to the corporeal part of our constitution. Hence human virtues have been distinguished into *Corporeal*, as health, strength, swiftness, &c. *Intellectual*, as genius, learning, wit, humour, eloquence, &c. and, *Moral*, as temperance, justice, benevolence, piety, &c.

509. Every rational being must see, that these last are quite different from corporeal and intellectual.
tual abilities, and that the preceding reasonings and description are applicable to moral virtue alone. This is valuable for its own sake, and always tends to happiness; and every man may be, and ought to be, possessed of it. But intellectual and corporeal accomplishments, though they give pleasure, and may even raise admiration, are not valuable on their own account; nor valuable at all, unless they promote moral goodness. They are not the objects of choice, and therefore cannot be said to be incumbent on mankind. They may be employed in doing evil; in which case they make a man more odious than he would have been without them. For what should we think of him, who would employ his learning or eloquence in perverting the principles of others, or his bodily strength in destroying their lives.

510. It is true, we ought to do every thing in our power for the improvement of our nature in all its parts. But this is moral virtue, or is not moral virtue, according to the intention with which it is done. If we endeavour to improve ourselves, because we consider it as our duty, and that we may have it in our power to be useful, we act virtuously; if we do the same thing, in order to qualify ourselves for doing harm to others, we act viciously. Besides, to have naturally a weak judgment, a bad memory, a narrow capacity, or a sickly constitution, makes one the object not of blame, but of pity; for these things are not in our
power, and every man would be without them if he could: but to want honesty, benevolence, justice, or piety, is always criminal, and deserves blame and punishment.

511. Aristotle and the Peripatetics, following perhaps the notions of Pythagoras, who wished to reduce every thing to number and proportion, gave it as a general character of virtue, that it consists in mediocrity, μεσοτης, or a middle between two extremes; one of which is criminal from excess, and the other from deficiency. This doctrine may be of use in the conduct of life, and will be found to hold true in many respects. It seems to be warranted by common opinion: ‘the middle way is best,’ is a proverb with us, as medio tutissimus ibis was with the Romans. But it does not hold universally, as Aristotle himself acknowledges. Love to God, and good will to man, cannot become vicious through excess; because they never can be excessive. The same author held, as was formerly observed, (§ 263) that virtue consists, not in transient acts, but in settled habits or dispositions; whence the word ἐξης, or habit, occurs in many of his definitions of the virtues. Some idea of his method of arranging this subject may be formed from the following brief remarks.

512. He considered all virtue as resolvable into the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude. Prudence is a habit of mediocrity, enabling us to act reasonably in re-
gard to those things that are good or evil; and it includes these three particulars. First, a habit of acting at all times with consideration; the vicious defect is rashness; the blameable excess is that mean-spirited caution, which keeps a man inactive and irresolute. Secondly, prudence includes a habit of judging rightly of the true nature of those good or evil things that may prompt us to action: the defect is folly: for the excess we have no name. But folly, when unavoidable, as it sometimes may be even in the wisest men, cannot be accounted blameable, though we must allow it to be an imperfection. Nor can a habit of right judgment be carried to excess. Nay, right judgment, so far as it depends not on ourselves, but is the gift of nature, cannot be called a moral virtue. And Aristotle himself names it among the intellectual virtues.

513. Prudence includes, thirdly, a habit of discovering the proper means for attaining good ends. Cunning is said to be the excess, and imprudence the defect. But imprudence, if owing to a weak judgment, is no vice at all; for we cannot help it: cunning, as it seeks to gain its ends by secret and unfair means, is rather an abuse, than an excess of prudence; and a habit of discovering the best means for accomplishing good purposes can never be carried to excess. Here observe, that, though the Peripatetics and Stoics treated, in their systems of duty, of intellectual as well as moral vir-
tues; because they considered both as necessary to form a perfect character, and thought it their duty to improve their whole nature, so as to make themselves useful and agreeable; yet they never thought of confounding, as a late writer endeavoured to do, moral virtues with intellectual. The distinction is expressed in the clearest terms, by Aristotle in the beginning of his Ethics, and by Cicero in his fifth book de finibus honorum et malorum.

514. Justice is said to consist in the middle between doing and suffering injury; as in the case of a man selling a piece of goods for as much as it is worth, and no more; for, were he to take less, he would injure himself, and, were he to take more, he would injure the buyer. But to suffer injury by another's injustice is no fault, but a misfortune; and therefore, except in some particular cases, justice is not the medium between two criminal extremes.—Justice is twofold, namely, general or strict justice, which consists in observing the laws, and the aim of which is public good; and particular justice or equity, which aims at the good of individuals, and is then observed, when one obtains no more good, and suffers no more evil, than is agreeable to humanity and common sense. Justice is also divided into distributive and commutative: the former respects reward and punishment; the latter regulates the ordinary dealings of men with one another.
515. Justice implies many virtues. It implies liberality, or mediocrity with respect to the use of wealth; the defect is avarice, the excess prodigality. It implies veracity, or adherence to truth; the one extreme is said to be dissimulation, when one conceals what is true; the other simulation, when one pretends what is false. But these two opposite extremes are not criminal in the same degree, at least in many cases. To conceal what we know to be true may sometimes be innocent, and sometimes even laudable; as in the case of our being bound by oath or promise to do so. Nor is simulation always criminal; to compose a sick person's mind, or pacify a madman, one may without blame say what one does not think. Justice further implies fidelity to promises, and to the trust reposed in us: the defect is unfaithfulness: the excess has no name, nor needs any; for one cannot be too faithful. Justice implies also such a regard to the rights of our fellow-creatures as prevents our doing them wrong. The defect is injury; the excess needs not a name, because it never happens.

516. Fortitude is a habit of mediocrity relating to fear and confidence. Its object is evil. It consists in being not insensible to evil, but superior to it. Now there are evils which we ought to fear and guard against; namely, the evil of vice, and such other evils as it is in our power to prevent. Aristotle therefore rightly determines, that evils which
depend on ourselves are not the objects of this virtue. Fortitude requires, that we should not be afraid without reason: the excess is fool-hardiness; the defect is called panic; unreasonable and unaccountable fear being by some of the ancients ascribed to the influence of the god Pan. Fortitude, when its object is real danger, may be called intrepidity: the excess is also termed fool-hardiness, the defect is cowardice. When its object is pain, fortitude is called patience; the extremes are said to be impatience on the one hand; and insensitivity on the other. But insensitivity to pain is no vice at all; and therefore patience, though a virtue, is not the middle between two extremes. Fortitude in regard to labour is activity; the excess restlessness, the defect laziness. Fortitude, when injury is its object, is forbearance; the one extreme is implacability, an odious and inhuman vice; the other may be called stupidity, which, though an imperfection, is not criminal, because it depends on constitution, and not on free-will. See more on this subject § 339, &c.

517. Temperance is a habit of mediocrity respecting those appetites which man has in common with the brutes; as eating, drinking, sleep, &c. and consists in having moderate desires, and being satisfied with moderate gratifications. The defect is intemperance; which those men are guilty of, who are either immoderate in the use of sensual pleasure, or uneasy in the want of it. Excessive
temperance cannot be reckoned a fault, unless when it goes so far as to injure health, and when a man means to injure his health by it: a circumstance, which may have happened, but is not likely to be frequent.

518. The Stoics divided moral philosophy into two parts, the speculative and the practical. In the former they inquired into the general nature of good and evil: in the latter, they explained the several duties incumbent on mankind in the various conditions of life. The former is illustrated by Cicero in his five books de finibus bonorum et malorum, concerning the boundaries of good and evil; the latter in his three books of moral duties, de officiis. In this last treatise he examines the five following questions; the first and second in the first book, the third and fourth in the second book, and the fifth in the third book: First, what is virtue, honestum? Secondly, of two given virtues which is the greater, or more important? Thirdly, what is utility? Fourthly, of two given utilities which is the greater? Fifthly, can virtue and utility ever be inconsistent? in other words, can it ever be a man's interest to violate or neglect his duty? This last question, though he does not discuss it with so much precision as could be wished, he very properly determines in the negative.

519. Virtue, honestum, belongs, not to things inanimate, or to brutes, but to man. It must therefore be founded in those parts of the human
constitution which are peculiar to man, and distinguish him from inferior beings. Accordingly, Cicero, having finished his introduction, begins his inquiry into the nature of virtue, by drawing a comparison between man and irrational animals. He observes, that all animals have some qualities in common, as a desire of self-preservation, of avoiding pain, of gratifying hunger and thirst and other natural appetites, and a certain degree of attachment to their young. But man, he says, differs from other animals in these four respects.

520. First, man is rational, desirous and capable of knowledge, and a lover of truth; whence arises, according to our author, the virtue of prudence. Secondly, man is a social and political being; who wishes, not only to live in society, and convey his thoughts to others by means of speech, but also, that the society in which he lives should be moulded into a certain form, and governed by political institutions or laws. Hence arises social virtue, which is the second of the great virtues, and which the author subdivides into justice and beneficence. Thirdly, man loves liberty, and naturally aspires after excellence and pre-eminence; yet is conscious of legal authority, and willing to submit to it: on this peculiarity in man's nature Cicero founds the third great virtue of magnanimity or fortitude. Lastly, man has a sense, which brutes have not, of elegance, order, and propriety, not only in things external and visible, but
also in the thoughts and emotions of the mind. And hence, we are told, arises temperance or modesty, the fourth of the great virtues. Into these four, prudence, social virtue, fortitude, and temperance, the whole of human virtue, may be resolved; according to the doctrine of the Stoics, as explained by Cicero in his books de officiis.

521. It may be proper, before we proceed to Practical Ethics, to offer a few brief observations on some points relating to the moral faculty, which have been made matter of controversy among philosophers.—Some have maintained, that moral approbation is an agreeable feeling, and nothing more; and that moral disapprobation is merely a disagreeable feeling. The truth is, that moral approbation is both an agreeable feeling, and also a determination of judgment or reason; the former following the latter, as an effect follows the cause. For the conduct of others, or of ourselves, would not give us an agreeable feeling, if we did not first judge it to be right; nor any painful feeling, if we did not first judge it to be wrong. Feelings and determinations of judgment frequently accompany each other: and sometimes, as in the case just now mentioned, the judgment precedes the feeling, and gives rise to it; and sometimes the feeling precedes and gives rise to the judgment; as in the case of our judging, that external things, because they affect our senses in a certain way, (that is, raise in us certain feelings), do really exist, and
are what they appear to be. In popular language feelings and judgments are too often confounded; but they are not the same. Feelings distinguish what is animated from what is inanimate; judgments, what is rational from what is irrational. In other words, all animals feel, rational beings alone can judge. Previously to their acquiring the use of reason, human creatures are not considered, by either the moralist or the lawgiver, as moral beings: which would hardly be the case, if moral approbation and disapprobation were understood to be feelings merely, and not also exertions of rationality.

522. Sensations and sentiments should also be distinguished, though they too have been confounded by some modern writers. Opinion, notion, judgment, is the true English meaning of sentiment, which of course implies the use of reason. Of moral sentiment, therefore, we may speak with strict propriety; but moral sensation is not proper English: and yet, if the suggestions of the moral faculty were understood to be mere feelings, it would seem captious to object to it. In French the word sentiment has greater latitude of signification than in English; and this may have led some of our writers into a licentious use of that term. It may be added, that the same word has been, and often is, used in another peculiar sense, to denote an opinion or thought which greatly affects or
interests us. This, too, is an innovation in our language, and seems to have given rise to various modes of expression, which, though we frequently see and hear them, it is not easy to explain. We have heard, not only of men and women of sentiment, (where perhaps the word may mean taste or delicacy), and of sentimental men and women, (which I know not whether I understand); but also of sentimental tales; and, what is yet more extraordinary, of sentimental journeys; which I think should be advertised in the same paragraph with philosophical razors.

523. Conscience, like every other human faculty, and suitably to the whole analogy of animal and even of vegetable nature, arrives at maturity by degrees, and may be either improved by cultivation, or perverted by mismanagement. In our early years, it is improved by moral precept and good example; and, as we advance in life, by habits of consideration, and a strict adherence to truth and our duty. By different treatment; by want of instruction, bad example, inconsiderate behaviour, neglect of duty, and disregard to truth, it may be perverted, and almost destroyed. From this, however, we are not warranted to infer, as some have done, that it is not a natural faculty, but an artificial way of thinking superinduced by education; nor suppose, that opposite habits, and opposite modes of teaching, would have made us disapprove virtue and approve vice, with the same
energy of thought, wherewith we now disapprove vice, and approve virtue.

524. For, let it be observed, that even our outward senses may be made better or worse, by good or bad management. Excessive light, or too long continuance in darkness, may hurt our eyes irrecoverably; and, from a companion who squints, it is neither difficult nor uncommon to learn a habit of squinting: fever may destroy taste and smell: even touch, or any other faculty, may be depraved by those disorders which we call nervous; and which, by injudicious conduct, in regard to food, study, or exercise, any man may bring upon himself. Those powers also, which I took the liberty to call (perhaps not very properly) secondary senses (see § 162), may, in like manner, be either debased;—a musical ear, for example, by continually hearing barbarous music; and a taste for elegance and sublimity, by long acquaintance with vulgar manners, vulgar language, and bad company: or improved;—the former, by hearing and studying good music; and the latter, by reading such books, and keeping such company, as may make good manners, good language, and elegant writing, familiar to us. Yet it cannot be denied, that the external senses are original faculties of our nature: it cannot be denied, that there is in man, if in any degree enlightened, a capacity of distinguishing between beauty and deformity, meanness and dignity, grossness and de-
elicacy, dissonance and harmony: nor can it be denied, that these distinctions have as real a foundation in nature, as any other that can be mentioned.

525. Even reason itself (which, if we have any original faculties, is surely one of them), is subject to the same law of habit, as the means of improvement or of debasement. How different is this faculty in its cultivated state, as it appeared in Newton, Clarke, Butler, (for example), or as it appears in any man of learning and good sense, from the unimproved understanding of a peasant, who can hardly follow the shortest train of reasoning; or from the still ruder intellect of a savage, who has never been accustomed to argumentation at all! What care is taken, by judicious parents and teachers, to improve both the moral and the intellectual powers of children! Yet it will not be said, that reason is merely an artificial thing, a way of thinking superinduced by education; or that human beings could, by the most artful management, be taught to mistake the plainest truth for falsehood, or the most glaring falsehood for truth. Ignorant people believe many things which are not true; and may, no doubt, by those who can infuse prejudice, or work upon the passions, be prevailed on to acquiesce in very gross absurdities: reason, in short, as well as sense and conscience, may be artificially, or may be accidentally, perverted to a certain degree; and, in some minds,
even to a great degree. But a total perversion of these faculties, needs not be apprehended. The most ignorant man will never, if he is not an idiot, be induced to reject the evidence of sense, to disbelieve the existence of the material world, to think all human actions equally right or equally wrong; or, in general, to doubt the truth of what is self-evident, or of what, by a few words of argument suited to his capacity, has been in his hearing demonstrated to be true.

526. To prove that moral sentiments are merely the effect of education, some authors have taken pains to collect, from the history of both civilized and savage men, a detail of singular customs and institutions, which are accounted lawful in some countries, and criminal in others. Something of this kind was attempted by Locke, in the first book of his Essay on human understanding. His examples, however, though they were all unexceptionable, could prove nothing more, than that conscience is liable to be, in some degree, influenced by habit; which nobody denies: but would be far from proving, that it is wholly subject to that influence. But of those examples it might easily be shewn, that some are so bare of circumstances, that they prove nothing; that some are quoted from writers of doubtful authority; and that some, when fairly stated, will be found to prove just the contrary of what they are brought to prove. Till the motives whence men act be
known, one cannot, with certainty, determine whether they be actuated by a good or a bad principle: and to detect the motives of those savage men, of whose customs and language little or nothing is known except to themselves, would, in most cases, be difficult, in many, impossible; and require a degree of sagacity which few travellers possess, or are solicitous to attain.

527. Besides, it is a true as well as an old observation, that most travellers are fond of the marvellous; few of them having that candour, humanity, and philosophical acuteness, which so eminently distinguished that ornament of his country and profession, the incomparable James Cook. And I fear it is no less true, that, in an age so addicted to paradox as the present, too many of the readers of travels may be well enough pleased to see the licentious theories of modern Europe, countenanced by reports from the extremities of Asia. We should, therefore, as long at least as this mode of thinking remains in fashion, be cautious of admitting with implicit faith the first accounts, that may be circulated among us, of the immoralities said to prevail in remote nations. Some particulars of this sort, which appeared in a late collection of late voyages, have already, if I am not misinformed, been declared on good authority to be unwarrantably exaggerated: but, even supposing the worst accounts to be true, we shall not find that they prove virtue an indeter-
minate thing; or the moral faculty a bias, either artificially or accidentally, impressed upon the mind by education and habit.

528. We may with good reason suppose, that in savage life moral notions must be few, the sphere of human action and human intellect being there extremely limited. In childhood we see the same thing happen among ourselves, even where the mind has been, in some degree, expanded by education. But if savages have any moral notions at all, they are not destitute of a moral faculty. And if there be friendship among them, or natural affection, or compassion towards one another, there must also be mutual confidence, gratitude, goodwill, and some regard to equity; virtues which cannot be where moral principle is not. Nor can any thing favourable to the opposite side of the question be inferred from their untowardly treatment of strangers, even of such as visit them with benevolent purposes; for it is very natural for them to mistake strangers for enemies; and it is melancholy to consider how often they have found them so. And if they be, as probably they all are, enslaved more or less to superstition, the immoralities and other absurdities thence resulting, need not raise wonder; for superstition ever was, and ever will be, productive of absurd and immoral behaviour.

529. Against the doctrine here maintained, of conscience being, as well as reason, a natural fa-
culty implanted in man by his creator, it is no argument, that, where the objects of duty are unknown, or where mistakes are entertained concerning their nature, man must be liable to misapprehend his duty with respect to those objects. The objects of duty are, the Deity, our fellow-creatures, and ourselves. Give a rational being right notions of these, and his moral faculty will not permit him to be ignorant of the duty he owes them. Convince him, for example, that God is infinitely wise, powerful, good, and holy, the source of happiness, and the standard of perfection; and he cannot fail to know (whether his practice be conformable or not) that it is his duty to love, fear, and obey so great and glorious a being. Teach him, on the contrary, that there are many gods, some capricious and foolish, others a little more intelligent, some as weak and wicked as men, not one of them free from imperfection, and not a few infamously profligate, and you will make him have the same absurd notions which the heathen vulgar formerly had, of the duties that men owe to those gods. Is this occasioned by a depravity of conscience, or by a total want of that faculty? Is it not owing to an understanding perverted by misrepresentation and ignorance?

530. Consider the following case, which, if not exactly, is nearly parallel. With the bodily eyes we cannot perceive what is situated beyond our sphere of vision; and through an impure, or un-
equal medium, we must see things discoloured, or distorted. This does not prove, either that we have no eyes, or that they are fallacious: nor does this prove, that it is education, or habit, which teaches men to see rightly, or to see wrong. For, without making any change on the visual organ, without subduing any evil habit or prejudice of education, and merely by purifying the medium, and bringing the objects within our sphere of vision, we see them at once in their natural colours and proportions. Similar mistakes, with respect to social virtue and the duties of self-government, may be either infused into the mind, by false information concerning the nature and end of man, or removed and rectified, by counteracting false information, and enforcing true. Now, of the divine nature, of the end for which men are sent into this world, of their relation to God and their fellow-men, and of the dispensations of providence with respect to their present and future state, the heathen world were very imperfectly informed; much more imperfectly indeed, than many of them might have been, if they had rightly improved the rational and moral faculties that had been given them. Need we wonder then at the imperfection of the best systems of pagan morality? Need we wonder that pagan nations, according as they make a better, or a worse use of their mental powers, are some of them more, and others less, enlightened with the knowledge of moral truth?
531. Nor is it any objection to the present doctrine, that all sorts of wickedness are perpetrated in civilized nations. This is a proof, that there the moral faculty has not so much power as it ought to have; but this does not prove, that there the moral faculty does not exist, or is entirely borne down by fashion and bad example. My argument requires me to speak here, not of the performance, but of the acknowledgment, of duty: and no body needs be informed, that men well instructed in all the duties of life, act, too often, contrary to the dictates of their conscience, and the known will of God. *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*, is a confession which even the best men have frequent occasion to repeat. But while the faults of individuals are condemned by the general voice of a nation, or of the unprejudiced and considerate part of mankind, that general voice is prompted by the suggestions of a moral faculty, which, in spite of bad example, licentious opinion, and absurd education, has been able to retain both its authority, and its power. And the conscience of the criminal himself, however thoughtless or hardened he may be for a time, seldom fails, sooner or later, to bear such testimony against him, as he finds it misery to endure, and an impossibility to evade.

532. Were it necessary to bring further evidence, of conscience being not an artificial, but a natural, way of thinking, and that moral senti-
ments are among men as prevalent and permanent as rationality itself, I might remark—that philosophers (real philosophers I mean), however they may have differed in their speculative notions concerning the foundation of morality, have not often disputed concerning the merit and demerit of particular virtues and vices; that in writings composed by the wisest men of remote antiquity, and under the influence of governments and manners very unlike ours, moral notions are exhibited and exemplified, similar to, and in many particulars the same with, our own; that in ancient poems and histories we seldom find those personages proposed as patterns for imitation whom we disapprove, or those actions condemned which we consider as meritorious; and, that, though it might seem possible for us, after undergoing a certain course of discipline, to choose modes of life extremely different from those in which we have been educated, it seems not possible for us to reconcile our minds to such characters as Nero, Herod, Catiline, Muley Ishmael, &c. I may add, that moral sentiments seem to be necessary to the very existence of society; that no association of human beings, in which, invariably, that should be believed to be virtue which we account vice, and that to be vice which we account virtue, could subsist for a single day, if men were to do what in that case they would think their duty; and that, by consequence, wherever human societies are es-
tablished, we may warrantably conclude that moral distinctions are there acknowledged. I do not say, that any particular moral principle is innate, or that an infant brings it into the world with him: this would be as absurd as to say, that an infant brings the multiplication table into the world with him. But I say, that the moral faculty which dictates moral principles, and the intellectual faculty which ascertains proportions of quantity and number, are original parts of man's nature; which, though they appear not at his birth, nor for some time after, even as the ear of corn is not seen till long after the blade has sprung up, fail not however, provided outward circumstances be favourable, to disclose themselves in due season.*

533. Much has been said, by writers on casuistry, concerning the merit or demerit of those actions which proceed from an erroneous conscience; that is, which are authorized by a conscience so perverted by education or habit, as in a particular case to approve what is wrong, or dis-

* This, and the ten preceding paragraphs, contain the general principles of a treatise on the Universality of moral sentiment, written in 1767. Some of the reasons which then hindered me from prosecuting the subject to its full extent, I have given elsewhere. Others, that have prevented the prosecution of it since, might be mentioned. But the detail of these it would be painful to write, and not pleasant to read: therefore I suppress them. See an Essay on truth, page 137, quarto edition: and see the preface to Dissertations moral and critical, printed in London 1783.
approve what is right. On this subject volumes might be written, and a thousand difficulties supposed, which, probably, will never take place in fact: but the whole matter, as far as it may be expressed in general terms, amounts to little more than this. It is man's duty, not to debase his reason by prejudice, nor his moral faculty by criminal practice; but to do every thing in his power to improve his nature, and particularly to obtain, in all matters that affect the conscience, the fullest information. If the person who has done this shall mistake his duty after all, the error is unavoidable, and he is not to blame. But if he has not taken due pains to obtain information, or to improve his moral nature, he has no right, at least in ordinary cases, to urge the plea of an erroneous conscience. In fact, men seldom do so: which is a proof that, when we do evil, our conscience seldom fails to inform us, that it is evil which we are doing.

534. It has been the opinion of some respectable writers, that no action or affection is morally good, unless it have a benevolent tendency. And it is true, that every virtue tends to public as well as private good; and that whatever is done with a view to promote happiness, without doing injury, is well done, and a proof of goodness in the agent. It is also true, that every act of virtue, even the most secret that we can perform, tends eventually to the good of others; either by diffusing hap-
ness immediately, or by improving our nature, and consequently making us more useful and more agreeable members of the community. But there are in the world many men, whose minds, from natural weakness, or other unfavourable circumstances, have always remained in an uncultivated state; and who, therefore, must be very incompetent judges of public good, as well as of the tendency of their actions to promote it. Yet, if such men are industrious and sober, honest in their dealings, and regardful of their duty, it would be very hard to refuse them the character of virtuous men.

535. Every moralist allows, that there are duties which a man owes to himself: in the deepest solitude we are not exempted from religious and moral obligation. For if a man were in the condition in which, according to the fable, Robinson Crusoe is said to have been, and confined for many years in a desert island, without having it in his power to do either good or harm to others of his species, he would, according to the measure of rationality that had been given him, be as really a moral being, and accountable to God and his conscience for his behaviour, as if he were in the most crowded society. In such a solitude, it would be in his power to be in various ways virtuous or vicious. He might impiously repine at the dispensations of providence, or he might acquiesce in them with thankfulness and humility. He might
lead a life of industry, or abandon himself to idleness and all other sensualities that were within his reach. He might envy the prosperity of others, and amuse himself with laying plans for their destruction; or pray for their happiness, and wish for opportunities of promoting it. In a word, benevolence is not the only virtue: but I admit, that there can be no virtue without it.

536. The stoics, who were much given to wrangling, and in many things affected to differ from popular opinion, maintained, that all virtues are equally meritorious, and all vices equally blamable. As one truth (said they) cannot be more true than another, nor one falsehood more false than another, so neither can one vice or virtue be greater or less than another vice or virtue. As he who is a hundred miles from Rome is not more really out of Rome than he who is one mile from it, so he who has transgressed the bounds of innocence is equally a transgressor, whether he has gone a great way beyond them, or a little way. Some crimes, however, they allowed to deserve a heavier punishment than others; but that, they said, was owing, not to the comparative greatness of one crime above another, but to this consideration, that one crime might be more complex than another. For example: he who murders a slave is as really a murderer as he who commits parricide: but the former is guilty of one injurious act, the other is guilty of many; the one has killed a
man; the other has killed a man, has killed his parent, has killed his benefactor, has killed his teacher.*

537. Such a tenet may be useful to declaimers; as one may argue long, and plausibly, in behalf of it: but plausible declamation is of no weight, when counterbalanced by the general opinion of mankind, as warranted by conscience and reason. What would be thought of a lawgiver who should declare every violation of the law a capital crime; or who, because some transgressions are venial, should grant pardon to every transgressor? The best man on earth is every day guilty of sins of infirmity; but who will say, that all the sins of this sort, which a good man commits in the course of a long life, are equal in guilt to one single act of treachery or cruelty! Every vice is, indeed, blameable; and every virtue, which it is in our power to perform, we ought to perform: but it may be presumed, that the possible degrees of guilt, which one may incur even by single acts of transgression, are as many as the possible degrees of punishment; and that the possible degrees of virtue are as various as the possible degrees of reward. Though all men are sinners, yet some are highly respectable on account of their goodness: and there are crimes so atrocious, perjury for example, that one single perpetration makes a man

* Cic. Paradox. See Hor. Sat. i, 3.
infamous. The Scripture expressly declares, that, in the day of judgment, it will be more tolerable for some criminals than for others; and not obscurely insinuates, that the future examination of the righteous will be in proportion to their virtue.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE NATURE AND FOUNDATION OF PARTICULAR VIRTUES.

Every duty has an object; and the objects of duty are, the Deity, our fellow-creatures, and ourselves. Into three classes, therefore, man's moral duties may be divided.

SECTION I.

Of Piety, or the Duties we owe to God.

538. The first part of piety is, to form right notions of God, as the greatest, wisest, and best of beings. All men, who are capable of reflection, must be sensible, that this is a matter of infinite importance: for if our opinions concerning him are erroneous, our sentiments of the duty we owe
him will be so too, and our whole moral nature must be perverted. Every considerate person, therefore, will be careful to obtain the fullest information possible with respect to the divine existence and attributes. To be indifferent about this, which is beyond comparison the most important part of knowledge, is inexcusable; and the ignorance is criminal which proceeds from such indifference. And if ignorance of God was without excuse in some ancient heathen nations, as the Scripture warrants us to believe, it must be highly criminal in us, who, both from reason and from revelation, have the best means of knowing what God is, and what he requires us to believe concerning him. How far the deplorable condition of many of the human race, with respect to false religion, barbarous life, and an exclusion hitherto unsurmountable from all the means of intellectual improvement, may extenuate, or whether it may not, by virtue of the great atonement, entirely cancel the imperfection of those to whom, in this world, God never was, or without a miracle could, be known, we need not inquire. It is enough for us to know, that for our ignorance we can plead no such apology; and that the righteous judge of all the earth will never impute to his creatures misfortune and misery, which they neither did bring upon themselves, or could avert when brought; especially that greatest of all misfortunes, invincible ignorance of God and their duty.
539. The second part of piety is, to cherish right affections suitable to those right notions of the divine nature. These affections are, veneration of his infinite and incomprehensible greatness; adoration of his wisdom and power; love of his goodness and mercy; resignation to his will; gratitude for his innumerable and inestimable benefits; a disposition to obey cheerfully all his laws; fear, in the apprehension of his displeasure; joy, in the hope of his approbation; and a desire to imitate him as far as we are able, and, with well-meant, though weak endeavours, to second the purposes of his providence, by promoting the virtue and happiness of our fellow-creatures. They who believe in the infinite goodness, greatness, wisdom, justice, and power of the supreme being, will acknowledge, that these glorious attributes do naturally call forth, and ought reasonably to call forth, the pious affections above mentioned; and that, not to cultivate those affections, or to encourage evil passions inconsistent with them, must be, in the highest degree, criminal and unnatural.

540. A third part of piety is worship; or the outward expression of these pious affections in suitable words and behaviour. Of this great duty, I observe, in the first place, that it is quite natural. Good affections, when strong, as all the pious affections ought to be, have a tendency to express themselves externally: where this does not appear, there is reason to apprehend that the affections are
weak, or wanting. If a man is grateful to his benefactor, he will tell him so; if no acknowledgments are made, and no outward signs of gratitude manifest themselves, he will be chargeable with ingratitude. When we admire the wisdom, and love the goodness, of a fellow-creature, we naturally shew him respect, and wish to comply with his will, and recommend ourselves to his favour; and we speak of him, and to him, in terms of esteem and gratitude: and the greater his wisdom and goodness, the more we are inclined to do all this. Now, God's wisdom and goodness are infinite and perfect; and, if we venerate these attributes as we ought to do, it will be neither natural nor easy for us so to conceal that veneration, as to prevent its discovering itself externally. It is true, that the omniscient being knows all our thoughts, whether we give them utterance or not: but, if expressing them from time to time in words is by him required of us as a duty; if it is beneficial to ourselves; and if, as an example, it has good effects on our fellow-men; no argument can be necessary to prove the propriety of the practice.

541. Let it therefore be considered, that worship, properly conducted, tends greatly to our improvement in every part of virtue. To indulge a pious emotion, to keep it in our mind, to meditate on its object, and with reverence and in due season to give it vocal expression, cannot fail to strengthen
it: whereas, by restraining the outward expression, and thinking of the emotion, and its object, seldom and slightly, we make it weaker, and may, in time, destroy it. Besides, the more we contemplate the perfections of God, the more we must admire, love, and adore them, and the more sensible we must be of our own degeneracy, and of the need we have of pardon and assistance. And the wishes we express for that assistance and pardon, if they be frequent and sincere, will incline us to be attentive to our conduct, and solicitous to avoid what may offend him. These considerations alone would recommend external worship as a most excellent means of improving our moral nature. But Christians know further, that this duty is expressly commanded; and that particular blessings are promised to the devout performance of it. In us, therefore, the neglect of it must be inexcusable, and highly criminal.

542. It being of so great importance, we ought not only to practise this duty ourselves, but also by precept and example, avoiding however all ostentation, to encourage others to do the same. Hence one obligation to the duty of social and public worship. But there are many others. One arises from the nature and influence of sympathy, by which, as formerly observed (§ 221), all our good affections may be strengthened. To join with others in devotion tends to make us devout, and should be done for that reason. Besides,
public worship, by exhibiting a number of persons engaged, notwithstanding their different conditions, in addressing the great father of all, and imploring his mercy and protection, must have a powerful tendency to cherish in us social virtue, as well as piety. The inequalities of rank and fortune, which take place in society, render it highly expedient, and even necessary, that there should be such a memorial, to enforce upon the minds of men, that they are all originally equal, all placed in the same state of trial, all liable to the same wants and frailties, and all equally related; as his accountable creatures, to the supreme governor of the universe. Hence let the mean learn contentment, and the great humility; and hence let all learn charity, meekness, and mutual forbearance.

543. By associating together men are much improved both in temper and understanding. Where they live separate, they are generally sullen and selfish, as well as ignorant: when they meet frequently, they become acquainted with one another's characters and circumstances, and take an interest in them; acquire more extensive notions, and learn to correct their opinions, and get the better of their prejudices: they become, in short, more humane, more generous, and more intelligent. Were it not for that rest which is appointed on the first day of the week, and the solemn meetings which then take place for the purposes of social worship and religious instruction, the
labours of the common people, that is of the greatest part of mankind, would be insupportable; most of them would live and die in utter ignorance, and those who are remote from neighbours would degenerate into barbarians. Bad as the world is, there is reason to think it would be a thousand times worse, if it were not for this institution; the wisdom and humanity of which can never be sufficiently admired; and which, if it were as strictly observed as it is positively commanded, would operate with singular efficacy in advancing public prosperity, as well as private virtue.

544. It is our duty to be devout, not at certain times only, but at all times; that is, to be constantly sensible of our dependence on God, of the mercies we every moment receive from him, of the gratitude, obedience, and resignation due to him, and of our being continually in his presence. These sentiments, habitually cherished in our minds, would very much promote our virtue and happiness; by keeping us at a distance from criminal pursuits, and giving an exquisite relish to every innocent pleasure. Let it not be supposed, that words are essential to devotion. Every day, indeed, they may be necessary to assist devotion, and render pious sentiments so definite and so comprehensive, as to impress upon us with energy the several parts of our duty. But pious emotion may rise in the mind, when there is no time for
utterance; or when words, by savouring of ostentation or hypocrisy, might be very unseasonable.

545. The vices, I should rather say, the crimes opposite to piety, and destructive of it, are atheism, impiety, superstition, and enthusiasm. On the atrocious nature of the first, I made some remarks already (§ 407). It is either a disbelief of, or an attempt to make others disbelieve, the divine existence and attributes: the former may be called speculative atheism, the latter is practical atheism: both imply hardness of heart, and perversion of understanding; the latter implies also incurable vanity, and malignity in the extreme. It has been doubted, whether any rational being can be really an atheist; and I should be inclined to think speculative atheism impossible, if I had not met with some, and heard of more, instances of practical atheism: which last, though both are very great, is undoubtedly the greater enormity of the two, and, perhaps, the greatest of which man's nature is capable.

546. Impiety consists in neglecting to cultivate pious affections; or in cherishing evil passions of an opposite tendency; or in being guilty of such practices, by word or deed, as may lessen our own or other men's reverence of the divine attributes, providence, or revelation. If we neglect the means of cultivating pious affection, it is a sign that in us piety is weak, or rather wanting; and that we are
regardless of our own improvement, and insensible to the best interests of mankind. Want of pious affection is a proof of great depravity. When infinite goodness cannot awaken our love, nor almighty power command our reverence; when unerring wisdom cannot raise our admiration; when the most important favours, continually and gratuitously bestowed, cannot kindle our gratitude; how perverse, how unnatural must we be! In order to guard against these and the like impieties, we shall do well to meditate frequently on the divine perfections, and on our own demerit, dependence, and manifold infirmities. Thus, we may get the better of pride and self-conceit, passions most unfriendly to piety; and form our minds to gratitude, humility, and devotion. But, instead of this, if we cherish bad passions of a contrary nature, or allow ourselves in impious practice; if, at any time, we think unworthily of our creator; if we use his name in common discourse without reverence; if we invoke him to be the witness of what is false or frivolous; if we practise cursing and swearing, or any other mode of speech disrespectful to his adorable majesty; if by serious argument we attempt the subversion of religious principles; or if, by parody or ludicrous allusion, we endeavour to make scriptural phraseology the occasion of merriment. In any of these cases, we too plainly shew, that our minds are
familiarized, more or less, to impiety, and in great danger of utter depravation.

547. Superstition and enthusiasm, as they arise from the same cause, that is, from false opinions concerning Deity, are to be removed by the same means, namely, by correcting those false opinions, and establishing true. They differ in this, however, that the former is more apt to infect weak and timorous minds, and the latter, such as are proud and presumptuous; and therefore the cure will not be complete, unless there be infused into the distempered soul, animation and comfort in the one case, and humility and modesty in the other. Superstition assumes different appearances, according to the diversity of those false opinions which men may entertain of invisible beings; and as the varieties of falsehood are innumerable, those of superstition must be so too.

548. To think that the world is governed by a being, or by beings, capable of deriving gratification from vengeance, and from making inferior natures unhappy, produces one hideous form of superstition, wholly enslaved to cruelty and fear, which prompts the poor idolater, in order to pacify his demons, to the most absurd and unnatural mortifications, or even to the murder of human creatures, under the denomination of sacrifice. To suppose that God takes pleasure in particular doctrines, that contradict the clearest intimations of
reason, produces a superstitious zeal in promoting such doctrines, with contempt, hatred, or perhaps persecution of those who refuse to say that they believe them. To imagine, that he admires or approves what some vain mortals term magnificence, produces another kind of superstition, that delights in pageantries, processions, and the like mummeries, which raise the wonder of children, and of men who think like children. To believe, that he governs the world, not by his own eternal rules of rectitude, but by caprice and humour, which are perpetually changing; and admits other beings, and some of the most contemptible that can be conceived, to share with him in that government; makes men superstitious in regard to dreams, omens, witches, spectres, enchantments, and other ridiculous things, which can never have any influence on a mind thoroughly convinced, and seriously considering, that he rules all nature, and that without his permission nothing can happen. But it were endless to enumerate the varieties of superstition. The history of man affords too many examples. Let it be our care to fortify our minds by a steady belief in the one true God; and by cherishing that humble cheerfulness, perfectly consistent with pious fear, which arises from being resigned to his will, and satisfied that all his dispensations are wise and good.

549. Enthusiasm, when the word denotes, as it often does, elevation of mind, ardour of fancy, or
keenness of attachment, may be not only innocent, but laudable: seldom has any great undertaking been accomplished without it. The enthusiasm here to be considered, as detrimental to piety, is a presumptuous conceit, which some weak, arrogant, and selfish people have entertained, of their being holier than others, and more the favourites of heaven. This turn of mind, which has also been called spiritual pride, is productive of many hateful passions and perversities; of uncharitableness, contempt of virtue, and a spirit of persecution. No man is truly pious but he who is humble, distrustful of himself, anxious to do good to others, and willing to think of them as favourably as possible. We cannot be too much on our guard against vice, and can hardly blame it too severely in ourselves; but our abhorrence of it should never make us abhor our fellow-creatures. We have no right to consider any of them as renounced by heaven. Though their wickedness be great, (and we are not always competent judges of its magnitude), it is our duty to believe that God, while he supports their lives, is willing to be reconciled to them; as he allows them the opportunity of repentance.

550. Many are the considerations that should move us to compassion and charity towards our unhappy brethren who fall into vice. How can we know, at least, in many cases, whether, in the moment of transgression, they enjoyed the full
use of their rational faculties? or how judge of the strength of their passions, or the precise nature of the temptation? Perhaps they have not had the means of so good education as may have fallen to our lot, or of keeping so virtuous company as we have kept. How do we know, in short, whether, if we had been all along in their circumstances, and they in ours, their conduct would not have been as good as ours, or even better, and ours as bad as theirs, or even worse? As to our own supposed attainments in moral goodness—the moment we are conscious of any degree of pride on account of them, we may be assured they are not genuine. The further a man advances in real virtue, the more he will feel and regret his own imperfection, and the more candid and charitable he will become in judging of other men.

SECTION II.

Of Social Virtue; or the Duties which Men owe to one another.

551. Of our passions, and other active principles, some prompt us to do harm to one another, and others to do good: social virtue consists in restraining and regulating the former, and cherishing the latter. Of the former sort is resentment,
or sense of injury; a passion, innocent it itself, because natural; and useful, because it makes men stand in awe of one another; but apt to become criminal by excess, or by being otherwise perverted. Too keen a sense of injury, to be more offended than it is reasonable we should be, is one abuse of resentment, and frequently arises from pride, in which case it is very blameable: when owing, as it sometimes is, to a peculiar irritability of nerves, the effect of bad health perhaps, or of misfortune, it is less faulty; but ought, however, to be guarded against, because it gives pain to others, and makes a man unhappy in himself. A worse abuse of resentment is revenge; which, as has been already shewn, would, if generally practised, introduce endless confusion, without answering, at least, in civilized society, any one good purpose. Other abuses of resentment are, passionateness and peevishness, which also have been taken notice of, (see § 364). Among Bishop Butler's Sermons there is an excellent one upon resentment, to which, for further particulars, I refer the reader.

552. Opposite to all abuses of resentment are, good nature, an amiable virtue; and forgiveness, a virtue not amiable merely, but sublime, and godlike. He who is possessed of these virtues will find, that they contribute, in a very high degree, to his peace, interest, and honour, even in this world: without them, in the next, no happiness is
to be expected; our religion having most emphatically declared, that unless we forgive others we cannot be forgiven. Few tempers are less respectable, than the unforgiving and litigious; who easily take offence, and would prosecute every injury to the utmost; or who are gratified by giving others that trouble, for which they think the law will not punish them. A modern poet* has the following sentiment, and is applauded for it by a modern sophister.—'Virtue, for mere 'good-nature is a fool—is sense and spirit with 'humanity.' It might have been said, with equal propriety and precision, 'Virtue—is Greek and 'Latin with humanity.' Sense and spirit, Latin and Greek, may no doubt serve as auxiliaries to virtue, but they may also promote the purposes of vice; and are, therefore, neither moral virtues, nor parts of moral virtue. And if good-nature be folly, what shall we say of ill-nature? Is it wisdom? Or what shall we say of good men (for they are all good-natured)? Are they fools? It would be difficult to mention a case, in which a man's character, on our being told that he is good-natured, would be lowered in our esteem. The contrary never fails to happen, except, perhaps, among bullies, and other barbarians.

553. That principle, which restrains malevolent passions, by disposing us to render to every one

* Armstrong.
his own, is called justice: a principle of great extent, and which may not improperly be said to form a part of every virtue; as in every vice there is something of injustice towards God, our fellow-men, or ourselves. As far as our fellow-men are concerned, the great rule of justice is, 'Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them:' a precept, which, in this its complete form, we owe to the Gospel; and which, for its clearness and reasonableness, for being easily remembered, and, on all occasions, easily applied to practice, can never be too much admired. Veracity, adherence to promises, discharge of trust, and all the duties comprehended in fidelity, or faithfulness, are parts of justice, and are to be regulated by this divine rule.

554. Of the second class of social duties, which consist in the indulgence of those affections that incline us to do good to others, the first is, to cherish benevolence, charity, or love, to all mankind without exception. We are all by nature brethren, placed in the same, or in similar, circumstances, subject to the same wants and infirmities, endowed with the same faculties, and equally dependent on the great author of our being; we cannot be happy but in the society of one another; and from one another we daily receive, or may receive, important services. These considerations recommend the great duty of universal benevolence, which is not more beneficial to others
than to ourselves; for it makes us happy in our own minds, and amiable in the eyes of all who know us; it even promotes bodily health, and it prepares the soul for every virtuous impression: while malevolent passions debase the understanding, harden the heart, and make a man disagreeable to others, and a torment to himself. A second duty of this class is compassion, or that sympathy which prompts us to relieve the distresses of one another: and a third is gratitude, which makes us anxious to requite the favours we may have received. Of these I have formerly spoken. Good men are entitled to peculiar love and esteem. He who does good to one person, from a benevolent principle, lays an obligation on the whole species; for he shews that he has the interest of mankind at heart, and he sets a good example. Our love of good men, therefore, partakes of the nature of gratitude: to be destitute of it is a proof of such depravity, as even profligates would be ashamed of.

555. Patriotism, or love of our country, has, in all ages, under free governments at least, been accounted a sublime virtue. It is natural, and extensively useful; for, as Cicero well observes, all those charities, all those affections of good-will, which we bear to relations, friends, and benefactors, are comprehended in it.* It elevates the

* De Officiis, i, 17.
mind, and promotes generosity, fortitude, benevolence, and a sense of honour. Even by the ties of gratitude we are bound to defend, as far as we are able, the government that has protected us and our fathers. The best proof that people in private station can give of love to their country is, to promote peace, and set an example of piety, industry, and moderation. A vicious, selfish, or turbulent man has nothing of this love, however violent his pretensions may be.

556. It becomes us to have a particular regard for those who are connected with us by kindred, by friendship, by neighbourhood, or as members of the same society. This is natural; for we are apt to contract attachments to those whom we see often, or with whom we have intercourse: and it is beneficial; as it promotes the good of small societies, whereof the great community of mankind is made up. But neither this, nor even the love of our country itself, should ever interfere with the still greater duty of universal benevolence. A stranger, nay an enemy, is entitled to our good offices: 'If thine enemy be hungry, feed him; if thirsty, give him drink.' It is our duty to defend our country, and maintain its laws and liberties; even as it is incumbent on each individual to take care of himself, of those who depend on him, and of those whom he has it in his power to protect from injury: but neither individuals, nor nations, have any right to
raise themselves, by injuriously pulling others down.

557. The last of these duties to be mentioned at present (for some of them have come in our way formerly, and others will hereafter), is the natural affection of parents and children; which in a greater or less degree prevails through the whole of animated nature, with some exceptions in those irrational tribes, where it is not necessary to the preservation of the young. I express myself improperly, when I mention this as a duty, and at the same time speak of irrational animals as possessed of it: it is a duty in those only who have a sense of duty, that is, who are endowed with a moral faculty. Natural affection is in brutes an instinct merely; a very amiable one, it must be acknowledged to be, but nothing more: in rational animals it is both an instinct and a duty; and, when exerted in action, a virtue. Human infants are far more helpless, and much longer so, than any other young animals, and require much more education; for they must be trained up, not only for animal life, and taught how to support themselves in the world (all which the brutes know by instinct), but also for a right performance of the many duties incumbent on them as rational and immortal beings. In the human species, therefore, natural affection is, and ought to be, peculiarly strong, and to continue through the whole of life. In other animals, it lasts while the young.
are unable to provide for themselves, and, for the most part, no longer.

558. Unless when exerted in unfavourable circumstances, or in a very exemplary manner, (and these peculiarities enhance the merit of any virtue), the performance of this duty is not considered as a proof of great moral goodness; the motives to it being almost irresistible. But, for the same reason, the neglect of it incurs the heaviest censure. An unnatural parent is a character that raises not only disapprobation, but horror; nor less odious is an undutiful child: indeed it is not easy to determine, which of the two is the more detestable. The former counteracts one of the best and most powerful instincts of animal nature, is at no pains to avert perdition from those whom he has been instrumental in bringing into the world, and manifests a total disregard to the good of society, which would soon become a chaos of misery, if parents were not attentive to the great duty of educating their children. The undutiful child hardens his heart no less against the calls of natural affection; shews that he can hate his best friends, and be ungrateful for the most important favours; and is guilty of the most barbarous cruelty, in wounding the sensibility, and blasting the hopes of a parent, to whom, in the emphatic language of a poet who understood human nature, 'a serpent's tooth is not so sharp as to have a thankless child.' To which I may take the li-
berty to add, that of the undutiful children whom it has been my misfortune to see, or hear of, not one ever came to good.

SECTION III.

Of the Duties which a Man owes to himself.

559. It is every man's duty to avoid idleness, to follow some useful calling, and to take care of his life and health. All this we owe to society, as well as to ourselves: for self-preservation is one of our most natural and most powerful principles; and without activity there can be no happiness; and without industry neither individuals nor society can prosper. Industry is always praiseworthy; common degrees of it, however, are not highly praised: it is generally considered as its own reward, its natural effects being competency and convenience. The motives to it, therefore, are so powerful, and withal so obvious to every person of sense, that in complying with them there can be no extraordinary merit. Idleness being, in like manner, its own punishment, and generally accompanied with want, disease, and contempt, is the object of pity, as well as disapprobation; and when these have the same object, the former mitigates the latter. We blame idleness, we despise the man who is enslaved to it, and keep at a dis-
tance from him; but, for the most part, do not entertain towards him those emotions of indignation, which rise within us on hearing of cruel, ungrateful, or perfidious behaviour.

560. Uncommon industry, however, or extreme idleness, give greater energy to our moral sentiments. They who labour incessantly, and more than their own wants require, in improving useful arts, are entitled to general admiration and gratitude. To such persons statues have been erected, and other public honours decreed; and, in the days of idolatry, even divine honours have been paid. Such industry comprehends many virtues; activity, rational self-love, superiority to sensual indulgence, benevolence, patriotism, and a desire to make the best use of the talents, and other blessings, conferred by providence on mankind. The reverse of all this must be imputed to that man, who, deaf to every call of honour and friendship, of social love and natural affection, abandons himself to sloth; and can bear to see his dependants miserable, his friends in affliction, and himself infamous and useless, rather than disengage himself from that shameful habit. Such a man, though he should not be guilty of those enormities that draw down the vengeance of human law, must have in him so much evil, that it is impossible not to consider him as a criminal of the first magnitude. The compassion, which his wretchedness may extort from us, he does not de-
serve: for it will generally be found, that persons of this character derive from their idleness, and even from their infamy, every gratification they wish for; and that they rather glory in their vileness, than are ashamed of it.

561. This topic, so interesting to young people, I cannot dismiss without further illustration. So active a being is the human soul, that, in the opinion of many philosophers, it can never rest. Certain it is, that without employment it cannot escape misery; and that, if it employ not itself in good, it will in evil. To the welfare of both the soul and the body activity is essential. Man was made for labour; and they who do not take to it from necessity, must either use it for recreation, in the way of hunting, riding, walking; or must pine in indolence, a prey to melancholy and disease. A sluggish body is always unhealthy; a lethargic mind is always unhappy. In the higher ranks of life, people who are neither engaged in business, nor anxious to improve their minds by study, are often put to hard shifts in their attempts to kill the time, and keep away troublesome thoughts. They have recourse to feasting, drinking, gaming; they employ themselves in receiving and retailing scandal, and the lies, which they call the news, of the day; or in a perpetual hurry of visits, that promote neither friendship nor rational discourse; or in running to shows, and other scenes of dissipation; and too frequently, it is to
be feared, in pursuits still more criminal, in seducing their fellow-creatures to infamy and ruin. I appeal to any man of sense, whether it would not have been better, both for their souls and bodies, in this world as well as in the next, if they had laboured all their days to earn a livelihood? and whether the condition of the honest plowman, or industrious mechanic, is not, in every respect, more happy, and more honourable; more free from danger and disappointment; and less exposed to the tyranny of unruly passion, and unsatisfied appetite?

562. Idleness, at any period of life, is dangerous to virtue; but, in youth, is more to be dreaded than at any other season: and, therefore, it is peculiarly incumbent on young persons to guard against it. For in youth the active powers are awake and restless, and will prompt to evil, if a sphere of operation is not prescribed them within the limits of innocence. In youth the passions are turbulent, and the love of pleasure strong; and as experience and knowledge are scanty, and foresight superficial, men want many of those monitors to caution and rectitude, which are the usual attendants of riper years. In youth the mind yields easily to every new impression, and to those in particular that promote intemperate emotions. In short, in youth men are headstrong, fickle, vain, self-sufficient, averse to consideration, intent on the present moment, regardless of the future,
and forgetful of the past; and therefore more in danger from temptation, and from idleness. I mean not to write a satire on youth, or to say that from the above account there are no exceptions: I know there are many. But I need not hesitate to affirm, that idleness in youth is never followed by a respectable old age. Habits then contracted take deep root; and habits of inattention it is almost impossible to eradicate.

563. Another duty which a man owes both to himself and to society, is temperance, (see § 517). Merely to be temperate requires no great effort; which makes intemperance (considering its consequences, whereof no person can be ignorant) the more inexcusable. Men, habitually intemperate, justly forfeit the esteem of their fellow-citizens; because they disqualify themselves for every duty, and prepare themselves for the violation of every law: for, whether they become stupid by gluttony, or frantic with drunkenness, they shew themselves equally insensible to the dignity of their nature, and to the calls of honour and duty. Savage and half-civilized people are addicted to these vices; which, as men improve in arts and manners, become more and more unfashionable. This, however, is not equally the case in all civilized countries.

564. The Athenians loved wine and dancing; the Romans, in their better days, were temperate and sedate. Cicero says, in his oration for Mu-
rena, that no man dances who is not either drunk or mad: and it is remarkable, as the same author in another place observes, that of an entertainment the Greek name \((\text{symposium})\) denotes \textit{drinking together}, and the Latin name \((\text{convivium})\) \textit{living together}. In the Symposium of Plato, at which Socrates, and other distinguished characters, are said to be present, it is proposed to enter on some philosophical inquiry, in order to avoid excess in drinking: and, before the end of the \textit{compotation}, Alcibiades comes in very noisy, and very drunk; and Aristophanes shews, by repeated hiccoughs, that he had both drank and eaten too much. In some Grecian states, however, the laws were severe against ebriety. Fittacus of Lesbos ordered, that every crime committed by a drunk man should incur two punishments; the one due to the crime, the other to the intoxication: which, though not according to the principles of strict morality, was, however, no bad political expedient. In France and Italy, and among the better sort of people in England, drunkenness is hardly known; and in Scotland we begin to improve in this respect, as in many others, by the example of our southern neighbours.

\textbf{565.} As habits of intoxication are not soon or easily acquired, being in most constitutions, especially in early years, accompanied with fits of fever and head-ach, young persons may easily guard against them. I have sometimes met with those
who had made it a rule never to drink anything stronger than water, who were respected on that very account; who enjoyed health and strength, and vigour of mind, and gaiety of heart, in an uncommon degree; and were so far from considering themselves as under any painful restraint, that they assured me they had no more inclination to taste wine, or strong drink, than I could have to eat a nauseous medicine. If I could prevail on my young friends (for whose sake I scruple not to digress a little now and then) to imitate the example, I should do much good to their souls and bodies, their fortunes and intellects; and be happily instrumental in preventing a thousand vices and follies, as well as many of those infirmities which beset the old age of him who has given way to intemperance in youth.

566. Persons of delicate, or broken constitutions, may find it necessary to follow the apostle's advice to Timothy, and take a little wine for their stomach's sake: but how much happier and more independent would they have been, if they had never needed such a cordial!—which might possibly have been the case, if in youth they had been uniformly and rigorously temperate. The apostle seems to intimate, that liquors which may produce inebriation, are to be used as medicines only. Let this be kept continually in view; and then we shall make no account of those rants in praise of wine, which we find in Anacreon, and other
drunken poets; who, that their own follies might be the less apparent, wished to make their readers as foolish as themselves. I shall only add, that habits of intoxication, as well as of idleness, are at every age most pernicious; but, if contracted in youth, seldom fail to end in utter profligacy, or early death, or perhaps in both. Older sinners may have a reserve about them, and a caution, that shall perhaps in part prevent, at least for a time, some of the bad effects of their vices. But when the natural fire of youth is inflamed by habitual intemperance, when the imprudence of that period is heightened into frenzy, every principle of honour and modesty may be borne down, and the person become useless, odious, and miserable.

567. There is one wickedness, which may be referred to this class; and which, though it must raise the most lively compassion, or rather the most exquisite sorrow, in consideration of what the unhappy being must have suffered before committing it, and may suffer after, is yet the object, not only of disapprobation, but of horror: and that is suicide. When self-destruction proceeds from insanity which one has not brought on one’s self, it is no more a crime, than a man’s throwing himself from a window in the delirium of a fever; but if it be the effect of intemperance, atheism, gaming, disappointment in any unjustifiable pursuit, or dissatisfaction with the dispensations of Providence, it is, of all enormities, the most un-
natural and atrocious; being, with respect to God, an act of the most presumptuous impiety, precluding, if the death be sudden, repentance, and consequently the hope of pardon; with respect to dependents and friends, most cruel and ungenerous; and, with respect to the perpetrator, cowardly in the extreme. Rebus in adversis facile est contemnire vitam, Fortiter ille facit qui miser esse potest. It is indeed so shocking to nature, that we can hardly conceive it possible for any person, in his perfect mind, to be guilty of it. And our laws are willing to suppose (for by the laws of most civilized nations it has been prohibited) that in almost all cases it is madness, and cannot take place, till man, by losing his reason, ceases to be an accountable being.

568. It is our duty to embrace every opportunity of improving our nature in all its parts, for in all its parts it is improveable; and every improvement tends to both private and public good, which it is surely every man’s business to promote. As far, therefore, as we are able, we ought to keep our bodies so decent in their appearance, as that they may give no offence; and, by means of temperance and exercise, so healthy, and so active, as that they may be in a condition to obey the mind, and to execute what reason declares to be expedient, and conscience to be incumbent. The faulty extremes to be avoided are, first, a finical attention to dress, complexion, and attitude; and,
secondly, such anxiety about health and the means of it, as may give unnecessary trouble to attendants or associates. A manly spirit loves simplicity, and does not mind trifles; nor seeks to move superfluous pity by unseasonable wailing, or by ostentatious pretences of caution to assume the air of superior sagacity.

569. The cultivation of our *intellectual powers* is a duty still more important. These, in proportion as they are improved, are ornamental to our nature, and qualify us for being serviceable to ourselves, our friends, the community, and mankind. Let us, therefore, be continually solicitous to acquire knowledge, strengthen our memory, rectify our judgment, and refine our taste; by reading good books and those only; by accurately observing what passes in the world around us; by studying the works of nature, and elegant performances in art; by meditating on the real nature of things, and the causes and consequences of human conduct, as they occur in history and common life; by avoiding frivolous pursuits, trifling discourse, and unprofitable theory; and by losing no opportunity of profiting by the conversation and example of wise and good men. To neglect the acquisition of wisdom, when the means of it are in our power, is always followed by a bitter, and generally unavailing, repentance. This is at least the case, where the mind retains any moral sensibility: how it may fare with those whose fa-
cultivities have become torpid with idleness or profligacy, we need not inquire.

570. A third duty of this class, still more important, and indeed the most important of all, is, to use every means of improving our moral nature; that being the business for which we were sent into this world, and on which our happiness, through eternity, will depend. As means of moral improvement, we ought constantly to be, as has been often observed already, attentive to our conduct, not to our actions only, but also to our thoughts, passions, and purposes; to reflect upon them daily, with a fixed resolution to reform what has been amiss; and carefully to avoid temptation and bad company. Of bad company indeed, the fascinations, if we give way to them ever so little, are so powerful, and assault our frail nature from so many quarters at once, that it is hardly possible to escape their influence; our minds must be tainted by them, even though there should be no apparent impurity in our outward behaviour. For, from our proneness to imitation, we come to act, and even think like those with whom we live; especially if we have any affection for them: and bad men have often agreeable qualities, which may make us contract such a liking to them, as shall incline us to be partial even to the exceptionable parts of their character. Then, the fear of giving offence, or of being ridiculed for singularity; the sophistries by which wicked men endeavour to
vindicate their conduct; and the habit of seeing or hearing vice encouraged, or virtue disregarded; all conspire, by lessening our abhorrence of the one, and our reverence for the other, to seduce into criminal practice and licentious principle.

571. Merely because it is his duty, a good man will sometimes do good: he will relieve distress, when, perhaps, his compassion is not very strong; he may be regular in his religious performances when his devotion is not so fervent as it ought to be. Nothing, surely, is more laudable, than to do what we know to be our duty; but if we can, at the same time, call up the correspondent good affection, the devotion, for example, or the compassion, we shall, by so doing, both improve our moral nature, and give double force to the virtuous motive. Yet, let not a man be discouraged, if, on some occasions, the good affection is not so lively as he wishes it to be; let him do the good action notwithstanding, if conscience command it; for whatever is thus done is virtue: and frequent repetitions of the action, from this principle, will in time produce, or strengthen, the good affection which he is anxious to cultivate.

572. In like manner, when we act in compliance with a good affection; when we relieve distress because pity impels us, requite a favour when prompted by gratitude; do good to another from a desire of seeing him happy; still let the performance be enforced by this consideration, that
such is our duty. But even this is not all: to constitute true Christian virtue, good affections, disposing to good actions, and accompanied too with a sense of duty, are not sufficient without the aid of another principle, and that is piety. The love of God ought continually to predominate in the mind, and give to every act of duty grace and animation. Christians do what is right, not only because good affections prompt them to it, and because their conscience declares it to be incumbent; but also because they consider it as agreeable to the will of God, to please whom is ever their supreme desire.

573. From every occurrence in life let us take occasion to practise some virtue, and cherish some good habit. Few occurrences are so uninteresting as to call forth no affection; most of them excite either a good or a bad one. Adversity may make us discontented, or it may teach humility and patience; affliction may dispose either to pious resignation, or to impious repining; prosperity may inflame sensuality and pride, or may supply the means of exercising moderation, beneficence, and gratitude to the giver of all good; injury may provoke hatred and revenge, or call forth the godlike virtues of forbearance and forgiveness; solitude may infuse laziness, or afford leisure for industry; and the bustle of busy life may form habits of cunning or candour, of selfishness or generosity. On these, and all other occasions, let
us shun the criminal, and embrace the virtuous, affection. And let us study our own temper, and so anticipate the events of life, as to be always ready to turn in this manner every occurrence to good account, and make it subservient to the cultivation of our moral nature. To our moral improvement the regulation of the passions and imagination is most essential; but that subject was already before us. Here, therefore, we conclude Ethics, the first part of Moral Philosophy.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.